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COPVRIGHT DEPCStE 



1914 




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1914 



By 
FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT FRENCH of YPRES 

K.P., O.M., Etc. 



WITH A PREFACE BY MARSHAL FOCH 

AND 

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

®be nitierjiibe prtM Cambcibse 
1919 






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COPYRIGHT, I919, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 



ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



M II 1919 



(g,CI. A. '5 25268 



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THIS BOOK 
IS DEDICATED TO 

THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, M.P. 

TO WHOSE PREVISION, ENERGY, AND TENACITY 

THE ARMY AND THE EMPIRE 

OWE SO MUCH 



PREFACE^ 

Le MarSchal French commandait en Chef VArmee Britannique au 
dehut de la Guerre. 

Comme on le salt, les Allemands ont cherche en 1914 a profiler de 
leur swperiorite numSrique et de Vecrasante puissance de leur arme- 
ment, pour mettre hors de cause les Armees AlliSes d' Occident, par une 
manoeuvre enveloppante, aussi rapide que possible. 

Apres avoir cherche en vain la decision a la Marne, puis a I'Aisne 
et a la Somme, Us la poursuivent successivement a Arras, sur VYser 
et a Ypres. 

A mesure que dans cette course a la mer, le terrain disponible se 
restreint devant eux, les coups se precipitent et se rSpetent plus 
violents, les reserves s'engagent, de nouveaux Corps d'Armee entrent 
en ligne nombreux et intacts. La reddition d'Anvers assure d'ailleurs 
a Vennemi d'importantes disponibilites. 

Mais dSja VArmee Beige, apptiySe de troupes frangaises, arrete les 
Allemands sur VYser, de Nieuport a Dixmude. Apres avoir pris part 
aux actions de VAisne, VArmee Britannique a ete transportee dans 
le Nord. C'est ainsi qu'elle s' engage progressivement de la Bassee a 
Ypres, s'opposant partout a Vinvasion. 

Bref, les Allemands, apres avoir vainement diveloppS leurs efforts 
de la Mer a la Lys, des le 15 Octobre, sont dans V obligation, a la fin 
du mois, de vaincre a Ypres, ou bien leur manoeuvre Schoue definitive- 
ment, leur offensive expire en Occident et la Coalition reste debout. 

Ainsi sont-ils amenes, sur ce point d' Ypres, dans une lutte 
acharnSe, a concentrer leurs moyens, une forte artillerie lourde large- 
ment approvisionSe, renforcSe de minenwerfers, de corps d'armee 
nombreux et renouveles. 

Quant aux AlliSs, Us sont rSduits a recevoir le choc avec des effectifs 
restreints, des munitions comptees et rares, unefaible artillerie lourde. 

^ For a translation of this Preface see Appendix. 



viii PREFACE 

Toute releve leur est interdite par la penurie de troupes, quelle que soit 
la duree de la hataille. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple, le premier corps 
hritannique reste engage du 20 Octohre au 15 Novembre — au milieu 
des plus violentes attaques et malgre de formidables pertes. 

Mais a cette derniere date la hataille etait gagnee. Les Allies avaient 
inflige un retentissant echec a Vennemi: ils avaient sauve les com- 
munications de la Manche et par la fixe le sort et Vavenir de la 
Coalition. 

Si r union Stroite du Commandement AlliS et la valeur des troupes 
ont permis ces glorieux resultats, c'est que le Marechal French a 
deploys la plus entiere droiture, la plus complete confiance, la plus 
grande energie: resolu a sefaire passer sur le corps plutot qu'd reculer. 

La Grande-Bretagne avail trouvS en lui un grand soldat. II avail 
maintenu ses troupes a la hauteur de celles de Wellington. 

Avec V emotion d'un souvenir prof and et toujours vivant, je salue le 
vaillant compagnon d'armes des rudes journees et les glorieux dra- 
peaux britanniques de la Bataille d'Ypres. 

F. FOCH 
MarSchal de France 



CONTENTS 

Preface, by Marshal Foch vii 

I. Peeliminaet 1 

II. The British Expeditionary Force 16 

III. The Sailing of the Expeditionary Force ... . .31 

IV. The Retreat from Mons 57 

V. Further Course of the Retreat 83 

VI. The Battle of the Marne 115 

VII. The Battle of the Aisne and its Progress up to 

September SO 144 

VIII. The Siege and Fall of Antwerp 178 

IX. The Last Days of the British Operations on the 

Aisne — The Northern Move 197 

X. The Battle of Ypres — First Phase, October 15 to 

October 26 218 

XI. The Battle of Ypres — Second Phase, October 27 to 

October 31 241 

XII. The Battle of Ypres — Third Phase, November 1 to 

November 10 262 

XIII. The Battle of Ypres — Fourth and Final Phase, No- 

vember 11 TO the End of the Battle .... 282 

XIV. The Entry of the Territorial Army 293 

XV. A Review of the Allied Plans in the West at the 

Close of the First Battle of Ypres .... 307 
XVI. The Operations of December 14-19, 1914 .... 327 

XVII. The Close of the Year 1914 339 

XVIII. Ammunition 355 

Appendix — Translation of Marshal Foch's Preface 371 

Index 373 



1914 



CHAPTER I 

PKELIMINARY 
For years past I had regarded a general war in Europe as an 
eventual certainty. The experience which I gained during 
the seven or eight years spent as a member of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence, and my three years' tenure of the Office 
of Chief of the General StaflF, greatly strengthened this con- 
viction. 

For reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon, I re- 
signed my position as Chief of the StaflF in AprU, 1914, and 
from that time I temporarUy lost touch with the European 
situation as it was officially represented and appreciated. 

I remember spending a week in June of that year in Paris, 
and when passing through Dover on my return, my old 
friend Jimmie Watson (Colonel Watson, late of the Sixtieth 
Rifles, A.D.C. to the Khedive of Egypt) looked into my car- 
riage window and told me of the murder of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand and his consort. I cannot say that I actu- 
ally regarded this tragedy as bemg the prelude which should 
lead ultimately to a great European convulsion, but in my 
own mind, and in view of my past experience, it created a 
feeling of unrest within me and an instinctive foreboding of 
evil. Then came a few weeks of the calm which heralded the 
storm — a calm under cover of which Germany was vigor- 
ously preparing for "the day." 
One afternoon, late in July, I was the guest at lunch of the 



2 PRELIMINARY 

German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowski. It was a small 
party, comprising, to the best of my recollection, only Prin- 
cess Henry of Pless, Lady Cunard, Lord Kitchener, His Ex- 
cellency, and myself. The first idea I got of the storm which 
was brewing came from a short conversation which I had 
with the Ambassador in a corner of the room after lunch. He 
was very unhappy and perturbed, and he plainly told me 
that he feared all Europe would be in a blaze before we were 
a fortnight older. His feeling was prophetic. His surprising 
candour foreshadowed the moral courage with which Prince 
Lichnowski subsequently issued his famous apologia. 

On July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The 
military preparations of the Dual Monarchy inevitably led 
to a partial mobilization by Russia against Austria, where- 
upon the German Emperor proclaimed the " Kriegsgef ahrs- 
zustand" on July 31, following this up by declaring war 
against Russia on August 1. On August 2 German troops en- 
tered Luxemburg and, without declaration of war, violated 
French territory. Great Britain declared war against Ger- 
many on August 4 and against Austria on August 12, France 
having broken off relations with Austria two days earlier. 

On Thursday, July 30, I was sent for by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, and was given private intimation 
that, if an expeditionary force were sent to France, I was to 
command it. On leaving the room I found some well-known 
newspaper correspondents in the passage. I talked a little 
with them and found that great doubt existed in their minds 
as to whether this country would support France by force of 
arms. This doubt was certainly shared by many. 

I remember well that on the morning of Saturday, Au- 
gust 1, the day upon which Germany declared war on Russia, 



COUNCIL OF WAR IN DOWNING STREET 3 

and it was known that the breaking-out of hostilities be- 
tween Germany and France was only a question of hours, I 
received a visit from the Vicomte de la Panouse, the French 
Military Attache in London. He told me that the Ambassa- 
dor was much disheartened in mind by these doubts and 
fears. We talked matters over and he came to dinner with 
me that night. Personally, I felt perfectly sure that so long 
as Mr. Asquith remained Prime Minister, and Lord Hal- 
dane, Sir Edward Grey, and Mr. Winston Churchill contin- 
ued to be members of the Cabinet, their voices would guide 
the destinies of the British Empire, and that we should re- 
main true to our friendly understanding with the Entente 
Powers. As the result of the long conversation I had with the 
Vicomte de la Panouse, I think I was successful in causing 
this conviction to prevail atthe French Embassy. 

England declared war on Germany on Tuesday, August 4, 
and on the 5th the mobilization of Regulars, Special Re- 
serves, and Territorials was ordered. On Wednesday, Au- 
gust 5, a Council of War was held at 10, Downing Street, under 
the Presidency of the Prime Minister. Nearly all the mem- 
bers of the Cabinet were present, whilst Lord Roberts, Lord 
Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, Sir Douglas Haig, the late 
Sir James Grierson, General (now Sir Henry) WUson, and 
myself were directed to attend. To the best of my recollec- 
tion the two main subjects discussed were: — 

1. The composition of the Expeditionary Force. 

2. The point of concentration for the British Forces on 
their arrival in France. 

As regards 1 : — 

It was generally felt that we were under some obligation 
to France to send as strong an army as we could, and there 



4 PRELIMINARY 

was an idea that one cavalry division and six divisions of all 
arms had been promised. As to the exact number, it did not 
appear that we were under any definite obligation, but it was 
unanimously agreed that we should do all we could. The 
question to be decided was how many troops it was necessary 
to keep in this country adequately to guard our shores 
against attempted invasion and, if need be, to maintain in- 
ternal order. 

Mr. Churchill briefly described the actual situation of the 
Navy. He pointed out that the threat of war had come upon 
us at a most opportune moment as regards his own depart- 
ment, because, only two or three weeks before, the Fleet had 
been partially mobilized, and large reserves called up for the 
great naval review by His Majesty at Spithead and the ex- 
tensive naval manoeuvres which followed it. So far as the 
Navy was concerned, he considered Home Defence reason- 
ably secure; but this consideration did not suffice to absolve 
us from the necessity of keeping a certain number of troops 
at home. After this discussion it was decided that two divi- 
sions must for the moment remain behind, and that one cav- 
alry division and four divisions of all arms should be sent out 
as speedily as possible. This meant a force of approximately 
100,000 men. 

As regards 2 : — 

The British and French General Staffs had for some years 
been in close secret consultation with one another on this 
subject. The German menace necessitated some preliminary 
understanding in the event of a sudden attack. The area of 
concentration for the British forces had been fixed on the 
left flank of the French, and the actual detraining stations of 



STAFF OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 5 

the various units were all laid down in terrain lying between 
Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The Headquarters of the Army 
were fixed at the latter place. 

This understanding being purely provisional and condi- 
tional upon an unprovoked attack by Germany, the discus- 
sion then took the turn of overhauling and reviewing these 
decisions, and of making arrangements in view of the actual 
conditions under which war had broken out. Many and vari- 
ous opinions were expressed; but on this day no final deci- 
sions were arrived at. It was thought absolutely necessary to 
ask the French authorities to send over a superior officer who 
should be in full possession of the views and intentions of 
the French General Staff. It was agreed that no satisfactory 
decision could be arrived at untU after full discussion with a 
duly accredited French officer. I think this is the gist of the 
really important points dealt with at the Council. 

During the week the Headquarters of the Expeditionary 
Force were established in London at the Hotel Metropole, 
and the Staff was constituted as follows : — 

Chief of Staff, General Sir Archibald Murray. 
Sub-Chief, Brigadier-General H. H. Wilson. 
Adjutant-General, Major-General NeviUe Macready. 
Quartermaster-General, Major-General Sir William Robertson. 
Director of Intelligence, Brigadier-General Macdonogh. 
C.R.A., Major-General Lindsay. 
C.R.E., Brigadier-General Fowke. 

Military Secretary, Colonel the Honourable W. Lambton. 
Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-General T. P. Woodhouse. 
Principal Veterinary Officer, Brigadier-General J. Moore. 

It was about Thursday the 7th or Friday the 8th of Au- 
gust that Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State 



6 PRELIMINARY 

for War, and on Monday the lOth the Mission sent by the 
French Government arrived. It was headed by Colonel Hu- 
guet, a well-known French artillery officer who had recently 
been for several years French Military Attache in London. 

As before mentioned, one of the most important matters 
remaining for discussion and decision was finally to deter- 
mine whether the original plan as regards the area of con- 
centration for the British forces in France was to be adhered 
to, or whether the actual situation demanded some change 
or modification. There was an exhaustive exchange of views 
between soldiers and Ministers, and many conflicting opin- 
ions were expressed. The soldiers themselves were not 
agreed. Lord Kitchener thought that our position on the left 
of the French line at Maubeuge would be too exposed, and 
rather favoured a concentration farther back in the neigh- 
bourhood of Amiens. Sir Douglas Haig suggested postponing 
any landing till the campaign had actively opened and we 
should be able to judge in which direction our cooperation 
would be most effective. 

Personally, I was opposed to these ideas and most anxious 
to adhere to our original plans. Any alteration in carry- 
ing out our concentration, particularly if this meant delay, 
would have upset the French plan of campaign and created 
much distrust in the minds of our allies. Delay or hanging 
back would not only have looked like hesitation, but might 
easily have entailed disastrous consequences by perma- 
nently separating our already inferior forces. Having regard 
to what we subsequently knew of the German plans and 
preparations, there can be no doubt that any such delayed 
landing might weU have been actively opposed. As will be 
seen hereafter, we were at first hopeful of carrying out a sue- 



MOBILIZATION 7 

cessful offensive, and, had those hopes been justified, any 
change or delay in our original plans would have either 
prevented or entirely paralyzed it. The vital element of 
the problem was speed in mobilization and concentration; 
change of plans meant inevitable and possibly fatal delay. 

Murray, Wilson, Grierson, and Huguet concurred in my 
views, and it was so settled. 

The date of the embarkment of the Headquarters Staff 
was fixed for Friday, August 14. 

During the fateful days which intervened, daily and al- 
most hourly reports reached us as to the progress of mobiliza- 
tion both of our allies and of our enemies. From the first it be- 
came quite evident that the German system of mobilization 
was quicker than the French. There was reason to believe 
that Germany had partly mobilized some classes of her re- 
serves before formal mobilization. The splendid stand made 
by the Belgians in defence of their frontier fortresses is well 
known, and the course of the preliminary operations on the 
Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, as well as those in the 
neighbourhood of Nancy, gave us hope that the wonderful 
army of which we had heard so much was not altogether the 
absolutely inviucible war machine we had been led to expect 
and believe. During this most critical time, my mind was oc- 
cupied day and night with anxious thought. I will try to re- 
call those days of the first half of August, 1914, and crystal- 
lize the result of my meditations. This wUl serve to show the 
doubts, fears, hopes, and aspirations — in short, the mental 
atmosphere in which I awaited the opening of the campaign. 

In the ten years previous to the war, I had constantly en- 
visaged the probable course of events leading up to the out- 
break of this world-war, as weU as the manner of the out- 



8 PRELIMINARY 

break itself. In imagination I had seen the spark suddenly- 
emitted in some obscure corner of Europe, followed by the 
blowrng-up of one huge magazine, such as the declaration 
of war between Russia and Austria would prove to be, then 
the conflagration spreading with lightning speed, and I had 
seemed to have a foretaste amid it all of the anxious hesita- 
tion which would precede our entry into the war. 

I have been a member of the Committee of Imperial De- 
fence since 1906 and have assisted at the innumerable delib- 
erations of that Aulic Council. It was somewhere about 1908 
that the certainty of a war was forced upon my mind. Lord 
Haldane was then Secretary of State for War and I was In- 
spector-General of the Forces. Lord Haldane was himself 
alive to the possibility of war; but, while he hoped to ward it 
off by diplomacy and negotiation, he fully acquiesced in the 
desirability of making every preparation which could be car- 
ried out in complete secrecy. He told me that were he in 
power, if and when the event occurred, he would designate 
me to command the Expeditionary Force, and requested me 
to study the problem carefully and do all I could to be ready. 
It thus fell out that in August, 1914, the many possibilities 
and alternatives of action were quite familiar to my mind. 

It is now within the knowledge of all that the General 
Staffs of Great Britain and France had, for a long time, held 
conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as 
to combined action in certain eventualities existed. 

Belgium, however, remained a "dark horse" up to the 
last, and it is most unfortunate that she could never be per- 
suaded to decide upon her attitude in the event of a general 
war. All we ever had in our mind was defence against attack 
by Germany. We had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, 



CONVERSATION WITH EMPEROR WILLIAM 9 

and all reports pointed to an intention by Germany to vio- 
late that neutrality. What we desired above all things was 
that Belgium should realize the danger which subsequently 
laid her waste. We were anxious that she should assist and 
cooperate in her own defence. The idea of attacking Ger- 
many through Belgium or in any other direction never en- 
tered our heads. 

Pre-war arrangements like these were bound in such cir- 
cmnstances to be very imperfect, though infinitely better 
than none at all. 

It wiU be of interest at this point to narrate a conversation 
I had with the Emperor William in August, 1911. When His 
Majesty visited this country in the spring of that year to un- 
veil the statue of Queen Victoria, he invited me to be his guest 
at the grand cavalry manoeuvres to be held that summer in 
the neighbourhood of Berlia. 

It was an experience I shall never forget, and it impressed 
me enormously with the efficiency and power of the German 
cavalry. It was on about the third day of the manoeuvres 
that the Emperor arrived by train at five in the morning to 
find the troops drawn up on the plain close by to receive 
him. I have never seen a more magnificent military spectacle 
than they presented on that brilliant August morning, num- 
beriug some fifteen thousand horsemen with a large force of 
horse artillery, jager, and machine guns. 

When His Majesty had finished the inspection of the line, 
and the troops had moved to take up their points for ma- 
noeuvre, the Emperor sent for me. He was very pleasant and 
courteous, asked me if I was made comfortable, and if I had 
got a good horse. He then went on to say that he knew all 
our sympathies in Great Britain were with France and 



10 PRELIMINARY 

against Germany. He said he wished me to see everything 
that could be seen, but told me he trusted to my honour to 
reveal nothing if I visited France. 

After the manoeuvres of the day were completed at about 
eleven or twelve o'clock, I was placed next to His Majesty at 
luncheon and we had another conversation. He asked me 
what I thought of what I had seen in the morning, and told 
me that the German cavalry was the most perfect in the 
world; but he added: "It is not only the cavalry; the artil- 
lery, the infantry, all the arms of the service are equally 
efficient. The sword of Germany is sharp; and if you oppose 
Germany you will find how sharp it is." 

Before I left. His Majesty was kind enough to present me 
with his photograph beautifully framed. Pointing to it, he 
remarked, semi-jocularly: "There is your arch-enemy! There 
is your disturber of the peace of Europe!" 

Reverting to my story. Personally, I had always thought 
that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality, and in no 
such half-measure as by a march through the Ardennes, 
which was what our joint plans mainly contemplated. I felt 
convinced that if ever she took this drastic step, she would 
make the utmost use of it to pour over the whole country 
and outflank the Allies. 

The principal source of the terrible anxiety I felt took its 
root in the thought that we were too much mentally com- 
mitted to meet an attack from the east, instead of one which 
was to come as it actually did. It reassured me, however, to 
know that our actual dispositions did not preclude the possi- 
bility of stemming the first outburst of the storm so effec- 
tively as to ward off any imminent danger which might 
threaten Northern France and the Channel ports. 



TRANSFORMATION OF ALL MILITARY IDEAS 11 

To turn from the province of strategy to the sphere of 
tactics, a lifelong experience of military study and thought 
had taught me that the principle of the tactical employment 
of troops must be instinctive. I knew that in putting the sci- 
ence of war into practice, it was necessary that its main ten- 
ets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In 
war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do 
must come like a flash — it must present itself to the mind 
as perfectly obvious. 

No previous experience, no conclusion I had been able to 
draw from campaigns in which I had taken part, or from a 
close study of the new conditions in which the war of to-day 
is waged, had led me to anticipate a war of positions. All my 
thoughts, all my prospective plans, aU my possible alterna- 
tives of action, were concentrated upon a war of movement 
and manoeuvre. I knew perfectly weU that modern up-to- 
date inventions would materially influence and modify our 
previous conceptions as to the employment of the three arms 
respectively; but I had not realized that this process would 
work in so drastic a manner as to render aU our precon- 
ceived ideas of the method of tactical field operations com- 
paratively ineffective and useless. Judged by the course of 
events in the first three weeks of the war, neither French nor 
German generals were prepared for the complete transforma- 
tion of all military ideas which the development of the opera- 
tions inevitably demonstrated to be imperative for waging 
war in present conditions. 

It is easy to be "wise after the event"; but I cannot help 
wondering why none of us realized what the most modern 
rifle, the machine gun, motor traction, the aeroplane, and 
wireless telegraphy would bring about. It seems so simple 



12 PRELIMINARY 

when judged by actual results. The modern rifle and ma- 
chine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defence as 
against the attack. This precludes the use of the old methods 
of attack, and has driven the attack to seek covered en- 
trenchments after every forward rush of at most a few hun- 
dred yards. 

It has thus become a practical operation to place the heav- 
iest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting 
line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor trac- 
tion, but also because the old dread of losing the guns before 
they could be got away no longer exists. The crucial neces- 
sity for the effective employment of heavy artillery is obser- 
vation, and this is provided by the balloon and the aero- 
plane, which, by means of wireless telegraphy, can keep the 
batteries instantly informed of the accuracy of their fire. 

I feel sure in my own mind that had we realized the true 
effect of modern appliances of war in August, 1914, there 
would have been no retreat from Mons, and that if, in Sep- 
tember, the Germans had learnt their lesson, the Allies 
would never have driven them back to the Aisne. It was in 
the fighting on that river that the eyes of all of us began to 
be opened. 

New characteristics of offensive and defensive war began 
vaguely to be appreciated; but it required the successive at- 
tempts of Maunoury, de Castelnau, Foch, and myself to turn 
the German flanks in the north in the old approved style, 
and the practical failure of these attempts, to bring home to 
oiu" minds the true nature of war as it is to-day. 

About the middle of November, 1914, — after three and 
a haK months of war, — we were fairly settled down to the 
war of positions. 



INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT 13 

It was, therefore, in a somewhat troubled frame of mind 
that I began to play my humble part in this tremendous epi- 
sode in the history of the world. The new lessons had to be 
learned in a hard school and through a bitter experience. 
However, for good or for evil, I have always been possessed 
of a sanguine temperament. No one, I felt, had really been 
able to gauge the respective fighting values of the French 
and German armies. I hoped for the best and rather be- 
lieved in it; and in this confident spirit, although anxious 
and watchful, I landed at Boulogne at 5 p.m. on August 14, 
1914. 

It will be a fitting close to this chapter if I add the instruc- 
tions which I received from His Majesty's Government be- 
fore leaving: — 

" Owing to the infringement of the neutrality of Belgium by 
Germany, and in furtherance of the Entente which exists be- 
tween this country and France, His Majesty's Government 
has decided, at the request of the French Government, to 
send an Expeditionary Force to France and to entrust the 
command of the troops to yourseK. 

" The special motive of the Force under your control is to 
support and cooperate with the French Army against our 
common enemies. The peculiar task laid upon you is to assist 
the French Government in preventing or repelling the inva- 
sion by Germany of French and Belgian territory and event- 
ually to restore the neutrality of Belgiimi, on behalf of which, 
as guaranteed by treaty, Belgium has appealed to the French 
and to ourselves. 

" These are the reasons which have induced His Majesty's 
Government to declare war, and these reasons constitute the 
primary objective you have before you. 



14 PRELIMINARY 

" The place of your assembly, according to present arrange- 
ments, is Amiens, and during the assembly of your troops 
you will have every opportunity for discussing with the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army the military posi- 
tion in general and the special part which your force is able 
and adapted to play. It must be recognized from the outset 
that the numerical strength of the British force and its con- 
tingent reenforcement is strictly limited, and with this con- 
sideration kept steadily in view it will be obvious that the 
greatest care must be exercised towards a minimum of losses 
and wastage. 

"Therefore, while every effort must be made to coincide 
most sympathetically with the plans and wishes of our ally, 
the gravest consideration will devolve upon you as to partici- 
pation in forward movements where large bodies of French 
troops are not engaged and where your force may be unduly 
exposed to attack. Should a contingency of this sort be con- 
templated, I look to you to inform me fully and give me time 
to communicate to you any decision to which His Majesty's 
Government may come in the matter. In this connection I 
wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an 
entirely independent one, and that you will in no case come 
in any sense under the orders of any allied general. 

" In minor operations you should be careful that your sub- 
ordinates understand that risk of serious losses should only 
be taken where such risk is authoritatively considered to be 
commensurate with the object in view, 

" The high courage and discipline of your troops should, and 
certainly will, have fair and fuU opportunity of display dur- 
ing the campaign, but officers may well be reminded that in 
this, their first experience of European warfare, a greater 



INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT 15 

measure of caution must be employed than under former 
conditions of hostilities against an untrained adversary. 

"You will kindly keep up constant communication with 
the War Office, and you wiU be good enough to inform me as 
to all movements of the enemy reported to you as well as 
to those of the French Army. 

"I am sure you fully realize that you can rely with the ut- 
most confidence on the whole-hearted and unswerving sup- 
port of the Government, of myself, and of your compatriots, 
in carrying out the high duty which the King has entrusted 
to you and in maintaining the great tradition of His Maj- 
esty's Army. 

(Signed) "KITCHENER 

" Secretary of State" 



CHAPTER II 

THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
I HAVE thought fit to interrupt my narrative here to devote 
some pages to the composition of the original Expeditionary 
Force. The First Expeditionary Force consisted of the First 
Army Corps (First and Second Divisions) under Lieutenant- 
. General Sir Douglas Haig, the Second Army Corps (Third 
and Fifth Divisions) under Lieutenant-General Sir James 
Grierson (who died shortly after landing in France and was 
succeeded by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien), and the 
cavalry division under Major-General E. H. H. AUenby. To 
these must be added the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, 
which, at the opening of our operations in France, was em- 
ployed on our lines of communication. The original Expedi- 
tionary Force was subsequently augmented by the Fourth 
Division, which detrained at Le Cateau on August 25. The 
Fourth Division and the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade were, 
on the arrival of General Pulteney in France, on August 30, 
formed into the Third Army Corps, to which the Sixth 
Division was subsequently added. 

For the purpose of convenient reference, I have included 
in this chapter the composition of the Sixth Division, which 
joined us on the Aisne, and of the Seventh Division and the 
Third Cavalry Division, which came into line with the origi- 
nal Expeditionary Force in Belgium in the opening stages of 
the First Battle of Ypres; as also of the Lahore Division of 
the Indian Corps, which likewise took part in the Battle 
of Ypres. 



THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 17 



THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief: 
Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French. 

Chief of the General Staff: 
Lieutenant-General Sir A. J. Murray. 

Adjutant-General: 
Major-General Sir C. F. N. Macready. 

Quartermaster-General: 
Major-General Sir W. R. Robertson. 



First Army Corps: 
Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig. 



First Division: 

Major-General S. H. Lomax, 

wounded October 31, replaced by Brigadier-General Landon, 

(temp.), then by Brigadier-General Sir D. Henderson. 

First Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General F. I. Maxse, 
succeeded by Brigadier-General FitzClarence, V.C. (killed, 
November 11). Colonel McEwen then took command. Later 
on. Colonel Lowther was appointed to command the Brigade. 

First Battalion Coldstream Guards. 

First Battalion Scots Guards. 

London Scottish (joined Brigade in November), 

First Battahon Royal Highlanders (the Black Watch). 

Second Battalion Royal Munster FusiHers (cut to pieces at 
Etreux, August 29, replaced by First Battahon Cameron High- 
landers). 



18 THE BEITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Second Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General E. S. Bulfin, 
wounded November 1, succeeded by Colonel Cunliffe-Owen 
(temp.). Brigadier-General Westmacott took command No- 
vember 23. 

Second Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment. 
First Battalion North Lanes Regiment. 
First Battalion Northampton Regiment. 
Second Battalion K.R.R. 

Third Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General H. J. S. Landon, 
appointed to command the Division after October 31, Colonel 
LovETT taking command of the Brigade. Brigadier-General 
R. H. K. BuTLEB was appointed to command the Brigade No- 
vember 13. 

First Battalion The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment (cut 

up October 31, replaced by Second Royal Munster FusiHers). 
First Battalion South Wales Borderers. 
First Battalion Gloucester Regiment. 
Second Battalion Welsh Regiment. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"C" Squadron Fifteenth Hussars. 
First Cyclist Company. 

Royal Engineers: 
Twenty-third and Twenty-sixth Field Companies. 
First Signal Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

XXV. Brigade — 113, 114, 115. 
XXVI. Brigade — 116, 117, 118. 
XXIX. Brigade — 46, 51, 54. 
XLIII. Brigade (Howitzer) — 30, 40, 57. 



FIRST ARMY CORPS 19 

Heavy Battery R.G.A. — 26. 
First Divisional Train. 

R.A.M.C. : First, Second, and Third Field Ambulances. 



Second Division: 
Major-General C. C. Monko. 

Fourth {Guards) Brigade: 

Brigadier-General R. Scott-Keeh, 

wounded September 1 and succeeded by Brigadier-General the 

Eakl of Cavan (arrived September 18). 

Second Battalion Grenadier Guards. 

Second Battahon Coldstream Guards. 

Third Battalion Coldstream Guards. 

First Battalion Irish Guards. 

First Herts (T.F.) (joined Brigade about November 10). 

Fifth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General R. C. B. Haking, 

wounded on September 16; succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel 

Westmacott until Haking returned on November 20. 
Second Battahon Worcester Regiment. 
Second Battahon Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. 
Second Battahon Highland Light Infantry. 
Second Battahon Connaught Rangers. (Second Connaughts 
were amalgamated with their First Battahon at the end of No- 
vember and replaced in the Brigade by Ninth Highland Light 
Infantry, Glasgow Highlanders.) 

Sixth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General R. H. Davies, 

invalided in September; succeeded by Brigadier-General 

Fanshawe, September 13. 

First Battalion The King's (Liverpool) Regiment. 

Second Battahon South Staffs Regiment. 



20 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

First Battalion Royal Berks Regiment. 
First Battalion K.R.R. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"B" Squadron Fifteenth Hussars. 
Second Cyclist Company. 

Royal Engineers: 
Fifth and Eleventh Field Companies. 
Second Signal Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

XXIV. Brigade — 25, 50, 70. 
XXXVI. Brigade — 15, 48, 71. 
XLI. Brigade — 9, 16, 17. 
XLIV. Brigade (Howitzer) — 47, 56, 60. 

Heavy Battery R.G.A. — 35, 
Second Divisional Train. 

R.A.M.C.: Fourth and Sixth Field Ambulances. 



Second Army Corps: 

Lieutenant-General Sir James Geierson, 

died Aug. 17; succeeded by General Sir Hora.ce Smith-Dorhien. 



Third Division: 
Major-General Hubert I. W. Hamilton, 
killed October 14; Major-General Mackenzie in command till 
end of October; then Major-General Wing till November 6; 
then Major-General Haldane. 

Seventh Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier -General F. W. N. McCracken. 

Third Battalion Worcester Regiment. 
Second Battahon South Lanes Regiment. 



SECOND ARMY CORPS 21 

First Battalion Wilts Regiment. 
Second Battalion Royal Irish Rifles. 

Eighth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General B. J. C. Doean, 

invalided October 23; Brigadier-General Bowes took over 

command. 

Second Battalion Royal Scots. 

Second Battalion Royal Irish Regiment. (Battahon cut up at Le 
Pilly, October 20; became G.H.Q. troops, replaced by Second 
Suffolks.) 
Fourth Battalion Middlesex Regiment. 

First Battahon Gordon Highlanders. (Employed as G.H.Q. 
troops during September, being replaced by First Devons, but 
rejoined Brigade at beginning of October.) 

Ninth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General F. C. Shaw, 

wounded November 12; succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel 

Douglas Smith, Royal Scots Fusihers. 

First Battahon Northimiberland Fusihers. 
Fourth Battahon Royal Fusiliers. 
First Battahon Lincolnshire Regiment. 
First Battahon Royal Scots Fusihers. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"A" Squadron Fifteenth Hussars. 
Third Cychst Company. 

Royal Engineers: 
Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Field Companies. 
Third Signal Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

XXIII. Brigade — 107, 108, 109. 
XL. Brigade — 6, 23, 49. 



22 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

XLII. Brigade — 29, 41, 45. 

XXX. Brigade (Howitzer) — 128, 129, 130. 
Heavy Battery R.G.A. — 48. 
Third Divisional Train. 

R.A.M.C.: Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Field Ambulances. 



Fifth Division: 

Major-General Sir Charles Feegusson, 

invalided October 22; succeeded by Major-General Moeland. 

Thirteenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General G. J. Cuthbert, 
invahded about the end of September; succeeded by Brigadier- 
General HicKiE, who went sick October 13, Colonel Martyn 
getting command (temp.). 

Second Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. 

Second Battalion (Duke of Wellington's) West Riding Regiment. 

First Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment. 

Second Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. 

Fourteenth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General S. P. Rolt, 

invalided October 29; succeeded by Brigadier-General 

F. S. Maude. 

Second Battalion Suffolk Regiment (replaced by First Devons at 
the beginning of October, and became General Headquarters 
troops). 

First Battalion East Surrey Regiment. 

First Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. 

Second Battalion Manchester Regiment. 

Fifteenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General Count A. E. W. Gleichen. 

First Battalion Norfolk Regiment. 
First Battalion Bedford Regiment. 



SECOND AEMY CORPS 23 

First Battalion Cheshire Regiment. 
First Battalion Dorset Regiment. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"A" Squadron Nineteenth Hussars. 

Royal Engineers: 
Seventeenth and Fifty-ninth Field Companies. 
Fifth Cyclist Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

XV. Brigade — 11, 52, 80. 

XXVII. Brigade — 119, 120, 121. 

XXVrn. Brigade — 122, 123, 124. 

Vm. Brigade (Howitzer) — 37, 61, 65. 

Heavy Battery R.G.A. — 108. 
Fifth Divisional Train. 

R.A.M.C: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Field Ambu- 
lances. 

Nineteenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General L. G. Drummond, 
succeeded early in September by Brigadier-General F. Gordon. 

[Note. This Brigade was formed from units on Lines of Com- 
munication, and was attached successively to the Cavalry Divi- 
sion, Second Corps, and Fourth Division during the retreat from 
Mons and advance to the Aisne. In the Flanders fighting of Octo- 
ber-November, 1914, it worked with the Sixth Division.] 

Second Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 

First Battalion Scottish Rifles. 

First Battalion Middlesex Regiment. 

Second Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. 

Nineteenth Field Ambulance. 



24 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Cavalry Division: 

Major-General E. H. H. Alleney, 

took command of the Cavalry Corps on its formation in October, 

Major-General de Lisle taking command of the First 

Cavalry Division. 



First Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General C. J. Briggs. 

Second Dragoon Guards. 
Fifth Dragoon Guards. 
Eleventh Hussars. 

Second Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General H. de B. de Lisle, 
transferred to command First Cavalry Division in October and 
succeeded by Brigadier-General Mullins. 

Fourth Dragoon Guards. 

Ninth Lancers. 

Eighteenth Hussars (Queen Mary's Own). 

Third Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General Hubert de la Poer Gough. 

Fourth Hussars. 
Fifth Lancers. 
Sixteenth Lancers. 

Fourth Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General Hon. C. E. Bingham. 

Household Cavalry (Composite Regiment). 

Sixth Dragoon Guards. 
Third Hussars. 



CAVALEY DIVISION 25 

Fifth Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General Sir Philip P. W. Chetwode. 

Twelfth Lancers. 

Twentieth Hussars. 

Second Dragoons (Scots Greys). 

Royal Horse Artillery: 

Batteries — "D," "E," "I," "J," "L" ("L" Battery went home 
to refit after Nery (September 1), and was replaced by "H," 
R.H.A., which arrived about the middle of September). 

Royal Engineers: 
First Field Squadron. 
First Signal Squadron. 

{Note. In September the Second Cavalry Division was formed, 
consisting at first of the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades imder 
Major-General Gough, Brigadier-General Vaughan taking com- 
mand of the Third Cavalry Brigade. With these brigades were 
"D" and "E" Batteries, R.H.A. In October the Fourth Cavalry 
Brigade was transferred to the Second Cavalry Division, as was 
also "J" Battery, R.H.A. The Second Cavalry Division had the 
Second Field Squadron, R.E., and Second Signal Squadron.] 

R.A.M.C. : corresponding Cavalry Field Ambulances. 



Royal Flying Corps: 
Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson. 
Aeroplane Squadrons Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5. 



Fourth Division: 
Major-General T. D. O. Snow, 
invalided September; succeeded by Major-General Sir H. Raw- 
LINSON, who was transferred to Fourth Army Corps early in 
October and replaced by Major-General H. F. M. Wilson. 



26 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Tenth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General J. A. L. Haldane, 

appointed to command Third Division, November 6; succeeded 

by Brigadier-General Hull. 

First Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. 
Second Battalion Seaforth Highlanders. 
First Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 

Eleventh Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General A. G. Huntek- Weston. 

First Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
First Battalion East Lanes Regiment. 
First Battalion Hampshire Regiment. 
First Battalion Rifle Brigade. 

Twelfth Infantry Brigade: 

Brigadier-General H. F. M. Wilson, 

in command of the Fourth Division in October and on promotion 

succeeded by Colonel F. G. Anley. 

First Battalion King's Own (Royal Lancaster) Regiment. 
Second Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers. 
Second Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusihers, 
Second Battalion Essex Regiment. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"B" Squadron Nineteenth Hussars. 
Fourth Cyclist Company. 

Royal Engineers: 
Seventh and Ninth Field Companies. 
Fourth Signal Company. 



FOURTH DIVISION 27 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

XIV. Brigade — 39, 68, 88. 
XXIX. Brigade — 125, 126, 127. 
XXXII. Brigade — 27, 134, 135. 
XXXVII. Brigade — 31, 35, 55. 

Heavy Battery, R.G.A. — 31. 

R.A.M.C.: Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Field Ambulances. 



Lines of Communication and Army Troops: 

First Battalion Devonshire Regiment (transferred to Eighth 
Brigade about middle of September, later to Fourteenth Bri- 
gade). 

First Battalion Cameron Highlanders (replaced Second Munsters 
in First Brigade about September 6) . 

[Note. The Twenty-eighth London (Artists' Rifles), Fourteenth 
London (London Scottish), Sixth Welsh, and Fifth Border Regi- 
ment were all in France before the end of the First Battle of Ypres, 
as was also the Honourable Artillery Company. These battahons 
were all at first on Lines of Communication.] 



Sixth Division: 
Major-General J. L. Keir. 

Sixteenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General C. Ingouville- Williams. 

First Battalion East Kent Regiment (The Buffs). 
First Battalion Leicestershire Regiment. 
First Battalion Shropshire Light Infantry. 
Second Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment. 



28 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Seventeenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General W. R. B. Doran. 

First Battalion Royal Fusiliers. 
First Battalion North Staffs Regiment. 
Second Battalion Leinster Regiment. 
Third Battalion Rifle Brigade. 

Eighteenth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General W. N. Congreve, V.C. 

First Battalion West Yorks Regiment. 
Fii-st Battalion East Yorks Regiment. 
Second Battalion Durham Light Infantry. 
Second Battalion Notts and Derby Regiment 
(the Sherwood Foresters). 

Divisional Cavalry: 
"C" Squadron Nineteenth Hussars. 
Sixth Cyclist Company. 

Royal Engineers: 

Twelfth and Thirty-eighth Field Companies. 
Sixth Signal Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.F.A. Batteries — 

II. Brigade — 21, 42, 53. 
XXIV. Brigade — 110, 111, 112. 
XXXVm. Brigade — 24, 34, 72. 

XII. Brigade (Howitzer) — 43, 86, 87. 

Heavy Battery R.G.A. — 24. 
Sixth Divisional Train. 

R.A.M.C. : Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Field Ambu- 
lances. 



SEVENTH DIVISION 29 

Seventh Infantry Division: 
Major-General T. Cappeh. 

Twentieth Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General H. G. Ruggles-Brise. 

First Battalion Grenadier Guards. 
Second Battalion Scots Guards. 
Second Battalion Border Regiment. 
Second Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 

Twenty-first Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General H. E. Watts. 

Second Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment. 
Second Battalion Yorkshire Regiment. 
Second Battalion Royal Scots Fusihers. 
Second Battahon Wiltshire Regiment. 

Twenty-second Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General S. T. B. Lawford. 

Second Battalion The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
Second Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. 
First Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
First Battalion South Staffs Regiment. 

Divisional Cavalry: 
Northumberland Yeomanry (Hussars). 
Seventh CycHst Company. 

Royal Engineers: 
Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Field Companies. 
Seventh Signal Company. 

Royal Artillery: 
R.H.A. Batteries — "F" and "T." 



30 THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

R.F.A. Batteries — 

XXII. Brigade — 104, 105, 106. 
XXV. Brigade — 12, 35, 58. 

Heavy Batteries R.G.A. — 111, 112. 

R.A.M.C.: Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and Twenty-third Field 
Ambulances. 



Third Cavalry Division: 
Major-General The Honourable Julian Btng. 

Sixth Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier- General E. Makins. 

Third Dragoon Guards (joined the Division early in November). 
North Somerset Yeomanry (attached to the Brigade before the 

end of First Battle of Ypres. 
First Dragoons (The Royals). 
Tenth Hussars. 

Seventh Cavalry Brigade: 
Brigadier-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh. 

First Life Guards. 

Second Life Guards. 

Royal Horse Guards (the Blues). 

Royal Horse Artillery: 
Batteries "C" and "K." 

Royal Engineers: 
Third Field Squadron. 

R.A.M.C. : Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Cavah-y Field Ambulances. 



CHAPTER III 

THE SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
I LEFT Charing Cross by special train at 2 p.m. on Friday, 
August 14, and embarked at Dover in His Majesty's cruiser 
Sentinel. Sir Maurice FitzGerald and a few other friends 
were at the station to see me off, and I was accompanied by 
Murray, Wilson, Robertson, Lambton, Wake, Huguet, and 
Brinsley FitzGerald (my private secretary). The day was 
dark, dull and gloomy, and rather chilly for August. Dover 
had ceased to be the cheery seaside resort of peace days, and 
had assumed the appearance of a fortress expecting mo- 
mentary attack. Very few people were about, and the place 
was prepared for immediate action. The fine harbour was 
crowded with destroyers, submarines, and a few cruisers; 
booms barred all the entrances and mines were laid down. 

It was the first time since war had been declared that I 
witnessed the outward and visible signs of the great struggle 
for which we were girding our loins. Not the least evidence of 
this was the appearance of the officers and men of the Senti- 
nel. All showed in their faces that strained, eager, watchful 
look which told of the severe and continual daUy and nightly 
vigU. This was very marked, and much impressed me. 

We sailed a little before 4 and landed at Boulogne about 
5.30 in the evening. I was met by the Governor, the Com- 
mandant, and the port officials, and we had a very hearty 
reception. There were several rest camps at Boulogne, and I 
was able to visit them. Officers and men looked fit and well, 
and were full of enthusiasm and cheer. 



32 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Boulogne was only a secondary port of embarkation, but I 
can vividly recall the scene. Every one knows the curious 
and interesting old town, with its picturesque citadel situ- 
ated on a lofty hill. On all sides were evidences of great activ- 
ity and excitement. Soldiers and sailors, both British and 
French, were everywhere. All were being warmly welcomed 
and cheered by the townspeople. 

The declining August sun lit up sinuous columns of in- 
fantry ascending the high ground to their rest camps on the 
plateau to the sound of military bands. From the heights 
above the town, the quays and wharves, where the landing 
of troops and stores was unceasingly going forward, looked 
like human beehives. Looking out to sea, one coidd distin- 
guish approaching transports here and there between the 
ever wary and watchful scout, destroyer, and submarine, 
which were jealously guarding the route. 

Over all towered the monument to the greatest world- 
soldier — the warrior Emperor who, more than a hundred 
years before, had from that spot contemplated the invasion 
of England. Could he have now revisited "the glimpses of 
the moon," would he not have rejoiced at this friendly in- 
vasion of France by England's "good yeomen," who were 
now oflfering their lives to save France from possible destruc- 
tion as a Power of the first class? It was a wonderful and 
never to be forgotten scene in the setting sun; and as I 
walked round camps and bivouacs, I could not but think of 
the many fine fellows around me who had said good-bye to 
Old England forever. 

We left Boulogne at 7.20 the same evening, and reached 
Amiens at 9. There I was met by General Robert (MUitary 
Governor) and his staflf, the Prefect, and officials. Amiens 



AMIENS AND PAEIS 33 

was the Headquarters of General Robb, the Commander of 
our Line of Commimications, and it was also the first point 
of concentration for our aircraft, which David Henderson 
commanded, with Sykes as his chief assistant. Whilst at 
Amiens I was able to hold important discussions with Robb 
and Henderson as to their respective commands. 

I left Amiens for Paris on the morning of the 15th and we 
reached the Nord Terminus at 12.45 p.m., where I was met 
by the British Ambassador (now Lord Bertie) and the Mili- 
tary Governor of Paris. Large crowds had assembled in the 
streets on the way to the Embassy, and we were received 
with tremendous greetings by the people. Their welcome was 
cordial in the extreme. The day is particularly memorable to 
me, because my previous acquaintance with Lord Bertie 
ripened from that time into an intimate friendship to which 
I attach the greatest value. I trust that, when the real his- 
tory of this war is written, the splendid part played by this 
great Ambassador may be thoroughly understood and ap- 
preciated by his countrymen. Throughout the year and a 
half that I commanded in France, his help and counsel were 
invaluable to me. 

We drove to the Embassy and lunched there. Li the after- 
noon, accompanied by the Ambassador, I visited M. Poin- 
care. The President was attended by M. Viviani, Prime Min- 
ister, and M. Millerand, Minister for War. The situation was 
fully discussed, and I was much impressed by the optimistic 
spirit of the President. I am sure he had formed great hopes 
of a victorious advance by the Allies from the line they had 
taken up, and he discoursed playfully with me on the possi- 
bility of another battle being fought by the British on the 
old field of Waterloo. He said the attitude of the French 



34 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

nation was admirable, and that they were very calm and 
determined. 

After leaving the President I went to the War Office. 
Maps were produced; the whole situation was again dis- 
cussed, and arrangements were made for me to meet General 
Joffre at his Headquarters the next day. 

In the evening I dined quietly with Brinsley FitzGerald at 
the Ritz, and here it was curious to observe how Paris, like 
Dover, had put on a sombre garb of war. The buoyant, op- 
timistic nature of the French people was apparent in the few 
we met; but there was no bombastic, over-confident tone in 
the conversation around us; only a quiet, but grim, determi- 
nation which fully appreciated the tremendous difficulties 
and gigantic issues at stake. The false optimism of "A Ber- 
lin" associated with 1870 was conspicuously absent. In its 
place was a silent determination to fight to the last franc and 
to the last man. 

We left Paris by motor early on the 16th, and arrived at 
Joffre's Headquarters at Vitry-le-Frangois at noon. A few 
minutes before our arrival a captured German flag (the first 
visible trophy of war I had seen) had been brought in, and 
the impression of General Joiire which was left on my mind 
was that he possessed a fund of human understanding and 
sympathy. 

I had heard of the French Commander-in-Chief for years, 
but had never before seen him. He struck me at once as a 
man of strong wUl and determination, very courteous and 
considerate, but firm and steadfast of mind and purpose, and 
not easily turned or persuaded. He appeared to me to be 
capable of exercising a powerful influence over the troops he 
commanded and as likely to enjoy their confidence. 



GENERAL JOFFRE 35 

These were all "first impressions"; but I may say here 
that everything I then thought of General Joffre was far 
more than confirmed throughout the year and a half of fierce 
struggle during which I was associated with him. His stead- 
fastness and determination, his courage and patience, were 
tried to the utmost and never found wanting. History wUl 
rank him as one of the supremely great leaders. The immedi- 
ate task before him was stupendous, and nobly did he arise 
to it. 

I was quite favourably impressed by General Berthelot 
(Joffre's Chief of Staff) and all the Staff officers I met, and 
was much struck by their attitude and bearing. There was a 
complete absence of fuss, and a calm, deliberate confidence 
was manifest everywhere. I had a long conversation with the 
Commander-in-Chief, at which General Berthelot was pres- 
ent. He certainly never gave me the slightest reason to 
suppose that any idea of "retirement" was in his mind. He 
discussed possible alternatives of action depending upon the 
information received of the enemy's plans and dispositions; 
but his main intention was always to attack. 

There were two special points in this conversation which 
recur to my mind. 

As the British Army was posted on the left, or exposed, 
flank, I asked Joffre to place the French cavalry division, 
and two reserve divisions which were echeloned in reserve 
behind, directly under my orders. This the Commander-in- 
Chief found himself unable to concede. 

The second point I recall is the high esteem in which Gen- 
eral Lanrezac, the general commanding the Fifth French 
Army, which was posted on my immediate right, was held by 
Joffre and his Staff. He was represented to me as the best 



36 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

commander in the Frencli Army, on whose complete support 
and skilful cooperation I could thoroughly rely. 

Before leaving, the Commander-in-Chief handed me a 
written memorandum setting forth his views as he had 
stated them to me, accompanied by a short appreciation of 
the situation made by the Chief of the General Staff. 

We motored to Rheims, where we slept that night. 
Throughout this long motor journey we passed through 
great areas of cultivated country. All work, it seemed, had 
ceased; the crops were half out, and stooks of corn were lying 
about everywhere. It was difficult to imagine how the har- 
vest would be saved; but one of my most extraordinary ex- 
periences in France was to watch the farming and agriculture 
going on as if by magic. When, how, or by whom it was done 
has always been an engima to me. There can be no doubt 
that the women and children proved an enormous help to 
their country in these directions. Their share of the victory 
should never be forgotten. It has been distilled from their 
sweat and tears. 

On the morning of the 17th I went to Rethel, which was 
the Headquarters of the general commanding the Fifth 
French Army. Having heard such eulogies of him at French 
General Headquarters, my first impressions of General Lan- 
rezac were probably coloured and modified in his favour; 
but, looking back, I remember that his personality did not 
convey to me the idea of a great leader. He was a big man 
with a loud voice, and his manner did not strike me as being 
very courteous. 

T^Tien he was discussing the situation, his attitude might 
have made a casual observer credit him with practical pow- 
ers of command and determination of character; but, for my 



GENERAL GRIERSON 37 

own part, I seemed to detect, from the first time my eyes 
fell upon him, a certain over-confidence which appeared to 
ignore the necessity for any consideration of alternatives. 
Although we arrived at a mutual understanding which in- 
cluded no idea or thought of "retreat," I left General Lanre- 
zac's Headquarters believing that the Commander-in-Chief 
had over-rated his ability; and I was therefore not surprised 
when he afterwards turned out to be the most complete ex- 
ample, amongst the many this war has afforded, of the Staff 
College "pedant," whose "superior education" had given 
him little idea of how to conduct war. 

On leaving Rethel, I motored to Vervins, where I inter- 
viewed the commanders of the French reserve divisions in 
my immediate neighbourhood, and reached my Headquar- 
ters at Le Cateau late in the afternoon. 

The first news I got was of the sudden death of my dear 
old friend and comrade, Jimmie Grierson (General Sir James 
Grierson, commanding the Second Army Corps). He was 
taken ill quite suddenly in the train on his way to his own 
Corps Headquarters, and died in a few minutes. I had 
known him for many years, but since 1906 had been quite 
closely associated with him, for he had taken a leading part 
in the preparation of the Army for war throughout that 
time. He possessed a wonderful personality, and was justly 
beloved by officers and men alike. He was able to get the 
best work out of them, and they would follow him anywhere. 
He had been British Military Attache in Berlin for some 
years, and had thus acquired an intimate knowledge of the 
German Army. An excellent linguist, he spoke French with 
ease and fluency, and he used to astonish French soldiers by 
his intimate knowledge of the history of their regiments, 



38 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

which was often far in excess of what they knew themselves. 
His military acquirements were brilliant, and in every re- 
spect thoroughly up-to-date. Apart from the real affection I 
always felt for him, I regarded his loss as a great calamity in 
the conduct of the campaign. 

His place was taken by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, al- 
though I asked that Sir Herbert Plumer might be sent out to 
me to succeed Grierson in command of the Second Corps. As 
a matter of fact, the question of Sir James Grierson's succes- 
sor was not referred to me at aU. The appointment was made 
at home. Although I knew Sir Horace to be a soldier who had 
done good service and possessed a fine record, I had asked for 
Sir Herbert Plumer because I felt he was the right man for 
this command. 

Lord Kitchener had asked me to send him a statement of 
the French dispositions west of the Meuse. I sent him this in 
the following letter: — 

"Headquarters, Le Cateau, 

"August 17, 1914 
" My dear Lord K., — 

" With reference to your wire asking for information as to 
the position of French troops west of the line Givet-Dinant- 
Namur-Brussels, I have already replied by wire in general 
terms. I now send fuU details. 

" A corps of cavalry (three divisions less one brigade), sup- 
ported by some infantry, is north of the river Sambre be- 
tween Charleroi and Namur. This is the nearest French 
force to the Belgian Army, and I do not know if and where 
they have established communication with them, nor do the 
French. 

" One French corps, with an added infantry brigade and a 



DISPOSITIONS OF FEENCH TROOPS 39 

cavalry brigade, is guarding the river Meuse from Givet to 
Namur. The bridges are mined and ready to be blown up. 

" In rear of this corps, two more corps are moving — one 
on Philippeville, the other on Beaumont. Each of these two 
corps is composed of three divisions. In rear of them a fourth 
corps assembles to-morrow west of Beaumont. Three reserve 
divisions are already in waiting between Vervins and Hirson. 
Another reserve division is guarding the almost impassable 
country between Givet and Mezieres. 

" Finally, other reserve formations are guarding the fron- 
tier between Maubeuge and LUle. 

"I left Paris on Sunday morning (16th) by motor, and 
reached the Headquarters of General Joffre (French Com- 
mander-in-Chief) at 12. They are at Vitry-le-Frangois. He 
quite realizes the importance and value of adopting a wait- 
ing attitude. In the event of a forward movement by the 
German corps in the Ardennes and Luxemburg, he is anxious 
that I should act in echelon on the left of the Fifth French 
Army, whose present disposition I have stated above. The 
French cavalry corps now north of the Sambre wUl operate 
on my left front and keep touch with the Belgians. 

" I spent the night at Rheims and motored this morning to 
Rethel, the Headquarters of General Lanrezac, commander 
Fifth French Army. I had a long talk with him and arranged 
for cooperation in all alternative circumstances. 

" I then came on to my Headquarters at this place, where 
I found everything proceeding satisfactorily and up to time. I 
was much shocked to hear of Grierson's sudden death near 
Amiens when I arrived here. I had already wired asking you 
to appoint Plumer in his place, when your wire reached me 
and also that of Ian Hamilton, forwarded — as I understand 



40 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

— by you. I very much hope you wiU send me Plumer; 
Hamilton is too senior to command an army corps and is al- 
ready engaged in an important command at home. 

" Please do as I ask you in this matter. I need n't assure 
you there was no 'promise' of any kind. 
"Yours sincerely 

(Signed) "J. D. P. French 

" P.S. I am much impressed by all I have seen of the French 
General Staflf. They are very deliberate, calm, and confident. 
There was a total absence of fuss and confusion, and a 
determination to give only a just and proper value to any 
reported successes. So far there has been no conflict of 
first-rate importance, but there has been enough fighting to 
justify a hope that the French artillery is superior to the 
German." 

It was on Tuesday, August 18, that I was first able to as- 
semble the corps commanders and their staffs. Their reports 
as to the transport of their troops from their mobilizing sta- 
tions to France were highly satisfactory. 

The nation owes a deep debt of gratitude to the Naval 
Transport Service and to all concerned in the embarking and 
disembarking of the Expeditionary Force. Every move was 
carried out exactly to time, and the concentration of the 
British Army on the left of the French was effected in such a 
manner as to enable every unit to obtain the requisite time 
to familiarize troops with active service conditions, before it 
became necessary to make severe demands upon their 
strength and endurance. 

My discussion with the corps commanders was based upon 
the following brief appreciation of the situation on that day: 



THE GENERAL SITUATION 41 

"Between Tirlemont (to the east of Louvain) and Metz, 
the enemy has some thirteen to fifteen army corps and seven 
cavalry divisions. A certain number of reserve troops are said 
to be engaged in the offensive of Liege, the forts of which 
place are believed to be still intact, although some of the 
enemy's troops hold the town. 

"These German corps are in two main groups, seven to 
eight corps and four cavalry divisions being between Tirle- 
mont and Givet. Six to seven corps and three cavalry divi- 
sions are in Belgian Luxemburg. 

"Of the northern group, it is believed that the greater 
part — perhaps five corps — are either north and west of 
the Meuse, or being pushed across by bridges at Huy and 
elsewhere. 

"The general direction of the German advance is by 
Waremme on Tirlemont. Two German cavalry divisions 
which crossed the Meuse some days ago have reached Gem- 
bloux, but have been driven back to Mont Arden by French 
cavalry supported by a mixed Belgian brigade. 

"The German plans are still rather uncertain, but it is 
confidently believed that at least five army corps and two 
or three cavalry divisions will move against the French 
frontiers southwest, on a great line between Brussels and 
Givet. 

"The First French Corps is now at Dinant, one infantry 
and one cavalry brigade opposing the group of German 
corps south of the Meuse. 

"The Tenth and Third Corps are on the line Rethel- 
Thuin, south of the Sambre. The Eighteenth Corps are mov- 
ing up on the left of the Tenth and Third. 

"Six or seven reserve French divisions are entrenched on a 



42 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONAEY FORCE 

line reaching from Dunkirk on the coast, through Cambrai 
and La Capelle, to Hirson. 

"The Belgian Army is entrenched on a line running north- 
east and southwest through Louvain." 

My general instructions were then communicated to corps 
commanders as follows : — 

"When our concentration is complete, it is intended that 
we should operate on the left of the French Fifth Army, the 
Eighteenth Corps being on our right. The French cavalry 
corps of three divisions will be on our left and in touch with 
the Belgians. 

"As a preliminary to this, we shall take up an area north 
of the Sambre, and on Monday the heads of the Allied col- 
umns should be on the line Mons-Givet, with the cavalry on 
the outer flank. 

"Should the German attack develop in the manner ex- 
pected, we shall advance on the general line Mons-Dinant 
to meet it." 

During these first days, whilst our concentration was in 
course of completion, I rode about a great deal amongst the 
troops, which were generally on the move to take up their 
billets or doing practice route marches. I had an excellent 
opportunity of observing the physique and general appear- 
ance of the men. Many of the reservists at first bore traces of 
the civilian life which they had just left, and presented an 
anxious, tired appearance; but it was wonderful to observe 
the almost hourly improvement which took place amongst 
them. I knew that, under the supervision and influence of 
the magnificent body of officers and non-commissioned offi- 



CAVALRY AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE 43 

cers which belonged to the First Expeditionary Force, all the 
reservists, even those who had been for years away from 
the colours, would, before going under fire, regaiu to the full 
the splendid military vigour, determination, and spirit which 
has at all times been so marked a characteristic of British 
soldiers in the field. 

I received a pressing request from the King of the Belgians 
to visit His Majesty at his Headquarters at Louvain; but 
the immediate course of the operations prevented me from 
doing so. 

The opening phases of the Battle of Mons did not com- 
mence until the morning of Saturday, August 22. Up to that 
time, so far as the British forces were concerned, the for- 
warding of offensive operations had complete possession of 
our minds. During the days which intervened, I had frequent 
meetings and discussions with the corps and cavalry com- 
manders. The intelligence reports which constantly arrived, 
and the results of cavalry and aircraft reconnaissances, only 
confirmed the previous appreciation of the situation, and 
left no doubt as to the direction of the German advance; but 
nothing came to hand which led us to foresee the crushing 
superiority of strength which actually confronted us on Sun- 
day, August 23. 

This was our first practical experience in the use of aircraft 
for reconnaissance purposes. It cannot be said that in these 
early days of the fighting the cavalry entirely abandoned that 
role. On the contrary, they furnished me with much useful 
information. 

The number of our aeroplanes was then limited, and their 
powers of observation were not so developed or so accurate 
as they afterwards became. Nevertheless, they kept close 



44 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

touch with the enemy, and their reports proved of the great- 
est value. 

Whilst at this time, as I have said, aircraft did not alto- 
gether replace cavalry as regards the gaining and collection 
of information, yet, by working together as they did, the 
two arms gained much more accurate and volmninous 
knowledge of the situation. It was, indeed, the timely warn- 
ing they gave which chiefly enabled me to make speedy dis- 
positions to avert danger and disaster. 

There can be no doubt indeed that, even then, the pres- 
ence and cooperation of aircraft saved the very frequent use 
of small cavalry patrols and detached supports. This enabled 
the latter arm to save horse-flesh and concentrate their power 
more on actual combat and fighting, and to this is greatly 
due the marked success which attended the operations of 
the cavalry during the Battle of Mons and the subsequent 
retreat. 

At the time I am writing, however, it would appear that 
the duty of collecting information and maintaining touch 
with an enemy in the field will in future fall entirely upon the 
air service, which wUl set the cavalry free for different but 
equally important work. 

I had daily consultations with Sir William Robertson, the 
Quartermaster-General. He expressed himself as well satis- 
fied with the condition of the transport, both horse and me- 
chanical, although he said the civilian drivers were giving a 
little trouble at first. Munitions and supplies were well pro- 
vided for, and there were at least one thousand rounds per 
gun and eight hundred rounds per rifle. We also discussed 
the arrangements for the evacuation of wounded. 



FEENCH CAVALRY IN BELGIUM 45 

The immediate despatcli from home of the Fourth Divi- 
sion was now decided upon and had commenced, and I re- 
ceived sanction to form a Nineteenth Brigade of Infantry 
from the Line of Communication battahons. 

At this time I received some interesting reports as to the 
work of the French cavalry in Belgium. Their morale was 
high and they were very efficient. They were opposed by 
two divisions of German cavalry whose patrols, they said, 
showed great want of dash and initiative, and were not well 
supported. They formed the opinion that the German horse 
did not care about trying conclusions mounted, but endeav- 
oured to draw the French under the fire of artillery and jager 
battalions, the last-named always accompanying a German 
cavalry division. 

At 5.30 A.M. on the 21st I received a visit from General de 
Morionville, Chief of the Staff to His Majesty the King of 
the Belgians, who, with a small staff, was proceeding to 
Joffre's Headquarters. The General showed signs of the 
terrible ordeal through which he and his gallant army had 
passed since the enemy had so grossly violated Belgian terri- 
tory. He confirmed aU the reports we had received concern- 
ing the situation generally, and added that the unsupported 
condition of the Belgian Army rendered their position very 
precarious, and that the King had, therefore, determined to 
effect a retirement on Antwerp, where they would be pre- 
pared to attack the flank of the enemy's columns as they 
advanced. He told me he hoped to arrive at a complete un- 
derstanding with the French Commander-in-Chief. 

On this day, August 21, the Belgians evacuated Brussels 
and were retiring on Antwerp, and I received the following 
message from the Government: — 



46 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

"The Belgian Government desire to assure the British 
and French Governments of the unreserved support of the 
Belgian Army on the left flank of the Allied armies with the 
whole of its troops and all available resources, wherever their 
line of communications with the base at Antwerp, where all 
their ammunition and food supplies are kept, is not in danger 
of being severed by large hostile forces. 

"Within the above-mentioned limits the Allied armies 
may continue to rely on the cooperation of the Belgian troops. 

"Since the commencement of hostilities the Field Army 
has been holding the line Tirlemont-Jodoigne-Hammemille 
-Louvain, where, up to the 18th August, it has been stand- 
ing by, hoping for the active cooperation of the Allied Army. 

"On August 18 it was decided that the Belgian Army, 
consisting of 50,000 infantry rifles, 276 guns, and 4100 cav- 
alry, should retreat on the Dyle. This step was taken owing 
to the fact that the support of the AUies had not yet been 
effective, and, moreover, that the Belgian forces were men- 
aced by three army corps and three cavalry divisions (the 
greater part of the First Army of the Meuse), who threat- 
ened to cut their communications with their base. 

"The rearguard of the First Division of the army having 
been forced to retire after a fierce engagement lasting five or 
six hours on August 18, and the commander of the division 
having stated that his troops were not in a fit state to with- 
stand a long engagement owing to the loss of officers and the 
weariness of the men; and, moreover, as the commander of 
the Third Division of the army, which was so sorely tried at 
Liege, had similarly come to the conclusion, on August 19, 
that the defence of the Dyle was becoming very dangerous, 
more especially in view of the turning movement of the Sec- 



THE BRITISH ARMY POSITIONS 47 

ond Army Corps and Second Cavalry Division, it was defi- 
nitely decided to retreat under the protection of the forts at 
Antwerp. 

"The general idea is now that the Field Army, in part or 
as a whole, should issue from Antwerp as soon as circum- 
stances seem to favour such a movement. 

" In this event, the Army will try to cooperate in its move- 
ments with the Allies as circumstances may dictate." 

Exhaustive reconnaissances and intelligence reports ad- 
mitted of no doubt that the enemy was taking the fullest ad- 
vantage of his violation of Belgian territory, and that he was 
protected to the right of his advance, at least as far west as 
Soignies and Nivelles, whence he was moving direct upon the 
British and Fifth French Armies. 

In further proof that, at this time, no idea of retreat was 
in the minds of the leaders of the Allied armies, I received 
late on Friday, the 21st, General Lanrezac's orders to his 
troops. All his corps were in position south of the Sambre, 
and he was only waiting the development of a move by the 
Third and Fourth French Armies from the line Mezieres- 
Longwy to begin his own advance. 

As regards our own troops, on the evening of the 21st, the 
cavalry, under AUenby, were holding the line of the Conde 
Canal with four brigades. Two brigades of horse artillery 
were in reserve at Harmignies. The Fifth Cavalry Brigade, 
under Chetwode, composed of the Scots Greys, Twelfth 
Lancers, and Twentieth Hussars, were at Binche, in touch 
with the French. 

Reconnoitring squadrons and patrols were pushed out 
towards Soignies and Nivelles. 



48 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

I visited Allenby's Headquarters in the afternoon of the 
21st, and discussed the situation with him. I told him on no 
account to commit the cavalry to any engagement of im- 
portance, but to draw off towards our left flank when pressed 
by the enemy's columns, and there remain in readiness for 
action and reconnoitring well to the left. 

The First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was in 
cantonments to the north of Maubeuge, between that place 
and Givry. The Second Corps, under Sir Horace Smith- 
Dorrien, was to the northwest of Maubeuge, between that 
place and Sars-la-Bruyere. The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade 
was concentrating at Valenciennes. 

Turning to our Ally, the Sixth and Seventh French 
Reserve Divisions were entrenching themselves on a line 
running from Dunkirk, through Cambrai and La Capelle, 
to Hirson. The Fifth French Army was on our right, the 
Eighteenth French Corps being in immediate touch with 
the British Army. Three divisions of French cavalry under 
General Sordet, which had been operating in support of the 
Belgians, were falling back behind the Eighteenth Corps for 
rest and refit. The Third and Fourth French Armies, com- 
prising eight and one-half corps, three cavalry divisions, and 
some reserve divisions, were between Mezieres and Longwy. 
The French troops farther south had taken the offensive 
and marched into Alsace. Liege stUl held out. Namur was 
intact. The Belgians seemed secure behind the fortifications 
of Antwerp. 

Before going further it would be as well to give some ac- 
count of the country in which the two opposing forces faced 
one another on the night of Friday, August 21, the area 
Conde-Cambrai-Le Nouvion-Binche: — 



TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES 49' 

Distances. — Cambrai to Conde 24 miles 

Conde to Binche . . ... 26 miles 

Cambrai to Le Nouvion . ... 26 miles 

Le Nouvion to Binche . . . . 31 miles 

This region forms part of the Belgian Province of Hainault 
and the French Departments of the Nord and the Aisne, ly- 
ing approximately between the upper valleys of the rivers 
Scheldt and Sambre. Its northern boundary is formed by the 
basin of the river Haine. This river, formed from three 
streams which rise in the neighbourhood of Binche, passes 
Mons and flows into the Scheldt at Conde after a course of 
thirty miles. Close to its left bank, from Mons to Conde, a 
canal connects the former place with the Scheldt. Prior to 
the construction of this canal, the Haine was navigable by 
means of locks. Several small parallel streams run into it from 
the south, along sunken valleys in an undulating plateau, 
over which lie scattered the various mines of the Berinage 
coal-field. 

West of Mons the valley of the Haine forms a long, low 
plain, covered with meadows, through which the river me- 
anders in broad bends as far as the Scheldt. Numerous water 
ditches, cut in the peaty soil and marked out by poplars and 
willows, drain the land and render the movement off the 
roads of any troops but infantry quite impracticable. On the 
northern boundary of the vaUey of the Haine, a belt of sand 
gives rise to a tract of rough uncultivated land which is in 
many places covered with woods. On its southern boundary 
the ground rises steeply on the east, and more gently on the 
west, to the Franco-Belgian frontier, over a rocky subsoU 
in which the affluents of the river have cut deep valleys. 



50 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

The Mons-Conde Canal has a length of sixteen and one- 
fourth miles, twelve and one fourth of which are in Belgian 
territory. It has a surface width of sixty-four feet and its 
maximum depth is seven feet. The canal is crossed by eight- 
een bridges, all of which, with the exception of the railway 
bridge east of Saint-Ghislain and the railway bridge at Les 
Herbieres, are swing bridges. A metalled towing-path runs 
along each bank. 

The principal passages across the valley of the Haine are 
at Mons from Brussels, at Saint-Ghislain from Ath, and near 
Pommeroeul from Tournai. 

The Scheldt, rising near Le Catelet at an altitude of three 
hundred and sixty feet above the sea, soon approaches the 
Saint-Quentin Canal and runs alongside it as far as Cam- 
brai, where the river and canal flow in one channel and form 
a navigable connection between the Scheldt and the Somme. 
Below Cambrai, the now canalized river flows on to Valen- 
ciennes, receiving on the way on its left bank the Sensee 
river and canal, and on its right bank the Ereclin, Selle, 
Ecaillon, and Rhonelle streams, which flow down in parallel 
courses from the watershed close to the left bank of the Sam- 
bre. From Valenciennes the Scheldt runs to Conde, where, as 
stated above, it is joined by the Mons-Conde Canal and the 
river Haine. Immediately afterwards it enters Belgian terri- 
tory, where it becomes the great river of the Flemish part of 
the country, just as the Meuse may be said to be the great 
river of the Walloon portion. 

There are fourteen locks between Cambrai and Conde, 
each providing a means of passage over the river. The gen- 
eral breadth of the canalized river is fifty-five feet and its 
maximum depth seven feet. The towing-path follows some- 



TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES 51 

times one bank and sometimes another. The principal points 
of crossing of the Scheldt between Cambrai and Conde are at 
Cambrai, Bouchain, Lourches, Denain, Rouvignies, Thiant, 
Trith, Saint-Legers, Valenciennes, and Conde. 

While the Scheldt as it grows older flows through country 
which is for the most part little above sea level, in its upper 
reaches it cuts through an upland plateau on its way to join 
the Belgian central plains. 

Rising near Fontenelle, nine miles southwest of Avesnes, 
the Sambre flows through Landrecies, where it becomes nav- 
igable, and where it is connected with the Oise by the Sam- 
bre Canal. Flowing past Maubeuge, it enters Belgium below 
Jeumont and traverses thence, in a northeasterly direction, 
one of the most important industrial districts of Belgium. 
The country through which the river flows from its source to 
Charleroi forms a plateau cut up by numerous dales and 
deep valleys. 

Below Landrecies the depth of the river is from six to 
seven feet, while its breadth is fifty feet; it is nowhere forda- 
ble. A towing-path runs in places on the left bank, in places 
on the right bank. Nine locks regulate the depth of the canal 
between Landrecies and Jeumont, and afford a means of 
passage for pedestrians. Communication is amply supplied 
for wheeled traffic by twenty-two road and railway bridges, 
of which the most important are those at Landrecies, 
Berlaimont, Hautmont, Louvroil, Maubeuge, Jeumont, 
Erquelinnes, Merbes-le-Ch&teau, and Lobbes. 

South of Landrecies important road bridges cross the 
Sambre Canal at Catillon and near Oisy. 

The principal tributaries of the Sambre, in the area under 
view, flow into the river from the eastern foothills of the Ar- 



52 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

dennes; the streams which join it on its left bank are few and 
insignificant. On the right bank the Rivierette, the Helpe 
Mineure, the Helpe Majeure, the Tarsy, and the Solre, flow- 
ing in parallel courses in a northwesterly direction, lie in 
deeply cut valleys which broaden out as they reach the main 
stream. The high ground between these streams offers a suc- 
cession of defensive positions against an enemy advancing 
from the north in a southwesterly direction. 

The area under review may be divided into two portions. 
A northern or industrial, with all the inconvenience to mili- 
tary operations characteristic of such a district, and a south- 
ern or agricultural with unlimited freedom of movement and 
view, resembling in many respects the features of Salisbury 
Plain. The dividing line of these two portions may be taken 
as a line running through Valenciennes and Maubeuge. 

With the exception of the thickly populated Berinage coal- 
field, west and south of Mons, the country is open, arable, 
and undidating. Extensive views are obtainable, the villages, 
though numerous, are compact, and movement across coun- 
try is easy. 

A notable feature in the southern portions of the area is 
the Foret de Mormal and in its neighbourhood the Bois 
I'Eveque. 

The Foret de Mormal, which is 22,460 acres in extent, is 
situated on the summit and slopes of the high ground border- 
ing the left bank of the Sambre between Landrecies and 
Boussieres. It is crossed by one first-class road from Le Ques- 
noy to Avesnes, and several second-class roads. 

The forest is also traversed by two railways; that from 
Paris to Maubeuge, which follows its southern boundary 
from Landrecies to Sassegnies, and that from Valenciennes 



STRATEGIC FEATURES 53 

to Hirson, which runs from northwest to southeast and joins 
the former line at Auhioye. On account of its thick under- 
growth, its streams and marshy bottoms, the forest is not 
passable for troops except by the above-mentioned roads. 

Le Bois I'Eveque (1805 acres), situated between Landre- 
cies and Le Cateau, may be considered as an extension of the 
For^t de Mormal, from which it is only about two and one 
half miles distant. It is traversed by the railway line from 
Paris to Maubeuge, by the road from Landrecies to Le Ca- 
teau, and the country road from Fontaine to Ors. 

In conclusion, let us glance at the principal places of stra- 
tegic importance in this region which witnessed the opening 
stages of the retreat from Mons. 

In the beginning of the war, Maubeuge, with twenty thou- 
sand inhabitants, belonged to the second class of French 
fortresses, which possessed a limited armament and which 
were destined to act as "points d'appui" for mobile forces 
acting in their vicinity. The strategic value of Maubeuge is 
due to the fact that the main lines from Paris to Brussels via 
Mons, and to northern Germany via Charleroi and Liege, 
pass through the town, whUe from it runs a line towards the 
eastern frontier via Hirson and Mezieres, with branch lines 
leading to Laon and Chalons. It is also a junction of main 
roads from Valenciennes, Mons, Charleroi, and Laon. 

The fortress has a circumference of about twenty miles. 
The forts, which lie in open country, are mostly small. 
Shortly before the outbreak of the War the defences of Mau- 
beuge had been strengthened to meet the increased effect of 
high explosives, and various redoubts and batteries had been 
constructed in addition to the above-mentioned works. 

Mons, the capital of Hainault, had a pre-war population 



54 SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

of twenty-eight thousand inhabitants, and is situated on a 
sandhill overlooking the TrovUlon. It is the centre of the 
Berinage, the chief coal-mining district of Belgium. Main 
roads from Brussels, Binche, Charleroi, Valenciennes, and 
Maubeuge have their meeting-place here, while the railway 
from Paris to Brussels passes through it. It is also the junc- 
tion point of the canal from Conde and the Canal du Centre, 
which connects the former with the Charleroi Canal and the 
Sambre. 

The town of Binche (twelve thousand inhabitants), lying 
fifteen miles east-southeast of Mons, is a centre of roads from 
Charleroi, Brussels, Mons, Bavai, and Beaumont. Through 
it passes a double line of railway coming from Maubeuge on 
its way to Brussels. 

Conde, a small and old fortified town, owes its military 
value to its position at the confluence of the Scheldt and the 
Haine, and to its canal communications with Mons. A single 
railway line connects it on the north with Tournai and on 
the south with Valenciennes. The main road from Audenarde 
to Valenciennes and Cambrai passes here. 

The strategical importance of Valenciennes, a town of 
thirty-two thousand inhabitants, is due to its being the 
meeting-place of main roads from Cambrai, Lille, Tournai, 
Conde, and Mons. It is also the junction point of the main 
lines from Paris via Cambrai, Hirson, and the north. Its 
position on the canalized Scheldt has been already referred 
to. 

Cambrai (twenty-eight thousand inhabitants), lying on 
the right bank of the Scheldt, which first becomes navigable 
here, is the centre of main roads from Peronne, Bapaume, 
Arras, Douai, Valenciennes, Bavai, and Le Cateau. It is also 



STRATEGIC FEATURES 55 

important as being the junction point of railways from Paris 
to Valenciennes and from Douai to Saint-Quentin. 

Le Cateau, where, as I have already said, I established my 
first General Headquarters in France, is situated on the 
Selle. Before the War its population niunbered ten thousand 
seven hundred and it possessed important woollen mills. It 
is the junction point of main roads connecting Valenciennes 
with Saint-Quentin and Cambrai with Le Nouvion. It also 
stands on the main line from Paris to Maubeuge, while 
single-line railways connect it with Cambrai, Valenciennes, 
and Le Quesnoy. 

Lastly, with regard to communications throughout the 
area, they were good and ample. The principal roads from 
north to south are those from Conde, through Valenciennes, 
to Cambrai, Le Cateau, and Landrecies, and from Mons to 
Binche, to Le Cateau via Bavai, and to Landrecies through 
Maubeuge. Numerous second-class roads afford good lateral 
communications between the above-mentioned roads. 

Such, then, was the region in which, on the night of Fri- 
day, August 21, the British Expeditionary Force found itseK 
awaiting its first great trial of strength with the enemy. That 
night we went to sleep in high hopes. The mobilization, 
transport, and concentration of the British Army had been 
effected without a hitch. The troops had not only been able 
to rest after their journey, but a few days had been available 
for practice marches and for overhauling equipment. The 
condition of the reservists, even those who had been longest 
away from the colours, was excellent and constantly improv- 
ing. 

The highest spirit pervaded all ranks, and the army with 
one accord longed to be at grips with the enemy. The cavalry 



5Q SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

had been pushed well to the front, and such engagements as 
had taken place between detachments of larger or smaller 
patrols had foreshadowed that moral superiority of Brit- 
ish over German which was afterwards so completely estab- 
lished, and proved of such enormous value in the retreat, 
the Battles of the Marne and the Aisne, and the opening 
phases of the first Battle of Ypres. The French troops had al- 
ready secured minor successes, and had penetrated into the 
enemy's territory. The AUied commanders were full of hope 
and confidence. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

At 5 A.M. on the 22d I awoke, as I had lain down to sleep, in 
high hopes. No evil foreboding of coming events had visited 
me in dreams; but it was not many hours later that the dis- 
illusionment began. I started by motor in the very early 
hours of a beautiful August morning to visit General Lanre- 
zac at his Headquarters in the neighbourhood of Philippe- 
ville. 

Soon after entering the area of the Fifth French Army, I 
found my motor stopped at successive cross-roads by col- 
umns of infantry and artillery moving south. After several 
such delays on my journey, and before I had gone half the 
distance, I suddenly came up with Captain Spiers of the 
Eleventh Hussars, who was the liaison officer at General 
Lanrezac's Headquarters. 

There is an atmosphere engendered by troops retiring, 
when they expect to be advancing, which is unmistakable to 
any one who has had much experience of war. It matters not 
whether such a movement is the result of a lost battle, an 
unsuccessful engagement, or is in the nature of a " strategic 
manoeuvre to the rear." The fact that, whatever the reason 
may be, it means giving up ground to the enemy, affects the 
spirits of the troops and manifests itself in the discontented, 
apprehensive expression which is seen on the faces of the 
men, and the tired, slovenly, unwilling gait which invaria- 
bly characterizes troops subjected to this ordeal. 

This atmosphere surrounded me for some time before I 



58 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

met Spiers and before he had spoken a word. My optimistic 
visions of the night before had vanished, and what he told 
me did not tend to bring them back. He reported that the 
Guard and Seventh German Corps had since daybreak ad- 
vanced on the Sambre in the neighbourhood of Franiere, 
and had attacked the Tenth French Corps, which was hold- 
ing the river. The advanced troops had driven the Germans 
back; but he added that "offensive action was contrary to 
General Lanrezac's plans," and that this had "annoyed him." 

The Tenth Corps had had to fall back with some loss, and 
were taking up ground known as the "Fosse Position," on 
the south side of the Sambre. Spiers thought that the Tenth 
Corps had been knocked about a good deal. He gave me vari- 
ous items of information gleaned from the Chief of Intelli- 
gence of the French Fifth Army. These reports went to show 
that the German ttirning movement in Belgium was extend- 
ing far towards the west, the right being kept well forward as 
though a powerful envelopment was designed. It was evident 
that the enemy was making some progress in his attempts to 
bridge and cross the Sambre all along the front of the Fifth 
Army. There appeared to be some difficulty in finding Gen- 
eral Lanrezac, and therefore I decided to return at once to 
my Headquarters at Le Cateau. 

I found there that our own intelligence had received in- 
formation which confirmed a good deal of what I had heard 
in the morning. They thought that at least three German 
corps were advancing upon us, the most westerly having 
reached as far as Ath. 

The hopes and anticipations with which I concluded the 
last chapter underwent considerable modification from these 
experiences and events; but the climax of the day's disap- 



THE FIFTH FRENCH ARMY 59 

pointment and disillusionment was not reached till 11 p.m., 
when the head of the French Military Mission at my Head- 
quarters, Colonel Huguet, brought a French Staflf officer to 
me who had come direct from General Lanrezac. This officer 
reported the fighting of which Spiers had already informed 
me, and said that the French Tenth Corps had suffered very 
heavily. When thinking of our estimates of losses in those 
days, it must be remembered that a dearly bought experi- 
ence had not yet opened our minds to the terrible toll which 
modern war exacts. 

The position of the Fifth French Army extended from 
Dinant on the Meuse (just north of Fosse-Charleroi-Thuin 
back to Trelon), about five corps in all. Sordet's cavalry 
corps had reported that probably three German corps were 
advancing on Brussels. 

The German luie facing the Anglo-French Army was 
thought to be "roughly" Soignies-Nivelles-Gembloux, and 
thence circling to the north of the Sambre, round Namiu-. A 
strong column of German infantry was advancing on Char- 
leroi from Fleurus about 3 p.m. on the 21st. There had been 
heavy fighting at Tamines, on the Sambre, in which French 
troops had been worsted. General Lanrezac was anxious to 
know if I would attack the flank of the German columns 
which were pressing him back from the river. 

In view of the most probable situation of the German 
Army, as it was known to both of us, and the palpable inten- 
tion of its commander to effect a great turning movement 
round my left flank, and having regard to the actual num- 
bers of which I was able to dispose, it is very difficult to real- 
ize what was in Lanrezac's mind when he made such a re- 
quest to me. 



60 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

' As the left of the French Fifth Army (reserve division of 
the Eighteenth Corps) was drawn back as far as Trelon, and 
the centre and right of that army were in process of retiring, 
the forward position I now held on the Conde Canal might 
quickly become very precarious. 

I, therefore, informed Lanrezac in reply that such an oper- 
ation as he suggested was quite impracticable for me. I 
agreed to retain my present position for twenty -four hours; 
but after that time I told him it would be necessary for me 
to consider whether the weight against my front and outer 
flank, combined with the retreat of the French Fifth Army, 
would not compel me to go back to the Maubeuge position. 

I should mention that earlier in the day, on my return to 
Headquarters after my talk with Spiers, I had despatched 
the following message to General Lanrezac: — 

"I am waiting for the dispositions arranged for to be car- 
ried out, especially the posting of French cavalry corps on 
my left. I am prepared to fulfil the role allotted to me when 
the Fifth Army advances to the attack. 

"In the meantime, I hold an advanced defensive position 
extending from Conde on the left, through Mons to Erque- 
linnes, where I connect with two reserve divisions south of 
the Sambre. I am now much in advance of the line held by 
the Fifth Army and feel my position to be as forward as cir- 
cumstances will allow, particularly in view of the fact that I 
am not properly prepared for offensive action till to-morrow 
morning, as I have previously informed you. 

"I do not understand from your wire that the Eighteenth 
Corps has yet been engaged, and they stand on my inner 
flank." 



THE SITUATION AUGUST 23 61 

I left my Headquarters at 5 a.m. on Sunday the 23d and 
went to Sars-la-Bruyere (Headquarters of the Second Corps), 
and there I met Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and AUenby. 

The Cavalry had, during the 22d, drawn off towards my 
left flank after heavy pressure by the enemy's advancing 
columns, leaving detachments in front of my right to the east 
of Mons, which was not so severely threatened. These de- 
tachments extended in a southeasterly direction south of 
Bray and Binche, the latter place having been occupied by 
the enemy. They were in touch with the Fifth French Army. 
Patrols and advanced squadrons had engaged similar bodies 
of the enemy and had held their own well. 

The Second Corps occupied the line of the Conde Canal, 
from that place round the salient which the canal makes to 
the north of Mons, and extended thence to the east of 
Obourg, whence that part of the line was drawn back 
towards VUlers Saint-Ghislain. 

The Fifth Division was holding the line from Conde to 
Mariette, whilst the Third Division continued the line 
thence round the salient to the right of the line occupied by 
the Second Corps. 

The First Corps was echeloned on the right and in rear of 
the Second. 

I told the commanders of the doubts which had arisen in 
my mind during the previous twenty-four hours, and im- 
pressed on them the necessity of being prepared for any kind 
of move, either in advance or in retreat. I discussed exhaus- 
tively the situation on our front. 

AUenby's bold and searching reconnaissance had not led 
me to believe that we were threatened by forces against 
which we could not make an effective stand. The Second 



62 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

Corps had not yet been seriously engaged, while the First 
was practically still in reserve. 

AUenby's orders to concentrate towards the left flank 
when pressed by the advance of the enemy's main columns 
had been practically carried into eflfect. I entertained some 
anxiety as to the salient which the canal makes north of 
Mons, and enjoined on Smith-Dorrien particular watchful- 
ness and care with regard to it. 

They all assured me that a quiet night had been passed 
and that their line was firmly taken up and held. 

The air reconnaissance had started at daybreak, and I 
decided to await aircraft reports from Henderson before 
making any decided plan. 

I instructed Sir Archibald Murray, my Chief of Staff, to 
remain for the present at General Smith-Dorrien's Head- 
quarters at Sars-la-Bruyere, and gave him full instructions 
as to arrangements which must be made if a retreat became 
necessary. I then went on to Valenciennes. General Drum- 
mond (commanding the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade) and 
the French commandant at Valenciennes met me at the sta- 
tion. 

I inspected a part of the entrenchments which were under 
construction, and the disposition of the Territorial troops 
(two divisions under General d'Amade) which were detailed 
to hold them and to guard our left flank. The Nineteenth 
Brigade (Second Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, First 
Battalion Scottish Rifles, First Battalion Middlesex Regi- 
ment, and Second Battalion Argyle and Sutherland High- 
landers) was just completing its detrainment, and I placed 
Drummond under the orders of General Allenby command- 
ing the cavalry division. 



RETIREMENT OF THE SECOND CORPS 63 

During this day (August 23) reports continued to reach 
me of heavy pressure on our outposts all along the line, but 
chiefly between Conde and Mons. 

Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, it will be remembered, was now 
in command of the Second Corps, having been sent out from 
England in succession to Sir James Grierson on the latter's 
untimely death. 

After my conference with the corps commanders on the 
morning of the 23d, I left General Smith-Dorrien full of con- 
fidence in regard to his position, but when I returned to my 
Headquarters in the afternoon, reports came to hand that he 
was giving up the salient at Mons because the outpost line at 
Obourg had been penetrated by the enemy, and that he was 
also preparing to give up the whole of the line of the canal 
before nightfall. He said that he anticipated a gap occurring 
in his line between the Third and Fifth Divisions in the 
neighbourhood of Mariette, and he went so far as to make a 
request for help to the First Corps. 

Up to this time there was no decided threat in any 
strength on Conde; Sir Horace, therefore, need not have 
feared an imminent tm-ning movement, and, as regards his 
front, he was nowhere threatened by anything more than 
cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry. 
■ At that time no directions for retreat had been issued from 
Headquarters, although the Chief of the General Staflf had 
been left at Sars-la-Bruyere on purpose to give orders for 
such a movement if it should become necessary. 

The General's anxiety seems to have lessened later in the 
afternoon, for at 5 p.m. a message from the Second Corps said 
that the commander was "well satisfied with the situation." 

The Third Division was now effecting a retirement south 



64 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

of the canal to a line running west through Nouvelles, and 
this movement had the inevitable result of bringing back the 
Fifth Division and handing over the bridges of the canal to 
the German cavalry. 

Every report I was now receiving at Headquarters 
pointed to the early necessity of a retirement of the British 
forces in view of the general strategic situation and I did 
not, therefore, deem it desirable to interfere with the Second 
Corps Commander. 

Reports of German activity on his front continued to be 
received from the G.O.C. Second Corps. At 7.15 p.m. he 
asked for permission to retire on Bavai; at 9.45 he was again 
reassured — a Divisional Headquarters which had retired 
was now "moving forward again"; and at 10.20 p.m. he re- 
ported, "casualties in no way excessive; all quiet now." 

The line which the Second Corps had taken up for the 
night showed an average retirement of three miles south of 
the canal. During the late afternoon the advanced troops of 
the First Corps were engaged, but not seriously threatened; 
they held their ground. 

During the late afternoon and evening very disquieting 
reports had arrived as to the situation on my right. These 
were confirmed later in a telegram from French Headquar- 
ters, which arrived at half-past eleven at night. It clearly 
showed that our present position was strategically unten- 
able; but this conclusion had been forced upon me much 
earlier in the evening when I received a full appreciation of 
the situation as it then appeared at French General Head- 
quarters. General Joffre also told me that his information 
led him to expect that I might be attacked the next day by 
at least three German corps and two cavalry divisions. 



DECISION FOR A GENERAL RETREAT 65 

Appreciating the situation from the point of view which 
all reports now clearly established, my last hope of an offen- 
sive had to be abandoned, and it became necessary to con- 
sider an immediate retreat from our present forward posi- 
tion. 

I selected the new line from Jerlain (southeast of Valen- 
ciennes) eastwards to Maubeuge. This line had already been 
reconnoitred. The corps and divisional staff officers who 
were called into Headquarters to receive orders, especially 
those of the Second Corps, thought our position was much 
more seriously threatened than it really was and, in fact, one 
or two expressed doubts as to the possibility of effecting a 
retirement in the presence of the enemy in our immediate 
front. I did not share these views, and Colonel Vaughan 
(chief of the staff of the cavalry division) was more inclined 
to accept my estimate of the enemy's forces on or near the 
canal than the others were. His opportunities of gauging the 
enemy's strength and dispositions had been greatly en- 
hanced by the fine reconnoitring work done on the previous 
two or three days by the cavalry division. However, I de- 
termined to effect the retreat, and orders were issued accord- 
ingly. 

The First Army Corps was to move up towards Givry and 
to take up a good line to cover the retreat of the Second 
Corps towards Bavai, which was to commence at daybreak. 
Our front and left flank was to be screened and covered by 
the cavalry and the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade. 

At about 1 A.M. on the 24th, Spiers came in from the 
Headquarters of the Fifth French Army and told me that 
they were seriously checked all along the line. The Third 
and Fourth French Armies were retiring, and the Fifth 



66 THE EETREAT FROM MONS 

French Army, after its check on Saturday, was conforming 
to the general movement. 

The information previously referred to as arriving from 
French Headquarters at 11.30 p.m. on the 23d was as fol- 
lows: — 

1. Namur fell this day. 

2. The Fifth French Army had been attacked all along 
their front by the Third German Corps, the Guard, the 
Tenth and Seventh Corps, and was falling back on the line 
Givet-Philippeville-Maubeuge. 

3. Hastiere had been captured by the Germans on the 
23d. 

4. The Meuse was falling rapidly and becoming fordable 
in many places, hence the difficulty of defence. 

At 5.30 A.M. on the 24th I went out to my advanced Head- 
quarters, which had been established at Bavai, a small vil- 
lage which is strategically important from the circiun- 
stance that it is the meeting-place of roads from every point 
of the compass. The orders issued through the night had been 
carried out. The First Corps was on the line Nouvelles-Har- 
mignies-Givry, with Corps Headquarters at Bonnet. They 
were making an excellent stand to cover the retirement of 
the Second Corps, which was being hard-pressed, particularly 
the Fifth Division to the southeast of Conde. In fact at 
10 A.M. General Fergusson, commanding the division, found 
it necessary to call very urgently upon General AUenby for 
help and support. The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade under 
Drummond had, it will be remembered, been placed at the 
disposal of the commander of the cavalry division, who, call- 
ing this brigade up in immediate support of the Fifth Divi- 



WITH THE FIRST CORPS 67 

sion, directed Gough's Third and De Lisle's Second Cavalry- 
Brigades (Third Cavalry Brigade, Fourth Hussars, Fifth 
Lancers, and Sixteenth Lancers; Second Cavalry Brigade, 
Fourth Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, and Eighteenth 
Hussars) to threaten and harass the flanks of the advancing 
German troops, whilst Bingham's Fourth Cavalry Brigade 
remained in observation towards the west. 

The intervention of AUenby and Drummond, and the 
support they rendered, was most effective in taking the se- 
vere pressure of the enemy off the Fifth Division and ena- 
bling it to continue its retreat. About 11.30 a.m. the Second 
Corps Headquarters were retired from Sars-la-Bruyere to 
Hon. 

Soon after arriving at Bavai I visited the Headquarters of 
the First Corps at Bonnet and observed the fighting above 
mentioned. Our troops in this part of the line were very 
active and pushing. The Eighth Brigade under Davies 
(Second Battalion Royal Scots, Second Battalion Royal 
Irish Regiment, Fourth Battalion Middlesex Regiment, and 
First Battalion Gordon Highlanders) was now at Nouvelles, 
on the left; then came the rest of the Second Division, and 
then the First Division under Lomax, on the right. 

I went out from Haig's Headquarters to a high ridge 
whence the ground slopes down towards the north and north- 
east along a gentle declivity stretching almost to the canal, 
which was some distance away. The situation of the First 
Corps was excellent, and the artillery positions were well 
chosen. From where we stood we could observe the effect of 
our fire. It was very accurate, and shrapnel could be seen 
bursting well over the enemy lines and holding his advance 
in complete check, whilst the German fire was by no means 



68 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

so effective. The infantry were defending their position a 
long way down the slope with great determination and tenac- 
ity. The steadfast attitude and skilful retreat of our right 
wing at Mons had much to do with the success of our with- 
drawal, and the short time I spent with the First Corps that 
morning inspired me with great confidence. 

The subsequent retirement of the First Corps was carried 
out successfully and with little loss, Haig's Headquarters 
being established at Riez de I'Erelle at about 1 p.m. 

After visiting some important points in the field over 
which the Second Corps was fighting, I determined to seek 
out General Sordet, commanding the French cavalry corps, 
which was in cantonments somewhere to the east of Mau- 
beuge. I found Sordet's Headquarters at Avesnes. The scene 
in the village was very typical of continental war as it has 
been so often presented to us in pictures of the war of 1870. 

The commander of the French cavalry corps and his staff, 
whom I met in the central square, formed a striking group 
against a very suitable background of gun parks and ammu- 
nition wagons. One looked in vain for the fire-eating "beau 
sabreur" of a Murat. 

The man who had come back from that first desperate 
onslaught in Belgium, and had so grandly supported and 
succoured our hard-pressed Allies in their splendid defence, 
was a very quiet, undemonstrative, spare little figure of at 
least sixty years of age. He appeared hard and fit, and 
showed no sign of the tremendous strain he had already un- 
dergone. On the contrary, he was smart and dapper, and 
looked like the light-weight horseman he is. His clear-cut 
face and small, regular features, denoted descent from the 
old noblesse, and he struck me in his bright tunic as one who 



GENERAL SORDET 69 

might be most fittingly imaged in a piece of old Dresden 
china; but added to all this was the bearing of a cavalry 
commander. His manner was courteous in the extreme; but 
he showed inflexible firmness and determination. 

His staff were of the pattern of French cavalry officers. I 
have seen much of them for years past at manoeuvres, etc., 
and they combine the best qualities of cavalry leaders with 
the utmost camaraderie and good fellowship. 

I interviewed the General at some length, pointing out 
what I had been told by General Joffre and his Chief of Staff, 
namely, that the cavalry corps had been directed to operate 
on my left or outer flank. I informed him that in my opinion 
this was the point where his presence was chiefly required, 
and where his action would be most effective in checking the 
advance of the enemy. I told the General that I should be 
very glad of his help in that locality as soon as possible, be- 
cause in my present forward position, and having regard to 
the continued retirement of the Fifth French Army, I should 
sorely need all the assistance I could get to establish the 
army under my command in their new position. 

General Sordet was very courteous and sympathetic. He 
expressed the utmost desire to help me in every possible way. 
He added that he had received no orders to move to the left 
flank and must, therefore, await these instructions before he 
could march. He further told me that after the arduous time 
he had experienced when supporting the Belgian Army, his 
horses stood in the most urgent need of rest, and that, in any 
case, it would be impossible for him to leave his present posi- 
tion for at least twenty-four hours. He promised, however, 
to do all in his power to help me, and, as my story will pres- 
ently show, he kept his word splendidly. 



70 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

I then went back to Le Cateau to pick up any messages or 
news from Joffre or Lanrezae. Here I was gladdened by the 
sight of the detrainment of the advanced troops of the 
Fourth Division (General Snow). 

After a brief halt at Le Cateau, I started again for my 
advanced Headquarters at Bavai. The experiences of that 
afternoon remain indelibly impressed on my memory. Very 
shortly after leaving Le Cateau I was met by streams of Bel- 
gian refugees, flying from Mons and its neighbourhood. They 
were lying about the fields in all directions, and blocking the 
roads with carts and vans in which they were trying to carry 
oflf as much of their worldly goods as possible. The whole 
country-side showed those concrete evidences of disturbance 
and alarm which brought home to all our minds what this 
retreat meant and all that it might come to mean. 

After much delay from these causes I reached Bavai about 
2.30 P.M., and it was with great difficulty that my motor 
could wind its way through the mass of carts, horses, fugi- 
tives, and military baggage trains which literally covered al- 
most every yard of space in the small town. The temporary 
advanced Headquarters were established in the market 
place, the appearance of which defies description. The Babel 
of voices, the crying of women and children, mingled with 
the roar of the guns and the not far distant crack of rifles 
and machine guns, made a deafening noise, amidst which it 
was most difficult to keep a clear eye and tight grip on the 
rapidly changing course of events. 

In a close room on the upper floor of the Mairie I found 
Murray, my Chief of Staff, working hard, minus belt, coat, 
and collar. The heat was intense. The room was filled with 
staff officers bringing reports or awaiting instructions. Some 



HEADQUARTERS STAFF AT BAVAI 71 

of the Headquarters Staff had not closed their eyes for 
forty-eight hours, and were stretched out on forms or hud- 
dled up in corners, wrapped in that deep slumber which 
only comes to brains which, for the time being, are com- 
pletely worn out. 

If some of the armchair critics who so glibly talk of the 
easy time which staff officers, compared with their regi- 
mental comrades, have in war — if some of them could have 
watched that scene, they would be more chary of forming 
such opinions and spreading such wrong ideas. 

Personally, I have always been far more a regimental than 
a staff officer, and I have every reason to sympathize with 
the former, but when I have witnessed scenes and gone 
through days such as I am now very imperfectly describing, 
and when I know such days to be frequent and long-drawn- 
out occurrences in war, it makes my blood boil to hear and 
to read of the calumnies which are often heaped upon the 
head of the unfortunate "Staff." 

Murray did splendid work that day and set the best of ex- 
amples. On my arrival at Bavai he reported the situation 
fully and clearly to me. The action of the cavalry and the 
Nineteenth Brigade on the left had greatly relieved the 
heavy pressure on the Fifth Division, and the retirement 
was proceeding fairly well. 

Information had, however, reached me of the defeat and 
retreat of the Third French Army, and the continued falling 
back of Lanrezac. I judged also, by the method and direction 
of the attack, that strenuous attempts were being made to 
turn our left flank and press me back on Maubeuge. The 
force opposed to me was growing in size, and I judged it to 
be more than double my numbers. As subsequent informa- 



72 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

tion proved, we were actually opposed by four corps and at 
least two cavalry divisions. 

Early in the afternoon it was clear to me that further defi- 
nite decisions must be taken. We could not stand on the line 
towards which the troops were now retiring. 

The fortress of Maubeuge lay close on my right rear. It 
was well fortified and provisioned. It is impossible for any 
one who has not been situated as I was to realize the terri- 
ble temptation which such a place offers to an army seeking 
shelter against overpowering odds. 

For a short time on this fateful afternoon I debated 
within myself whether or not I should yield to this tempta- 
tion; but I did not hesitate long, because there were two con- 
siderations which forced themselves prominently upon my 
mind. 

In the first place, 1 had an instinctive feeling that this was 
exactly what the enemy was trying to make me do; and in 
the second place, I had the example of Bazaine and Metz in 
1870 present in my mind, and the words of Sir Edward Ham- 
ley's able comment upon the decision of the French Marshal 
came upon me with overwhelming force. Hamley described 
it as "the anxiety of the temporizing mind which prefers 
postponement of a crisis to vigorous enterprise." Of Bazaine 
he says, "In clinging to Metz he acted like one who, when 
the ship is foundering, should lay hold of the anchor." 

I therefore abandoned all such ideas, and issued orders at 
about 3 P.M. directing the retreat some mUes farther back to 
the line Le Cateau-Cambrai. 

The pressure of the enemy on our left flank became greater 
towards night. All reports and reconnaissances indicated a 
determined attempt to outflank us and cut across our line of 



THE RETREAT CONTINUED 73 

retreat, but Allenby's cavalry was splendidly disposed and 
handled. The German columns were kept at bay, and the 
troops bivouacked generally on a line somewhat south of 
that towards which they had been ordered to retreat in the 
morning. There was some confusion in the retirement of the 
Second Corps. The Fifth Division crossed the rear of the 
Third near Bavai, got to the east of them and somewhat on 
the line of the retreat of the First Corps, whose movement 
was thus hampered and delayed. 

I got back to Headquarters at Le Cateau late in the eve- 
ning, where a budget of reports awaited me. The most impor- 
tant news was contained in a telephone message received at 
9.40 P.M. from Major Clive of the Grenadier Guards, who 
was my liaison officer at French Headquarters. This ran as 
follows: — 

"The Fourth Army, fighting against an enemy estimated 
at three corps, has fallen back to the line Virton-Spincourt. 
Three reserve divisions made a counter-attack this afternoon 
from the south against the enemy's left flank. The Third 
Army, fighting in difficult country, has fallen back to better 
ground this side of the Meuse, about Mezieres and Stenai. 
The enemy have been unable to cross the Meuse. The Third 
Army is waiting for sufficient strength to make a counter- 
attack from its right. The First Corps of the Fifth Army 
foimd that the Germans had crossed the Meuse behind 
them south of Dinant; they therefore fell back to the neigh- 
bourhood of Givet and Philippeville." 

Murray followed me to Headquarters about 3 a.m., and 
reported that all orders had been carried out effectually and 



74 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

that the move was proceeding satisfactorily. All the troops 
were very tired and had suffered severely from the heat. Our 
losses in the fighting of the last two days were considerable, 
but not excessive, having regard to the nature of the opera- 
tions. 

In the early hours of the 25th the retreat was continued, 
again covered skilfully by AUenby's cavalry. 

During the night the Fourth Division had nearly com- 
pleted their detrainment, and were taking up the position 
assigned to them towards Cambrai. In the course of the 
morning of the 25th I visited Snow, who commanded this 
division, and went over the ground with him. 

The only action of importance during the day occurred at 
Solesmes, when the rearguard of the Third Division under 
McCraeken was heavily attacked. AUenby, with the Second 
Cavalry Brigade (Fourth Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, 
and Eighteenth Hussars), came to his assistance and enabled 
him to continue his retreat. He did not, however, arrive at 
his appointed destination till late in the evening, and then it 
was with very tired men. 

The reports received up till noon of the 25th showed that 
the French were retiring all along the line, and there was no 
longer any doubt in my mind as to the strength and inten- 
tion of the enemy in our own immediate front. Three corps 
and a cavalry division were concentrating against us, whilst 
a foiu-th corps and another cavalry division were trying to 
turn our western flank. 

I had now to consider the position most carefully and 
again come to a momentous decision. Was I to stand and 
fight on the line to which the army was now retiring (Le 
Cateau-Cambrai) or continue the retreat at daybreak? 



A VITAL PROBLEM 75 

To hold the Le Cateau position in view of the heavy- 
threat on my front and western flank was a decision which 
could only be justified if I were sure of the absolute deter- 
mination of the French commander to hold on all along the 
line with the utmost tenacity; but our allies were already a 
day's march in rear of us, and every report indicated con- 
tinual retreat. At least one army corps and two cavalry 
divisions of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking 
movement on my left, in which they had already made some 
progress, and the only help I could depend upon ui that 
quarter was from two French reserve divisions spread out 
on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily 
and indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they 
would be able to oppose any effective resistance to the ene- 
my's flank movement. 

If this flank attack were successful, my communications 
with Havre would be practically gone. 

There had been neither time nor labour available to make 
the Le Cateau position strong enough to withstand a serious 
onslaught by the superior numbers which were advancing 
against my front, and the British troops, which had been 
almost continuously marching and fighting since Sunday 
morning, stood in much need of rest, which could only be se- 
cured by placing some serious obstacle, such as a river line, 
between my troops and the enemy. 

After long and anxious deliberation, it seemed clear to me 
that every consideration pointed to the necessity of re- 
suming our march in retreat at daybreak on the 26th, and 
orders to that effect were accordingly issued. 

I determined to direct the march on Saint-Quentin and 
Noyon. The troops were to be held so concentrated as to en- 



76 THE EETREAT FROM MONS 

able me to take immediate advantage of any change in the 
situation which might check the retreat and offer favourable 
opportunities for taking the offensive. Failing such develop- 
ments, my idea was to concentrate behind the Somme or the 
Oise. Behind such a barrier I should be able to rest the 
troops, fill up casualties and deficiencies in material, and 
remain ready to act effectively with the Allies in whatever 
direction circumstances might dictate. 

The retreat had been resumed at daybreak, and at 6 p.m. 
all the troops of the Second Corps were on the Le Cateau 
line except McCracken's Brigade, which, as before described, 
had been obliged to stand and fight at Solesmes. The First 
Corps, however, was delayed in starting for several hours, 
and was only able to reach the neighbourhood of Landrecies; 
so that at the conclusion of the day's march a somewhat 
dangerous gap existed between the First and Second Corps, 
which caused me considerable anxiety in the small hours of 
the morning of the 26th. 

When darkness fell on the 25th, the enemy had sent for- 
ward advance troops in motors and lorries through the Foret 
de Mormal in pursuit of the First Corps. This culminated in 
a violent attack on Landrecies, which, however, was splen- 
didly driven off with heavy loss to the enemy, chiefly by the 
Fourth (Guards) Brigade under Brigadier-General Scott-Kerr. 

With reference to this action, the following is an extract 
from a letter which I despatched to Lord Kitchener on 
August 27: — 

"The Fourth Brigade were fighting in the early morning 
in the streets of Landrecies. A German infantry column, 
about the strength of a brigade, emerged from the wood 



THE SECOND CORPS 77 

north of the town and advanced south in the closest order, 
filling up the narrow street. 

"Two or three of our machine guns were brought to bear 
on this magnificent target from the other end of the town. 
The head of the column was checked and stopped, a frightful 
panic ensued, and it is estimated that, in a very few minutes, 
no less than eight hundred to nine hundred dead and 
wounded Germans were lying in the streets." 

Sir Douglas Haig, although his troops were very tired and 
handicapped also by heavy rearguard fighting, still pro- 
ceeded to carry out the instructions he had received, and the 
retirement of the First Corps was continued in excellent 
order and with complete efficiency. 

Things did not go so well with the Second Corps. General 
Allenby, who had been most ably covering the retreat of the 
army with his cavalry, had already materially assisted the 
rearguard of the Third Division to surmount their difficul- 
ties at Solesmes. McCracken's Brigade (Seventh) (Third 
Battalion Worcester Regiment, Second Battalion South 
Lanes Regiment, First Battalion Wilts Regiment, and 
Second Battalion Royal Irish Rifles) did not reach the Le 
Cateau position until 10 or 11 p.m. on the 25th. His men 
were, of course, nearly done up, and he had suffered severe 
losses. 

Colonel Ansell, commanding the Fifth Dragoon Guards, 
one of the finest cavalry leaders in the Army, who fell at the 
head of his regiment a few days later, gave information to 
General AUenby at about 2 a.m. regarding the nature of the 
German advance. This seemed of such great importance that 
the latter at once sought out Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and 



78 THE RETREAT FROMMONS 

warned him that, unless he was prepared to continue his 
march at daybreak, he would most probably be pinned down 
to his position and would be unable to get away. Sir Horace 
asked General AUenby what, in his opinion, were the chances 
he had if he remained and held the position, adding that he 
felt convinced his troops were so exhausted as to preclude 
the possibility of removing them for some hours to come. 
AUenby's reply was that he thought, unless the commander 
of the Second Corps made up his mind to move at daybreak, 
the enemy probably would succeed in surrounding him. 

Nevertheless, Sir Horace determined to fight. As to this 
decision, a commander on the spot, and in close touch with 
his divisions and brigades, is in the best position to judge of 
what his men can do. 

I had, late on the evening of the 25th, before leaving for 
my Headquarters at Saint-Quentin, visited several units of 
the Second Corps in their bivouacs and, though tired indeed, 
they had not struck me as being worn-out troops. 

By the break of day on the 26th the Fifth Division on the 
right had secured several hours' rest. The same may be said 
of the Eighth and Ninth Brigades, which came next in the 
line. The Seventh Brigade had only just arrived at canton- 
ments at 10 P.M. or 11 P.M. on the 25th, after a heavy day's 
march and some severe fighting, but they could in such an 
emergency have marched at dawn. The Fourth Division on 
the left of the Second Corps was comparatively fresh. 

I visited in particular one artillery brigade, some of whose 
guns had been saved from capture on the previous day by 
the cavalry. The brigade commander broke down with emo- 
tion as he recounted to me the glorious bravery displayed 
by Francis GrenfeU and the Ninth Lancers. 



LE CATEAU 79 

This brigade fought magnificently for several hoiirs next 
day on the Le Cateau position. 

All reconnaissance and intelligence reports received up to 
midnight on the 25th concur in saying that Cambrai was 
then stUl in the possession of the French, and that the posi- 
tion there was not yet seriously threatened; further, that 
whilst there were clear signs of the outflanking movement 
in progress, no considerable bodies of the enemy had yet 
crossed the line Valenciennes-Douai, and that, after their 
repulse at Solesmes by McCracken and AUenby, the enemy 
was not in strength south of the line Valenciennes-Mau- 
beuge. 

This estimate of the situation was confirmed by a German 
wireless message, intercepted towards the evening of the 
26th, which stated that the outflanking German corps was 
only at that time " moving towards " Cambrai, and that the 
remaining corps, which were engaged in the frontal attack, 
were only then "moving on" towards Cattenieres, Walin- 
court, and Le Cateau respectively. 

The First Corps had, as we know, experienced a much 
harder day's march on the 25th, and was attacked at Lan- 
drecies and its neighbourhood before it could get any rest at 
all. Sir Douglas correctly appreciated the strength of the 
enemy on his immediate front and gauged the situation, 
namely, the German design to impose on us the idea that he 
was in great strength, and to pin om* troops to the ground 
whilst his flanking movement became effective. 

For this purpose the enemy had hurried forward a large 
force of artillery, composed of guns and howitzers of all cali- 
bres, escorted and protected by four cavalry divisions and a 
limited munber of jager battalions. 



80 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

These troops were pushed forward against the Second 
Corps at Le Cateau as they had been against the First Corps 
at Landreeies, and with a precisely similar purpose. 

The superb gallantry of the troops, and the skUful leading 
by divisional and brigade and battalion commanders, helped 
very materially by the support given by Allenby and, as I 
afterwards learned, by Sordet and d'Amade, saved the Sec- 
ond Corps, which otherwise would assuredly have been 
pinned to their ground and then surrounded. The cavalry 
might have made good their retreat, but three out of five di- 
visions of the British Army with the Seventh Brigade must 
have been lost. 

The enemy, flushed by this primary victory, would have 
pressed in on the flanks of the First Corps, cut off their re- 
treat, and, continuing his combined front and flank attack, 
would have almost certainly pushed the whole Allied Army 
off their line of retreat, and a stupendous repetition of Sedan 
might well have resulted. 

The magnificent fight put up by these glorious troops 
saved disaster; but the actual result was a total loss of at 
least fourteen thousand officers and men, about eighty guns, 
numbers of machine guns, as well as quantities of ammuni- 
tion, war material and baggage, whilst the enemy gained 
time to close up his infantry columns marching down from 
the northeast, at the cost of losses not greater than, if as 
great, as our own, but which were, in view of the immense 
superiority he possessed in numbers and fighting power, in- 
finitely less important to him. 

The effect upon the British Army was to render the sub- 
sequent conduct of the retreat more difficult and arduous. 

Th,e hope of making a stand behind the Somme or the 



LE CATEAU 81 

Oise, or at any other favourable position north of the Marne, 
had now to be abandoned owing to the shattered condition 
of the Army, and the far-reaching effect of our losses at the 
Battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even throughout the 
subsequent Battle of the Marne and during the early opera- 
tions on the Aisne, It was not possible to replace our lost 
guns and machine guns until nearly the end of September. 

In my despatch written in September, 1914, I refer eu- 
logistically to the Battle of Le Cateau. I had been, together 
with my staff, directing the movements of the British Army 
day and night up to the time of the Battle of the Marne — 
in the course of which battle I received an urgent demand 
from the Government that a despatch should be forwarded. 

It was completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before 
there had been time or opportunity to give thorough study 
to the reports immediately preceding and covering the pe- 
riod of that battle, by which alone the full details could be 
disclosed. It was, indeed, impossible, until much later on, to 
appreciate in all its details the actual situation on the morn- 
ing of August 26. 

At the time the despatch was written, indeed, I was en- 
tirely ignorant of the material support which was rendered 
throughout the day by Generals Sordet and d'Amade, and I 
accepted without question the estimate made by the com- 
mander of the Second Corps as to the nature of the threat 
against him and the position of the German forces opposed 
to him. 

It is very difficult for the uninitiated to realize the con- 
centration which the direction of an army carrying out a 
vigorous offensive like that of the Marne demands from the 
brain of the Commander-in-Chief, if he is to make the best 



82 THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

use of the forces under his command. In the surroundings 
and under the conditions of a great battle, the preparation of 
material for and the compilation of any despatch is a mat- 
ter of great difficulty. It is very easy to say: "Why not em- 
ploy others.'*" I have always held that it is only the general 
who conducts an operation of any magnitude who can, or 
should, sum up and describe it. No one else can know what 
was passing in his mind, or how his judgment was directed 
and formed by the swiftly moving procession of events. 
Nor can exact information become available for weeks or 
months, sometimes, indeed, even for years, after the con- 
clusion of a particular series of operations. 

In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from 
Mons, it is alleged that some tacit consent at least was given 
at Headquarters at Saint-Quentin to the decision arrived at 
by the commander of the Second Corps. I owe it to the able 
and devoted officers of my staff to say that there is not a 
semblance of truth in this statement. 



CHAPTER V 

FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 
General Joffre had arranged for a conference at my Head- 
quarters at Saint-Quentin with Lanrezac and myself, to take 
place early on the 26th. 

I had reached Samt-Quentin at about 8 a.m. on the 25th. 
There had been little sleep during the night for any of us. In 
the earlier hours continual reports came in regarding the 
dangerous position of the First Corps. In addition to the un- 
fortunate but. inevitable delay in commencing their march 
in the morning, the troops were fxirther greatly embarrassed 
and worried by the retirement of the French from the Sam- 
bre, and their convergence on our own line of march. 

The enemy's cavalry, supported by guns, jager, and de- 
tachments of infantry carried on motor cars and lorries, 
closely pressed our colimms through the Foret de Mormal. 
The result of this was to make it imperative that the Second 
Division should make a firm stand at Landrecies and Ma- 
roUles before the First Corps could reach the line assigned to 
it in the morning. A gap of some eight miles existed between 
the right of the Second Corps at Le Cateau and the left of 
the First Corps at Landrecies. 

-<, The moment this news reached me I summoned Huguet, 
and through him despatched an urgent request to two 
French reserve divisions (which formed part of the Fifth 
French Army and were nearest to the British) to move up 
and assist Haig. 

They readily responded, and the effect of the diversion 



84 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

enabled Haig to extricate his corps from this most dangerous 
situation, which he did with great skill and judgment, whilst 
inflicting severe loss on the enemy. 

Towards morning it was reported to me that the enemy 
had drawn off, and at dawn the retreat was resumed by the 
whole of the First Corps as ordered. The fighting of the First 
Corps through this night, combined with its skilful and efii- 
cient withdrawal in the morning, was one of the most bril- 
liant episodes of the whole retreat. 

No sooner was my miud made easier by this happy deliv- 
erance of the First Corps when the trouble related in the last 
chapter commenced with the Second Corps. 

It was not until 8 a.m. on the 26th that I knew the left 
wing of the Army was actually committed to the fight. At 
this time I was anxiously awaiting the arrival of Joffre and 
Lanrezac. 

Staff officers were sent to General Smith-Dorrien, carrying 
peremptory orders to break off the action and to continue 
the retreat forthwith. 

Shortly afterwards the French Commander-in-Chief ar- 
rived with his Chief of Staff. He was followed by the com- 
mander of the Fifth French Army, and we proceeded to dis- 
cuss the situation. 

I narrated the events of the previous two days, and 
pointed out the isolated situation in which the British Army 
had been placed by the very sudden change of plan and head- 
long retirement of the Fifth French Army on my right. 

Lanrezac appeared to treat the whole affair as quite nor- 
mal, and merely incidental to the common exigencies of war. 
He offered no explanation, and gave no reason for the very 
unexpected moves he had made. The discussion was appar- 



CONFERENCE WITH JOFFRE 85 

ently distasteful to him, for he remained only a short time at 
my Headquarters, and left before any satisfactory under- 
standing as to further plans and dispositions had been ar- 
rived at. 

Joffre remained with me some considerable time. I gath- 
ered that he was by no means satisfied with the action and 
conduct of his subordinate general. No very definite plans 
were then decided upon, the understanding, as the French 
Commander-in-Chief left, being that the retreat was to be 
continued as slowly and deliberately as possible, until we 
found ourselves in a favourable position to make a firm stand 
and take the offensive. The Commander-in-Chief urged me 
to maintain my position in the line, which I told him I hoped, 
in spite of the heavy losses which we had suffered, to be able 
to do. 

Immediately Joffre left I set out for Sir Horace Smith- 
Dorrien's Headquarters, as I could get no satisfactory report 
from that general. For the first few miles we were able to 
make fair progress, but as we went on, the road got worse 
and worse, and sometimes we were absolutely blocked for 
several minutes together. 

The whole country-side was covered with refugees and 
their belongings, whilst our own transport were endeavour- 
ing to make all the haste they covdd to convey much needed 
food, ammunition, and material to the divisions in front. 

Several messages reached me on the road, and at last I got 
information that Smith-Dorrien had broken off the action 
and that his columns were once more on the march. He was 
only just in time, for subsequent reports reached me during 
this motor journey of considerable Uhlan patrols in the 
neighbourhood, and towards evening Saint-Quentin itseff 



86 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

was tLireatened by hostile cavalry, which, however, did not 
succeed in entering the town. 

On reaching Headquarters I found that more or less de- 
tailed reports had arrived, which showed the shattered condi- 
tion of the troops which had fought at Le Cateau. 

AU idea of making any prolonged stand on the Somme 
south of Saint-Quentin, which had during the day seriously 
entered my mind as a possibility, was definitely abandoned. 

The first necessity was to rally and collect the troops, 
which had become mixed up and scattered by the trying ex- 
periences of the previous days and nights. The great essen- 
tial was to recover order, restore confidence, and infuse fresh 
spirit with a clear aim in view. To enable all this to be 
brought about we had first to look to the cavalry. Orders 
were at once sent to AUenby to make such dispositions as 
would eflFectually cover our rear and western flank. I told 
him he was to enlist the cooperation of the French cavalry 
under Sordet. The corps commanders were ordered to move 
towards the line La Fere-Noyon. 

On the evening of the 26th, Headquarters were moved to 
Noyon, where I arrived late at night to consider the possi- 
bilities of making a stand behind the Oise. 

On the 27th the orders issued for the efiicient conduct of 
the retreat began to take efi^ect, and the cavalry kept the 
enemy well at bay. 

Smith-Dorrien reported himself in the early hours of the 
morning, and later Major Dawnay (Second Life Guards) — 
the recollection of whose splendid and invaluable services 
until he fell at the head of his regiment will forever remain 
with me — brought news of Haig's progress, whilst Shea of 
the Indian cavalry — afterwards a renowned leader of a di- 



JOFFRE'S TRIBUTE TO THE BRITISH ARMY 87 

vision at the front — told me of the valuable role which was 
being so efficiently performed by the cavalry. 

In a telegram, which I commmiicated to the troops, Gen- 
eral Joffre very handsomely acknowledged what he de- 
scribed as the "invaluable" services rendered to the Allied 
cause by the British Army throughout the past few days. It 
was a sincere gratification to the Army to see the generous 
terms in which the French Commander-in-Chief expressed 
his appreciation. 

I spent the early hours of the 27th in personally recon- 
noitring the coimtry bordering the south bank of the Oise, 
in the neighbourhood of Noyon. 

The one idea which now possessed my mind was the pos- 
sibility of making a stand with the object of obtaining the 
necessary time for rest, and to make good equipment and 
bring up reenforcements. 

At first sight it appeared to me that the line of the Oise 
and its tributary canalized waters offered such an opportu- 
nity. The cursory examination of the ground which I was 
able to make on the morning of the 27 th satisfied me that it 
possessed decided capabilities for a defence which was not 
intended to be prolonged, and I thought, also, that the tor- 
tuous course of the river aflforded some alternative features, 
by availing ourselves of which a powerful offensive might 
be commenced at the right time. 

During the day I had another interview with Joffre, which 
took place before I had time to estimate the actual fighting 
capabilities of the Second Corps and the Fourth Division. 

I was not even then fuUy aware of the terrible extent to 
which we had suffered at Le Cateau. That these losses were 
heavy I never doubted, but I had no idea, imtil many hours 



88 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

later, that they were such as must paralyze for several days 
any movement in the direction of taking the offensive. 

My early morning deliberations were very much in accord 
with the view of the French Commander-in-Chief. The pro- 
posal Joffre then communicated to me was that the Allied 
Armies should fall back on a line, roughly, from Rheims on 
the east to Amiens on the west, which would bring the Brit- 
ish forces into the zone of country south of the Oise, whose 
course I had already reconnoitred. We discussed the situa- 
tion thoroughly, and Joffre was most sympathetic and "un- 
derstanding" in reference to our special position. He prom- 
ised that the Fifth French Army should be directed to take 
energetic action to relieve us from undue pressure by the 
enemy, and told me of his projects for the formation of the 
Sixth French Army on our left. 

We parted without coming to any actual decision: for my 
part I could give no promise until I knew exactly what I had 
to rely upon; whilst energetic pursuit by the enemy might 
well prevent Joffre rendering me that support on both flanks 
which the situation imperatively demanded. 

As a matter of fact, no more was heard of this project, and 
the idea of standing on the above-mentioned line was aban- 
doned. 

On the morning of the 28th, General Headquarters moved 
to Compiegne, where we remained till the morning of the 
31st. 

It was during Friday the 28th that I fully realized the 
heavy losses we had incurred. Since Sunday the 23d this had 
reached, in officers and men, the total of upwards of fifteen 
thousand. The deficiency in armament and equipment was 
equally serious. Roughly, some eighty guns and a large proT 



THE CAVALRY'S EFFECTIVE WOEK 89 

portion of our macliine guns, besides innumerable articles of 
necessary equipment and a large quantity of transport, had 
fallen into the enemy's hands. 

It became quite clear to me that no effective stand could 
be made until we were able to improve our condition. 

It was on this day that I received the assurance, the most 
welcome to a commander in retreat, that the cavalry under 
AUenby's skilful direction was eflFectively holding off the 
enemy's pursuit. 

Gough with the Third Cavalry Brigade at Saint-Quentin, 
and Chetwode with the Fifth at Cerizy, vigorously attacked 
the leading troops of the German cavalry at both these 
places, and threw them back in confusion and with heavy 
loss on to their main bodies. 

On our left, d'Amade with the two French reserve divi- 
sions, and Sordet with his corps of cavalry, attacked the 
Germans in and around Peronne. AUenby's Headquarters 
were then at Cressy (northwest of Noyon), and Sordet 
called upon him for support in this enterprise. Before ar- 
rangements could be made for such assistance the French 
were driven back. 

Although this attack failed to drive the Germans north, it 
was most valuable and effective in checking the pursuit, and 
by their vigorous action the troops of d'Amade and Sordet 
showed the stuff of which the embryo Sixth Army was being 
formed: that army which a few days later covered itself with 
imperishable glory on the Marne and Ourcq. 

On our right there stiU appeared little encouragement to 
hope for an early effective stand. The Fifth French Army 
was in full retreat, the reserve divisions, after fighting at 
Urvillers, were retiring on the Oise, whilst the Eighteenth 



90 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

Corps on their right was thrown back from Itancourt to the 
Oise by a violent German attack. 

I spent several hours of the 28th in going the round of the 
troops, as it was possible to intercept various columns on the 
march or at their temporary halts. I was able to get the men 
together on the roadside, to thank them for the splendid 
work they had done, to tell them of the gratitude of the 
French Commander-in-Chief, and the immense value of the 
service they had rendered to the Allied cause. I charged them 
to repeat all this to their comrades, and to spread it through- 
out the units to which they belonged. There was neither time 
nor opportunity for any formal inspection or set parade. The 
enemy was on our heels, and there was little time to spare, 
but it touched me to the quick to realize how, in the face of 
aU the terrible demand made upon their courage, strength, 
and endurance, these glorious British soldiers listened to the 
few words I was able to say to them with the spirit of heroes 
and the confidence of children. It afforded me gratifying evi- 
dence of the wonderful instinctive sympathy which has al- 
ways existed between the British soldier and his officer. These 
men had seen how they had been led, they knew the far 
greater proportionate loss suffered by their officers, they felt 
that they trusted them and were ready to follow them any- 
where. It is this wonderful understanding between "leaders" 
and "led" which has constituted the great strength and 
glory of the British Army throughout all ages. 

In all these roadside talks and confidences never did I hear 
one word of complaint or breath of criticism. The spirit of 
discipline was as palpably shown amongst these scattered 
groups of unkempt, overstrained, tired soldiers as on any 
"King's Birthday" Review ever held on the Horse Guards 



AMONG THE TROOPS 91 

Parade. Their one repeated question was: "When shall we 
turn round and face them again?" And they would add: 
"We can drive them to hell." 

It was distressing, indeed, to look at some battalions, 
which I had seen near Mons only some three or four days 
earlier in all their fresh glory and strength, now brought 
down to a handful of men and two or three officers; but the 
glorious spirit I saw animating the men gave me the keenest 
pleasure, and inspired a confidence which was of the utmost 
help. 

On this day I inspected a large proportion of the transport 
of both army corps, which I found in a much better condition 
than could have been thought possible. 

I did not reach my Headquarters at Compiegne until 
five. I found Huguet waiting for me with a staff officer of the 
Seventh French Army Corps, which was to form part of the 
new Sixth French Army. It was from the talk I had with 
them that I learnt how Joffre was forming the new Sixth 
Army. 

Huguet informed me that a considerable force was being 
railed round from Verdun to Amiens, and that the new army 
would be commanded by General Maunoury. I knew noth- 
ing then of the French Commander-in-Chief's ultimate 
plans, and I doubt if at that moment he had been able to 
formulate any decided line of action. At this particular time 
I think the unprepared condition of Paris loomed largely in 
his mind, and that his original intention with regard to the 
Sixth Army was most probably to make further provision 
for the protection of the capital. 

Joffre had particularly asked me to undertake the air 
reconnaissance on the western flank of the Allied forces. 



92 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

Our intelligence service had been admirably organized, 
and was working most effectively under the able direction of 
Brigadier-General Macdonogh. I cannot speak too highly 
of the skill and ability displayed by this distinguished officer 
throughout the whole time during which we served together. 
His service was invaluable; his ingenuity and resource in ob- 
taining and collecting information, his indefatigable brain, 
and the unfailing versatility and insight with which he sifted 
every statement and circumstance were beyond all praise. 
He trained an excellent staff, who valued his leadership, 
for he had an extraordinary power of getting the most and 
best work out of every one. His information as to the ene- 
my's movements was remarkably accurate, and placed me 
throughout in the best position to interpret the enemy's 
probable intentions. 

During my stay at Compiegne all appreciations of the sit- 
uation pointed to the immediate investment of Paris by the 
right wing of the German Army as being the enemy's first 
objective. 

It is fairly certain that the concentration of an important 
new army on the western flank of the British, to the north of 
Paris, was quite unknown to the Germans, and did not enter 
into their calculations until some days later. 

We had also the best reason for believing that the German 
Higher Command regarded the British forces as shattered 
and almost useless, at any rate so far as any effort which we 
could make for the defence of Paris was concerned. In fact, 
believing the capital to be practically at its mercy, the right 
wing of the German Army was blindly marching into a veri- 
table hornet's nest, in spite of the backward condition of the 
Paris defence. 



FEENCH VICTORY AT GUISE 93 

On the 29tli a very brilliant and successful attack by the 
French Fifth Army at Guise heavily defeated three German 
army corps and threw them back with severe loss. This had 
a great effect in assisting the retreat, for it not only enabled 
the Fifth Army to hold its own for some time on the Oise, be- 
tween Guise and La Fere, but it considerably relieved hostile 
pressure on the British and on the French troops on our left. 

From Roye on the west, Montdidier, Noyon, La Fere, 
Guise, up to Hirson on the east, the heads of the Allied col- 
umns were established, well covered by their advanced cav- 
alry. 

I Throughout this day reports often contradictory and con- 
flicting reached me. It was quite clear that our position 
on the Oise was being dangerously threatened by superior 
forces, and I felt it to be impossible to stand on that line even 
until we could make good some of our heavy losses, and I 
could not hope to get anything up for several days to come. 

With great reluctance I ordered the retreat to be contin- 
ued to the line of the Aisne from Compiegne to Soissons, but 
in view of the knock given to the enemy at Guise by the 
Fifth French Army, and the desire expressed by General 
Joffre that the Allied forces should hold their ground as long 
as possible and only retire when necessary, I directed com- 
manders to carry out their marches with all deliberation, 
and to take advantage of every opportunity to check the 
enemy's advance. 

It now became known to the AUied Command that the 
enemy had detached a considerable force to his eastern 
frontier, where he was being seriously threatened by the 
Russians. Joffre's natural desire to profit by this, coupled 
with his fears for the safety of Paris, made him very anxious 



94 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

to take the offensive at the earliest possible moment. He 
came to see me on the afternoon of the 29th August at Com- 
piegne, and urged these views upon me. I remained firm in 
my absolute conviction that the British forces could not 
effectively fulfil their share in such action for some days, and 
that, so far as we were concerned, a further retreat was inev- 
itable. I assured the French Commander-in-Chief that no 
serious gap should be made in his line by any premature or 
hasty retirement, but I imperatively demanded the neces- 
sary time to refit and obtain reenforcements. 

I strongly represented to Joffre the advantage of drawing 
the German armies on still farther from their base, even 
though we had to move south of the Marne. Indeed, the 
ideas which I afterwards expressed at the British Embassy 
in Paris to M. Millerand, the French Minister of War, in the 
presence of Lord Kitchener, were the same which I had in 
my mind during this interview with Joffre, namely, that our 
stand should be made on some line between the Marne and 
the Seine. 

The French Army was still in full retreat. The Sixth 
French Army on our left was not yet formed, and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief had put no definite plan of attack before 
me, with an assigned role which he desired me to fulfil. All he 
asked me to do was to remain in the line and fill up the gap 
between the Fifth and Sixth Armies. This I had every inten- 
sion of doing. 

I am bound to say that I had to make this decision in the 
face of resistance from some of my subordinate commanders, 
who took a depressed view as to the condition of their 
troops. When I discussed the situation at a meeting of 
British commanders held at Compiegne, Sir Horace Smith- 



A NEW BASE 95 

Dorrien gave it as his opinion that the only course open to 
us was to retire to oiu* base, thoroughly refit, reembark, 
and try to land at some favourable point on the coast-line. 
I refused to listen to what was the equivalent of a coun- 
sel of despair. 

Our communications with Havre being now dangerously 
threatened, it became necessary to effect a change of base 
and establish a fresh line. Saint-Nazaire and Nantes were 
fixed upon, with Le Mans as advanced base. 

The morning of the 30th found our cavalry with two bri- 
gades to the northwest of Compiegne, one to the north and 
one to the northeast. The Fifth, under Chetwode, covered 
the retirement of the First Corps. Our line that night was 
through Nampiel on the west to Coucy-le- Chateau. 

Huguet to-day communicated to me Joffre's new disposi- 
tions. He was retiring the Fifth French Army to the line of 
the Serre, their left on La Fere; their right on the left of the 
Fourth French Army towards Rethel. The Sixth French 
Army was to fall back to the line Compiegne-Clermont. 
Sordet's cavalry corps was to be on the left of the line. 

Joffre sent an urgent request to me to destroy the bridges 
over the Oise between Compiegne and La Fere. 

Huguet once more pressed upon me Joffre's urgent desire 
that I should remain and fill the gap between Compiegne and 
La Fere. In reply I again repeated emphatically what I had 
previously stated, namely, that I could be in no condition to 
stand and fight for several days, and therefore I could not 
consent to fill any portion of a "fighting" line. I was fully 
prepared to continue the retreat slowly and deliberately, re- 
taining my present position between the Fifth and Sixth 
Armies. 



96 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

Now, as before, the view I took of my responsibilities, in 
accordance with my interpretation of the "special instruc- 
tions" given me, guided my deliberations in these difficult 
days. 

I could not forget that the Fifth French Army had com- 
menced to retreat from the Sambre at least twenty-four 
hours before I had been given any official intimation that 
Joffre's offensive plan had been abandoned. I knew that it 
was alone due to the vast superiority of our cavalry over 
that of the enemy, and to the splendid tenacity and the su- 
perior marching and fighting powers of our troops, that we 
had been saved from overwhelming disaster. My duty to my 
country demanded that I should risk no recurrence of such a 
situation, and I determined that our needs and the interests 
of our Empire must be duly weighed and balanced in the 
councils of the Supreme Headquarters Staff. 

I despatched a letter to Lord Kitchener on this day, in 
which the following passage occurs: "I feel very seriously 
the absolute necessity for retaining in my hands complete 
independence of action and power to retire towards my base 
should circumstances render it necessary." 

On this day Pulteney arrived, and the formation of the 
Third Army Corps under his command was commenced 
forthwith. It was composed of the Fourth Division and the 
Nineteenth Brigade, with some mounted troops temporarily 
attached, pending the arrival of the Sixth Division, which 
had now been ordered to France. 

On the morning of the 31st, Headquarters were moved 
to Dammartin. After riding round to see whatever troops I 
could, we reached there early in the afternoon. Huguet was 
waiting for me with more information and messages from 



KITCHENER IN PARIS 97 

Joffre. The demand that we should stand and fight was not 
only urgently repeated, but was actually backed by impera- 
tive messages from the French President, and from Lord 
Kitchener and the British Government, yet at this very mo- 
ment Lanrezac was actually throwing back the left flank of 
the Fifth Army and widening the gap between us. At the 
same time Lord Kitchener was assuring the Home Govern- 
ment that our losses were comparatively small, and that all 
deficiencies had been made good. 

■ I retain the most profound belief that, had I yielded 
to these violent solicitations, the whole AUied Army would 
have been thrown back in disorder over the Marne, and 
Paris would have fallen an easy prey into the hands of the 
Germans. 

It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of the situation 
as it existed. Neither on this day nor for several subsequent 
days did one man, horse, gun, or machine gun reach me to 
make good deficiencies. 

I refused. This brought Lord Kitchener to Paris, where I 
met him on September 1 at the British Embassy. I went 
there with my Chief of Staff at his urgent request, regarding 
him as a representative of His Majesty's Government. 

I deeply resented being called away from my Headquar- 
ters at so critical a time. Two important actions were fought 
by considerable detachments of the army under my com- 
mand during this day, over which there was no one to ex- 
ercise any coordinating control. Either might have easily 
brought on a general engagement. 

The interview had one important result. M. Millerand 
(the War Minister) and M. Viviani (the Prime Minister) 
were present at the conference, and before them all I was 



98 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

able to give a clear exposition of my views as to the future 
conduct of the Allied operations. 

M. Millerand undertook to lay this document before Gen- 
eral Joffre at once. This great statesman and invaluable serv- 
ant of his country occupied the post of War Minister during 
most of the time I was in France. His invariable kindness 
and courtesy, coupled with his skilful and astute apprecia- 
tion of the military situation throughout all its difficult and 
varying periods, will always be gratefully remembered by me. 

The result of my proposals will be the better understood if 
I quote General Joffre's reply to the War Minister, and a 
personal letter which I received from the Commander-in- 
Chief on the same subject: — 

" Grand Quartier General des Armies de I'Est 
"Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914 
"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Ministre de la 
Guerre. 

" J'ai regu les propositions du Marechal French que vous 
avez voulu me communiquer; elles tendent a organiser sur la 
Marne une ligne de defense qui serait tenue par des effectifs 
suflfisamment denses en profondeur et particulierement ren- 
forces derriere le flanc gauche. 

" Les emplacements actuels de la V® Armee ne permettent 
pas de realiser le programme trace par le Marechal French et 
d'assurer a I'Armee Anglaise, en temps voulu, un aide efficace 
sur la droite. 

" Par contre, I'appui de I'Armee du General Maunoury qui 
doit se porter a la defense des fronts Nord-Est de Paris est 
toujours assure a I'Armee Anglaise sur la gauche; celle-ci 
pourrait, dans ces conditions, tenir sur la Marne pendant 



A LETTER FROM JOFFRE 99 

quelque temps, puis se retirer sur la rive gauche de la Seine 
qu'elle tiendrait de Melun a Juvisy; les forces Anglaises 
participeraient ainsi a la defense de la capitale et leur pre- 
sence serait pour les troupes du camp retranche un precieux 
reconfort. 

" Je dois ajouter que des instructions viennent d'etre don- 
nees aux Armees en vue de coordonner leurs mouvements, et 
qu'il pourrait etre desavantageux de modifier ces instruc- 
tions. EUes tendent a placer nos troupes dans un dispositif 
leur permettant de prendre I'offensive dans un delai assez 
rapproche. Le date de leur mouvement en avant sera com- 
munique au Marechal French afin de permettre a I'Armee 
Anglaise de participer a I'oflFensive generale," 

" Grand Quartier GenSral des Armies de I'Est, Etat Major 
"Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914 
"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Marechal French, 

Commandant-en-Chef les Forces Anglaises. 
"Monsieur le Marechal, — 

" J'ai I'honneur de vous adresser mes remerciements pour 
les propositions que vous avez bien voulu soumettre au 
Gouvernement de la Republique, relatives a la cooperation 
de I'Armee Anglaise et qui m'ont ete communiquees. 

"La situation actuelle de la 5^ Armee ne permet pas a cette 
Armee d'assurer a I'Armee Anglaise un appui siiffisamment 
eflBcace sur la droite. 

"En raison des evenements qui se sont passes depuis deux 
heures, je ne crois pas possible actuellement d'envisager une 
manoeuvre d'ensemble sur la Marne avec la totalite de nos 
forces. Mais j'estime que la cooperation de I'Armee An- 
glaise a la defense de Paris est la seule qui puisse donner un 



100 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

resultat avantageux dans les conditions exposees par la let- 
tre ci-jointe que j'adresse a M. le Ministre de la Guerre et 
dont j'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir la copie. 

" Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, I'expression de ma 
haute consideration et mes sentiments de cordiale camara- 
derie." 

I replied as follows: — 

" Mortcerf, September 3, 1914, 12 noon 
"To the Commandant-en-Chef from Field Marshal Sir John 

French, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces. 
" Deab General, — 

■ "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your very 
kind and cordial letter of September 2 (3332). 

"I felt some considerable hesitation in putting forward 
my views as to the general trend of the future operations, 
and I am much indebted to you for the kind and friendly sup- 
port which you have accorded to my expression of opinion. 

" I have now received your 'Instruction No. 4' and your 
'Notes pour les Commandants d'Armee' of September 2, 
and I completely and clearly understand your plans and the 
part you desire me to take in carrying them out. 

" You may rely on my most cordial cooperation in every 
respect. 

" My troops have very much appreciated the kind consider- 
ation you have shown them in sending so many decorations 
for distribution. 

(Signed) "French" 

I touch with some diffidence on less agreeable features of 
this memorable discussion in Paris. 
Lord Kitchener arrived on this occasion in the uniform 



THE CONFEEENCE IN PARIS 101 

of a Field Marshal, and from the outset of his conversation 
assumed the air of a Commander-in-Chief, and announced 
his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops. 

On hearing this, the British Ambassador (Sir Francis, 
now Lord, Bertie) at once emphatically objected, and 
drafted a telegram to the Foreign Secretary stating clearly 
and unmistakably his views, and demanding instructions. 
He gave this despatch to Lord Kitchener to read. The latter 
then asked for my opinion, and I said my views on the sub- 
ject coincided entirely with those of the Ambassador. 

After some discussion, the Secretary of State decided to 
abandon his intention, and the telegram to Sir Edward Grey 
was not sent. In the conversation which followed between us 
all. Lord Kitchener appeared to take grave exception to 
certain views which I expressed as to the expediency of leav- 
ing the direction of the operations in the field in the hands of 
the military chiefs in command in the field. He abruptly 
closed the discussion and requested me to accompany him 
for a private interview in another room. 

When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong 
objection to the tone I assumed. Upon this I told him all 
that was in my mind. I said that the command of the British 
forces in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty's 
Government; that I alone was responsible to them for what- 
ever happened, and that on French soil my authority as re- 
gards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally 
superseded by the same authority which had put that re- 
sponsibility upon me. I further remarked that Lord Kitchen- 
er's presence in France in the character of a soldier could 
have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my posi- 
tion in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. 



102 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

I reminded him of our service in the field together some thir- 
teen years before, and told him that I valued highly his ad- 
vice and assistance, which 1 would gladly accept as such, but 
that I would not tolerate any interference with my executive 
command and authority so long as His Majesty's Govern- 
ment chose to retain me in my present position. I think he 
began to realize my difficulties, and we finally came to an 
amicable understanding. 

Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, 
and I told Lord Kitchener that it was impossible for me to 
absent myseK any longer from my Headquarters, whither I 
at once repaired with all possible speed. 

It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the 
real bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the con- 
fidence of the troops in their commander is shaken in the 
least degree, or if his influence, power, and authority are 
prejudiced by any display of distrust in his ability to con- 
duct operations, however slight the indications of such dis- 
trust may be, the effect reacts instantly throughout the 
whole army. This is more than ever true with troops which, 
as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great 
and severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, 
above all, faith in their leaders. 

Then again there was the effect which might have been 
produced on the French. Ministers and generals were present 
and witnessed Lord Kitchener's apparent assertion of his 
right to exercise the power and authority of a Commander- 
in-Chief in the field. 

Fortunately, the incident terminated in a manner which 
led to no regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realized his 
mistake and left Paris that night. 



A LETTER FROM GALLIENI 103 

I did not reach my Headquarters at Dammartin until 
about seven in the evening of September 1. Two important 
rearguard actions had been fought during the day, one at 
Nery — where Captain Bradbury was killed, whilst "L" 
battery fought heroically against overwhelming odds — and 
the other at Villers-Cotteret. 

The proximity of the enemy, and the close presence of de- 
tachments of hostile cavalry with guns, which had broken 
through our line, required the retirement of my Headquarters 
to Lagny on the Marne. As it was necessary to move with 
precaution, this place was not reached until 1 a.m. on the 2d. 

1 have already reproduced the communications from 
General Joffre under date September 2, in connection with 
the Paris interview on the 1st. Although I did not receive 
these documents until late on the 2d, they indicated the ideas 
which occupied my own mind on that day, namely, the de- 
fence of the Marne with a view to a subsequent offensive. 

On this day I also received a letter from the Governor of 
Paris which, with my reply, run as follows : — 

" Gouvernement Militaire de Paris 
" Le Gouverneur 
"Paris, le 2 septembre 1914 
"Le General Gallieni, Gouverneur Militaire de Paris et Com- 
mandant-en-Chef des Armees de Paris a Monsieur le 
Marechal French, Commandant-en-Chef des Armees 
Anglaises. 
"Monsieur le Marechal, — 

" J'ai appris ce matin, dans la tournee que j'ai faite dans nos 

regions N.E. de Paris, que vous veniez d'arriver a Dammartin. 

"Comme Gouverneur de Paris et Commandant-en-Chef 



104 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

des Armees de Paris, je m'empresse de vous souhaiter le 
bienvenu et de vous dire combien je suis heureux de savoir 
que les braves troupes anglaises qui se sont conduites si 
vaillamment ces derniers jours, se trouvent a la proximite de 
Paris. Vous pouvez compter sur le concours absolu que nous 
devons a nos courageux compagnons d'arme. 

" Personnellement, j'ajouterai que votre nom ne ra'est pas 
inconnu, etant moi-meme un colonial ayant fait de nom- 
breuses campagnes, et notamment m'etant trouve a Mada- 
gascar lorsque vous commandiez I'expedition anglaise contre 
les Boers. Je suis done slir d'avance que je puis fermement 
compter sur I'entiere collaboration d'un clief tel que vous. 

" Vous savez que le General Commandant-en-Chef vient de 
faire placer Paris dans la zone de ses operations. Je vous en- 
voie done les dispositions que je viens de prendre, afin que 
vous soyez bien oriente a ce sujet, pour couvrir les fronts N. 
et E. de Paris qui paraissent les plus exposes et d'autre part, 
pour attirer sur nous les corps qui menacent le flanc gauche 
de notre armee. 

" Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien me tenir au 
courant de vos intentions et des dispositions que vous pren- 
drez. 

" Veuillez agreer. Monsieur le Mareclial, I'assurance de 
ma haute consideration et de mes sentiments profondement 

^^^°^^^^- "Gallieni" 

" Mortcerf 

"September 3, 1914, 12 Jioon 
" Mt dear General, — 

"I have received your very kind letter (with enclosures) 
for which I beg to offer you my most sincere thanks. 



REPLY TO GALLIENI 105 

" A French officer attached to my staff is now going into 
Paris, and will explain the situation of the British forces and 
their intentions fully to you. 

"You may rely upon my most cordial and energetic co- 
operation with the French forces on my right and left. 

"I have duly received Gen. Joffre's 'Instruction No. 4' 
and his 'Notes pour les Commandants d'Armee' of Sep- 
tember 2, and I fully understand the Commander-in-Chief's 
plans and intentions. 

" May I say what a keen pleasure and satisfaction it is to 
me and the Army under my command to be fighting side by 
side with the Grand Army of France! 

"Believe me, my dear General 

" Yours most sincerely 
(Signed) " French, Field Marshal 

^^Commander-in-Chief, British Forces" 

From these documents it will be seen that the safety of the 
capital was the paramount thought in the minds of the 
French generals. 

On September 2, the Fifth French Army on my right and 
the Sixth on my left were retiring on Chateau-Thierry and 
Paris respectively, whilst our own troops reached the line of 
the Marne towards Lagny and Meaux. The Fourth Division 
was, however, delayed by a small rearguard action and 
passed the night south of Dammartin. 

I had spent the greater part of the day in carefully recon- 
noitring the best defensive positions south of the Marne, and 
to these points the British forces were directed to move on 
the following day, destroying the bridges after they had 
passed. 



106 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

By early morning of September 3, General Joffre's letter 
(quoted above) had reached me, by which I judged that, 
whilst generally agreeing in my views, the General did not 
think it advisable to attempt a deliberate defence of the 
Marne. On this, the orders given to the British troops on the 
night of the 2d were modified, and they were directed to con- 
tinue their march to the line Montry-Crecy-Coulommiers. 

Reenforcements of all kinds were ordered up to these 
points and were well on their way, but the railways were 
badly blocked and there was much delay. 

I must now turn to the discussion of important informa- 
tion which began to reach us on the afternoon of the 3d re- 
garding the movements of the enemy. 

It appeared that a direct advance on Paris by the German 
right wing was no longer intended. They were reported to be 
moving in large columns southeast and east. A few regi- 
ments were said to be moving east by train. Later on, further 
reports arrived that the country in our front for several 
miles north of the Marne was clear of the enemy. No less 
than four German corps were said to be concentrating on 
Chateau-Thierry and to the east along the Marne, and it was 
reported that they had begun an attack on the Fifth French 
Army. The latest information told us that Chateau-Thierry 
was in the hands of the enemy, and that the Fifth French 
Army was retiring south to the Seine. 

The ideas underlying this concentration on their centre by 
the enemy look as if it was based on a totally wrong appreci- 
ation of our situation. The Germans were ignorant of the real 
strength which was gathering north of Paris in the formation 
of the Sixth French Army. They regarded the British Army 
as practically crushed, and almost useless as a fighting force. 



THE ENEMY'S CHANGE OF PLAN 107 

Relying upon this, they had no hesitation in leaving what 
they thought were the remnants of the Allied forces immedi- 
ately north and east of the Paris fortifications to be dealt 
with by such of their own forces as were operating through 
Amiens and on their extreme right. The German Higher 
Command then decided to strike with overwhelming force at 
the Allied centre south of the Marne and to cut our armies 
in two. 

The first necessity for the enemy was a quick decision by a 
great victory to be achieved at once. They were out-march- 
ing their supplies; there was Russia to be crushed and their 
frontier to be secured; and, further, a prolonged campaign 
was what they desired to avoid at all costs. The desperate at- 
tempt was no sooner fairly launched than the fatal error of 
over-confidence and the folly of under-rating one's enemy 
stared them in the face with all its stupendous consequences, 
as west of the Ourcq the country was seen to blaze along its 
whole length with the fire of the French 75's, whilst the Brit- 
ish and Fifth French Armies, now at bay, threw the enemy 
back in confusion over the Marne. 

With their usual arrogance and pomposity the Germans, 
ignoring the fact that it was their own negligence which had 
led them into a most dangerous situation, claim that General 
von Kluck showed unusual skill in extricating the First 
German Army from the toils. 

After considering the subject very carefully, and with a 
thorough knowledge of the situation and the ground, I have 
formed the opinion that von Kluck manifested considerable 
hesitation and want of energy. 

The rear section of the British General Staff had been es- 
tablished during this day at Melun, on the Seine. The lead- 



108 FURTHEK COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

ing section remained with me at Mortcerf , which became my 
advanced Headquarters. 

Information which arrived during the 4th confirmed all 
our anticipations of the previous day, and, in the evening at 
Melun, messages reached me from JoflFre that he was formu- 
lating his new plan. 

I had spent most of the day at advanced Headquarters, 
and had passed some time with Haig near Coulommiers. It 
seemed likely, by the direction of the German advance, that 
the First Corps might be attacked, and Haig had retired his 
Second Division in line with the First and was preparing for 
any eventuality. I conversed with him for a considerable 
time on the state of his troops, about which he expressed 
some anxiety. He said they stood in urgent need of rest and 
refitment, but as usual he was full of fight and ready to meet 
any emergency. 

Whilst I was with Haig, Smith-Dorrien arrived. 

The British Army had, indeed, suffered severely, and had 
performed an herculean task in reaching its present position 
in such fighting form, and its morale had withstood the or- 
deal. 

I think the Germans were probably justified in doubting 
our ofifensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the na- 
tion from which we spring. 

On my return to Melun on this night (September 4) I 
found that Murray had received a visit from General Galli- 
eni. Governor of Paris, who had communicated Joffre's 
plans for my consideration. 

He wished the Sixth French Army to recross the Marne 
between Lagny and Meaux on Sunday the 6th, and then to 
take up a position facing east towards the Ourcq. He asked 



GENERAL SIR H. H. WILSON 109 

me to fill up the space between the right of the Sixth Army 
(on the Mame) and the left of the Fifth Anny (near Pro- 
vins). He then intended the whole of the Allied armies to 
advance east, northeast, and north, and endeavour to crush 
the German corps operating between us. 

General Franchet d'Esperey had now superseded Lanrezac 
in command of the Fifth Army. I had sent Wilson (Sub- 
Chief of the General Staff) to him on the previous day, and 
to-night he returned and told me that d'Esperey was making 
similar plans. 

I must say a word here with regard to Henry WUson. I 
have known him for many years. He possesses a striking per- 
sonality. In appearance very tall and spare, his frame is sur- 
mounted by a face in which one sees great intelligence and 
power, combined with a very kindly and humorous expres- 
sion. In looking at him it is impossible not to realize the 
strength of will and character which he undoubtedly pos- 
sesses. His appearance does not belie him; he is all that he 
looks. Not one of his many friends has had a more thorough 
experience of him than I, in both "Sunshine and Shadow." 
However dark the surroundings, however desperate the situ- 
ation, however gloomy the prospect, his fine humour, splen- 
did courage, and high spirit are always the same. 

In those many weary, anxious days we passed together 
during my term of command in France, I cherish a most 
grateful remembrance of his unfailing and invaluable help, 
as well as of his sincere, loyal, and whole-hearted support. Of 
iron nerve and frame, nothuig seemed to tire him. Having 
passed through the Staff College early in life with high hon- 
ours, he was marked out for the most important staff work; 
and after filling many important minor positions with dis- 



110 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

tinction he became Commandant of the Staff College, where 
his great talents were employed in reforming and much im- 
proving that institution. His "magnum opus'" in peace-time 
was done when he was Director of Military Operations at the 
War Office during the four years preceding the war. His 
countrymen have never realized, and probably may never 
know, the vital importance and invaluable results of the 
work he did there, not only in regard to the share he took 
in the preparation of the Expeditionary Force, but also in 
establishing those happy relations with the French Army 
which have proved of such help to Allied operations through- 
out the war. 

Fearing no man, it was the very essence of his nature to 
speak his mind openly on all occasions, and when the great 
Irish crisis in the spring of 1914 was at its height, he sided 
openly with his native Ulster. He accompanied me to France 
as Sub-Chief of the General Staff, and when Murray's health 
broke down, in January, 1915, I selected Wilson as his suc- 
cessor; but, owing to his candid expression of opinion in the 
Ii'ish embroglio, he had many enemies, and his appointment 
was vetoed. It was this bad luck alone which prevented his 
valuable services then being used for his country's benefit in 
the best direction, and in a position for which he was better 
qualified than any one else. 

But to return to my story. 

I somewhat feared the gap which existed between mj^ right 
and d'Esperey's left, although the cavalry under Allenby at 
Garatin were on this flank. Because of this, and also because 
the Germans were exercising some pressure on Haig, on this 
night (September 4) I ordered the British forces to retire a 
few miles farther south. 



PLANS FOR OFFENSIVE DISCUSSED 111 

This facilitated the movements of reenforcements, sup- 
plies, and material, which were coming up fast. 

I have now brought the story down to September 5, the 
last day of the great German advance. The British forces 
had halted on the previous night on a line facing nearly east 
and extending from Villers-sur-Morin on the north to Fonte- 
nay on the south. The Fifth French Army lay east of my 
right flank on an east and west line through Provins, facing 
north. The Sixth Army was on my left, preparing to recross 
the Marne between Lagny and Meaux. 

I was at Melun early in the morning. Huguet had arrived 
in the night with despatches and a staff officer from Joffre, 
with whom I held a long conference. 

It appeared that the Sixth Army had already crossed the 
Marne, and would be in position west of the Ourcq at 9 a.m. 
on the 6th, on which day the French Commander-in-Chief 
proposed that the whole Allied Army should advance to the 
attack. 

Shortly afterwards General Maunoury, commanding the 
Sixth French Army, arrived, and we proceeded to discuss the 
situation fully. He described in detail what he intended do- 
ing, which was almost exactly as I have explained above. He 
thought that very few of the enemy still remained north of 
Paris, his cavalry having reconnoitred for some distance 
north and northwest. He expressed it as his intention to at-» 
tack most vigorously ("au fond"), and asked for my best 
support, which I promised to give. 

I despatched Murray at once to visit the corps and cav- 
alry commanders and ascertain exactly the condition of 
their troops. He returned later in the day with very favour- 
able reports. All were in excellent spirits and eager for the 



112 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

advance. They were having some much-needed rest; whilst 
reenforcements both of men and material were beginning 
to arrive. 

Reports received during the day confirmed all we had 
previously heard. The enemy's concentration against the 
centre of our line was complete. They had crossed the Marne 
at several points, and their advanced troops had been en- 
gaged during the past night and this day with our cavalry 
and First Army Corps on our right, and along the entire 
front of the Fifth French Army. 

Later in the day Joffre came to Melun, and I had a long 
conference with him. We again went over all plans, and it 
was definitely arranged that the attack was to commence all 
along the line next day, the 6th. Joffre was full of enthusi- 
asm, and very hopeful of success if we all fulfilled our re- 
spective roles and attacked "au fond." 

Thus ended the " Great Retreat." 

In these pages I have avoided as far as possible any de- 
tailed account of the many splendid engagements which 
have added new and undying laurels to the battle rolls of all 
the distinguished regiments which fought them. 

I repeat that the main cause of the success, which pre- 
pared this vast battle-ground and opened the way for the 
decisive battle of the Marne, is to be found in the able dis- 
positions made by the leaders, the magnificent example set 
by officers and non-commissioned officers, and the wonder- 
ful spirit, courage, and endurance which was displayed by 
the rank and file of the Army. 

My main object in writing this record is to explain as 
clearly as possible to my countrymen the line of thought 



GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 113 

which was in my own mind, the objects I set out to attain, 
and the reasons why I directed the troops as I did and came 
to the decisions at which I arrived at each successive phase 
of the operations. 

In concluding this chapter I am anxious to lay particular 
stress on a principle which seems to me of the utmost im- 
portance, namely, the danger of undue interference by the 
Government at home with the commander of an army in the 
field. Stanton's interference with McClellan in the American 
Civil War should have been a sufficient warning. 

I have referred to the natural anxiety which was deeply 
felt by the French President, Government, and generals for 
the safety of Paris. The utmost pressure was brought to bear 
upon me to alter my dispositions so as to make a dangerous 
stand on lines and in places which, in my judgment, would 
have exposed the British Army to the greatest danger of 
annihilation. The shattered condition of my troops was not 
realized, but perhaps in view of the situation such pressure 
was natural and inevitable. 

I had the power, in accordance with the instructions 
which I had received before coming to France, to use my full 
discretion in agreeing to or resisting such demands, and in all 
my happy experience of them, never did I find my French 
comrades resentful of such resistance when they realized the 
true reason for it. 

But when, in spite of my earnest representation of the true 
condition of affairs, the Secretary of State for War himself, 
and the Government with him, brought still greater pressure 
to bear, backed by the authority they possessed, to enforce 
their views, I was placed in a position of the utmost diffi- 
culty. 



114 FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT 

Lord Kitchener came to Paris with no other object than to 
insist upon my arresting the retreat, although no sign of a 
halt appeared at any part of the Allied line. He was ignorant 
of the condition of the Army as I knew it, and was mistaken 
in his assertion that reenforcements of men and material 
had already reached me. The impression conveyed by his 
visit was that I had greatly magnified the losses which had 
occurred, and exaggerated the condition of the troops. It was 
difficult to resist such pressure. 

Fortunately I was able to do so. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE BATTLE OF THE MAENE 
When day dawned on the ever memorable morning of Sep- 
tember 6, 1914, some ray of the great hopes in which I had 
indulged during the first two or three days at my Head- 
quarters at Le Cateau seemed to revive. Taught now by a 
bitter experience, I felt more than ever the necessity of being 
prepared for anything. There was much, however, to inspire 
confidence. Great changes had been made amongst the 
higher commanders in the army of our allies. The finest mili- 
tary leaders of France were now heading the splendid sol- 
diers of that truly martial nation, and we had all learnt most 
valuable and practical lessons in the hard school of adversity. 

The latest reports showed that French and British sol- 
diers alike were animated by the highest spirit and meant to 
"do or die." As regards the British Army, reenforcements 
had arrived, deficiencies in armament and material had been 
partially made good, and, most important of all, the promise 
of an immediate advance against the enemy had sent a thrill 
of exultation and enthusiasm throughout the whole force. A 
modicum of rest had also been secured. 

As I have said before, it is not my purpose in these pages 
to write a history. Many volumes have been published with 
this object. They have appeared in many countries and in 
many languages. A few have seemed to me to be wonderfully 
accurate accounts, considering the great difficulty of arriv- 
ing at the truth long before the time when full and authentic 
material can possibly be available. 



116 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

All I have had in my mind in writing this book is to ex- 
plain, so far as I can, my own part throughout these great 
events in carrying out the responsible task entrusted to me by 
my country; the aspect in which the situation presented itself 
m my mind from day to day; and my reasons for the decisions 
which guided the action of the troops under my command^ 

My desire here is to recall exactly what was in my mind on 
the morning of the 6th of September, which saw the opening 
of the Battle of the Marne, and to describe the view which 
presented itself to me of the situation on both sides; in other 
words, the basis for the orders which were issued to the 
troops. 

These orders were necessarily founded upon my own per- 
sonal appreciation of the situation as it appeared to me at 
the moment. It was impossible for me to know that situation 
accurately in all its details. For instance, I could not then 
know, as I know now, that the Germans had abandoned 
their vigorous offensive twenty-four hours earlier than this, 
nor should I have conceived it possible that they could have 
done so. 

Reverting, then, to my general view of things on the morn- 
ing of the 6th; in the first place, my personal conference with 
Joflfre on the night of the 5th had put me in full possession of 
his exact plans and all that was in his mind. 

His intention was to attack at all points "aufond," to in- 
flict a crushing defeat on the whole German Army on our 
front by assailing its flank with the Sixth French and British 
Armies attacking from a line running roughly from Le Ples- 
sis-BeUeville on the north through Cuisy-Iverny-Neufmon- 
tiers-Meaux, across the Marne to VUlers-sur-Morin-Rozoy- 
la Chapelle Iger to Gastins on the south. 



JOFFRE'S ORDEE FOR AN ADVANCE 117 

At the same time the Fifth French Army was to advance 
north from its present position and, with all the French 
Armies to its right, Franchet d'Esperey was to make a simul- 
taneous frontal attack. 

The following were General Joffre's orders of Septem- 
ber 4 : — 

1. Advantage must be taken of the risky situation of the 
German First Army to concentrate against it the efforts of 
the Allied Armies on our extreme left. All preparations must 
be made during the 5th for an attack on the 6th of September. 

2. The following general arrangements are to be carried 
out by the evening of September 5 : — 

(a) All the available forces of the Sixth Army northeast 
of Meaux are to be ready to cross the Ourcq between Lizy 
and May-en-Multien, in the general direction of Chateau- 
Thierry. The available portions of the First Cavalry Corps 
which are close at hand are to be handed over to General 
Maunoury for this operation. 

(b) The British Army is to establish itself on the line 
Changis-Coulommiers, facing east, ready to attack in the 
general direction of Montmirail. 

(c) The Fifth Army will close slightly on its left and take 
up the general line Courtagon-Esternay-Sezanne, ready to 
attack, generally speaking, from south to north. The Second 
Cavalry Corps will ensure connection between the British 
Army and the Fifth Army. 

(d) The Ninth Army will cover the right of the Fifth 
Army by holding the southern outlets of the Saint-Gond 
marshes and by placing part of its forces on the tableland 
north of Sezanne. 



118 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

3. These diflferent armies are to attack on the morning of 
September 6. 

The Eighth Division of the Fourth French Corps was to 
arrive south of Meaux during the early morning and main- 
tain connection with the British Third Corps about Villers- 
sur-Morin, whence the British line following the points 
named above was facing nearly due east. 

My own view of the enemy's situation and intentions was 
fairly in accordance with the Germans' actual positions, al- 
though I did not know at that time that a retreat had really 
set in, or how the various corps and divisions were placed. 
Judging from the air and cavalry reconnaissances and from 
intelligence reports, I thought that a large part of von 
Kluck's First Army was now south of the Grand Morin 
River, and that the enemy's western columns had crossed 
the Marne about Meaux and TrUport, although one or two 
divisions were still north of that river and west of the Ourcq. 
From the fact that the rearguards of both my First and Sec- 
ond Corps in their retirement on the day previous were 
slightly engaged, whilst a few outpost aflfairs were reported 
as having occurred in the night, I judged the enemy to have 
got some distance south of the Grand Morin River. The ap- 
pearance of hostile cavalry detachments on the previous 
evening indicated the presence of that arm. 

Whilst it appeared to me that our dispositions promised 
great things, I also realized fully that the situation de- 
manded the utmost care and watchfulness, as everything 
depended on the timing of our movements, the utmost meas- 
ure of mutual support, and the most vigorous and continu- 
ous attacks. 



TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLE-FIELD 119 

The area in which the British Army operated in the Battle 
of the Marne may be described as the country enclosed be- 
tween the tributaries of the Marne, the Ourcq on the north 
and the Grand Morin on the south, between which bounda- 
ries it is intersected by the Marne itself, and a third tribu- 
tary, the Petit Morin. 

This area forms the western portion of the Plateau de la 
Brie, which rises to a height of four hundred to five hundred 
feet above the plain of Champagne. The general slope of the 
ground is from east to west. The plateau is of rock formation, 
and the rivers, which were formerly of greater volume than at 
present, have worn away deep channels, with the result that 
the ground falls very steeply to the river-beds. A certain 
amount of alluvial deposit has been brought down by the 
rivers and streams, in the immediate vicinity of which are to 
be found marshy pools and swamps. With the exception of 
the Foret de Crecy, to the southwest of the area under con- 
sideration, there are no extensive woods, the higher ground 
being covered with small copses of thick undergrowth with a 
sprinkling of oak. 

The country generally is open, and presents no obstacles 
to the passage of troops of all arms. The steep cliflfs rising 
abruptly from the river-beds afford good defensive positions 
suitable for rearguard actions, obliging an advancing force to 
concentrate at defiles. 

"The roads and railways follow generally the course of the 
rivers. 

The chief roads are — 

(a) Paris-Meaux-La Ferte-sous- Jouarre, where one branch 
continues through Montmirail to Chalons, and the other 



120 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

bends slightly north through Chateau-Thierry and Dor- 
mans to Rheims and Epernay. 

(6) Paris-Lagny-Coulommiers-La Ferte-Gaucher-Ester- 
nay. 

(c) Soissons-Villers-Cotterets-Meaux, and thence through 
the Foret de Crecy to Melun. 

The chief railways are — 

(1) Paris-Nanteuil-Crepy-en-Valois, thence to Com- 
piegne and Soissons. 

(2) Paris-Meaux-Rheims (following the Ourcq). 

(3) Paris- Meaux-Chateau-Thierry-Epernay (following 
the Marne). 

(4) Paris-Tournan, through the Foret de Crecy to Cou- 
lommiers, and thence to Esternay following the Grand 
Morin). 

In addition to the roads mentioned above, which are 
"routes nationales," there are numerous smaller roads 
("routes departementales ") which are practicable for all 
arms and transport. In places the gradients are steep where 
the roads cross the deep beds of the rivers. 

The march of the Army on the morning of the 6th was 
ordered in a direction bearing generally about east-northeast, 
and I did not then expect to reach the Grand Morin River 
the same evening, as heavy fighting was most probable. 

I joined Haig about 9.30 a.m. He was then engaged all 
along his front against detachments of the enemy which ap- 
peared to be advanced guards with some supporting cavalry. 
The fighting had commenced about 7.30 a.m. by a move of 
hostile infantry on Rozoy. They were attacked and thrown 
back by the Fourth Guards Brigade. 



NINTH LANCERS AT MONCEL 121 

Although the German artillery was in action early in the 
day, close observation, combined with constant reports, 
showed us before noon that this advance was not being 
pushed with much vigour, and later (the right of the First 
Division being thrust forward towards Vaudoy, the left of 
the Second Division at Ormeaux), as we attempted to close 
with them, it was discovered that a general retreat was in 
progress, covered by rearguards. 

A visit which I paid to the Second Corps on Haig's left 
confirmed this impression. 

On this I gave orders that the enemy was to be closely 
pressed, and that, if possible, the line of the Grand Morin 
River was to be made good before night. 

As a matter of fact, this was not done tUl the next day, but 
a considerable further advance was made. Our cavalry from 
Gastins drove the enemy back north of Lagny, 

On the morning of September 7, the Second Cavalry Bri- 
gade was acting as left flank guard to the cavalry division, 
with the Ninth Lancers as advanced guard to the brigade. 

On reaching Fretoy, the village of Moncel was found to be 
occupied by a patrol of Germans, and was taken at a gallop 
by the leading troop, followed by the one remaining machine 
gun of the regiment. About a troop and a half, accompanied 
by the commanding ofilcer, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Camp- 
bell and Major Beale-Browne, moved up on the left of the 
village. Shortly afterwards two squadrons of the First Garde 
Dragoner charged the village and drove out the troop of the 
Ninth Lancers after a little street fighting. A third dragoner 
squadron then came up to the village from the north in sup- 
port. The troop and a half of the Ninth Lancers, led by the 
commanding oflBcer and second in command, attacked this 



122 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

squadron in perfect order, charged the left half of the Ger- 
man squadron, and pierced it with loss, both sides facing the 
charge; the Germans at a fifteen-mile rate and the Ninth 
Lancers at speed. 

Swinging round after the charge, the Ninth Lancers 
gained the village and rallied on the south of it. At the same 
time, the Eighteenth Hussars, who had been sent up in sup- 
port, drove off the Germans by fire from the wood on the left 
of the village. In this charge by the Ninth Lancers Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Campbell was wounded in the arm by a lance 
and in the leg by a bullet, both wounds, however, being 
slight. The Adjutant, Captain G. F. Reynolds, was severely 
wounded in the shoulder by a lance. Lieutenant Alfrey, the 
machine-gun officer, who must have gone to his assist- 
ance from the village, was killed whilst extracting the lance 
from Captain Reynolds. Our casualties were slight — one 
oflBcer (Lieutenant Alfrey) killed, two men killed; two offi- 
cers (Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Captain Reynolds) 
wounded and five men wounded. The number of Germans 
left on the ground was considerable. 

Shortly afterwards, "I" Battery, R.F.A., was moved to 
the north of the village, and the Eighteenth Hussars were 
sent to Faujus and to a line of trees to the south of that vil- 
lage. 

"B" Squadron, Eighteenth Hussars, under Major Leve- 
son, took up a position by this line of trees, dismounting in 
the corn stooks, and was immediately charged by a German 
squadron in perfect order, in line at close order. The Eight- 
eenth Hussars squadron met the charge with well-directed 
fire at close range, and the German squadron was almost an- 
nihilated. A few passed through the firing line and were shot 



THE ENEMY IN RETREAT 123 

by the horse holders. Thirty-two dead and wounded Ger- 
mans were counted on the ground in front of the squadron, 
and of the sixty or seventy who charged not more than a 
dozen escaped. A second charge was attempted shortly after- 
wards, but did not approach closer than four hundred yards. 

Aircraft at night reported the German Second Corps 
(which had been moving north nearly all day) to have en- 
tered a large forest from which we supposed them to be de- 
bouching through Lizy north of the wood. 

The Third Corps were practically in reserve, but moved 
up during the day a little on our left rear. 

On this day I saw most of the troops and found them in 
excellent spirits. 

The Sixth French Army on our left was opposed chiefly by 
the German Fourth Reserve Corps, which, however, was 
reenforced by a considerable part of the retiring Second 
Corps. The Fourth German Corps had also been directed 
towards this part of the battle-field. 

The Fifth French Army on our right, after a heavy day's 
desperate fighting, reached the line Courtagon-Esternay-La 
Villeneuve-les-Charleville. At the close of the advance and 
fighting on the 6th, I returned to Melun to receive reports 
and ascertain the general situation of the Allied forces. It 
was perfectly clear now that the enemy had abandoned the 
offensive and was in full retreat towards the Marne. I sent a 
despatch to General Joffre, telling him of our work during 
the day and the points we had reached, and requested in- 
structions from him for the 7th. 

Very late at night I got his reply, telling me that the Fifth 
Army had made good progress, which had been materially 
helped by the pressure of the British forces east of the ene- 



124 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

my's right flank. He asked me to continue the move to-mor- 
row, but in a rather more northerly direction. 

During the night of the 6th-7th, it became necessary to 
study the situation with great care. Joffre's original plan 
presupposed a continued German advance to the south and 
southeast, culminating in a great attack on the Fifth and 
Ninth French Armies. His directions to me on the 5th were 
to move east, and attack this advance in flank. 

It was to attain that object that the moves of the 6th were 
ordered, and, as a matter of fact, the First Corps under Haig 
did move almost due east. The troops which opposed him 
were on that day supposed to be the flank guard of the enemy, 
which was attacking the Fifth French Army. 

As stated above, I spent some time in the morning of the 
6th with the First Corps, but it was not before noon that the 
possibility of a German retirement began to take shape in my 
mind. The conviction that such a retirement was actually 
taking place was increased as the day wore on and after my 
visits to the Second and Third Corps. 

It was on my return to Melun late in the evening of this 
day that air and intelligence reports, combined with the im- 
pression which my own observations had made upon me, 
left no doubt in my mind that the German retreat had really 
been in full progress for many hours, and that the British 
Army must be immediately moved in a direction which 
would bring it in close contact with the enemy. 

Orders were therefore issued directing the march on the 
Grand Morin River, which was to be forced and passed with 
all possible speed on the 7th. 

Joffre's request to me to move in a rather more northerly 
direction pointed to some such conclusion; but I do not 



THE PROBLEM 125 

think that his information during the day had impressed him 
to the same extent with the drastic change in the situation, 
and the fact that the Germans had so soon taken the alarm 
and been overtaken by a veritable "panic." 

My intention to close at all speed with the enemy had to 
be tempered by consideration for the French armies on my 
flank, both of which were opposed by much larger forces. 

It was necessary to keep close touch with Franchet d'Es- 
perey on my right, and to direct the movements of the Third 
Corps on my left so as to bring the best possible support to 
the hard-pressed right of the Sixth Army, who were fighting 
there so gallantly and well. 

The cavalry acted with great vigour in advance of the 
Army throughout the 7th, and on that day the Grand Morin 
River was forced and positions were taken up well to the 
northeast of it. 

The Fifth and Sixth French Armies were both heavily en- 
gaged throughout the 7th. The left of the Fifth Army on my 
right reached La Ferte-Gaucher at nightfall. 

The position of the British Army at daybreak on the 8th 
was, roughly: — 

Third Corps — La Haute Maison. 

Second Corps — Aulnoy and neighbourhood. 

First Corps — Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin. 

The problem before me on the night of the 7th-8th may be 
stated thus : — 

I knew that the Fifth Army on my right had been heavily 
opposed on the 7th, and that powerful forces of the enemy 
were still in front of it. The Sixth Army was fighting hard 
west of the Ourcq, opposed to nearly all the German First 



126 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Army. I gathered at this time that the enemy forces oppos- 
ing our own immediate advance consisted chiefly of cavalry 
with a strong artillery supporting, backed up by some in- 
fantry detachments. 

I have referred before in this book to a visit I paid to Ger- 
many in 1911. On that occasion I saw a great deal of German 
cavalry in manoeuvre, and the knowledge I thus acquired 
enabled me to estimate the value of the forces which were 
now opposing me. 

For years the German cavalry have been trained in rear- 
guard action such as the work they were now doing. They 
carry a large quantity of machine guns, which they are 
trained to handle very efiiciently. To each brigade of cavalry 
there is attached a regiment of jager, picked riflemen, chosen 
for their skill in shooting and in taking advantage of ground. 
These troops are specially valuable for the defence of river 
lines and positions which are intended to cause delay to an 
advancing enemy. 

There was little doubt in my mind that the Petit Morin 
and Grand Morin rivers could be forced with comparative 
ease, but I knew that good troops would be required, and the 
chief question to be considered at that moment was how 
the hard-pressed Sixth French Army could best be assisted 
whilst effective connection with the Fifth French Army on 
the right was safeguarded. 

There was the certainty that the passages of the Marne 
opposite my left flank, between Changis and La Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre, would be strongly guarded, and that our advance at 
this point would be very difficult. A large force of German 
heavy artillery was reported to be in the loop of the river 
near Varreddes. 



FORCING THE PETIT MORIN 127 

After considering alternatives of action — e.g., the possi- 
bility of sending round direct help to Maunouiy, or the ad- 
visability of strengthening my left flank to ensure a quicker 
passage there — I decided that the best help I could bring to 
the Sixth Army was to effect a speedy passage of the Grand 
Morin, Petit Morin, and Marne rivers. 

The course of the Marne at the point to be passed from 
left to right was generally northeast, and the British Army 
after passing would be facing northwest, which would bring 
it almost directly upon the line of retreat of the First German 
Army, which was in close contact with Maunoury across the 
Ourcq. The adoption of any other method of action which I 
had considered must have meant delay and a weakening of 
my front. What was wanted was a speedy decision of the 
critical situation on the left. I had also to remember the 
necessity of keeping up close connection with d'Esperey on 
my right. Orders were accordingly issued for a general attack 
on the Petit Morin River, to begin early on the 8th. 

On that morning I found Haig at La Tretoire (north of 
Rebais), near where the Fourth Guards Brigade of the Sec- 
ond Division (Second Battalion Grenadier Guards, Second 
and Third Battalions Coldstream Guards, First Battalion 
Irish Guards), supported by some field batteries, were forc- 
ing the passage of the Petit Morin. 

I can well recall the scene. We were on some high ground 
which was intersected by rocky ravines and sandhills. Just 
below where we stood was the village, into which the enemy 
were putting a good many shells, and beyond it lay the line 
of the Petit Morin stream with its wooded, shelving banks, 
upon which the enemy was holding a strong rearguard posi- 
tion on the further bank. 



128 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

The Fifth Brigade was brought up in support of the 
Fourth, and the heavy artillery were got into action. The 
crossing of the river at this point was stoutly opposed for a 
considerable time; but the passage of it, when secured, was 
much assisted by the cavalry and the First Division, which 
had effected a crossing some way higher up. 

The detailed story of this great fight is worth the telling. 
Approaching the river on a fairly wide front, on the right of 
the First Corps was the First Guards Brigade with a troop 
of the Fifteenth Hussars, some cyclists, the Twenty-third 
Field Company, R.E., and the Twenty-sixth Brigade, 
R.F.A., which, under General Maxse, formed the advance 
guard to the First Division in its advance from Jouy-sur- 
Morin to Bassevelle. A French cavalry division was operat- 
ing on our right and front, covered by our cavalry division. 

At 9.15 A.M. a French cavalry officer reported to Maxse 
that French cavalry was in occupation of the heights to the 
north of Bellot. At 9.30 a.m. the First Battalion Black Watch 
and one Battery of the Twenty-sixth Brigade, R.F.A., had 
reached Bellot village, and the main guard was approaching 
the village through a ravine, when a battery of the enemy's 
horse artillery opened fire on the column from high ground 
near Fontaine Saint-Robert. The fire was quickly silenced 
by French horse artillery guns which cooperated with our 
Twenty-sixth Brigade. The casualties were remarkably low 
considering the circumstances. 

An alarming report reached General Maxse that a brigade 
of French cavalry was cooped up in Bellot exposed to artil- 
lery fire, and that a large force of German infantry was ad- 
vancing southwards through the woods to attack them. This 
somewhat delayed the further advance of our troops. 



CLOSE FIGHTING 129 

It was 10.40 A.M. when Colonel Grant Duff advanced to 
seize and picket the heights north of the valley of the Petit 
Morin and to safeguard the advance of the column down the 
valley to Sablonnieres. This main guard crossed the Petit 
Morin at 11 a.m., and shortly afterwards the advance guard 
was in contact with some two hundred and fifty of the 
enemy's Jager of the Guard in the thick woods north of the 
ravine. 

Some close fighting ensued, during which the Black Watch 
and Cameron Highlanders suffered casualties. The enemy 
lost some fifty killed and fifty wounded. Subsequently the 
advance was continued northwards on Hondevilliers, the 
First Guards Brigade advancing on the east and the Third 
Brigade on the west of the ravine. Advanced troops reached 
Bassevelle. The Forty-third Howitzer Brigade and Twenty- 
sixth Heavy Battery were engaged in supporting the 
advance of the Second Division during the day. 

On the left the Fourth (Guards) Brigade and the Forty- 
first Brigade, R.F.A., under Lieutenant-Colonel Lushing- 
ton, R.F.A., formed the advanced guard to the Second Divi- 
sion moving from Saint-Simeon via Rebais and La Tretoire. 

When the vanguard of the Third Coldstream Guards had 
just passed La Tretoire, shell fire was opened on them from 
the high ground round Boitron. 

The enemy's guns did not remain long in action; but the 
crossing was held by the enemy, who had a machine-gun bat- 
tery. The valley is closely wooded, and the machine guns 
were so well placed that, whenever our infantry came into 
action, they were met by a heavy fire from these guns. The 
other battalions were brought up one by one to support the 
Third Coldstream Guards; two guns were placed at the bend 



130 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

in the road just north of La Tretoire, and howitzers were also 
brought up north of thiat village. 

At twelve noon the Worcestershire Regiment was sent to 
assist the Fourth (Guards) Brigade, and moved via La Tre- 
toire-Launoy-north of Ruine-Moulin Neuf , to force the pas- 
sage of the river at Le Gravier, and to work up stream to 
assist the Guards Brigade. 

By 1.30 P.M. the bridge had been seized by the Worcester- 
shire Regiment, who captured about thirty prisoners in the 
farm by the bridge. The Second Grenadier Guards also man- 
aged to cross at La Forge. 

The enemy retired, leaving a good many dead and two 
machine guns in our hands. 

An advance was then made to the north of Boitron 
church, where the divisional artillery came into action. 

The Connaught Rangers were despatched to work down 
the right bank to assist the passage of the Third Division. 
They encountered some opposition at Le Moulin du Pont, 
but pushed on to near Orly, where they found the Third 
Division already across the river. 

At 2.30 P.M. the Grenadiers and Second Battalion Cold- 
stream Guards were sent northwards to protect the front, 
whilst the Highland Light Infantry were sent towards Bus- 
sieres to endeavour to cut off the enemy's retreat. 

The remainder of the Fifth Infantry Brigade were en- 
gaged with small bodies of the enemy La the woods northeast 
of the Becherelle-Maison Neuve road, but the Brigadier- 
General withdrew his three battalions, fearing they would 
fire on the Fourth Brigade and Highland Light Infantry, and 
they reached Boitron about 5 p.m., except one company of 
the Connaught Rangers, which worked through the woods 



THE ENEMY RETIRING 131 

and emerged at Le Cas Rouge, and claimed to have headed 
off some German stragglers. Meanwhile, at about 4.30 p.m. 
the enemy made a counter-attack with machine guns against 
our gun position from the woods northwest of Boitron 
church. This was dealt with by the Guards Brigade. The 
Third Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards made a direct 
attack, whilst the Second Coldstream Guards swung round 
against the enemy. The whole machine-gun battery of five 
guns surrendered with one hundred personnel. 

I then went to Smith-Dorrien, whose Headquarters were 
at Doue. His corps had then forced the passage of the river, 
but had encountered severe opposition in doing so. 

I found the Third Corps on the left advancing well at all 
points, driving the enemy before them and inflicting consid- 
erable loss all along the line. Pulteney was in touch with the 
Eighth French Division on his left; and Gough, with the 
Third Cavalry Brigade (Fourth Hussars, Fifth Lancers, and 
Sixteenth Lancers) , was successfully engaged all the morning 
on the left flank. There appeared to be a considerable force 
of the enemy in the woods lying to the south of Lizy, north 
of the Marne, and later reports stated that some ninety Ger- 
man guns were deployed there against the right flank of the 
Sixth French Army. 

I impressed on Pulteney the necessity for pushing on to 
the utmost of his ability in aid of the Sixth Army. It looked 
as if he would have considerable opposition at Changis 
and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. The Germans retiring over the 
Marne at the latter place occupied the town in strength and 
blew up the bridge. 

Although the Third Corps were not able to pass the Marne 
tin daybreak on the 10th, there could be no doubt that the 



132 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

vigour of Pulteney's attack took considerable pressure off 
the right of the Sixth French Army. The British troops 
fought all along the line with splendid spirit, energy, and 
determination, and they were skilfully handled and led. 

From what I could observe, however, it seemed to me that 
the infantry were not in a wide enough formation, and per- 
haps in some cases the field artillery were not pushed far 
enough forward. I called attention to these points in the fol- 
lowing memorandum, which was issued on the 10th: — 

"The latest experiences have shown that the enemy never 
neglects an opportunity to use all his available artillery in 
forward positions under cover of cavalry and other mobile 
troops. 

"Our cavalry is now organized in two divisions, the first 
of three, the second of two brigades, each with a brigade of 
horse artillery. During the present phase of the operations — 
which consist of as rapid a pursuit and pressure of the enemy 
as possible in his retreat — two corps will generally be in 
first line. A cavalry division will be directed to work on the 
front and flank of either corps and well in advance. The 
commander of the cavalry will remain in the closest con- 
cert with the corps commanders on the flank on which he 
is working. 

"The corps commanders wUl send forward with the cav- 
alry as much of their field artillery as can be usefully em- 
ployed in harassing the enemy's retirement. They will place 
them under the direction of the cavalry commander for the 
day, the latter ofiicer being responsible for their safety. 

"When, owing to the approach of darkness, the field artil- 
lery can no longer find useful targets, they will be with- 



MEMORANDUM TO CORPS COMMANDERS 133 

drawn from the cavalry back to the division to which they 
belong. Should the enemy make any decided stand during 
such operations and a general action arise or become immi- 
nent, the field artillery in the front will either fall back or 
retain their position, at the discretion of the corps com- 
mander, and again come under their divisional commander. 

"The withdrawal from under the supervision of the cav- 
alry cormnander wUl always remain at the discretion of the 
corps commander. 

"I wish to call the attention of corps commanders to the 
necessity of warning their infantry against what is known as 
'bunching up.' Losses and delay in overcoming rearguards 
resistance during the present phase of the operations have 
undoubtedly been caused by this.' 

" Instances have also occurred when undue delay in effect- 
ing the passage of a river has been caused by a failure to 
realize the nature of the problem from the purely local stand- 
point. 

"Small flanking parties, crossing at unguarded points by 
hastily improvised means, will dislodge hostile infantry and 
Maxims much more quickly and effectively than by frontal 
attacks, however powerfully supported by artillery." 

On the night of the 9th and 10th, the Third Corps occu- 
pied La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and the left bank of the Marne, 
but were unable to cross, and our left ran roughly eastward 
through Bussieres and Boitron to Hondevilliers. 

In all the villages which the enemy had so hastily occupied 
and evacuated, there was evidence of violent damage and 
looting. At La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Done, and Rebais, there 
were signs of great disorder and lack of discipline. 



134 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

At daybreak on the 9tli the advance on the Marne was 
continued. My Headquarters were now at Coulommiers, 
where a number of air reports were received early in the day. 
They seemed to show that the powerful German battery of 
ninety guns which had been located on the previous day in 
Lizy had been withdrawn, and that the enemy in front of the 
Fifth French Army was somewhat reduced. The front of the 
Fifth French Army was apparently clear up to the Marne. 

A considerable concentration of Germans was said to be 
between Chateau-Thierry and Marigny, but as the large 
columns in the rear were seen to be marching north, this 
looked only like a strong rearguard. 

The following orders were issued to the troops at 7.30 p.m. 
on the 8th: — 

" General Headquarters 

" September 8, 1914 

"1. The enemy are continuing their retreat northwards 
and our Army has been successfully engaged during the day 
with their rearguards on the Petit Morin, thereby materially 
assisting the progress of the French Armies on our right and 
left, which the enemy have been making great efforts to 
oppose. 

" 2. The Army will continue the advance north to-morrow 
at 5 A.M., attacking rearguards of the enemy wherever met. 
The cavalry division will act in close association with the 
First Corps and gain touch with the Fifth French Army on 
the right. General Gough, with the Third and Fifth Cavalry 
Brigades, will act in close association with the Second Corps 
and gain touch with the Sixth French Army on the left. 

"3. Roads are allotted as follows: — 



GENERAL ORDERS 135 

"First Corps: 

"Eastern road: Sablonnieres-Hondevilliers-Nogent-rAr- 
taud-Saulchery, eastern side of Charly-sur-Marne. 

" Western road : La Tretoire-Boitron-Pavant-western side 
of Charly-Villiers-sur-Marne-Domptin-Coupru; both in- 
clusive. 

" Second Corps: 
"Western road : Saint-Ouen-Saacy-Mery-Montreuil in- 
clusive, and all roads between this and western road of First 
Corps exclusive. 

" Third Corps: 
"Western road: La Ferte-sous-Jouarre-Dhuisy; western 
road of Second Corps exclusive. 

"Supply Railheads for September 9, 1914: 



Cavalry division .... 
Brigadier-General Gough's Brigades 

First Corps 

Second Corps .... 
Third Corps .... 

L. of C. (line of communications) 
G.H.Q. (General Headquarters) . 
R.F.C. (Royal Flying Corps) 
Ammunition railroad . 



Chaumes 

Chaumes 

Coulommiers 

Coulommiers 

Mortcerf 

Chaumes 

Chaumes 

Chaumes 

Verneuil 



" Reports to Melun till 9 a.m., after that hour to Coulom- 
miers. 

" A. J. Murray, Lieutenant-General 

" Chief of the General Staff" 



136 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

AUenby, with the cavalry, seized the bridges at Charly- 
sur-Marne and Saulchery and, advancing rapidly to the 
high ground north about Fontaine Fauvel, covered the rapid 
passage of the First Corps over these bridges. Clearing the 
ground of the enemy and making many captures, the First 
Army Corps reached Domptin, and the cavalry the heights 
about Montgivrault, some miles farther north. 

The Third Division of the Second Corps, to the left, seized 
and crossed the bridge at Nanteuil early in the day. The 
Fifth Division (Second Corps) crossed at Mery, but was then 
held up for some time by German artillery said to be in the 
neighbourhood of La Sablonniere. It was essential to my 
general plan that the Second Corps should not get too far 
north until the First and Third Corps were completely estab- 
lished on the farther bank of the Marne. Smith-Dorrien was 
instructed accordingly. 

As the fight progressed during the day, our Third Corps 
at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and the Eighth French Division 
at Changis found difficulty in crossing the river. I then in- 
structed Smith-Dorrien to send one division towards Dhuisy 
to menace the rear of the troops opposing these crossings. 
The Fifth Division was directed there, but as they were un- 
able to overcome the enemy's resistance they only succeeded 
in reaching Montreuil, two miles southeast of Dhuisy, very 
late at night. 

I found Pulteney south of La Ferte early in the morning, 
and heavy fighting going on to gain the passage of the river 
which the enemy was still vigorously disputing. It was a re- 
markable scene. The banks of the Marne at this point are 
somewhat steep, and there is high commanding ground on 
either side of the river. The old town of La Ferte, so famous 



THE CROSSING OF THE MARNE 137 

in Napoleon's campaign of 1814, presented a picturesque 
appearance with its ancient church and buUdings. Sur- 
rounded and held by the enemy, it seemed to frown down on 
the broken bridge, forbidding all approach. The enemy was 
vigorously defending the passage, strongly supported by 
artillery from the high ground north of the town. 

The Fourth Division ia two columns attempted to ad- 
vance on the bridge with a view to repairing it and then to 
close and establish a bridgehead on the northern bank, but 
all their attempts were frustrated by the German guns. Just 
after dark, however. Hunter Weston's Eleventh Brigade 
(First Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry, First Bat- 
talion East Lancashire Regiment, First Battalion Hamp- 
shire Regiment, and First Battalion Rifle Brigade) was able 
to reach the southern bank, where a niunber of boats were 
seized. In these the brigade was pushed across, and by 10 p.m. 
had established an effective footing on the northern bank, 
under cover of which a pontoon bridge was constructed 
by the Royal Engineers of the Fourth Division under very 
heavy fire. It was a very fine piece of work, to which the com- 
mander of the Third Corps particularly drew my attention. 
During this operation Colonel Le Marchant was killed.„ 

Another detachment also effected a crossing farther up 
the river in the neighbourhood of Chamigny, but the main 
body of the Third Corps crossed by the pontoon bridge in 
the early hours of the 10th. 

I found Smith-Dorrien at Pulteney's Headquarters. 

The Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades were operating be- 
tween the Third and Second Corps, filling up the gap, which, 
however, in view of the enemy's hurried retirement, never 
caused me any apprehension. 



138 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

It has been stated that on the 8th I called upon General 
Maunoury for assistance in forcing the river, and that this 
was the reason why the French Eighth Division was not 
taken away. 

I can only say that no such request was ever made by me 
or my Headquarters Staff, nor had any other commander 
my sanction for such a demand. I felt throughout the battle 
that my principal role was to bring assistance in the best 
manner and in the most effective direction to the Sixth 
Army, for I fully appreciated the much greater difficulty of 
the task which they were undertaking. On the other hand 
my diary shows that on the 9th I received two urgent mes- 
sages from Maunoury begging me to take the pressure of the 
enemy's Third Corps off him, and I think the action of the 
British Army on the 9th had this effect. 

In the afternoon I rode across the Marne at Nogent and 
met several units of the First Army Corps moving up the 
heights of the north side of the river. I was tremendously 
struck by their general appearance and attitude. They were 
full of spirit and fired with enthusiasm. They had upon them 
that war-worn look which we all know so well, but one felt, 
as one rode beside them, that here were troops whom noth- 
ing could stop, who asked only to be led forward, and who 
were enveloped in an atmosphere of confidence and victory. 

They were very tired, however; how tired was not brought 
fully home to me until I came to the Fifth Cavalry Brigade 
(the Scots Greys, Twelfth Lancers, and Twentieth Hussars). 

The whole brigade was dismounted behind some woods on 
the heights. Every man of them, except a small proportion of 
horse holders, was lying fast asleep on the ground. 

Accompanied by the Brigadier (Chetwode), I rode into 



TROOPS TIRED BUT CONFIDENT 139 

the midst of the sleeping mass, my horse picking his way 
through the recumbent figures. They hardly stirred. 

I was anxious to say a few words to the men, and the Brig- 
adier asked me if he should call them up to attention. I said, 
"No, let them rest," adding that I would talk to them for 
any one to hear who happened to be awake and not too done 
up to listen. I thanked them, as they lay there on the ground, 
for all they had done ; I told them of the situation and of our 
hopes of complete victory. A few men tried to struggle up; 
others, half awake, leaned on their elbows and drowsily lis- 
tened. I hardly realized that they had heard anything of 
what I had said. This particular regiment was the Scots 
Greys, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bulkeley John- 
son, who afterwards fell so gallantly at the head of his brigade 
on the Ancre. Bulkeley Johnson subsequently told me that 
every word I had spoken on that occasion was published 
afterwards in the local papers all over Scotland. From the 
Greys I went on to the other two regiments of the brigade 
and the horse batteries, where I witnessed similar scenes. 

On my return to Headquarters I received the welcome 
news that the Fifth French Army on my right was across the 
river and in close touch with the British; and that the Sixth 
French Army, after desperate fighting, had practically got 
possession of the lower bridges of the Ourcq, to which river 
the enemy was only clinging on his northern flank in order, 
apparently, to cover his retreat. In short, since noon the 
Germans had given up resistance and were now, at nightfall, 
in full retreat. 

During this day we made large captures in prisoners and 
war material, and our position at night was (roughly) along the 
line La Ferte-Bezu-Domptin, with the cavalry well forward. 



140 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

In my despatches of September 17, 1914, 1 estimated that 
the Battle of the Maine reached its conclusion on the night 
of September 10, and I see no reason to think otherwise now. 

On that night the British forces reached the line La Ferte- 
Milon-Neuilly-Saint-Front-Rocourt. 

The Sixth French Army had been wheeling up their right 
into line with us, and the Fifth French Army was nearly in 
line on our right. The enemy were in full retreat to the north 
and northeast. During the day, the cavalry, the First Army 
Corps, and the Second Army Corps had fought numerous 
engagements with the enemy's rearguard, and had made 
large captures. AUenby, as usual, had handled his cavahy 
with great vigour and skUl, nor had his detachments of the 
Third and Fifth Brigades on the left under General Gough 
been less energetic. The bridging of the Marne at La Ferte- 
sous-Jouarre by engineers of the Third Corps was a fine 
piece of work. Our casualties were heavy, but, having regard 
to the results attained, by no means excessive. 

I was able to visit some of the hospital trains on the 10th. 
Although there had been no chance yet of fully developing 
the organization of the wounded transport service, I think 
the best was done with the means available at the moment. 

Much has been written to recount the story of this great 
battle, and doubtless for the next century controversy will 
rage over the event and its results. 

At the opening of the battle, on the morning of Septem- 
ber 6, the Allied forces had to turn from the task of arranging 
defensive positions on the Seine. The Fifth French Army 
and the British Army had already fallen back close to that 
river in accordance with the general plan, and the rear eche- 
lons of transport, etc., rested to the south of it. 



A SURVEY OF THE BATTLE 141 

Between September 6 and 12 the German Army was 
driven back pell-mell from the Seine to the Marne, a dis- 
tance of sixty-five miles, whilst the front extended from 
Paris to Verdun. Their losses in officers, men, prisoners, 
guns, machine guns, and war material were enormous. Most 
desperate battles were fought all along the line. 

Many different views have been put forward regarding 
the initial foundation upon which the Germans built up 
their strategic scheme for the invasion of France. It is not 
my purpose here to discuss them or to speculate upon what 
was actually in the minds of the Great General Staff when 
they set out upon this gigantic enterprise. Whatever the 
original conception may have been, I claim for the Allies 
that its fulfilment was crushed forever and a day at the Bat- 
tle of the Marne. 

Splendidly, however, as the Allied armies fought, skUf ully 
as each of the various corps and armies which were engaged 
supported one another, it was the Germans themselves who 
deliberately threw away whatever chance they ever had of 
securing a decisive victory. We have seen that so late as the 
morning of September 6, Joilre and I were still so certain that 
the German thrust was in full career that an advance by the 
British Army in an almost easterly direction was ordered 
and partially undertaken. Yet at that time von Kluck's 
great "advance" had for some hours become a counter- 
march in hurried "retreat." 

Why this sudden change? 

Because he then discovered that his communications were 
about to! be threatened on the Ourcq. Surely the most in- 
experienced of generals might have anticipated some such 
threat, and, further, might have realized that the line of the 



142 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

river Ourcq afforded him the most convenient and efficient 
means of securing flank protection. It has been said by crit- 
ics of the battle that, had Maunoury delayed his movement 
on the Oui'cq, von Kluck would not have taken alarm. But 
when the German general first ordered the counter-march 
the French general had hardly recrossed the Marne. 

The fact probably is that von Kluck and his staff never 
really liked the role which was forced upon them by the 
Great General Staff, and that they undertook their part in 
the battle with wavering minds and with their heads half 
turned round. 

When the Allied armies look back to this great battle and 
realize what was accomplished, they cannot fail to remember 
with a thrill of pride that they fought and badly defeated an 
army not only flushed with the knowledge that it had ef- 
fected a tremendous inroad into the enemy's territory, but 
which also enjoyed one other incalculable advantage; it was 
commanded and led by a sovereign who possessed absolute 
authority — military and civil. Its Emperor and Command- 
er-in-Chief was served by a Great General Staff which had 
been steadily and vigorously preparing for this tremendous 
trial of strength for a period of over forty years. 
; This great collision of nations in arms had been kept 
steadfastly in view. In the preparation of the German iVrmy 
for this supreme moment not a chance had been thrown 
away. In man power, armament, training, and equipment; 
in the instruction of leaders and officers; on the choice of 
commanders and every other element which makes for effi- 
ciency in an army, the most laborious thought and care had 
been expended. 
- Compare with this the conditions in which the French 



A COMPARISON 143 

and British Armies had been brought up to this fateful 
hour — systems, staffs, military policy, even money grants, 
all undergoing constant and drastic change year after year 
with every fresh wave of popular opinion and every fresh 
clamour, whilst the intrigues which run riot in all branches 
of the public service when "votes" rule everything, exer- 
cised their usual baneful influence. 

As regards the tactical aspect of the Battle of the Marne, 
I believe that the name of Marshal Joffre will descend to 
posterity with that battle as one of the greatest military 
commanders in history; I believe that the battles fought and 
won throughout the great length of the line over which they 
took place by the armies of France under their splendid lead- 
ers, will outshine for valour and skill even those glorious 
deeds of the past, the memorials of which deck their colours 
with imperishable laurels. 

For the British Army I claim that we carried out the role 
assigned to us, and that our rapid passages of the various 
river lines in face of great opposition, and our unexpected 
appearance on the lines of retreat of the forces opposing the 
Fifth and Sixth Armies were practically decisive of the great 
result. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE AND ITS PROGRESS UP TO 
SEPTEMBER 30 

I AM throwing my thoughts back, and endeavouring to re- 
call the mental atmosphere which surrounded me during the 
two days of pursuit following the fighting on the Marne and 
during the early days of the Battle of the Aisne, which I am 
now about to recount. I know that the predominant senti- 
ments which ruled my mind were decidedly optimistic. 

As I pointed out in the opening pages of this book, we had 
not even then grasped the true effect and bearing of the many 
new elements which had entered into the practice of modern 
war. We fuUy believed we were driving the Germans back to 
the Meuse if not to the Rhine, and all my correspondence 
and communications at this time with Joffre and the French 
generals most closely associated with me, breathed the same 
spirit. 

This wiU be better understood if I quote an order which 
was issued from French General Headquarters at Chatillon, 
dated September 10, the day which practically saw the close 
of the Marne battle: — 

"The German forces are giving way on the Marne and in 
Champagne before the Allied Armies of the centre and left 
wing. 

" To confirm and take advantage of this success, it is neces- 
sary to follow up this movement with energy so as to allow 
the enemy no rest. 



ENCOURAGING REPORTS 145 

"The offensive movement will, therefore, be continued 
along the whole front in a general north-northeast direc- 
tion. 

" (a) The Sixth Army will continue to rest its right on the 
Ourcq at the Sapieres stream and on to the line Longpont- 
Chaudun-Courmelles-Soissons (inclusive). Bridoux' cavalry 
corps will gain ground on the outer wing and will endeavour 
to disturb the enemy's line of communication and retreat. 

" (b) The British forces should follow up their victorious 
advance between the above-mentioned line and the road 
Rocourt-Fere-en-Tardenois-Mont Notre Dame-Bazoches, 
which wUl be at their disposal. 

" (c) The Fifth Army east of the latter line will turn the 
forest south and north of Epernay on the west, coveruig it- 
self against hostile troops which may be found there, and 
ready to act in an easterly direction towards Rheims against 
the columns which are retiruig before the Ninth Army. The 
Tenth Corps wiU move from about Vertus in the direction of 
Epernay-Rheims, securing connection between the Fifth 
and Ninth Armies and ready to support the latter at any 
time." 

Subsequent to the issue of the above orders, Joffre and I 
held several consultations with reference to marches through 
the wooded country (For^t de Saiut-Gobain and other 
places) lying to the north of the Aisne. 

In these first few days of this period of the war we were 
decidedly encouraged by reports from other theatres. The 
Belgian Army appeared to be well established in Antwerp, 
and a fine sortie, directed by the King of the Belgians, had 



146 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

considerable effect in scattering the German forces operating 
there, and certainly delayed the movement of reenforce- 
ments which had been ordered south. The news from Russia 
was also not unfavourable. 

However, we were destined to undergo another terrible 
disappointment. The lessons of war as it is to-day had to be 
rubbed in by another dearly bought experience, and in a 
hard and bitter school. 

The first surprise came when the "Jack Johnsons" began 
to fall. This was a nickname given by the men ("Black 
Marias" was another) to a high-explosive shell fired from 
eight-inch howitzers which had been brought down from 
the fortress of Maubeuge to support the German defen- 
sive position on the Aisne. They were our first experience 
of an artillery much heavier than our own. Although these 
guns caused considerable damage and many bad casual- 
ties, they never had any very demoralizing effect upon 
the troops. 

As day by day the trench fighting developed and I came 
to realize more and more the much greater relative power 
which modern weapons have given to the defence; as new 
methods were adopted in the defensive use of machine guns; 
and as unfamiliar weapons in the shape of "trench mortars" 
and "bombs," hand grenades, etc., began to appear on the 
battle-field, so, day by day, I began dimly to apprehend 
what the future might have in store for us. 

This drastic process of education went steadily on, but 
still reports came periodically from our aircraft, from our 
trenches, and from the French on either flank, that the 
enemy in front of us was "weakening," that (phantom!) 
columns had been seen marching north, etc., and so the 



NEW LESSONS IN WAR 147 

still small voice of truth and reality, trying to speak within 
me, remained faint and almost unheard. 

Presently came Maunoury's great effort to turn the Ger- 
man right flank. I witnessed one day of this fighting myself 
with General Maunoury and came back hopeful : alas ! these 
hopes were not fulfilled. Afterwards we witnessed the stu- 
pendous efforts of de Castelnau and Foch, but all ended in 
the same trench! trench! trench! 

I finished my part in the Battle of the Aisne, however, un- 
converted, and it required the further and more bitter lesson 
of my own failure in the north to pass the Lys River, during 
the last days of October, to bring home to my mind a princi- 
ple in warfare of to-day which I have held ever since, 
namely, that, given forces fairly equally matched, you can 
"bend," but you cannot "break," your enemy's trench line. 

Everything which has happened in the war has borne out 
the truth of this view, and from the moment I grasped this 
great truth I never failed to proclaim it, although eventually 
I suffered heavily for holding such opinions. 

The great feature of the pursuit on the 11th was the cap- 
ture by the Third French Army of all the artillery of a Ger- 
man corps. 

On the 12th my Headquarters were moved to Fere-en- 
Tardenois. Early in the day I joined Pulteney at some cross- 
roads two mUes south of Buzancy (southeast of Soissons). 
The enemy was opposing the passage of the Aisne to the 
Sixth French Army all along its line westwards from Sois- 
sons, and the Fourth Division held a position on the bridges 
southeast of Soissons to assist it. 

The banks of the Aisne are very precipitous, and our posi- 
tion on the heights gave us a wonderful view of the fighting. 



148 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

What astonished me was the volume of the fire. Between 
Soissons and Compiegne the river seemed ablaze, so intense 
was the artillery fire on both sides. 

I watched the action till about 1.30 p.m., when the German 
artillery, which had been very active all the morning at 
Montagne de Paris (south of Soissons) and other important 
points, withdrew north of the river. We saw large masses of 
transport and troops moving in a northeast direction. 

At nightfall our Third Corps was close to the Aisne, the 
bridges of which were destroyed. 

On my return to Headquarters at night the reporting offi- 
cer informed me that the Sixth French Army had reached 
the Aisne after some opposition, and that the French cavalry 
on the left were working round by Compiegne and moving 
northeast to threaten the German communications. 

The Fifth French Army on our right was on the line Cor- 
micy-Rheims-Verzy, the Eighteenth Corps being thrown 
back on its left flank in touch with our right. A message 
from Joffre informed me that the Ninth and Fourth French 
Armies had both made considerable progress and driven 
back the enemy. 

The cavalry under AUenby did very good work on this 
day. They cleared the town of Braine and the high ground 
beyond it of strong hostile detachments. They bivouacked 
this night at Dhuizel. Allenby reported to me some excellent 
work done in the neighbourhood of Braine by the Queen's 
Bays assisted by Shaw's Ninth Brigade of the Third Division 
(First Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Fourth Battal- 
ion Royal Fusiliers, First Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, 
and First Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers). 

The First Corps reached Vauxcere and the Second Corps 



THE AISNE VALLEY 149 

Braine and neighbourhood. Gough, with the Second Cavalry- 
Division, was at Chermizy. 

Thus, on the morning of September 13, the day on which 
the Battle of the Aisne really opened, the British Army was 
in position south of that river in its course between Soissons 
on the west and Bourg on the east, with outposts on the 
river. 

Now as to the ground over which the British Army fought. 
The Aisne valley runs generally east and west, and consists 
of a flat-bottomed depression, of width varying from half a 
mile to two mUes, down which the river follows a winding 
course to the west, at some points near the southern slopes 
of the valley and at others near the northern. The high 
ground, on both the north and the south of the river, is 
approximately four hundred feet above the bottom of the 
valley itself, which is broken into numerous rounded spurs 
and reentrants. The most prominent of the former are the 
Chivres spur on the^ right bank and the Sermoise spur on 
the left. 

Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is 
divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, 
down which the small river Vesle flows to the main stream 
near Sermoise. The slopes of the plateau overlooking the 
Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and 
are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also 
stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top 
of the high ground. There are several small towns and vil- 
lages dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the 
chief of which is the town of Soissons. 

The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some one hundred and 
seventy feet in breadth, but, being fifteen feet deep in the 



150 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and 
Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured 
by the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it. 
On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Sois- 
sons to Vailly, where it crosses the river and continues east- 
ward along the south bank. From Soissons to Sermoise a 
double line of railway runs along the south bank, turning at 
the latter place up the Vesle valley towards Bazoches. 

The position held by the enemy was a very strong one, 
either for a delaying action or for a defensive battle. One 
of its chief military characteristics is that, from the high 
ground, on neither side can the top of the plateau on the 
other side be seen, except for small stretches. This is chiefly 
due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another impor- 
tant point is that all the bridges are under either direct or 
high-angle artillery fire. 

The general lay and contour of the ground in the region 
over which the British Army fought at the Battle of the 
Aisne are deeply impressed on my memory. 

Rolling downs of considerable altitude characterize the 
country over which the approaches to the river from the 
south lead, whilst the banks of the river itself, especially at 
the south, are wooded, precipitate, and rocky. Thus was I 
able to secure many posts of observation which enabled me 
to compass a much greater personal survey of the fighting 
than in any other terrain over which we fought. 

During the early phases of the Battle of Ypres, the high 
ground north of the river Lys presented some similar fea- 
tures; just as Kemmel HiU, and the height overlooking Lens 
and, farther south, the rolling plains west of the Somme, 
were also good for observation; but these all differed from 



WATCHING THE BATTLE 151 

the Aisne as aflPording a distant view, whereas, by avoiding 
observation and creeping through woods and undergrowth, 
it was possible to reach points of vantage on the southern 
bank of the Aisne, whence a close observation of the fighting 
line could be maintained. 

I can remember sitting for hours at the mouth of a great 
cave which lay high up the southern bank of the river within 
about four hundred yards of the vUlage of Missy and to the 
eastern flank of it, from which point I saw some of the first 
effects of the six-inch siege howitzers which were sent to us at 
that time. Missy lay along the bed of the stream on both 
banks, and the Germans occupied a curiously shaped, high, 
conical hiU which was called "Conde Fort." This was situ- 
ated about six hundred yards north of Missy and reached by 
a steep ascent from the banks of the river. The hill com- 
pletely dominated the village. 

On the day of which I am writing (September 24), it was 
very interesting to witness the clearance of this hiU by our 
high-explosive shells. We could see the Germans flying in all 
directions to the rear, and we subsequently got reliable in- 
formation that their losses on this occasion were very heavy. 

Although this relieved the pressure on the Fifth Division, 
which was holding Missy and the entrenchments to the 
north of it, I have always thought it very creditable to Sir 
Charles Fergusson and his command that he retained his 
hold on Missy to the last in face of the threatening situation 
on his front. He was no doubt much helped by the superior 
power of observation obtained by his artillery owing to the 
configuration of the ground all along the south bank, and 
this, in fact, was most helpful to the British Army through- 
out the battle. 



152 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

Missy is another instance in proof of the principle which 
all recent fighting has clearly established, namely, that com- 
mand of ground is of value chiefly with regard to the power 
of observation it affords. 

On another occasion I well remember spending a long time 
lying on the top of a rick, covered by hay for concealment. 
From this point very valuable artillery observation was se- 
cured, and an excellent view of all Haig's positions was 
afforded. 

Poor Wing, the C.R.A. of the First Corps, took me to this 
place, and was beside me all the time. He was afterwards 
killed at the Battle of Loos whilst in command of the 
Tweffth Division. He was beloved by all who served with 
him; his gallantry, skill, and dash were spoken of by every 
one, and his loss was deeply felt. 

In the early hours of the 13th, we attacked the river line 
all along our front. The enemy artillery made a vigorous de- 
fence, employing many heavy and other kinds of guns. The 
German infantry was not very energetic in defence, but the 
bombardment continued heavily all day on both sides. At 
nightfall all passages except that at Conde were secured and 
held, our advance line running from Bucy-le-Long on the 
west through spurs north and northeast of Celles to Bourg 
on the east. 

On this afternoon I went to see the bridge which the Third 
Corps had tlu-own over the Aisne at Venizel. The task had to 
be done under fire of heavy guns with high-explosive shell, 
and it was a fine piece of work. 

After leaving there, I went to the Headquarters of the 
Fifth Division at Serches, where I met Fergusson. Here I 
learnt that up to then they had been unable to approach the 



FIRST DIVISION AT VENDRESSE 153 

crossing at Missy, as the enemy had infantry and machine 
guns on the opposite bank, supported by artillery in rear. 
Throughout the battle this particular point was a locality of 
great interest. 

Early on the 14th I got news that the Sixth Division, 
which had been sent out to me from England, was now con- 
centrated south of the Marne, and was beginning its march 
to join us. 

During the night of the 13th all three corps had con- 
structed bridges on their fronts for crossing, and, in the early 
morning of the 14th, the remainder of the First Corps crossed 
at Bourg, the Second at Vailly and Missy, and the Third 
Corps at Venizel. On the 14th I spent some time with Haig, 
who was very successful, and made an excellent advance 
considering the strong opposition which confronted him. 

Early in the morning, Lomax, with the First Division, sur- 
prised the enemy at Vendresse, capturing six hundred pris- 
oners and twelve guns. This distinguished divisional com- 
mander died a few months later from the effect of wounds 
received during the first Battle of Ypres. 

From the opening of the campaign up to the day he was 
wounded his services were invaluable. The division he com- 
manded was always in the hottest of the fighting, and he 
commanded it throughout with consummate skill and dash. 
His personality gained for him the esteem and affection of 
all who served with him, and his loss was badly felt through- 
out the Army. 

On this day (14th) the Second Division also made good 
progress, and in the evening its left held the Ostel Spur, an 
important point of vantage. 

The centre and left of the Army were not so successful. 



154 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

The Third Division, after crossing at Vailly, had nearly- 
reached Aizy (about two and one-half mUes north of the 
river) when they were driven back by a powerful counter- 
attack supported by a strong force of heavy artillery. At 
nightfall, however, they were still one mile north of the 
river. The enemy's artillery position north of Aizy was a very 
strong one. 

The Fifth Division was unable to advance beyond the 
northern edge of the Chivres Plateau. Here also a considera- 
ble force of heavy artillery was concentrated against them. 

The Fourth Division retained during the 14th the position 
they had taken the day before north of Bucy-le-Long. 

The Sixth French Army pushed up its left flank, and the 
Fourth French Corps was advancing east in support of the 
Seventh Corps, which was holding the enemy from the north. 

The French position about Soissons was well held all day. 

The Eighteenth Corps (Fifth French Army) had its left 
flank close to the right of our First Corps on the heights of 
Craonne. The remainder of the Fifth Army was heavily en- 
gaged the whole day all along its line as far as Rheims. 

On the night of the 14th I began to think that the enemy 
was really making a determined stand on the Aisne. 

Our situation on this night was as follows: — 

First Corps and cavalry division holding line Troyon- 
south of Chivy-south of Beaulne-Soupir, with First and 
Second Cavalry Brigades on the left, all in close touch with 
the enemy. 

First Corps Headquarters: Courcelles (afterwards Dhui- 
zel). 

Second Corps: Third Division holding circle round Vailly, 
Fifth Division holding south of Chivres Plateau to Sainte- 



HEAVY LOSSES 155 

Marguerite and Missy, both in close touch with the enemy; 
guns on south bank of river. 

Third Corps : Fourth Division holding south end of spurs 
from Le Moncel to Crouy (French on north of Crouy Ridge), 
also in close touch with enemy; Nineteenth Brigade in re- 
serve at Venizel Bridge. 

Gough's Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades : Chassemy. 

On this day our casualties were heavy, amounting to be- 
tween fifteen hundred and two thousand, including three 
commanding officers. 

On the 15th my impression of the previous day — namely, 
that the enemy was making a firm stand in his actual posi- 
tion — was confirmed also by an intercepted German wire- 
less message. It seemed probable that we had the whole of 
the German First Army in front of us. 

This being my appreciation of the situation, I was not 
satisfied with my own position in two important respects. In 
the first place, our losses were heavily accumulating, and I 
had not sufficient reserves to reenforce dangerous points; the 
enemy had a great artillery superiority, and at this time 
and for some days afterwards I badly felt the want of the 
guns and machine guns which had been lost at Le Cateau 
and were not yet made good. In the second place, I was 
most anxious to get the Second and Third Corps forward 
and more in line with the First Corps on the right. 

The Sixth Division had now crossed the Marne, moving 
north, and orders were sent to its commander, General Keir, 
to come up as quickly as possible. My idea was that the 
Sixth Division should go to Haig, and that, with this rein- 
forcement, he should advance west and take the pressure 
off the Second and Third Corps. 



156 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

The First Corps was heavily counter-attacked on several 
occasions throughout the 15th, and, although the enemy was 
most gallantly repulsed everywhere, our losses were very 
severe. 

Towards evening a retirement of both German infantry 
and cavalry took place, and my hopes were revived of the 
continuance of the enemy's retreat. On this I directed the 
Sixth Division to join its own Third Corps on the left. 

However, the enemy showing no further signs of leaving 
the position, my hopes for a further advance at last began to 
be founded altogether upon the probability of a successful 
attack by the Sixth French Army. 

On the 16th I went to see General Maunoury at his Head- 
quarters. I found him watching an attack of the Sixty-first 
and Sixty-second Divisions on the village of Nouvron and 
the plateau above it. The General and his staff were stand- 
ing on a kind of grassy tableland on the edge of a wood. I re- 
member that a French staff officer who was there spoke Eng- 
lish fluently. I threw myself down on my face on the grass 
and watched the battle taking place on the other side of the 
river. 

I spent an hour or two with the General at this spot 
and discussed the situation with him. From all I could see 
the French appeared to be gettmg on very well. 

On my way back I visited the corps commanders again, 
and they all expressed the utmost confidence in their ability 
to hold their positions. 

After my return to Headquarters in the evening, Colonel 
C. B. Thompson (liaison officer with the Sixth French 
Army) reported to me. His accounts were disappointing 
after my experience during the day with Maunoury. He said 



A SOURCE OF ANXIETY 157 

that the Thirteenth French Corps had been checked south- 
west of Noyon by a night-attack of troops from the Nmth 
Reserve German Corps, which was said to have reached 
Noyon from Belgium. 

Here was another incident in that continual "flanking" 
and "outflanking" manoeuvre which was only to cease at 
the sea. 

Again, the Fourth French Corps arriving east had been 
arrested on finding the German force entrenched on its left 
(northern) flank. 

It is from this particular evening, 16th of September, that 
I date the origin of a grave anxiety which then began to 
possess me. 

In the years which preceded the war, discussions on vari- 
ous subjects which had come before the Imperial Committee 
of Defence, of which I was a member, had imbued my mind 
with a sense of the vital importance it was to Great Britain 
that the Channel ports should be held by a power in absolute 
friendship with us. 

I venture here to quote some extracts from a paper which 
I wrote very shortly before the war, for circulation amongst 
the members of the Committee of Imperial Defence: — 

"... I think it will be allowed that, in a war between our- 
selves and a great Continental Power which is in possession of 
the Eastern Channel coast-line between Dunkirk and Bou- 
logne, submarines, assisted by aircraft, would effectually 
deny the passage of the Straits of Dover to any war or other 
vessel which was not submersible. In fact, the command of 
the sea, in so far as this part of the Channel is concerned, 
would not depend upon the relative strength of the opposing 



158 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

Navies, but would remain in dispute until one side or other 
effected practical destruction of its adversary's aircraft and 
submarines. 

"The way would then lie open to the Power which had 
gained this advantage to move an invading force of any size 
in comparative safety across the Straits at any part of the 
coast between (say) Ramsgate and Dungeness on the one 
side and Dunkirk and Boulogne on the other. 

"The command of these Straits would be a contest be- 
tween submarines and aeroplanes . . . 

"If the Continental Powers secured the command they 
would possess the great advantage of menacing us with a 
twentieth-century edition of the stroke Napoleon intended 
to deal against us from Boulogne in 1805. 

"To put the matter briefly; I hold that the Straits of 
Dover, regarded as a military obstacle to the invasion of this 
country, wUl, in the not far distant future, altogether lose 
their maritime character, and the problem of their successful 
passage by an invading force will present features somewhat 
resembling those involving the attack and defence of great 
river lines or operations on the Great Lakes in a war be- 
tween Canada and the United States. 

"The main object to be attained in trying to secure the 
passage of a great river line is to gain possession of the oppo- 
site bank and establish a strong bridgehead. 

"In accordance with the views enunciated in this paper, I 
apply the same principle to the Straits of Dover, and hold 
that the only reliable defence against a powerful attack by 
hostile aircraft and submarines in vastly superior numbers, 
is to possess a strong bridgehead on the French coast with an 
effective means of passing and repassing across the Straits 



THE CHANNEL PORTS 159 

which would only be secured by the projected Channel 
Tunnel." 

The bearing of all this upon the subject of the present 
chapter is apparent. So long as the Germans were being 
driven back, whether by frontal or flank attack, the Channel 
ports might be considered comparatively safe; but on the 
particular night of which I am speaking (September 16) I 
had arrived at the conclusion that a frontal attack was hope- 
less, whilst it began to appear that any threat against the 
German flank would be effectually countered if not turned 
against ourselves. 

This, then, was my great fear. What was there to prevent 
the enemy launching a powerful movement for the purpose 
of securing the Channel ports, whilst the main forces were 
engaged in practically neutralizing one another.'* From this 
time I sent constant and urgent warnings to London by 
wire and by letter to look out for the safety of these same 
ports. 

It was just about now that I began to conceive the idea of 
disengaging from the Aisne and moving to a position in the 
north, for the main purpose of defending the Channel ports, 
and, as a secondary reason, to be in a better position to con- 
cert combined action and cooperation with the Navy. 

At the moment of which I am speaking, and for many 
days afterwards, there was no serious thought or belief that 
Antwerp was in danger. My fear for the Channel ports, 
which then began to lay a strong hold upon my thoughts, in 
all probability influenced my mind, and, perhaps, affected 
my dispositions throughout the rest of the time during 
which I took my part in the Battle of the Aisne. 



160 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

r remember on the same day (September 16) visiting some 
hospital trains which were taking the wounded away. It 
was gratifying to mark the great improvement in their 
organization and equipment. 

On the 17th the First Corps was heavily attacked, but re- 
pulsed the enemy with great loss. Craonne was lost by the 
Eighteenth French Corps, but a strong position was still 
maintained by them on the Chemin des Dames. 

Our operations on the Aisne were at this time much ham- 
pered by heavy rain. 

On this day (September 17) a French reserve division cap- 
tured two complete battalions of Prussian Guards in Berry- 
au-Bac, and a French cavalry corps made a splendid raid on 
the German communications, operating from Roye and 
moving east as far as the neighbourhood of Ham and Saint- 
Quentin. In this raid General Bridoux, commanding the 
cavalry corps, was killed in his motor, and his papers were 
captured. 

I detached the Sixth Division from Pulteney's command 
(Third Corps) to form an army reserve, but gave him the 
use of the divisional artillery. 

An entrenched position was now selected and laid out, and 
work begun on it south of the Aisne in view of a possible re- 
treat to the south of the river. 

The First Corps continuing to be subject to heavy and 
constant attacks, I reenforced Haig on the 18th with a Brig- 
ade of the Sixth Division, and moved the remainder of that 
division into a more central position. My anxiety as to re- 
serves caused me also to move Gough's cavalry division 
from the Second Corps to take up that duty. 

The prominent featm-e of this day's dispositions was the 



DE CASTELNAU'S NEW ARMY 161 

issue of an order from Joffre by which the Sixth French 
Army assumed a defensive role, occupying the line Soissons- 
Vic-sur-Aisne-Tracy-le-Val-Bailly, pending the formation of 
another army to consist of four corps (Fourth, Fourteenth, 
Thirteenth, and Twentieth French) with two cavalry corps. 
This army was to concentrate at once to the northwest of 
Noyon; it was intended that it should operate in an easterly 
direction against the enemy's flank, and it was placed under 
the command of de Castelnau. 

I had enjoyed the great advantage and privilege of a close 
acquaintance with this distinguished French commander for 
some years before the war, and in that time I had learnt 
enough of his splendid, soldier-like character and great capa- 
bilities as a leader to experience no surprise when actual war 
revealed his ability. 

Although de Castelnau and the army he commanded were 
not successful in actually turning the enemy's flank and 
compelling his retreat, I believe that history will assign to 
this great general the honour of commanding the army 
which drove the first big nail into the German coffin, for it 
was the army which struck the blow that changed the line of 
battle from "east and west" to "north and south." De Cas- 
telnau, by the fine leading of that army, built the first sec- 
tion of the great besieging wall which was destined to form 
an impenetrable barrier between Germany and her main 
objectives. 

In directing this great movement as he did, Marshal Joffre 
must once again be credited with one of those flashes of mili- 
tary genius which have never been surpassed in the annals of 
war, 

A somewhat significant and rather amusing example of 



162 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

Haig's power of resource was shown on the 19th, when he 
arranged with the Zouaves on his right to give them ten 
thousand rations of bully beef in exchange for the loan of 
two hea'\y guns. 

It was estimated that the enemy's attacks against the 
First Corps up to this time had cost him at least seven thou- 
sand men. The dead were lying thick in front of our trenches. 

The fighting on the 19th of September will always remain 
memorable to the French, because on this day the Germans 
practically destroyed Rheims Cathedral by artillery fire. 

On the 20th I had a long conference with Haig at his 
Headquarters, and afterwards visited both his divisional 
commanders (Lomax and Munro) and also some of the brig- 
adiers. 

The Fu'st Corps was indeed hard pressed, but was gal- 
lantly repulsing all attacks. Nevertheless, it was suffering 
heaAy losses and badly needed rest. I told Haig he could call 
upon the remaining two brigades of the Sixth Division (he 
already had the Eighteenth Brigade in his trenches) for re- 
enforcement, if necessary. 

Later in the day a violent attack on the Third Division 
(Second Corps) obliged me to place the Sixteenth Brigade 
(First Battalion the Buffs, Fhst Battalion Leicester Regi- 
ment, First Battalion Shropshire Light Infantry, and Second 
Battalion York and Lanes Regiment) at Smith-Dorrien's 
disposal. This left only the Seventeenth Brigade and Gough's 
cavalry in general reserve. 

I told Haig he could call upon them if absolutely neces- 
sary, but asked him to do without them if possible. Although 
he was heavily pressed he finished the day without the aid of 
these troops. 



TIRED BRIGADES RELIEVED 163 

The position of the three reserve divisions on the left of 
the Sixth French Army gave cause for great anxiety on this 
evening, as the development of de Castelnau's movements 
to the north could not make itself felt for some two or three 
days. 

On the 21st I was able to effect a much-needed relief of the 
troops holding the trenches. The Sixteenth Infantry Brigade 
of the Sixth Division relieved the Seventh Infantry Brigade 
(Third Battalion Worcester Regiment, Second Battalion 
South Lanes Regiment, First Battalion Wilts Regiment, 
and Second Battalion Royal Irish Rifles) of the Third Divi- 
sion, the Seventh Brigade joining the Sixth Division in gen- 
eral reserve at Couvrelles. The Seventeenth Infantry Bri- 
gade (First Battalion Royal Fusiliers, First Battalion North 
Staffs Regiment, Second Battalion Leinster Regiment, and 
Third Battalion Rifle Brigade) relieved the Fifth Infantry- 
Brigade (Second Battalion Worcester Regiment, Second 
Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, Second Bat- 
talion Highland Light Infantry, and Second Battalion Con- 
naught Rangers) of the Second Division, the latter joining 
the Sixth Division as general reserve at Dhuizel. 

A significant result of our recent experience was that the 
cavalry were calling out loudly for bayonets. 

On this day Sir Henry Rawlinson arrived and reported 
himself. General Snow having met with a severe accident 
owing to his horse falling, I placed General Rawlinson in 
temporary command of the Fourth Division. 

General Maxwell, the newly appointed Inspector-General 
of Lines of Communication, also reported his arrival. 

On the afternoon of the 22d I went out with Allenby to the 
extreme right of Haig's position, where the cavalry were 



164 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

working, and made a close reconnaissance of the ground over 
which the First Army Corps was fighting. 

We ascended the heights north of the Aisne leading to the 
plateau which lies to the south of the Chemin des Dames, 
now so famous a locality. The ground was thickly wooded 
up to the edge of the plateau, and the winding narrow road 
led through small groups of rough houses and buildings 
which seemed as if they had been hewn out of the rock. 
The enemy's "Black Marias" constantly searched those 
roads in close proximity, — indeed, actually within the 
boundaries of these locations, — but still tiny children were 
to be seen playing beside the road all unconscious of any 
danger. 

Near the top of the ascent was an enormous crater or val- 
ley, apparently of volcanic origin, which furnished covering 
and concealment to a large force of JNIoroccan troops in re- 
serve, who completely filled it. They, like the children, 
seemed to be perfectly oblivious of the high-explosive shell 
which often fell amongst them. Lying about in their light- 
blue and sUver uniforms they presented a very pictiu-esque 
appearance. 

On the night of the 22d I got a letter from Maunoury 
telling me that the enemy was most certainly going away 
from his front and that he intended to advance and attack 
at 4 A.M. on the 23d, and asking me to support him. I 
learned also that the Fifth French Army on my right was 
also planning an attack. 

I arranged to cooperate accordingly, but by the night of 
the 23d very little progTess had been effected. 

After this I think all om' eyes were turned eagerly towards 
the north and to de Castelnau, whilst, as to myself, I was 



DEFICIENCIES IN AMMUNITION 165 

more determined than ever that my proper sphere of action 
was clearly on the Belgian frontier in the north. 

The Second French Army made decided progress up to the 
end of September, but their action did not compel the enemy 
to evacuate his positions on the Aisne, nor did it seriously 
turn his flank. 

On the 26th, de Castelnau was heavily engaged, and was on 
that evening roughly on the line Ribecourt-Roye-Chaulnes- 
Bray-sur-Somme, with one cavalry division north of the 
Somme. On the 26th it was clear that the flanking move- 
ment of the Second (French) Army had for the moment 
failed, as the Second Bavarian Corps was on its left north 
of Peronne. 

By the 30th, de Castelnau was practically thrown on the 
defensive, and another army was composed of units drawn 
from the east. This army was intended to effect a turning 
movement pivoting on de Castelnau's left. 

There are a few salient points in the history of these last 
few days of the month which materially affected the course 
of the campaign. 

On the 26th, Sir Charles Haddon, Master-General of the 
Ordnance, arrived at my Headquarters to discuss the ques- 
tion of armament and ammunition. I took this opportunity 
to impress upon him how terribly deficient we were in heavy 
artillery as compared with the Germans, and urged as 
strongly as I possibly could that the manufacture of the 
class of ordnance, as well as an abimdance of ammunition, 
should be put in hand at once. 

My oflBcial correspondence with the War Office on this 
vital subject dates back to this time, and continued right up 
to June, 1915, when at last Mr. Lloyd George came to the 



166 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

rescue and entered upon his career of patriotic salvation. 
Britons all over the world will ever remember this distin- 
guished statesman with the utmost gratitude as one of the 
greatest of their Empire's sons. 

Only those who were in any degree associated with Mr. 
Lloyd George in this time of trial can fully realize the awful 
responsibility which rested upon him, and the difficult na- 
ture of the problem he had to solve. His work was done in 
face of a dead weight of senseless but powerful opposition, 
all of which he had to undermine and overcome. 

In later pages of this volume I shall refer again to the sub- 
ject of deficiencies in armament and ammunition. I have 
mentioned it here because I am firmly convinced that, had 
my advice with regard to it been listened to and acted upon 
at the time, the war would have finished long before it did, 
and untold suffering would have been saved to the civilized 
world. 

I think it was on September 24 that a few six-inch siege 
howitzers arrived and proved of great help to me. 

As I am about to recount the pourparlers with Joffre which 
led up to our move north, I am reminded that it was during 
these latter days of September that my friend Winston 
Churchill paid me a visit. I think of him in connection with 
this subject — quite apart from any question of Antwerp, 
which was not then in danger - — because it was at that time 
that we first discussed together the advisability of joint ac- 
tion by the Army and Navy. It was then that we sketched 
out plans for an offensive with one flank towards the sea, 
which, although the subsequent fall of Antwerp effected a 
drastic change in the conditions, were the same in principle 
as those which took substantial shape and form in the early 



NOTE TO GENERAL JOFFRE 167 

days of 1915, and which will be recounted in their proper 
place. 

I cannot adequately express my sense of the valuable help 
which I received throughout the war from Winston Church- 
ill's assistance and constant sympathy. Not only have I al- 
ways indignantly repudiated the shameful attacks which his 
countrymen have so often made upon him, but it rejoices 
me to know that I have been able to do so — having a full 
knowledge of all the facts — with a deep and true sense of 
the horrible injustice of the charges brought against him. I 
shall have more to say on this subject later. 

On September 29 I addressed to the French Commander- 
in-Chief the following note, which was conveyed to him that 
evening by General Wilson: — 

" Ever since our position in the French line was altered by 
the advance of General Maunoury's Sixth Army to the river 
Ourcq, I have been anxious to regain my original position 
on the left flank of the French armies. On several occasions I 
have thought of suggesting this move, but the strategical 
and tactical situation from day to day has made the proposal 
inopportune. Now, however, that the position of affairs has 
become clearly defined, and that the immediate future can 
be forecasted with some confidence, I wish to press the pro- 
posal with all the power and insistence which are at my dis- 
posal. The moment for the execution of such a move appears 
to me to be singularly opportune. 

" In the first place, the position of my force on the right 
bank of the river Aisne has now been thoroughly well en- 
trenched. 

" In the second place, I have carefully reconnoitred an 



168 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

alternative position on the left bank of the river Aisne, and 
have had this position entrenched from end to end, and it is 
now ready for occupation. 

"The strategical advantages of the proposed move are 
much greater. I am expecting to be reenforced by the Sev- 
enth Division from England early next week. 

" Following closely on this reenforcement will come the 
Third Cavalry Division from home, and then the Eighth 
Division from home, and simultaneously with this last reen- 
forcement wUl come two Indian divisions and an Indian 
cavalry division. 

" In other words, my present force of six divisions and two 
cavalry divisions will, within three or four weeks from now, 
be increased by four divisions and two cavalry divisions, 
making a total British force of ten divisions (five corps) and 
four cavalry divisions. 

" All through the present campaign I have been much re- 
stricted both in initiative and in movement by the smallness 
of my army in face of the enormous numbers of the enemy. 

" With an army of five corps and four cavalry divisions, my 
freedom of action, field of operation, and power of initiative 
wiU be increased out of all proportion to the numerical in- 
crease in corps, more especially as almost half my total force 
will then consist of fresh troops and will be opposed by an 
enemy already much worn by the severity of the previous 
fighting. 

"Another reason of a strategical nature for changing my 
position in the line is the great advantage which my forces 
will gain by a shortened line of communication, an advan- 
tage which falls almost equally on your railways. 

" It appears to me, therefore, that both from strategical 



GENERAL JOFFRE'S VIEWS 169 

reasons and from tactical reasons it is desirable that the 
British Army should regain its position on the left of the line. 

"There remains the question of when this move should 
take place. 

" I submit that now is the time. 

" We are all sedentary armies, and movements and changes 
are easily made. Once the forward movement has been com- 
menced, it will be more diflScult to pull out my army from 
the line of advance, and a further delay in the transfer of my 
force from its present position will lead to great confusion 
both at the front and on the lines of communication, and a 
great loss of power and efficiency ui the coming campaign. 

" It is for these reasons that I advocate the transfer of my 
force from its present position to the extreme left of the liae, 
and I advocate that the change should be made now." 

On the 30th, I received the following reply from Joffre: — 

" Great General Headquarters Staff 
" 3d Bureau 

" September 30, 1914 
" Note by General Joffre, Commander-in-Chief, to Marshal 
French, Commanding British Army. 
" His Excellency Marshal French has been good enough to 
draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the particu- 
lar interest attaching to the proposal that the British Army 
should reoccupy the position which it originally held on the 
left of the French armies. 

"In view of the ever-increasing strength of the British 
forces, this position would oflFer great advantages in lighten- 
ing the work of the French railways and diminishing the 
length of the British line of communication, and, above all. 



170 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

in giving to Marshal French's army a liberty of action and of 
power very superior to those it now possesses. 

" The increase of strength which will shortly accrue to the 
British Army by the arrival of the Seventh and Eighth Di- 
visions and a division of cavalry, and the two Indian divi- 
sions and one cavalry division from India entirely justifies 
the Marshal's request. The Commander-in-Chief shares this 
view, and is persuaded that if this movement had been possi- 
ble it would have been very advantageous for the Allied 
Armies; but so far the general situation has not admitted of 
this being carried out. 

" Is it possible at this moment to contemplate its realization 
in the future.'' His Excellency Marshal French thinks that 
the present moment is particularly favourable to his project. 
In front of the British line, as also in front of the Sixth, 
Ninth, and Fourth Armies, the situation is, so to speak, un- 
changed. For nearly fifteen days the armies of the centre 
have been accrochees to the ground without making any real 
advance. There have been violent attacks and periods of 
calm, but the Commander-in-Chief wishes to point out that 
this is far from being the case on the wings. 

" As a matter of fact, on the right, the Third Army and a 
portion of the First Army for several days in the neighbour- 
hood of Saint-Mihiel have been fighting an obstinate battle, 
the issue of which is not in doubt, but the results of which 
have not yet made themselves felt. On the left, the Second 
Army, which to-day forms the extreme flank of the line, has 
for three days past been the object of furious attacks, which 
show how important it is for the enemy to crush our wing. 

" Will this army always form the left of the French forces? 
We cannot think so, because the fact that to-day the army 



SUGGESTED DISPOSITIONS 171 

there has been subdivided will doubtless lead the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to form a new army there; the transport of 
troops necessitated by the creation of this army, formed 
from elements taken away from the front without leaving a 
gap in our line, must of necessity render our situation some- 
what delicate for some days. 

" If the Commander-in-Chief has contemplated the pos- 
sibility of withdrawing a certain number of corps without 
modifying his front, he has never thought of transporting 
an entire army, the removal of which would create a gap 
impossible to fiU. 

"The battle has been going on since September 13. It is 
necessary that during this period of crisis, which will have 
considerable influence on the subsequent operations, every 
one should maintain his position without thinking of modi- 
fying it, so as to be ready for all eventualities. 

"Now, the movement contemplated by His Excellency 
Marshal French would inevitably entail complications, not 
only in the position of troops but also in those of supply 
trains, etc. It might possibly create confusion in the general 
dispositions of our armies the extent of which it would be 
difficult to measure. 

" For the above reasons the Commander-in-Chief cannot 
share the view of Marshal French as to the time at which this 
movement should be carried out; on the other hand, it ap- 
pears that it might be possible to begin it from to-day on- 
wards by making certain dispositions, the detail of which is 
given below: — 

" 1. The British Army might operate like the French 
Army. It is to-day strongly entrenched in the positions 
which it occupies. While maintaining the integrity of its 



172 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

front, it might doubtless be possible for it to withdraw a cer- 
tain number of divisions (to begin with one corps), which 
might in succession be transported to the left. 

" 2. The British cavalry division is at the present moment 
unemployed on the front; it might, similarly to the Eleventh 
and Tenth Corps and Eighth Division of Cavalry, move by rail 
or by march route to the extreme left to act as a communi- 
cating link between the Belgian Army and the French troops. 

" 3. The Seventh and Eighth Divisions, which will shortly 
arrive, could be disembarked in the neighbourhood of Dun- 
kirk. They would subsequently operate in the direction of 
Lille. Their action would immediately make itself felt on the 
right flank of the German Army, which daily receives fresh 
reenforcements. These divisions would be joined to the divi- 
sions withdrawn from the front. 

" 4. The Indian divisions, as soon as they are able to take 
the field, would move by rail to join the English formations 
assembled in the northern region, and would form the nu- 
cleus with which would be united the other British divisions 
as soon as they should be removed. 

"5. As soon as the advance can be resumed, the front will 
be narrowed; it would then be possible for the English to 
halt and slip behind with a view to moving the left of the line 
while the Sixth and Fifth Armies close in towards each other. 
The fewer units remaining to be moved, the easier would be 
the operation. 

"To sum up, the Commander-in-Chief shares Marshal 
French's view that it is desirable for the whole British Army 
to be on the left of the French armies, but cannot be entirely 
of the same opinion as to the time at which this movement 
should be carried out. 



NEW DISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS 173 

" The Commander-in-Chief would be grateful to His Ex- 
cellency Marshal French if the latter would let him know 
whether he shares his views as to the proposals indicated 
above." 

On the same date, I replied to the Commander-in-Chief as 
follows: — 

" September 30, 1914 
" Note by the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, British 
Forces, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. 

" The Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, 
has received the note which His Excellency the Com- 
mander-in-Chief has been kind enough to address to him, in 
reply to his Memorandum of the 29th instant. 

" Sir John French entirely agrees with the views expressed, 
and will give effect to them at once in the following manner: — 

" 1. The Second Cavalry Division, consisting of two bri- 
gades under the command of Major-General Gough, which is 
now located in rear of the left of the line held by the British 
forces, will hold itself in readiness to proceed to whatever 
point on the railway His Excellency the Commander-in- 
Chief may decide upon, to be moved thence to Lille, if that 
place should be decided upon as the point upon which the 
British forces should first concentrate on reaching the left of 
the Allied line. 

" 2. As soon as trains are available, the Field-Marshal 
Commanding-in-Chief will disengage the Second British 
Corps which now occupies the centre of the British line. This 
corps will concentrate in rear and be ready to move by the 
same route and for the same destination as the Second Cav- 
alry Division. 



174 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

"3. In like manner, the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade will 
be held in readiness to move immediately after the Second 
Corps. 

" 4. The position in the centre of the British line, held now 
by the two divisions of the Second Corps, wUl be divided be- 
tween the First Corps, now occupying the left of the British 
line, in such a manner as to unite the inward flanks of the 
two corps; whilst the First Cavalry Division will be held as a 
reserve south of the river. 

"5. The Field Marshal understands that, as soon as a for- 
ward move by the whole line becomes feasible, these two 
corps and the First Cavalry Division will remain behind, 
their places being filled up by closing in the Fifth and Sixth 
French x\rmies on their inward flanks. 

"6. The Field Marshal will immediately inform the British 
Secretary of State for War of these arrangements, and will 
ask that the Seventh and Eighth Divisions may be moved as 
soon as practicable via Boulogne or Havre to join the British 
forces concentrating at Lille. 

" 7. The Indian division will be directed to move in accord- 
ance with the views expressed in the note of September 30. 

" Sir John French hopes that these proposals will meet with 
the approval of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief." 

The following was General Joffre's reply: — 

" October 1, 1914 
" The Commander-in-Chief of the French forces has the 
honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter of His Excellency 
the Field Marshal Commanding the British Army, dated 
September 30, referring to the future movements which are 
to be carried out by this army. 



NEW DISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS 175 

" He is happy to be able to comply with the wishes ex- 
pressed by the Field Marshal and to state, once more, the 
entire unanimity of views which exists between the Com- 
manders of the Allied Armies. At the same time, owing to the 
necessities of the railway service, it is not possible to com- 
mence entraining before the afternoon of October 5. 

" Referring to the points touched on in the letter of Septem- 
ber 30, and in accordance with the views given by the Field 
Marshal, it is suggested that the following instructions might 
be given : — 

" 1. The Second Cavalry Division (two brigades imder the 
command of General Gough) should move by road, owing to 
the lateness of the date on which entrainment becomes pos- 
sible. They should move in rear of the Sixth and Second 
Armies, by Villers-Cotterets-La Croix-Saint-Ouen-Amiens- 
Saint-Pol-Lille (similarly to the Eighth and Tenth French 
Divisions) . 

" 2. The Second Corps should march to the area Longueil- 
Pont-Sainte-Maxence by October 5, to be moved by rail to 
the Lille'dlstrict, its place on the front held by the British to 
be taken as arranged by the Field Marshal in his letter of 
September 30. 

"3. The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade to be in readiness 
to follow the Second Corps. 

"4. As regards the two corps and the cavalry division re- 
maining at the front, it would appear inconvenient to leave 
them halted there when the general advance of the whole 
line becomes possible. 

" Apart from the unfairness of depriving the British troops 
of the satisfaction of advancing after their valiant fighting, it 
will be more convenient to halt them successively, as the 



176 THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE 

closing in of the inner flank of the Fifth and Sixth Armies 
shortens the front allotted to the British Army. 

" It would be advisable for the Commander-in-Chief and 
the Field Marshal to arrange mutually, at some convenient 
date, the conditions under which the transport of these 
troops by rail should be made. 

"5. Referring to the disembarkation of the Seventh and 
Eighth Divisions, the Commander-in-Chief is most anxious 
that these two divisions should proceed as soon as possible to 
Boulogne. Their arrival at Lille, where they are to join the 
British forces pushed to the front, would then be more rapid 
than if they were disembarked at Havre and the arrange- 
ments would be simpler. Their movement from the port of 
landing could be carried out by road with the assistance of 
the railway for marching troops. 

"6. The Indian divisions should be moved to the neigh- 
bourhood of Lille as soon as the Field Marshal reports that 
they are ready. 

" The Commander-in-Chief hopes that these proposals are 
in accordance with the views expressed by the Field Marshal 
in his letter of September 30, and he would be glad to be as- 
sured of this as soon as possible in order that steps may be 

taken to execute them. 

(Signed) "J. Joffre." 

I acknowledged the above in these terms: — 

" October 1, 1914 
"The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British 

forces has duly received the note dated October 1, 1914, from 

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. 

" He is extremely glad to find that the proposals contained 



NEW DISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS 177 

in his last note meet with the approval of the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

" Such modifications as are suggested in the present note 
are perfectly feasible, and Sir John French will give immedi- 
ate effect to them. 

" The necessary orders were issued to-day, and the pre- 
liminary movements are now in progress. 

" The Field Marshal hopes that the Second Cavalry Divi- 
sion will commence its march towards Lille on the morning 
of October 3." 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 
In our appreciation of the situation at British Headquarters 
on October 1 it was considered that the reduction of Ant- 
werp was at this moment the great objective of the enemy. 
Personally, I had no reason to thmk that Antwerp was in 
any immediate danger, and therefore a message which I re- 
ceived from the Secretary of State on October 2 came as a 
most disagreeable surprise. 

I was informed that a serious situation had been created at 
Antwerp, which was m grave danger of falling m a short time. 

Further uiformation reached me at 3 a.m. on the 3d from 
London that tlie Belgian Government, acting on the advice 
unanimously given by the Superior Council of War in the 
presence of the King, had decided to leave at once for Os- 
tend. It was further stated that the King, with the Field 
Army, would withdraw from Antwerp in the direction of 
Ghent to protect the coast-line and in the hope of being able 
to cooperate with the Allied Armies. The message added that 
the town could hold out for five or six days, and that the de- 
cision to evacuate was taken very seriously as a result of the 
increasingly critical situation. 

It is needless to say that I was perturbed on receipt of this 
news. It was difficult to understand why the Belgians, who 
had fought so weU at Liege, were unable to do more in de- 
fence of a fortress which was much stronger, and situated, 
moreover, in a position where it could be supported by the 
British Fleet. 



GERMANY'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY 179 

I fully realized the consequence of the capture and occu- 
pation of Antwerp by the Germans. It was impossible to say 
how much of the coast-line the captured terrain would in- 
clude, but there could be no doubt that the Channel ports 
would be gravely imperilled. 

Operating from such a base, there would appear to be no 
insuperable obstacle to an immediate German advance on 
Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. The Belgian Army was in no 
condition to resist such an advance. The occupation of these 
places and the formation of a defensive line which would in- 
clude the whole of the Pas-de-Calais, might become a fait 
accompli before the troops could arrive from the main thea- 
tres to prevent it. 

But here, again, we have an example of the over-confi- 
dence which forever possessed that army which set out for 
"world conquest." As on the Marne, so at Antwerp, they 
were not prepared to seize the psychological moment and to 
play boldly for the great stake. 

It is seldom that fortune offers another chance to a mili- 
tary leader who has once failed to gather the rich harvest 
which she has put into his grasp. Yet the German Emperor 
presents, together with his Great General Staff, one of the 
few instances in history of a commander-in-chief so soon be- 
ing given a splendid opportunity to retrieve such mistakes as 
those of September 5 and 6. 

With all these tragic possibilities in my mind in these early 
October days, I redoubled my endeavours to effect a speedy 
move of the British forces to the north. Added to the other 
cogent reasons to which I referred in the last chapter was 
now the most vital of all — the relief of Antwerp. 

Lord Kitchener did not make things easy for me. Keenly 



180 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

desirous to influence the course of operations, his telegrams 
followed one after another, each containing "directions" 
regarding a local situation of which, in London, he could 
know very little. 

For instance, in one message he told me he was communi- 
cating with General Joff re and the French Government, but, 
as he did not do so through me, I was quite unaware of what 
was passing between them, yet all the time he was urging 
me to make what I knew to be impracticable suggestions to 
General Joffre. This could only lead to misunderstandings 
and confusion of ideas, and I must repudiate any responsibil- 
ity whatever for what happened in the north during the first 
ten days of October. I was explicitly told by the Secretary of 
State for War that the British troops operating there were 
not under my command, as the following telegram shows: — 

" Have already given Rawlinson temporary rank. I am 
sending him instructions regarding his action Antwerp. The 
troops employed there will not for the present be considered 
part of your force." 

Rawlinson, I may remark, had been sent for to meet the 
Seventh Division at Ostend and take command of it. 

Had I been left to exercise my full functions as Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the British Army in France, I should 
certainly have made different dispositions with regard to the 
disposal of these troops. I regret that I must record my de- 
liberate opinion that the best which could have been done 
throughout this critical situation was not done, owing en- 
tirely to Lord Kitchener's endeavour to unite in himself the 
separate and distinct roles of a Cabinet Minister in London 
and a Commander-in-Chief in France^ I feel it only right and 



GENERAL JOFFRE'S VIEWS 181 

in the interest of my country, with a view to any war we 
may be engaged in in the future, to make this plain state- 
ment of fact. The calamity at Sedan was due lq part to in- 
terference from Paris with the army in the field, and the 
American Civil War was more than probably prolonged by 
the repeated interference on the part of the Secretary of 
State with the cormnanders lq the field. 

As to the method of employing the Seventh Infantry and 
Third Cavalry Divisions, the following telegram will show 
that the French Commander-in-Chief completely concurred 
in my views : — 

"General Commanding-in-Chief to Colonel Huguet, Octo- 
ber 8, 8.45 A.M.: — 

"The Commander-in-Chief has the honour to inform Mar- 
shal French that he entirely agrees with the ideas on the sub- 
ject of employing the whole of the British forces united. 

"He estimates that, in the actual situation of Antwerp, 
the reenforcement of the garrison by the Seventh English 
Division will not have any effect on the fate of the place. 

"In these conditions he believes on the contrary that it is 
very advantageous that this English division should unite as 
early as possible with the main body of the British forces in 
the northern zone. 

"WUl the Marshal be kind enough to inform Lord Kitch- 
ener of the Commander-ia-Chief's views of the situation? 

"He will ask the President of the Republic to confirm 
these views to the British War Muiister." 

As to the confusion of ideas to which I have referred, the 
following telegram which I found it necessary to address to 



182 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

the commander of the Seventh Division, Sir Henry Rawlin- 
son, will show that it existed up to the 11th instant: — 

"Your message No. 19, addressed to Lord Kitchener and 
repeated to me, received. I really do not understand whether 
you regard yourself as under my orders or not; but if you do, 
please be good enough to explain your situation clearly with- 
out delay, as I have no knowledge of any necessity for your 
reembarkation or of your intention to do so. 

"Hazebrouck will be in occupation of the Third Corps 
to-morrow morning. 

"Be good enough to answer me by some means at once, as 
my own and General Joffre's plans are much put out and per- 
haps compromised by all this misunderstanding." 

To this Rawlinson replied that he was under my orders, 
and proceeded to give me the information I requested. 

Such, then, was the general atmosphere of doubt and un- 
certainty in which I had to work after the fall of Antwerp un- 
til towards the 10th of the month (October), when at length 
the Secretary of State for War consented to allow me full 
liberty of action to direct the movements of all British forces 
in France. 

Some thi-ee thousand marines had been landed in Dunkirk 
towards the end of September and, when Antwerp was 
threatened. Lord Kitchener — saying nothing of it to me — 
arranged with General Joffre that the latter should send one 
or two French Territorial divisions to join them and act 
with them. 

The first intimation I had of this was a wire from Lord 
Kitchener, received late at night on October 3d, which ran 
as follows: — 



PLANS FOR RELIEF OF ANTWERP 183 

"I do not know when the two divisions promised by the 
French Government from Havre will be able to start. 

"Could you ascertain this and let me know your views on 
the situation and how you contemplate acting?" 

To this I replied in the early hours of the 4th: — 

"I do not know what has passed direct between English 
and French Governments, but French General Headquar- 
ters told me positively in answer to repeated enquiry that 
they are only sending one Territorial division from Havre to 
Ostend, which they say is to start at once by sea. 

"With reference to the last sentence in your message 1315, 
please refer to my message F272 despatched last night at 
7.30. I shall get report from oflScer I sent yesterday to 
Bruges and Antwerp directly and will wire again." 

That part of my message F272 (referred to above) which 
bears on the subject runs as follows : — 

"French wish us to use Boulogne for Seventh Division and 
cavalry to disembark. ... I am strongly averse to sending 
any troops inside the fortress [of Antwerp] even if they could 
be got there." 

General Joffre's telegram for me of October 8 has already 
been quoted, and I had previously been in constant com- 
munication with him on this subject. When I despatched 
telegram F272 I knew that Joffre's views accorded with my 
own. 

That the wishes of the Allied commanders were ignored ia 
London is further shown by the following message received 
by me from the Secretary of State for War at 2.30 p.m. on 
October 4 : — 



184 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

"I am embarking Seventii Division and portion of cavalry 
division to-day, but I cannot get report from Antwerp on 
the military situation from which I can decide where they 
should be disembarked. 

" My present opinion is Zeebrugge, where there are good 
landing facilities. Can you send Rawlinson by motor to Ant- 
w^erp to take charge and study the situation before the troops 
arrive.'^" 

This message was amplified by the following message 
which was sent later in the day : — 

"I am arranging following Expeditionary Force for relief 
Antwerp : — 

"British Force: Seventh Division, under General Capper, 
18,000 men, 63 guns; cavalry division, under General Byng, 
4000 men, 12 guns. To arrive at Zeebrugge October 6 and 
October 7. 

"Naval detachments under General Alston, 8000 men, al- 
ready there; also naval and military heavy guns and detach- 
ments already sent. Headquarters Staff will be subsequently 
notified. 

"French Force: Territorial division. General Roy, 15,000 
men, proper complement guns, and two squadrons to arrive 
Ostend October 6 to October 9; Fusiliers Marins Brigade 
under Rear-Admiral Ronarch, 8000 men; grand total, 53,000 
men. Numbers are approximately correct." 

In order to summarize the situation as it was reflected in 
my mind at this time, I wUl quote two more telegrams. 
Lord Kitchener wired on the early morning of the 6th : — 



THE GERMAN AND ALLIES' LINES 185 

"Please let me have a telegraphic appreciation of the situ- 
ation of the Allied Forces for information of the Govern- 
ment." 

To which the following reply was sent: — 

"Allied line extends from La Bassee, about fourteen miles 
southwest of LUle on the left, through Arras, east of Albert, 
Bray-sur-Somme, west of Roye, Ribecourt, Nampcelle, 
Nouvron, Soissons, north of Braye-en-Laonnois, Craonnelle, 
Berry-au-Bac, then south of Rheims, then east to Verdun, 
then south to Saint-Mihiel, then east to Thiaucourt. 

"On the extreme left is the Twenty -first French Corps, 
with two cavalry corps operating between Carvin and Lens. 

"Hard fighting north of the Oise, where strength of French 
force equivalent to twelve corps and six cavalry divisions. 
Comparative quiet on the Aisne; British forces in progress 
of evacuating positions and moving north of the Somme 
near Abbeville; move should be completed by the 20th in- 
stant. 

" The German line extends from about Lille, roughly 
parallel to the Allies, west of Bapamne, Chaulnes, Roye, 
south of Noyon, thence along the hills north of the Aisne to 
Craonne, Brimont, Nogent-l'Abbesse, Somme Py, northeast 
of Verdun, where it turns south to Fresnes-en-Woevre, then 
to near Saint-Mihiel, Thiaucourt, and east of Thiaucourt. 

"The strength of the Germans north of the Oise is prob- 
ably eleven corps and nine cavalry divisions in position. In 
addition to the above forces, one brigade was detraining 
at Cambrai yesterday, and reserve troops are holding en- 
trenched positions about Mons and Valenciennes, numbers 
variously reported from 50,000 to 70,000. 



186 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

"The object of the Allies is to bring about a retirement of 
the Germans from their present line by turnrag their north 
flank, and at the same time to hold ia this theatre of opera- 
tions as many German corps as possible. French General 
Headquarters anticipated that the northern turning move- 
ment would have been facilitated by the close cooperation of 
the Belgian Field Army. 

"So far as I am able to have an object apart from the gen- 
eral French view of the situation, I place the relief of Ant- 
werp as of first importance as regards forces under my com- 
mand." 

Lord Kitchener had despatched these troops en route to 
Antwerp itself before he even asked me for an appreciation 
of the general situation. 

The history of the rapid investment and fall of Antwerp, 
the evacuation of Ostend and Zeebrugge and the retreat of 
the Belgians to the Yser, is very well known now, and it is 
not my intention to go over the ground again here; but I 
feel sure that, had the views of the commanders in the field 
(Joffre and myself) been accepted, a much better and easier 
situation would have been created. 

> It is perfectly clear that the operations for the relief of 
Antwerp should never have been directed from London. It 
should have been left entirely in the hands of the French 
Commander-in-Chief (or in mine acting with him) to decide 
upon the dispositions and destination of the troops immedi- 
ately they left British shores. We alone were in a position to 
judge as to the best methods by which to coordinate the ob- 
jectives and distribute the troops between the northern and 
southern theatres. 



CRITICISM OF COASTAL OPERATIONS 187 

As things actually turned out, the troops which were 
landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge had (to quote from General 
Joffre's wire to Huguet on October 8) no influence on the 
fate of the fortress, and what help they were in protecting 
the retreat of the Belgians and saving that army from de- 
struction might have been equally well rendered from a safer 
and more effective direction. This would not have necessi- 
tated that dangerous and exliausting flank march, costing 
such terrible loss, by which alone they were able eventually 
to unite with the main British forces. 

Despatched from England on October 5 or 6, and disem- 
barking at Calais or Boulogne (Dunkirk could have been used 
if the Belgian Army had required more help), they would 
have deployed six or seven days later in the valley of the Lys 
south of the Third Corps, and Lille might have been saved. 

It is quite possible also to conceive a situation starting 
from these preliminary dispositions which would have re- 
sulted in saving Ostend, even Zeebrugge and that line of 
coast, the possession of which by the enemy, dating from 
October, 1914, was a source of such infinite trouble to us. 

Although I was given no voice in these Antwerp disposi- 
tions, and was left in partial ignorance of what was going on, 
— which, in my position as Commander-in-Chief, was de- 
plorable, — I took what steps I could to keep in close touch 
with the progress of events. 

Colonel Bridges, of the Fourth Dragoon Guards, was with 
his regiment in the cavalry division. He had formerly been 
Military Attache in Brussels and understood the Belgians 
well. He had already greatly distinguished himself in earlier 
battles, and I sent for him. 

Bridges commenced the war as a squadron commander. 



188 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

and it will always be a matter of deep gratification to me 
that I was enabled to see him in command of a division be- 
fore I gave up the army in France. 

Of tall and spare figure, his face has always struck me as 
that of an ideal leader of men. He has an absolute contempt 
of any personal danger, and was constantly putting himself 
in the most exposed positions, so that I was often in dread 
of losing him. I know he was hit slightly once or twice 
and said nothing about it, but on another occasion he was 
so severely wounded that for a day or two his life was in 
danger. 

He was calm, quiet, and very deliberate in all situa- 
tions, and his reports were of the utmost value. He never 
appeared to want anything in the way of personal comfort, 
was quite indifferent in any weather as to whether he slept 
on a bed or on the ground, and had a happy knack of 
seeming delighted to start on any mission however difficult 
and dangerous, or for any place however distant, with noth- 
ing but the clothes he stood up in. 

I wish I could describe Tom Bridges better. He is a typi- 
cal fighting soldier and leader, and I have entertained the 
deepest regard for him ever since we first met many years 
ago. I certainly had hoped ere this to have seen him in com- 
mand of an army corps. 

In accordance with my instructions he arrived at my 
Headquarters during the night of October 3-4. I despatched 
him at 5 a.m. on the 4th by motor to Brussels, instructing 
him to get into immediate communication with the Belgian 
General Staff and endeavour to persuade them to hang on to 
Antwerp, promising support from us so soon as we could 
possibly get to them. 



URGENT REPRESENTATIONS 189 

Colonel Sykes was at that time second to Sir David Hen- 
derson in command of the Royal Flying Corps. I sent him 
by aeroplane in the same direction, telling him to find out all 
he could and bring me back a report from Bridges. 

I directed Sir David Henderson to establish air recon- 
naissances towards Antwerp, which he did. 

Finally, I did my utmost to expedite the move of aU the 
British forces to the northern theatre. 

It appeared likely that there might be considerable delay 
in relieving the First Corps. I therefore despatched Henry 
Wilson to General Joffre with the following note, dated 
October 4, 1914: — 

"With reference to Sir John French's note and the impor- 
tance, therein dwelt upon, of the earliest possible relief of the 
First Corps from its present position, he suggests to His Ex- 
cellency the Commander-in-Chief the possibility of an ex- 
tension by the Eighteenth Corps of its line to the left, as 
far as the point where the Aisne Canal passes through the 
line of entrenchment occupied by the First Corps in the 
neighbourhood of Braye. 

"In this connection Sir John French would particularly 
bring to the notice of His Excellency the greatly increased 
strength of the entrenchment by reason of the work which 
has been carried out dm-ing the long time it has been under 
occupation by the First Corps. He would also point out that 
the enemy is now much weaker than before, and that such 
feeble attempts as he makes on the line of entrenchment are 
entirely in the nature of reconnaissances, with a view to 
discover whether the entrenchment is still held or not. An- 
other consideration of importance is that the line now held 



190 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

by the Eighteeatli Corps and French troops attached to 
it is much less in extent than that occupied by the British 
First Corps. 

"In these circumstances Sir John French trusts that His 
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be able to give 
such orders as will ensure the troops occupying the portion 
of the line extending from the right of the British entrench- 
ment to the canal being relieved by troops from the Eight- 
eenth Corps, the change to be carried out on the night of 
6th-7th October." 

To this General Joffre replied as follows: — • 

"General Wilson has been good enough to convey the 
desire expressed by His Excellency Marshal French to see 
the whole of the British Army follow the move of the Second 
Army Corps to the left wing of the Allies line. 

"The Commander-in-Chief has the honour to state that 
he wlU endeavour to satisfy this request, but as already 
stated in Note No. 159 of October 1 the movement of the 
British troops can only be carried out in succession. 

v"The heavy task with which the railway service is at 
present burdened, and the difficulty of immediately replac- 
ing on the front aU the British units employed there, ren- 
der it impossible to contemplate the simultaneous with- 
drawal of all the British forces. 

"A French division will arrive to-morrow in the area of 
Soissons. Its billeting area is fixed by the G.O.C. Sixth 
Army and it is intended to relieve the Third Army Corps. 
When this corps has been withdrawn from the front it 
will march to the area Compiegne-Longueil-Pont-Sainte- 



GENERAL JOFFRE'S VIEWS 191 

Maxence, where it will entrain in its turn. The route to 
be followed can be decided upon by agreement with the 
G.O.C. Sixth Army. Admitting that the relief can be car- 
ried out on the night October 5-6, the Third Corps, taking 
three days to march to the neighbourhood of Pont-Sainte- 
Maxence, will be ready to entrain on October 9. 

"With regard to the movement of the First Army Corps 
it is impossible at present to decide the date at which its 
withdrawal can be carried out. Indeed, its withdrawal wiU 
depend on the general situation, the difficulty of bringing 
up other troops to be taken from the front to replace the 
First Army Corps, and finally on the tasks imposed on the 
railway service, but the Commander-in-Chief begs once 
more to assure Marshal French that he will make the great- 
est efforts to concentrate the whole of the British Army 
in the north. He takes note that the commander of the 
British troops wishes to see his forces concentrated with 
all speed. 

"The First Cavalry Division wiU move by march route 
as has already been done by General Gough's division. 

"Regarding the detrainment area, Lille was first of aU 
regarded as the centre, but in view of existing circimastances 
it appears difficult to determine as yet in what area the 
Second Corps now in course of transport can be detrained. 
This corps wUl have finished detraining on the 8th and wiU 
be ready to act on the 9th. The most favourable area 
for detraining appears to be that of Saint-Omer-Haze- 
brouck. 

"The Third Corps, having been withdrawn from the front 
on the 6th and entraining on the 9th, will be detrained on the 
12th in the same area. It will be ready to act on the 13th. 



192 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

"Lastly, the Commander-in-Chief reiterates the request 
already made in the note of October 1 that the Seventh Brit- 
ish Division may be disembarked at Boulogne with the least 
possible delay. As soon as this division has been assembled, 
it will move by march route to join the Second and Third 
Corps. No precise indications can be given as to the date 
on which this jmiction will be effected, as it will depend 
on the date of arrival in France of the Seventh Division, 
which date the Commander-in-Chief is not in a position to 
decide. 

"The Indian divisions will join the British Army as soon 
as desired by Marshal French. 

"In order to strengthen the forces in this part of the 
theatre of operations the request made to the French Gov- 
ernment by His Excellency Lord Kitchener has been re- 
sponded to by sending to Dunkirk two Territorial divisions, 
one going from Havre by sea and the other railed from Paris 
without in any way retarding the movement of the British 
Army. 

"These are the dispositions that have been made with re- 
gard to the movements to be carried out in the immediate 
future. The Commander-in-Chief, however, wishes to lay 
particular stress on the following considerations. The opera- 
tions in progress necessitate the constant reenforcement of 
our left wing by troops taken away from different portions 
of the front. The movements carried out at Marshal French's 
request, which can only be effected in succession, will re- 
sult : — 

"First. In temporarily dividing the British Army in two. 

"Secondly. In preventing for nearly ten days all move- 
ment of French troops to the north and, in consequence. 



GENERAL JOFFRE'S VIEWS 193 

creating a serious delay in the realization of the operations 
contemplated. 

"Now it is of capital importance for the success of the 
operations that all movements made to the north, either 
English or French, should immediately contribute to the 
same object, namely, to arrest and outflank the German 
right wing. The result will certainly not be achieved should 
His Excellency Marshal French propose to defer his action 
until all his forces are concentrated. 

" It would be advantageous to have time enough to com- 
plete the English movement so that the British Army could 
be engaged all at once, but it appears certain that events wiU 
decide otherwise. 

"The Commander-in-Chief may be forced to ask Marshal 
French to cooperate with British divisions as they detrain 
and without waiting for the whole of the detrainment to be 
carried out. He would be obliged to consider the case of the 
retreat of the left wing, the extent of which he would not be 
in a position to limit, if with the object of carrying out a con- 
centration which, though certainly advantageous, is not in- 
dispensable, some divisions remained inactive at the time 
when the fate of the campaign was being decided; moreover, 
it is to be noted that the enemy on his side engages as he de- 
trains; we cannot act differently. 

"The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that His Excel- 
lency Marshal French will be good enough to examine this 
question of capital importance with all the attention it de- 
serves and will take the necessary action without which the 
gravest consequences must be faced. 

"To sum up, the Commander-in-Chief has the honour 
to submit to His Excellency Marshal French the following 



194 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

points, on whicli he begs His Excellency may be good enough 
to give a prompt reply : — 

"1. Transport of the Second Army Corps to the same 
area, Hazebrouck, completed the 9th. 

"2. Transport of the Third Corps to the same area, com- 
pleted the 13th. 

" 3. Lastly, — and this is the essential point, without 
which the fate of the campaign may be compromised, — the 
possibility of engaging the British divisions in the north as 
they arrive, without waiting for the British Army to be 
concentrated. 

"The task of the British Army now in the general opera- 
tions should, therefore, be constantly to prolong the general 
line as it detrains, in order to outflank the enemy and thus 
to join hands with the Belgian Army. 

"The support of our cavalry corps operating in the north- 
ern area will always be given." 

I answered thus : — 

"Sir John French has duly received His Excellency's note 
791, for which he begs to ofl^er him his best thanks. 

"The arrangements therein proposed are perfectly satis- 
factory, and the role which the British Army can fulfil on 
the left flank of the Allied force will. Sir John French 
hopes and believes, tend best to the efficient progress of the 
campaign. 

"He can assure His Excellency of the very best support 
of the British Army at all times; and, should necessity arise, 
the various units, as they arrive in the new area, will on no 
account be held back to await a general concentration, if 



ANXIETY REGARDING ANTWERP 195 

and when their immediate action is demanded by the exi- 
gencies of the campaign. 

"Sir John French would Hke to point out particularly to 
His Excellency that the possibility of his having to engage his 
forces, unit by unit, before the entire force is concentrated, 
offers another great reason why it is most essential that the 
relief of the First Army Corps from its present position 
should be effected with the least possible delay. 

"Whilst feeling quite assured that His Excellency the 
Commander-in-Chief will do his utmost to effect this. Sir 
John French feels that it is most necessary to insist upon the 
vast importance of the presence of all the British forces on 
the left flank at the earliest possible moment. 

"His Majesty's Government feel great anxiety as to the 
condition of the fortress of Antwerp, the fall of which strong- 
hold would have far-reaching consequences, political, ma- 
terial, and moral. 

"Sir John French is now in close daily communication 
with the Belgian commandant of the fortress, and if he can 
daily assure him that there is no delay in a movement which 
must have the ultimate effect of relieving the situation at 
Antwerp, so long as that place is able to hold out, it should 
prove a great encouragement to the garrison. 

"Sir John French will address another note later on to His 
Excellency on the subject of the Indian divisions. 

" Sir John French wishes to call His Excellency's attention 
to the fact that the Second Corps will not complete its de- 
trainment until the evening of the 9th instant, and therefore 
will not be ready to act until the 10th instant. In his mem- 
orandum His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief states as 
follows, referring to the Second Corps: 'This Corps will 



196 THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP 

have finished detraining on the 8th and will be ready to act 
on the 9th.'" 

Antwerp fell on the 9th of October and was followed by the 
retirement of the Belgian Army to the line of the Yser. 

The Seventh Infantry and Third Cavalry Divisions were 
not placed under my orders imtil October 10. From that 
date, however, I will commence to chronicle their doings. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE LAST DAYS OF THE BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 
THE NORTHERN MOVE 

I SPENT some hours on October 1 closely examining the cen- 
tre of the enemy's position on the Aisne, and arrived at the 
conclusion that troops had certainly been withdrawn and 
that the Germans were weaker in strength. I was not, more- 
over, apprehensive of any great difficulty in eflfecting our 
withdrawal from the Aisne front, and I prepared at once to 
carry out the arrangements made with Joffre. 

Operation orders were issued ordering the Second Corps 
(less the Sixteenth Infantry Brigade) to withdraw during the 
nights of October 1-2 and 2-3, and assemble in the area 
Cuiry-Housse-Oulchy-le-Chateau with a view to moving 
to Pont-Sainte-Maxence (twelve miles southwest of Com- 
piegne), there to entrain for the left flank; the First and 
Third Corps and First Cavalry Division to be withdrawn 
when opportunity occurred; the Second Cavalry Division 
and Nineteenth Infantry Brigade to follow the Second Corps; 
the First Corps and Sixteenth Infantry Brigade to take over 
positions at the moment held by the Third Division; the 
Third Corps to take over those held by the Fifth Division. 

I certainly entertained sanguine hopes at this time, in 
spite of the bad news received as to the condition of Ant- 
werp, and although such hopes were never realized I still 
think they were justified. These optimistic anticipations 
were groimded entirely upon the advance which the Russians 
were then making through Galicia, and the splendid fights 



198 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

they had put up in East Prussia and Poland. We estimated 
that they were not far from Cracow, and if that fortress were 
taken, and the Russians maintained their position, I looked 
forward to a great reduction of the German forces opposed 
to us on the Western front. 

The Grand Duke Nicholas had proved himself to be a 
commander of high courage, energy, and skill, and we all 
hoped for great things from his leadership. 

At this time we never had the faintest idea of the actual 
political situation in Russia, and knew nothing of the terrible 
dissensions and intrigues which were destined to nullify all 
the magnificent self-sacrifice displayed by the Russian troops, 
and to ruin every attempt made by these great armies of the 
East to assist and support the Allied operations. 

I feel sure that the British Army officers and men alike 
will ever hold these Russian soldiers and their loyal leaders 
in honour and grateful memory and admiration. Their 
prompt invasion of Eastern Prussia did much to make the 
victory of the Marne possible. 

As a matter of fact, however, in depending upon our East- 
ern Allies to the extent that we subsequently did, we showed 
as limited a mental prevision in the "political" as we did in 
the "military" outlook. 

Just as we had failed during the past to read accurately the 
lessons as regards the fighting of the future which modern 
science and invention should have taught us, so we had never 
foreseen how unstable and unreliable a country must be 
whose ruler and government are absolutely despotic, and in 
no sense representative of the will of the people. Worse than 
this, the governing classes in Russia were saturated with dis- 
loyalty and intrigue in the most corrupt form. But for their 



GOUGH'S CAVALRY MOVES NORTH 199 

black treachery the war would have ended successfully at 
the latest in the spring of 1917. 

How could such a people successfully withstand the strain 
of so mighty a clash of arms, expecially when the immense 
foreign loans and the placing of enormous contracts brought 
grist to the mills of that corrupt mass of financiers whose 
business in life was only to fatten on the misfortunes of their 
fellow creatures? 

But to proceed with my narrative, Gough's cavalry divi- 
sion was moving up towards the north next day. I saw him 
and discussed the situation fully. I explained the desperate 
nature of the situation at Antwerp and told him how neces- 
sary it was that he should expedite his movements to the ut- 
most, adding that he must, therefore, avoid being drawn 
en route into any local encounter in which French troops 
might be engaged. 

The situation will be clearer if I state the actual position 
of the troops on the night of 2d October. 

The First Corps and the Sixteenth Infantry Brigade and 
the Thirty-second Royal Field Artillery Brigade holding for- 
mer positions and, in addition, the trenches round Vailly 
formerly held by the Third Division. 

The Third Corps holding former positions and, in addi- 
tion, the trenches round Missy formerly held by the Fifth 
Division, 

The First Cavalry Division as before, but the First Cav- 
alry Brigade holding trenches covering Conde Bridge. 

The Second Cavalry Division moved to area Silly-sur- 
Ourcq-Hartennes-Ambrief. 

The Second Corps, Third Division, in area Oulchy-le- 
Chateau-Grand Rozoy, with Seventh Brigade at Cerseuil; 



200 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

two battalions of the Ninth Brigade still in trenches at Vailly 
to be withdrawn this night (October 2). 

The Fifth Division in area Couvrelles-Ciry-Nampteuil- 
sous-Muret. 

On the 3d, General Sir James Willcocks, commanding the 
Indian contingent, arrived and reported himself. Of the 
Indian troops, one cavalry regiment (Fifteenth Lancers) , one 
brigade of artillery, and two brigades of infantry had reached 
Orleans, which was the Indian advance base. I fully dis- 
cussed the situation with him. 

Much has been said and written about the work of the 
Indian troops in France, and various opinions have been 
expressed. For my part I can only say that, from first to 
last, so long as they were under rhy command, they main- 
tained and probably surpassed even the magnificent tradi- 
tions of the Indian x\rmy. In a country and climate to which 
they were totally unaccustomed, the exigencies of the mo- 
ment required that they should be thrown into action suc- 
cessively by smaller or greater units before they could be 
properly concentrated. 

I shall always gratefully remember the invaluable assist- 
ance they and their commander. Sir James Willcocks, ren- 
dered under these difiicult conditions in the most critical 
hours of the first Battle of Ypres, especially the Lahore Divi- 
sion, commanded by General Watkins. 

Just after the appearance of the Indian troops in our 
trenches, we intercepted a German wireless message sent to 
the enemy commanders on the Indians' front, directing them 
to take prisoner as many unwounded Indians as possible, to 
treat them with all possible courtesy and consideration and 
send them in to Headquarters, It was a cunning attempt to 



GENERAL FOCH 201 

undermine the loyalty of the Indian contingents, but it never 
met with the slightest success. 

I received news on this day that the Twenty -first French 
Corps had commenced to detrain three miles west of Lille. 
This corps formed the left of the French Army under de Mau- 
d'huy, which was concentrating to the north of de Castelnau, 
in order to carry on the great attempted outflanking move- 
ment. 

The armies under de Castehiau and de Maud'huy, with 
some cavalry divisions, formed a "group " under the supreme 
command of General Foch, who was directed also to exercise 
general control over all the French armies operating in the 
northern theatre. 

No personal record of my share in the war would be satis- 
factory to me did it not include special mention of this re- 
markable man and eminent soldier. Like his great friend 
Henry Wilson in England, he was at one time head of the 
Staff College in France. Shortly before the war he paid sev- 
eral visits to England. It was on the occasion of one of these 
that I first made his acquaintance. All the world knows the 
splendid work he did in the first weeks of the war, and it gave 
me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction to find myself so 
closely associated with him in the northern theatre. I hope it 
is not too much to say that, during this time, our acquaint- 
ance ripened into a fast and firm friendship, which has in- 
creased and expanded ever since. 

I regard General Foch as one of the finest soldiers and most 
capable leaders I have ever known. In appearance he is slight 
and small of stature, albeit with a most wiry and active 
frame. It is in his eyes and the expression of his face that one 
sees his extraordinary power. He appreciates a military situ- 



202 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

ation like lightning, with marvellous accuracy, and evinces 
wonderful skill and versatility in dealing with it. Animated 
By a consuming energy, his constant exclamation "Attaque! 
Attaque! Attaque!" reflected his state of mind, and there 
can be no doubt that he imbued his troops with much of his 
spirit. Of all the generals in this great struggle he most re- 
sembled in audacious strategy his great master — Napoleon. 

Personally I owe a great deal to his invaluable help and 
cordial cooperation. In the darkest hours of our work to- 
gether — and there were many such — I never knew him 
anything but what I have described — bold, hopeful, and 
cheery, but ever vigilant, wary, and full of resource. 

Several local attacks were delivered against the First 
Corps, which were repulsed with loss, and I saw little reason 
to fear that the temporary weakening of our line would have 
any ill-effects. 

The First Cavalry Division was now also en route for the 
northern theatre. 

On the 5th reports had reached me from Bridges, in Ant- 
werp. He was certainly pessimistic as to the possibility of the 
fortress holding out until we could relieve it. He told me that 
the Germans had sixteen-inch howitzers in position against 
the forts. 

There were indications to-day that considerable German 
forces were collecting against Foch's left, near Lille, and the 
flanking movement was making very little progress. German 
cavalry were reported to be in Hazebrouck. 

At Fere-en-Tardenois I received a visit from President 
Poincare. He thanked me for all the work the British Army 
had done in France, and spoke a great deal about the situa- 
tion at Antwerp. He told me he thought the action of the 



FOCH'S OPTIMISM 203 

British War Office in sending troops into Antwerp was a mis- 
take, and expressed great surprise that the control and di- 
rection of all the British troops in France was not left en- 
tirely in the hands of one Commander-in-Chief. 

On the 8th, General Headquarters moved to Abbeville, at 
which place the Second Corps had nearly completed their 
detrainment. They were concentrating northeast of Abbe- 
ville, and their leading troops were on the line Oneux- 
Nouvion-en-Ponthieu. 

The Third Corps had been relieved on the Aisne by French 
troops, and their entrainment at Compiegne was proceeding. 

We left Fere-en-Tardenois at 8.30 on the morning of the 
8th, and reached General de Castehiau's Headquarters at 
Breteuil about one. He told me that his Fourth Corps was 
again being very hard pressed, and that the enemy was at- 
tacking violently aU along his front. The General had just 
heard that two of his sons had been killed in action, and was 
naturally in a very sad and depressed frame of mind. 

I then went on to General Foch's Headquarters at Doul- 
lens, which I reached about four in the afternoon. He gave 
me a great reception with a guard of honour. 

He took a very optimistic view of the situation, said that 
the enemy was making no headway anywhere, and that he 
was gradually getting round the German flank on the north. 
It gave me a great hope for the future to find him so confi- 
dent of success. 

I explained my plans to him briefly as follows: — 

The Second Corps, having completed its detrainment 
north of Abbeville, was to march to the line Aire-Bethune. 
The corps should arrive there on the 11th; the Third Corps 
was to detrain at Saint-Omer about the 12th; the cavalry 



204 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

was to move in advance of the Second Corps to sweep round 
by the front and northern flank to clear the ground. 

I returned to Abbeville that evening. I found that an offi- 
cer had arrived from Ostend by motor with a letter from 
Rawlinson, in which he explained the situation in the north, 
the details of which we know. 

I remained at Abbeville and its neighbourhood on the 9th. 
The British move to the north was now in full swing. Abbe- 
ville is an important railway junction, and as I looked down 
from some high ground commanding a view of all the lines of 
railway, it was as though every set of metals had its proces- 
sion of trains as far as the eye could reach. That a flank 
movement of some magnitude was proceeding must have 
been apparent to any observer. Some enemy aircraft flew 
over the ground on which I stood, and I felt sure that the 
Germans must have had warning of our approach to the 
north. But if the movement was ever properly reported, very 
little attention was paid to it, for the subsequent activities 
of the cavalry and the Third Corps were most certainly a 
surprise to the enemy. 

Spiers, too, came in and told me that the left of Foch's 
Army (de Maud'huy's corps) was holding its own well. 

That day, I had a long interview with AUenby, and ar- 
ranged with him to form the cavalry into two divisions, the 
First under de Lisle, the Second under Gough; the two, 
forming the cavalry corps, to be, of course, under Allenby's 
command. I directed him to make Aire by the 10th with the 
Second Cavalry Division, the First to follow in support. 

I told him that his r6le in the immediate future would be 
to clear the country to the north and northeast, reconnoi- 
tring woods, etc., and securing passages over waterways. I 



RAWLINSON'S INSTRUCTIONS 205 

warned him that he must be prepared to turn round and sup- 
port the Second Corps if it became necessary, but added that 
I hoped not to have to call upon him for this. 

An air officer (not, however, Sykes) whom I had sent 
towards Antwerp returned and reported the faU of the for- 
tress. He told me of the great difficulty which had been ex- 
perienced in withdrawing the Naval Brigade. 

On this afternoon (October 9) I had a message from Raw- 
linson. He told me that 8000 French were holding Ghent. 
He was sending two brigades under Capper to the place in 
order to cover the retreat of the Belgians to Bruges, and, 
with the same object, he was directing a brigade of Byng's 
cavalry on the Lys towards Courtrai. 

A wire having arrived from Kitchener putting Rawlinson 
under my command, I sent the latter instructions. 

He was told to hold the line of the Lys if he could, but 
not to risk a big fight. If he could hold on to these positions 
I promised to connect up with him by the 13th or 14th. If, 
however, he were forced to retire, he was directed to do so 
in the direction of Saint-Omer, where the Third Corps was 
now detraining. 

On the afternoon of the 9th, the Second Corps were ap- 
proaching the line Bethune-Aire, the infantry travelling 
in motor lorries lent by General Foch. These lorries and 
motor omnibuses were much used in the ensuing operations, 
and proved of great value in adding to the mobility of the 
troops. 

On the 10th, orders were sent to Rawlinson to the effect 
that the troops under his command (namely, the Seventh 
Division and the Third Cavalry Division) were to form the 
Foiirth Corps, and that, as soon as the Eighth Division 



206 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

came out it would go to him, and Byng's cavalry would be 
withdrawn. 

I was much perturbed at hearing that there was delay on 
the part of the French in relieving the First Corps on the 
Aisne; Joffre, however, assured me that all Haig's troops 
should reach Saint-Omer so as to enable me to get them into 
line by the 17th or the 19th, and with this I had to be con- 
tent. 

When I visited Smith-Dorrien at his Headquarters at 
Hesdin, I found that he would not be able to reach the line 
assigned to him on this night, as the motor lorries were late, 
and his mounted troops and horses were very tired. I di- 
rected him to rest for the night and march at 9 a.m. next 
morning. 

After leaving the Second Corps I went to Saint-Pol and 
had a long talk with General de Maud'huy (commanding the 
Tenth Army). I learnt from him that things were not going 
so well north of Loos. He had been obliged to fall back be- 
fore the attack of the Nineteenth German Corps, which had 
come up from Valenciennes. He expected to be forced 
farther west, but promised me to hold a line extending from 
Bethune to the southeast up to 12 noon on the 12th, if by 
then the Second Corps could have arrived at Bethune. 

De Maud'huy was among the best army commanders that 
France had produced in the war. I look back with much 
pleasure and gratification to my long association with him. 
He was of a most cheerful and buoyant temperament and a 
bon camarade in every sense of the word. His skill and dash 
as a leader are well known. 

On leaving him I returned again to Smith-Dorrien, and 
begged him to hasten his move. He promised to deploy into 



PLANS ARRANGED WITH FOCH 207 

his new position as early as possible on the following morn- 
ing. 

On this day (October 10) instructions were sent to AUenby 
to take the First Cavalry Division to join the Second near 
Aire early the next day, and to act on the left front and flank 
of the Second Corps. The Foret de Nieppe was said to be 
occupied by German cavalry in some strength. 

After a long interview with Foch, we concerted together 
plans of which the following is a brief outline. 

It was agreed that, by the 13th, the British and French 
troops would be in a position to make a combined advance 
east. On that day we were to make the line Lille-Courtrai. 

The French left was to secure the passage of the Scheldt 
at Lille; the British centre was to be directed on Courtrai, 
and was to make good the passage of the Lys at that place. 

The road Bethune-Lille-Tournai was to be used by the 
French, and all roads north of it by the British. 

The Fourth Corps and Belgians were to be on the left of 
the advance. 

On the evening of the 11th the cavalry had cleared the 
Foret de Nieppe (south of Hazebrouck), and were in touch 
with the divisional cavalry of the Sixth Division east of that 
place. They extended thence southeast to the left of the 
Second Corps. 

The Second Corps had reached the line of the canal, and I 
directed Smith-Dorrien to wheel up his left the next morn- 
ing in the direction of Merville and move east to the line 
Laventie-Lorgies, which would bring him on the immedi- 
ate left of the French Tenth Army. 

One division of the Third Corps was moving on Haze- 
brouck. 



208 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

Rawlinson reported that Capper with two brigades was 
still in Ghent. His aircraft had brought word that two di- 
visions of the enemy were moving on Alost-Termonde- 
Lokeren, and that five pontoon bridges had been constructed 
by the Germans at Termonde. He said he had received my 
instructions and would carry them out as far as he was 
able to. 

The Third Cavalry Division was at Thourout. 

The French cavalry were very energetic on the 11th. 
Conneau's cavalry corps pushed back the German cavalry 
to the line Vermelles-Richebourg-Vieille Chapelle. De 
Mitry's cavalry corps assembled and drove the German 
cavalry back to the line of the Lawe at Vieille Chapelle and 
Estaires. 

By the night of the 11th, the cavalry corps under Allenby 
had made good a great deal of ground to the north, and were 
halting between Wallon-Cappel (west of Hazebrouck) and 
Merville. Moving thence on the morning of the 12th, they 
carried out invaluable work during the subsequent two or 
three days. Allenby liberally interpreted his orders and 
made a magnificent sweep to the north and northeast, driv- 
ing the enemy back all the way. 

Of aU the splendid work performed by the cavalry during 
the war, little can compare (in results achieved) with this 
advance. It was only surpassed by their immortal stand 
on the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge on those ever-memorable 
days and nights of October 31 and November 1. 

By the evening of the 12th, Gough, with the Second Cav- 
alry Division, had attacked and captured the Mont des 
Cats position, which was a strategic point of great importance 
lying six miles northeast of Hazebrouck. There was great 



IMPORTANT WORK OF THE CAVALRY 209 

opposition by the enemy cavalry, which was supported by 
jager and strong infantry detachments; but Gough carried 
all before him in fine style. 

The First Division under de Lisle halted before Merris, 
after severe fighting which drove the enemy back many miles. 

On the 13th, the cavalry made a further great advance, 
driving the enemy before them, and in the evening reached 
the line Mont Noir-Boeschepe-Berthen. The position of 
Mont Noir was vigorously defended by the Germans, but 
they were finally driven out by the Second Cavalry Division 
under Gough, who handled his troops with great skill and 
determination. 

On the 14th, the First Cavalry Division reached the area 
Dranoutre-Messines and pushed advanced detachments to 
Warneton. The Second Division moved to the Xemmel- 
Wytschaete area, sending advance detachments to Werwick. 

I sent instructions to AUenby to make a strong recon- 
naissance of the Lys from Estaires to Menin on the 15th, 
and report the result as quickly as possible to me at the 
Headquarters of the Third Corps. 

Late at night on the 12th, the Third Corps (Fourth and 
Sixth Divisions and Nineteenth Brigade) moved to the area 
east and south of Hazebrouck. The infantry were moved in 
motor omnibuses. 

On this day General Headquarters were moved from Ab- 
beville to Saint-Omer. On my way there I went to Haze- 
brouck to see the Commander of the Third Corps. Pulteney 
is a very old friend and comrade of mine, to whom I shotdd 
like to devote a few lines of this story. 

The keenest of soldiers from his early youth, he was ad- 
jutant of his battalion of the Scots Guards. Thence he sought 



210 BEITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

service in Africa, where he did excellent work, although he 
suffered severely from the climate. 

I had the good fortune to be closely associated with him in 
the South African War, and there had experience of his fine 
qualities as a soldier and leader of men. I was delighted to 
find him with me as one of the three corps commanders who 
fought with the First Expeditionary Force sent to France. 

Throughout my period of Commander-in-Chief he wholly 
justified the estimate which I had formed of his capacity and 
capability in the field. He enjoyed the full confidence of the 
officers and men who served under him. Possessed of iron 
nerve and indomitable courage, he remained imperturbable 
and unmoved in face of the most difiicult and precarious sit- 
uations. No matter how arduous the task imposed upon him, 
he never made difficulties, but always carried out the r6le 
assigned to him with energy and skill. It had been my hope 
to see him in command of an army, for which I feel sure he 
was thoroughly qualified; but my withdrawal from France 
prevented my carrying out my intentions with regard to him. 

His conduct of the operations which I am just about to 
describe was characterized by his customary skill, boldness, 
and decision. The great results which accrued from the 
First Battle of Ypres may be fairly traced back to his initial 
leading of the Third Corps in the series of successful ad- 
vances which were the most prominent and important 
amongst the opening phases of that great combat. 

On reaching Hazebrouck, about 4 p.m. on the 13th, I was 
told that the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy some 
miles east of the town. Repairing with all speed in that di- 
rection, I came up with the rear of the Sixth Division, which 
had been heavily engaged almost up to that moment, but 



VALUABLE CAPTURE BY THE THIRD CORPS 211 

now was preparing to advance. My ear got hopelessly blocked 
amidst ammunition wagons and aU manner of traffic, and in 
trying to extricate it we found ourselves badly bogged in a 
ploughed field. 

Leaving the motor to struggle back, I tried to see what 
was going on from some high ground close by. Rain was 
falling heavily, and the atmosphere was foggy and misty. 
I watched as best I could for some little time what was go- 
ing forward, until I felt assured that the tide of battle was 
flowing very favourably for us. I then got back as quickly 
as possible to Headquarters at Saint-Omer, where reports 
were awaiting me. I learnt that the town had been heavily 
bombed by hostile aircraft during the day. Much damage 
was done to buildings, and several soldiers and civilians 
had been killed and wounded. It was a somewhat unpleasant 
welcome for us, but the effect of it was completely wiped out 
by the news I received from Pulteney of the victory he had 
attained. 

The enemy opposed to him consisted of one or two divi- 
sions of cavalry, at least a division of infantry (Nineteenth 
Corps) and several jager battalions. Pulteney found them 
posted in a strong position covering Bailleul, with their left 
resting on Bleu (close to Vieux Berquin) and their right on 
Berthen. The British attack opened at 1.30 p.m., and by 
nightfall the Sixth Division had captured Bailleul and Men- 
teren, whilst the Foiu'th Division captured and occupied a 
strong position facing east one mile to the north of the Sixth 
Division. 

This was an excellent day's work performed by the Third 
Corps; and the captured ground was of great value in the 
subsequent operations. 



212 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

About noon on the 14th, the Third Corps continued the 
advance, and after some considerable fighting secured, by 
7 P.M., the line Bleu-east of Bailleul-Neuve Eglise. 

On the 15th I directed Pulteney to make good the river 
Lys between Armentieres and Sailly-sur-la-Lys, and endeav- 
our to gain touch with the Second Corps. 

By nightfall the Third Corps had made the line Sailly- 
Nieppe. 

Between the 11th and the 15th, the Fourth Corps under 
Rawlinson was constantly engaged in assisting and covering 
the retreat of the Belgian Army. During this time the Ger- 
man forces from Antwerp were concentrating westwards in 
ever-increasing strength. The Seventh Division under Cap- 
per retired successively from Ghent to Aeltre, thence to Thielt, 
from Thielt to Roulers, and from Roulers to the south and 
east of Ypres. 

The Third Cavalry Division under Byng was at Thourout 
on the 11th, at Roulers on the 12th, at Ypres on the 13th, 
and on the 14th connected up with Gough's Second Cavalry 
Division in front of Kemmel, which position the two cavalry 
divisions captured and secured. 

On the 15th the Seventh Division was east of Ypres, with 
the Third Cavalry Division well out in advance of them in 
the direction of Menin and Courtrai. 

The capture of the high ground about Kemmel proved to 
be of the utmost importance to us throughout the Battle of 
Ypres. 

On the 12th the Belgian Army assembled in the area 
Ostend-Dixmude-Furnes-Nieuport, but on the 15th with- 
drew entirely behind the Yser to the north of Ypres. 

The French Naval Division and other troops which had 



OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND CORPS 213 

been covering the Belgian retreat were at Dixmude and Nieu- 
port. A French Territorial division from Cassel had been 
moved to Ypres. 

On the 14th it was reported that about ten thousand Ger- 
man troops from Antwerp were moving on Bruges and Rou- 
lers, and that another German division from Antwerp had 
reached Courtrai. 

On the 15th, the enemy strengthened their line on the 
Lys, where part of the Nineteenth and Twelfth German 
Corps were reported to be with their right on Menin, and, 
finally, the Germans were said to be advancing in four col- 
umns to the line Ghistelles-Roulers. 

I now turn to the operations of the Second Corps, which, 
it will be remembered, was on the right of the British forces 
to the east of Bethune. 

I visited Smith-Dorrien at his Headquarters almost every 
day between the 11th and the 15th. On each occasion I was 
more and more impressed by the exceptionally difficult na- 
ture of the coimtry in this part of our field of operations. 

If we draw a line on the map starting from Lens on the 
south and following north through Lievin, La Bassee, Fro- 
melles, Armentieres, almost to the valley of the river Douve 
on the north, the whole terrain for several miles to the east 
and west of that line strongly resembles the English Black 
Country. North of Lievin the ground is very flat, whilst 
mining works, slag heaps, factories, and mining villages 
completely cover the surface in all directions. 

There is a large mining population whose tenements (some- 
times single houses, sometimes separate rows or cottages) 
cover the whole area. There are also towns of some size, such 
as Bethune, Noeux-les-Mines, Nieppe, and Armentieres. 



214 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

The ground, moreover, was of such a character as to render 
effective artillery support to an infantry attack most diffi- 
cult. The roads were rough, narrow, badly paved, and very 
slippery in wet weather, which caused movements by motor 
to be a work of time and difficulty, particularly in the case 
of the heavy motor transport passing between the troops 
and their supply depots. This marked defect in the roads 
applied, however, to the whole area over which the British 
operations extended. 

After some severe fighting, particularly by the Fifth Di- 
vision, the Second Corps reached the line Annequin-Pont 
Fixe-Festubert-Vieille Chapelle-Fosse on the night of the 
12th. 

On my way to Hazebrouck on the 13th, I saw Smith-Dor- 
rien for a short time. He was holding his own, and during the 
day his left (Third Division) made good progress, reaching 
Pont du Hem close to Laventie. 

The French cavalry, which had been operating in advance 
of the Second Corps, had drawn back to the northern flank 
of the latter and were at Pont Rigneul. For some days sub- 
sequently they held the ground and kept up connection 
between our Second and Third Corps. 

On the afternoon of the 14th, I again visited Smith-Dor- 
rien at Bethune. He was in one of those fits of deep depres- 
sion, which unfortunately visited him frequently. He com- 
plained that the Second Corps had never got over what he 
described as the "shock" of Le Cateau, and that the officers 
sent out to him to replace his tremendous losses in officers 
were untrained and inexperienced; and, lastly, he expressed 
himself convinced that there was no great fighting spirit 
throughout the troops he commanded. 



GENERAL HUBERT HAMILTON 215 

I told him that I thought he greatly exaggerated these 
disabilities. I pointed out that the cavalry, the Fourth Di- 
vision, and the Nineteenth Brigade were all just as heavily 
engaged at Le Gateau as the Second Gorps, but that their 
spirit and condition, as I had seen for myself the day be- 
fore, were excellent. 

Even if, as I consider, his point of view was needlessly pes- 
simistic, Smith-Dorrien was certainly confronted with a 
difficult task. He was on a very extended front, and the 
situation undoubtedly demanded skilful handling and great 
determination. 

I arranged with Foch that the French should extend their 
line north, up to the line of the La Bassee Ganal. When this 
was done, the commander of the Second Gorps was able 
to shorten his line and keep one of his brigades back in 
reserve. 

On this day General Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 
Third Division, was killed by a shell. His loss was deeply 
felt by his division, who had the utmost confidence in him. 

Hubert Hamilton was an old friend of mine, and it grieved 
me much to lose him. He was a fine soldier, possessing a 
most attractive nature, and I do not think he can have had 
an enemy in the world. I have always looked back with ad- 
miration to his leading of the Third Division in that critical 
period of the war. 

I conclude this chapter with the arrival of the last detach- 
ment of the First Gorps at Saint-Omer from the Aisne, 
There to the last they maintained the fine fighting rec- 
ord which they had earned, for on the 11th — shortly be- 
fore their departure — they once again gallantly repulsed a 
heavy German attack with great loss to the enemy. 



216 BRITISH OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE 

On the night of the 11th, the Second Division and Six- 
teenth Brigade had been withdrawn from the trenches and 
had begun entraining en route for Saint-Omer, being fol- 
lowed shortly by the remainder of the First Corps. 

The following Order of the Day was issued to the troops 
on October 16: — 

" Special Order of the Day 

" General Headquarters 

" October 16, 1914 

"1. Having for twenty-five days successfully held the line 
of the river Aisne between Soissons and Villers against the 
most desperate endeavours of the enemy to break through, 
that memorable battle has now been brought to a conclusion, 
so far as the British forces are concerned, by the operation 
which has once more placed us on the left flank of the Allied 
armies. 

" 2. At the close of this important phase of the campaign, I 
wish to express my heartfelt appreciation of the services per- 
formed throughout this trying period by the ofiicers, non- 
commissioned oflScers, and men of the British Field Forces 
in France. 

" 3. Throughout nearly the whole of these twenty -five days 
a most powerful and continuous fire of artillery, from guns 
of a calibre never used before in field operations, covered and 
supported desperate infantry attacks made in the greatest 
strength and directed at all hours of the day and night on 
your positions. 

" Although you were thus denied adequate rest and suffered 
great losses, in no case did the enemy attain the slightest 
success, but was invariably thrown back with immense loss. 



ORDER OF THE DAY 217 

"4. The powerful endurance of the troops was further 
greatly taxed by the cold and wet weather which prevailed 
during the greater part of the time. 

"5. Paragraph 2 of the Special Order of the Day, August 
22, ran as follows: — 

" ' All the regiments comprising the Expeditionary Force 
bear on their colours emblems and names which constantly 
remind them of glorious victories achieved by them in the 
past. I have the most complete confidence that those regi- 
ments, as they stand to-day in close proximity to the enemy, 
will not only uphold the magnificent traditions of former 
days, but will add fresh laurels to their standards.' 

" I cannot convey what I feel with regard to the conduct of 
the troops under my command better than by expressing my 
conviction that they have justified that confidence well and 
nobly. 

"6. That confidence is everywhere endorsed by their 
fellow-countrymen; and, whatever may be before the Brit- 
ish Army in France, I am sure they will continue to follow 
the same glorious path till final and complete victory is at- 
tained. 

(Signed) " J. D. P. French, Field Marshal, 

"Commander-in-Chief, the British Army in the Field" 



CHAPTER X 

THE BATTLE OF YPRES 

First Phase, October 15 to October 26 
Before continuing my narrative, which has now reached the 
opening stages of the First Battle of Ypres, let us consider 
what were the points at issue in this grave crisis in the his- 
tory of the world. What were the stakes for which we were 
playing? 

Let us suppose that from October, 1914, up to the end of 
the war, the German right flank had been established at 
Dieppe, instead of at Nieuport. The enemy would have been 
in occupation of the whole of the Department of the Pas de 
Calais, including the seaports of Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, 
and Dunkirk. 

How then would it have fared with the British Empire.'* 

Discussing the question of the Channel tunnel, at a meet- 
ing of the Council of Imperial Defence, in May, 1914, I 
suggested the possibility of submarines being despatched in 
sections by rail to certain ports and there assembled. The 
expert reply was that this would be quite impracticable. 
How has the experience of the war borne out this dictum.' 

It is as certain as anything can be, that, in the circum- 
stances I have supposed, the Channel ports would soon have 
been full to overflowing with these craft, which, with such 
bases of operations, would have rendered the Channel a veri- 
table mare clausum, so far as any attempts by our Navy to 
prevent invasion were concerned. 

If, then, Napoleon entertained high hopes of success when 



THE THREAT TO THE CHANNEL PORTS 219 

tie concentrated an army at Boulogne in 1805 for the inva- 
sion of this country, surely the Germans, in such circum- 
stances as I have described, would have regarded such an 
enterprise with still greater confidence. And they would have 
been justified in so doing. 

Then, as to aircraft. An examination of the map will show 
that London would be within about half the aircraft range of 
the German aerodromes as they existed if these latter were 
moved to Calais and its neighbourhood. Let those who have 
had experience of the full effect of air raids on London during 
the war judge what this might have meant. Had the western 
Channel ports been in German occupation, the horrors of 
these air raids would have been multiplied a hundredfold. 

It is only necessary to add that, during the war, heavy 
artillery succeeded in making effective practice at ranges 
greater than the distance between Calais and Dover. 

I think it is reasonable to deduce from this argument that 
the stakes for which we were playing at the great Battle of 
Ypres were nothing less than the safety, indeed, the very 
existence, of the British Empire. 

Now, the Germans had two distinct opportunities of bring- 
ing about such a situation as I have contemplated — 

(1) To reenforce their right much sooner than they did — 
even though, by so doing, they had to make slight and unim- 
portant sacrifices elsewhere — and to take up a line of en- 
trenchments resting on the sea at Dieppe, whence they could 
have run their trenches east and joined up with their main 
line before de Castelnau's flank movement could possibly 
have developed. 

(2) By successfully attacking the British and French 
forces to the east of Ypres, and driving them back to the sea. 



220 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

This latter alternative, as we know, is what they actually 
attempted; which mighty effort, together with our success- 
ful and prolonged resistance, constituted the First Battle of 
Ypres. 

No one who has done me the honour of reading this book 
so far can suppose that I did not realize this danger. 

I am free to confess, however, that, on October 15, 1914, 
the day upon which I date the opening of the Battle of 
Ypres, I thought that the danger was past. I believed that 
the enemy had exhausted his strength in the great bid he 
had made to smash our armies on the INIarne and to capture 
Paris. The fine successes gained by the cavalry and the Third 
Corps, narrated in the last chapter, did much to confirm 
these impressions on my mind. 

I could not bring myself to suppose for one moment that, 
with such resources as the Germans afterwards showed that 
they had at this time in reserve, they could have let slip such 
an opportunity as we afforded them by our long delay on the 
Aisne and our perilous disregard of the danger in the north. 
One of their punishments will be the corroding contempla- 
tion of the "ifs" and "buts" of their stupendous gamble. 

In my inmost heart, I did not expect I should have to fight 
a great defensive battle. All my dispositions were made with 
the idea of carrying out effectively the combined offensive 
which, as narrated in the last chapter, was concerted be- 
tween Foch and myself. 

There was only one reservation in my mind, and that con- 
cerned the danger of leaving a gap anywhere in our long 
line, or of failing to give a sufficiently close support to the 
weary but most gallant army of the King of the Belgians. 
As will presently be shown, I had to run a terrible risk to 



THE RIGHT IMPULSE 221 

safeguard against this danger, but I hold that the risk was 
justified. 

Many of Napoleon's great campaigns developed in a to- 
tally unexpected manner, quite different from his original 
conception, but he always claimed that his constant success 
was due to the initial correct direction and impulse which he 
always imparted to his armies. Tolstoy states that the only 
directions he gave at Borodino, three in number, were never 
carried out, and could never, as the battle developed, have 
been carried out. I have not verified the great Russian novel- 
ist's statement, but it may well be true. History relates that 
in the Jena campaign of 1806, Napoleon, in three days, made 
three erroneous calculations of the Prussians' doings. 

"On the 10th," says Hamley, in his "Operations of War," 
"he thought Hohenlohe was about to attack him; on the 
10th also he judged that the Prussians were concentrating 
on Gera; and on the 13th he mistook Hohenlohe's army for 
the entire Prussian force. Still, his plan, made on these sup- 
positions, was in the main quite suitable to the actual cir- 
cumstances. And this, as is mostly the case, was owing to the 
right direction given to the movements at the outset. The pre- 
liminary conditions of a campaign seldom offer more than 
three or four alternatives; an attack by the centre or either 
flank, or some combination of these. If the enemy has made 
such false dispositions as to render one of these alternatives 
decidedly the best, the general who has the faculty of choos- 
ing it thereby provides in the best possible way for all subse- 
quent contingencies. A right impulse once given to an army, 
it is in a position to turn events not calculated on, or mis- 
calculated, to advantage." 

As a humble but lifelong disciple of this great master of 



222 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

war, I venture to make the same claim for the operations 
now about to be discussed. 

The designation of the place where any great battle has 
taken place, and the limits of time within which it has lasted, 
were formerly much more easily defined than now. 

In my first despatch reporting the details of the Battle of 
Ypres, I think it was described as "The Battle of Ypres- 
Armentieres," and, strictly speaking, that really would have 
been more correct. 

I have mentioned this in order to draw attention to the 
fact that, although the most critical point throughout this 
living line of battle was east of the town of Ypres, yet the 
battle which was given that name was fought on a front of 
many miles, extending from the sea at Nieuport to the 
Bethune-Lille Canal. Continuous and heavy fighting went 
on for days all along this line. 

At the beginning of the operations which I am about to 
narrate, my plans were based generally on the agreement 
which I had come to with Foch on the 10th instant. Nothing 
had occurred, so far, to raise any great doubts in my mind as 
to the possibility of prosecuting the offensive which we had 
arranged to put in movement. At the time of the arrival of 
the First Corps, a few days later, increasing opposition had 
made itself felt all along the Allied front in the north, and 
reports reached us of a powerful offensive by the enemy 
towards Ypres and the Yser. In consequence of this, my 
appreciation of the situation was that I should have to 
make a very momentous decision between two most per- 
ilous alternatives. 

But, for the moment, at any rate, I felt complete confi- 
dence. I met the corps commanders at Hazebrouck, and, in 



CONFERENCE WITH CORPS COMMANDERS 223 

accordance with the plans which Foch and I had agreed 
upon, directed them as follows: — 

The Second Corps on the right was ordered to continue 
in its present direction, making ground to the east. 

The Third Corps was to advance and make good the river 
Lys between Armentieres and Sailly-sur-Lys, and to en- 
deavour to gain touch with the Second Corps. 

The cavalry under AUenby were to make good the river 
towards Menin, and then, if possible, sweep round to the 
north and northeast. 

Rawlinson was to move with his right on Courtrai, keeping 
generally level with the Third Corps in the subsequent ad- 
vance, should that prove possible; his cavalry, under Byng, 
were to move to the north of him. 

I had told Rawlinson that, whilst conforming to the gen- 
eral move east, he must keep an eye on the enemy's detach- 
ments known to be at Bruges and Roulers. I told him I would 
deal with these later by means of the First Corps, but for the 
moment his left required careful watching. 

In carrying out these orders some progress was made, and 
the troops reached the following lines by midnight : — 

Second Corps: Givenchy-les-La Bassee-Pont du Hem. 

Third Corps: Neighbourhood of Sailly. 

The remaining parts of the line were much in the same 
position as before. 

On the 16th I went out to see the cavalry. The day was 
wet and misty, and it was almost impossible to get artillery 
targets. 

The First and Second Cavalry Divisions fought all day to 
gain the passage of the Lys from Warneton to Comines, but 
without success. 



224 THE BATTLE OF YPEES — FIRST PHASE 

The Second Cavalry Division gained a footing in Warne- 
ton, but was counter-attacked and driven out in the evening. 
Before I left Allenby, he told me he had great hopes of suc- 
ceeding the next day. I remember watching some of this 
fighting from an artillery observation post established in a 
very roughly constructed hay-loft, through the rotten floor 
of which we were nearly precipitated some twenty feet to 
the ground. 

On my way back I came to the Headquarters of the Third 
Corps. They were getting on fairly well and had made some 
progress, but they had not yet taken Armentieres. 

On this day the Second Corps was able to move forward 
with slight opposition to the line Givenchy-northwest of 
Aubers. 

Of the Fourth Corps, the Seventh Division occupied the 
line Houthem-Gheluvelt-Saint-Julien, in touch with Ger- 
man outposts. 

The Third Cavalry Division moved towards Roulers, and 
was slightly engaged with the enemy in the forest of Hou- 
thulst. In the evening they occupied the line Zonnebeke- 
Westroosebeke. 

Reports pointed to an increasing hostile advance centred 
on Thourout. 

My ideas as to an earnest offensive on our part were so 
far modified by what I had seen and heard that I sent Wilson 
to Foch expressing my conviction that we could not hope to 
advance east on the lines which we had discussed on the 10th 
until our left was cleared. An ofifensive on that flank was the 
only move open to us. This, if successful, would drive the en- 
emy back from Bruges, and possibly clear Ghent. I was anx- 
ious to know what support Foch could give me in the north. 



SOME PROGRESS MADE ' 225 

I told Wilson to assure Foch that the Second and Third 
Corps, as well as the cavalry, would continue their endeavour 
to make headway east, so far as circumstances permitted. 

Foch replied that he had already two Territorial divisions 
and two cavalry divisions, besides some six to seven thousand 
marines, on the Yser. He could have another regular division 
there by either the 22d or the 23d, and he would then ad- 
vance with all the forces at his disposal, in support of my 
left, and clear the country as far as Ostend and Bruges. 

By the night of the 18th the Third Corps had captured 
Bois Grenier and Armentieres, and were on the line Radin- 
ghem-Premesques-Houplines, after an excellent advance for 
which Pulteney deserved great credit. 

On the left of the Second Corps the Third Division had 
made some advance to the line Lorgies-Herlies. The Fifth 
Division on the right was up against La Bassee, but could 
make no further headway. It was a most formidable strong- 
hold. 

The cavalry were watching the river Lys to Menin. 

As to the Fourth Corps, doubtless Rawlinson was re- 
stricted by the warning I had given him, and was naturally 
somewhat anxious about his left flank. His troops made but 
little progress towards the objective assigned to them. 

I had good reasons to think that Menin was very weakly 
occupied on the 17th, and orders were sent to Rawlinson to 
move on and attack that place on the 18th. He did not, how- 
ever, march. The embargo I had laid upon him as to his left 
flank was, perhaps, a sufficient justification; but I have al- 
ways regretted that the cavalry did not get this very neces- 
sary support on the 18th, which might possibly have secured 
to us the line of the Lys from Menin upwards. 



226 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

I do not impute blame for this to the commander of the 
Fourth Corps. Such instances of disregard of orders occur in 
every campaign. Only when the full history of the war is 
known, and all the cards are laid on the table, can a right 
judgment be formed. 

Nothing impressed me so much with the increasing power 
and weight of the enemy's opposition as my own personal 
experience on the afternoon of the 18th, when I went into 
Armentieres to try and study the situation with a view to 
estimating future possibilities. A good outlook was afforded 
from some high buildings on the eastern edge of this place. 
The town was being heavily shelled, and the way in which 
large buildings were being smashed and turned into ruins 
proved that projectiles of large calibre were falling, and that 
a considerable force of Jieavy artillery was, therefore, in action 
against the town. It was evident that powerful reenforce- 
ments were coming up to the enemy. 

I recall this afternoon in Armentieres very vividly. Armen- 
tieres has a manufacturing population, and, the day being 
Sunday, every one was wearing his best clothes. The scenes 
in the streets were extraordinary. Some of the men seemed to 
have gone mad with either rage or fear. Women rushed to 
and fro, screaming, with babies in their arms. 

Close to the lookout post where I was standing, a priest 
in his altai" vestments dashed out of a church with the sacred 
vessels inliis arms, and tore in panic down the street in front 
of me, followed by large numbers of his flock. A great deal of 
damage was done to the town, and there were many casual- 
ties amongst the civilians. 

By October 19, the First Corps under Haig was fully con- 
centrated in the northern theatre. 



CONCENTRATION OF THE FIRST CORPS 227 

The Second Division was in the area Poperinghe-Boe- 
schepe-Steenvoorde, the First Division between Saint-Omer 
and Cassel. 

On this day I had to take a very grave decision, and I shall 
try and recall the working of my mind at the time, and the 
manner in which the problem I had to solve presented itself 
to me. 

On October 10 and 11, when I commenced operations 
in the northern theatre with the British forces, I was, as 
I have said, decidedly optimistic as to the possibility of 
carrying out a strong offensive eastwards. Foch was equally 
confident, and we both thought that our concerted plans 
promised well. 

My reason for forming this opinion was, in the first place, 
based upon my talks with Foch, who had already been on the 
spot for several days. He had been able to forni some esti- 
mate of the enemy's strength between Arras and the sea. 
He considered that the Germans were in no condition to stem 
a determined advance by us. Reports had reached me of large 
transfers of German troops from this theatre to the Aisne 
and south of that river. Foch expressed himself as well satis- 
fied with the progress already made by his own army, partic- 
ularly the cavalry on his northern flank. 

But I had other and more tangible reasons for hope and 
confidence. Between the 12th and the 15th, the cavalry and 
the Third Corps had gained important victories and made 
splendid advances. During these days it did not appear that 
Rawlinson in the north was ever heavily pressed. The Second 
Corps had made certain progress, though I have always 
thought, in regard to them, that more might have been done 
had they been directed with more determination and vigour. 



228 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

The Germans themselves certainly thought so. We inter- 
cepted a wireless message sent by General von der Marwitz, 
commanding the Fourth German Cavalry Corps, who, in 
wiring to the commander of the Sixth German Army, com- 
mented upon the "weakness" of the Second Corps' attack, 
and the ease with which he had been able to withstand it. 

After the 15th, however, the result of my own observa- 
tions, and the reports I continued to receive of the enemy's 
constantly increasing strength all along our line, caused me 
anxiety and induced me to send the message I have men- 
tioned to Foch. 

I was far from satisfied with the situation in the north. 
Although no reports had reached us of any great concentra- 
tion of the enemy there, I had much reason to fear that 
troops were being moved east across Belgium to reenforce 
him. The French troops on the Yser were not numerous, and 
they included many Territorials, whilst the Belgians were 
completely tired out. On the right of the Belgians, as far 
as IMenin, there were only the Third Cavalry and Seventh 
Infantry Divisions, both of which stood in need of rest 
and refit. 

Ours was a tremendously long line to guard with so few 
troops available. If the enemy broke through the left flank, 
all the British would be turned, the Belgians and the French 
troops with them would be cut off, and the seacoast towns 
would be gone. 

When I looked farther south, the prospect was no better. 
The enemy was daily and almost hourly getting stronger in 
front of our line, which was held by the cavalry and by the 
Second and Third Corps. The endurance of these troops had 
been heavily taxed, and I had practically no reserves. More- 



THE PROBLEM 229 

over, they were extended on a front mucli too wide for their 
numbers, especially north of the Lys. 

Bad as a complete break through by the enemy in the 
north would have been, a wedge driven through our lines 
south of Menin would have entailed still more disastrous 
consequences. 

In a message which I received from de Maud'huy on the 
16th, he expressed great fear that the Germans were intent 
on attacking between us and finally separating us. Had they 
accomplished this, the eventual alternatives before the Brit- 
ish Army would have been to surrender or be driven into 
the sea. 

I pondered long and deeply on the situation, and finally ar- 
rived at the following conclusion : — 

If the enemy's threats against Ypres and the Yser were 
not strongly met by a corresponding offensive move, then a 
break through at some point in that neighbourhood by the 
Germans was a practical certainty, and the seaboard would 
be theirs. 

On the other hand, although from the south of Ypres to 
La Bassee the situation would remain very precarious, I 
conceived that it might be possible to hold on till support 
could arrive. 

Since the solution of the problem, as presented to my 
mind, resolved itself into a balance of certain disaster against 
a disaster which, although much greater in degree, was still 
not a certainty, I determined to guard against the former; and 
on the evening of the 19th I sent for Sir Douglas Haig and 
gave him his instructions. 

I explained the situation as clearly as possible, and showed 
him on the map where and how we thought the enemy's 



230 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

troops were distributed. I said that at the moment I did not 
think there was much more than the Third German Reserve 
Corps, with possibly one or two divisions attached, between 
Ostend and Menin, but that all reports pointed to an early 
arrival of strong reenforcements from the centre and east of 
Belgium. 

I pointed out to Haig how much importance I attached to 
the clearing of Ostend and Bruges before these reenforce- 
ments could arrive. I said I hoped that, with the assistance 
of the French and Belgian troops on the north, and Rawlin- 
son on his right flank, he would be able to effect this object 
and perhaps, with luck, throw the enemy back on Ghent. I 
told him that this was what I particularly wanted to bring 
about, but that he would have to be guided by the course of 
events. I informed him of Wilson's visit to Foch on the 16th, 
and Foch's promise that he would strongly support us on the 
north. 

Orders were then issued to the First Corps, of which the 
following is a summary : — 

" The First Corps will advance via Thourout with the ob- 
ject of captvu'ing Bruges. If this is proved to be feasible and 
successful, every endeavour must be made to turn the enemy's 
left flank and drive him back to Ghent. The situation, how- 
ever, is very uncertain, and in the first instance it is only 
possible to direct the First Corps with its right on the line 
Ypres-Roulers. Should the forces of the enemy, reported to 
be moving west between Iseghem and Courtrai, seriously 
menace the Fourth Corps, it is left to the discretion of the 
commander of the First Corps to lend this corps such assist- 
ance as may be necessary." 



INCREASING ENEMY PRESSURE 231 

It had been arranged by the Admiralty that some battle- 
ships were to be held in readiness at Dover, to cooperate with 
our movements on the north coast should opportunity offer. 

My advanced Headquarters were now established at Bail- 
leul, and a long discussion I had there on the 19th with Pul- 
teney and Smith-Dorrien showed that our front south of 
Menin was being still more severely pressed. 

An attempt by the Fourth Corps to advance on Menin 
ended in failure. 

The Germans were also fairly active in the north. They 
pushed back de Mitry's French cavalry corps towards Sta- 
den and Zarren, and heavily attacked the Belgians at Nieu- 
port, but our allies held their ground well. 

The events of the 20th showed still greater pressure by the 
enemy. The Third Cavalry Division was driven back to the 
line Zonnebeke-Saint-Julien-Pilkem by infantry and guns 
advancing from Roulers. 

The centre of Allenby's cavalry corps fell back on Mes- 
sines, which place was heavily shelled. 

In order to cement the connection between the Second and 
Third Corps (now only maintained by Conneau's French 
cavalry) I sent the Nineteenth Brigade to be placed at 
Pulteney's disposal. 

Haig sent two battalions of the Fourth Guards Brigade 
to support the centre of the Fourth Corps between Byng and 
Capper. 

On the 21st, all my worst forebodings as to the enemy's in- 
creasing strength were realized. Intercepted wireless mes- 
sages established the certainty that the comparatively small 
German force which on the night of the 18th we judged to 
be between Ostend and Menin, was now reenforced by no 



232 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIEST PHASE 

less than four corps, namely, the Twenty-first, Twenty- 
second, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps. 
These corps had been hastily formed, and were not composed 
of the best troops. They were also weak in numbers and ar- 
tillery as compared with other corps. 

Although I looked for a great addition to the enemy's 
numbers within a few days from the 18th, the strength they 
actually reached astounded me. This, taken with the speed 
in which they appeai-ed in the field, came like a veritable bolt 
from the blue. 

My only comfort lay in the certainty that my direction of 
the First Corps to the north was sound and best calculated 
to meet these new and startling conditions. 

All hope of any immediate offensive had now to be aban- 
doned. It was simply "up to us" to hold on like grim death 
to our positions by hard, resolute fighting, until relief in 
some shape could come. 

It may well be asked how I expected such relief to be af- 
forded, and whence it could arrive. What hope could be justi- 
fied in face of such overpowering odds? 

As far as reenforcements went, all I had to look to was 
the Indian corps, one division of which (the Lahore) de- 
trained on the 19th and the 20th at Saint-Omer, and was 
now concentrating at Wallon-Cappel, west of Hazebrouck. 
A wire from Lord Kitchener on the 22d offered me another 
Territorial battalion to replace the London Scottish on the 
lines of communication, if I wished to use the latter at the 
front. I had also available the Oxfordshire Yeomanry 
Cavalry, which had been landed at Dunkirk. 

These were all the British reserves which could possibly 
be available for some time. Doubtless, if we could keep our 



SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY 233 

positions for two or three weeks, much larger reenforcements 
would be forthcoming. But, even so, it did not appear that 
there was any prospect, in the near future, of attaining 
definite results by an effective offensive. 

Nevertheless, I remained hopeful and confident of the 
final result. 

On the 23d I issued the following special Order of the Day 
to the troops : — 

"The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief wishes once 
more to make known to the troops under his command how 
deeply he appreciates the bravery and endurance which they 
have again displayed since their arrival in the northern 
theatre. In circulating the official information which records 
the splendid victories of our Russian allies, he wotild remind 
the troops that the enemy must before long withdraw troops 
to the East and relieve the tension on our front. He feels 
it is quite unnecessary to urge officers, non-commissioned 
ofiicers, and men to make a determined effort and drive the 
enemy over the frontier. 

(Signed) " H. Wilson, Major-General 

Sub-Chief. 

" 7.30 P.M." 

This, then, was my great hope. It was to Russia and to 
the East that all eyes were turned at that time. Our allies 
had scored a considerable success in that theatre. 

With the failure of the second attack of the Central 
Powers upon Warsaw, we may take stock for a moment of 
Russia's achievement. Russia made no secret preparation 
for war, and the outbreak of hostilities had found her with 



234 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

her army reorganization incomplete and a serious shortage 
of equipment. She had to bring her men by slender com- 
munications many thousands of miles, but she was ready 
to strike a fortnight before Germany believed she could 
move. Her invasion of East Prussia had done much to 
relieve the strain in the West, and heavily she paid for her 
quixotry. 

But, after Tannenberg, she made no mistakes. Von 
Hindenburg was enticed to the Niemen and then driven 
back to disaster at Augustovo; while in Galicia, Lemberg 
and all Eastern Galicia were won, and in two mighty battles 
three Austrian armies were heavily beaten. 

The Russian generals showed that rarest of combinations 
— an omnipresent sense of a great strategic objective and 
a power of patiently biding their time and of temporarily 
relinquishing their objective when prudence demanded. 
A commander less wise than the Grand Duke Nicholas 
would have battled desperately for Cracow, lost a million 
men, and at the end of the year have been farther from it 
than in September. But as it was, the first great advance 
was promptly recalled when von Hindenburg threatened 
Warsaw, and the second was also abandoned when it was 
at the very gates of the city. 

The first Battle of Warsaw and the Battle of Kazimirjev 
were strategically admirable; and the subsequent fighting, 
from Kozienice westward, showed the stubborn valour of 
the Russian soldier. Not less brilliant was the long retire- 
ment from the Warta. There was some blunder of timing 
in the fighting between Lodz and Lowicz, for which Ren- 
nenkampf was held responsible; but there was no flaw in 
the retreat to the Bzura or the holding of the river line. 



RUSSIA'S ACHIEVEMENTS 235 

Tlie Grand Diike Nicholas proved that he possessed that 
highest of mihtary gifts — the power of renunciation, of 
"cutting losses," of sacrificing the less essential for the more. 
We must remember that in all these first five months of 
war the united strength of the Teutonic League outnum- 
bered the Russians by at least half a million. Locally, as 
at the first Battle of Warsaw, the latter may have had the 
superiority; but in all the retreat from the Warta to the 
Bzura the Russian front was markedly inferior in weight of 
men to von Mackensen's forces. When we remember this, 
we can do justice not only to the excellence of the generalship, 
but also to the stamina and courage of the rank and file. 
Let it be added that reports are unanimous as to the be- 
haviour of the Russian troops at that time, their chivalry 
towards the foe, their good humour, their kindliness towards 
each other, and their devotion to their commanders. 

In a decade the miracle of miracles had happened. Russia 
had found herself, and her armies had become an expression 
of the national will. "There is as much difference," wrote 
one correspondent, "in organization, morale, and efficiency 
between the armies which some of us saw in Manchuria 
ten years ago and which crumpled up before the Imperial 
Guards of Japan at the Battle of the Yalu, and the military 
machine that these past few weeks has been steadily and 
surely driving back the armies of Germany and Austria, as 
there was between the raw American recruits who stampeded 
at the Battle of Bull Run in 1861 and the veterans who re- 
ceived the surrender of Lee at Appomattox." 

If, then, I am asked upon what I based my hopes during 
October, 1914, that is my answer. 

The actual fronts and positions of the opposing forces 



236 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

from Nieuport and the sea to La Bassee, on the night of 
October 21, were, according to our latest and best informa- 
tion, as follows: — 

Summary from Right to Left 





Front {approx). 


Attacked hy 


Second Corps 


6 miles 


Seventh Corps 


Conneau's Cavalry Corps 


Filhng gap. 


Nineteenth Corps and 




1 mile 


part of Seventh Corps 


Third Corps and Nine- 






teenth Brigade 


12 miles 




Cavalry Corps 


4 miles 


Part of Nineteenth Corps 
and of Eighteenth Corps 


Fourth Corps 


6 miles 


One Division of Thir- 
teenth Corps and Twen- 
ty-seventh Corps 


First Corps 


7 miles 


Twenty-sixth Corps and 
part of the Twenty-third 
Corps 


Territorials, de Mitry's 


20 miles 


Twenty-third Corps, the 


Cavah-y Corps, Belgians, 




Twenty-second and the 


and French Marines 




Third Reserve Corps, 
and Ersatz Division 



On October 21 the First Corps came into line, and after 
hard fighting held at night the line Zonnebeke-Lange- 
marck-Bixschoote, the left of the First Division being on 
the Yser Canal. 

Some confusion and friction were caused by the with- 
drawal of de Mitry's cavalry corps to the west bank of the 
canal, thus uncovering the flank of the First Corps, who were 
also considerably delayed in their advance by French Terri- 
torial troops blocking the road. In spite of this, however, the 
First Corps delivered some powerful attacks with the bay- 
onet, and in the afternoon the artillery of the corps was 
in action for a long time against retreating hostile masses. 



A VISIT FROM GENERAL JOFFRE 237 

These were splendid targets for one brigade in particular, 
which did tremendous execution. 

The inevitable evUs of divided command are clearly 
shown when Allied troops are mixed, and the limits of con- 
trol cannot be properly defined. As will appear later, I made 
the most strenuous attempts to minimize this very serious 
drawback, until either rectified or considerably reduced by 
arrangements between the two Governments, but all in vain. 
I could get no hearing. 

I was so strongly impressed with the danger of the con- 
fusion and congestion which the divided command was 
causing in the north, that I went myself on the evening of 
the 21st to Ypres, where I was met by Haig, Rawlinson, de 
Mitry, and Bidon (who commanded a French Territorial 
division) . Arrangements were there made by which the town 
was to be at once cleared of the French troops, and the left 
flank of the First Corps properly covered. 

On the 21st I received a visit from General Joffre, who 
told me he was at once bringing up the Ninth French Army 
Corps to Ypres. 

Two battalions of the Lahore Division were sent at night 
in motor omnibuses to Wulverghem, to come under AUen- 
by's orders in support of the cavahy. 

The Third Cavalry Division was moved from the left to 
the right of the Seventh Division to be in a position to assist 
AUenby's cavalry corps, which was being hard pressed on 
the left at Zonnebeke. 

A fine piece of work was done by the Fourth Division under 
Wilson on the morning of the 21st. The Germans had advanced 
and captured Le Gheer. The Fourth Division retook it by a 
brilliant coimter-attack and secured two hundred prisoners. 



238 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

I fix the close of the first phase of the Battle of Ypres 
as the night of October 26. By the morning of the 27th the 
Ninth French Corps had settled down in the trenches which 
they had taken over from the First Corps in the northern 
part of the Ypres salient. 

Speaking generally, it may be said that, in the last days of 
this, the opening period of the battle, the northern portion 
of our line progressed slowly but surely, very heavy losses 
being inflicted on the enemy and many prisoners captured. 

To the south, however, between Zonnebeke and La 
i Bassee, a certain amount of ground was lost, but troops held 
stanchly to their positions, and there was never any break 
of a serious nature made in the line. 

On the 22d, the enemy, who had thrown a number of 
pontoon bridges across the Lys opposite the cavalry corps, 
appeared to be massing troops against that part of our line. 
The Lahore Division having then reached Bailleul, I sent 
Egerton's brigade to support the cavalry. I found there was 
no chance of getting the Meerut Division for some time to 
come, as they were being hopelessly delayed at Marseilles 
and Orleans. 

At midnight on the 22d both the Second and Third Corps 
commanders were very anxious about their positions, and 
I therefore despatched the Lahore Division to Estaires, 
from which point it could support either corps in case of 
urgent necessity. 

; On the 24th I paid a visit to General d'Urbal at Poperinghe. 
He had come to command the northern French army. We 
discussed the situation together, and he seemed hopeful as 
to future possibilities. 

D'Urbal impressed me as a man of striking personality. 



GERMAN LOSSES SEVERE 239 

In figure and bearing he reminded me of the old Murat type 
of French beau sabreur. All his regimental service was passed 
in the cavalry. I was a great deal associated with him in the 
operations at Ypres and afterwards, when he commanded 
the French troops on the Arras front, and I can testify to his 
remarkable powers of command, his fine courage, and his 
extraordinary tenacity. We were together in many critical 
situations, and I have passed some anxious hours in his com- 
pany; but I never knew him other than helpful in the highest 
degree. Nothing ever ruffled the calmness of his demeanour, 
or prevented him from exercising that deliberate and well- 
weighed judgment which was a remarkable feature of his 
truly soldier-hke character. 

Dawnay came back from the First Corps on this night, 
and told me that late on the previous day the enemy had 
delivered a succession of counter-attacks against the front 
of the Second Division just as they were being relieved. 
The German infantry came on in dense columns singing 
"The Watch on the Rhine." They were simply mown down 
by our artillery and rifle fire. The ground was a veritable 
shambles, and the First Corps estimated that in the last 
three or four days they had put at least eight thousand 
Germans hors de combat. 

Foch, with whom I had a long interview at Cassel on the 
morning of the 25th, appeared to be quite hopeful and san- 
guine about the situation on the canal north of Ypres. He 
told me that another French regular division was to be 
brought up on either flank at Nieuport and Ypres, and he 
proposed later to move Conneau from the neighbourhood of 
Bethune. I told him I could hardly do without Conneau for the 
moment, and he agreed to leave him as long as I wanted him. 



240 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FIRST PHASE 

It is interesting to recall tliat General Conneau was once 
a cadet at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He 
proved himself throughout the war to be a distinguished and 
able cavalry leader. 

The first phase of the Battle of Ypres may be briefly sum- 
marized as the conclusion of the successive attempts, begun 
a month previously, to eflfect a great turning movement 
round the German right flank. The operations up to the 
night of the 26th certainly failed in their original intention 
of clearing the coast-line and driving the enemy from Bruges 
and Ghent, but they succeeded in establishing a line to the 
sea which, if it could be held, brought the Germans face 
to face with the challenge: "Thus far shalt thou go and no 
farther." 

What this meant to them is proved by the desperate but 
abortive attempts they made to break through in the second 
phase of the battle. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE BATTLE OF YPRES 
Second Phase, October 27 to October 31 
I REGARD the operations which were carried on by the British 
forces in France during the days of which this chapter treats 
as more momentous and fateful than any others which I di- 
rected during my period of service as Commander-in-Chief 
in the field. October 31 and November 1 will remain forever 
memorable in the history of our country, for, during those 
two days, no more than one thin and straggling line of tired- 
out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its prac- 
tical ruin as an independent first-class power. I still look back 
in wonder on that thin line of defence, stretched, out of sheer 
necessity, far beyond its natural and normal power for de- 
fence. Right, centre, and left our men were tried and pressed 
as troops were never tried and pressed before. 

A lofty tower of some antiquity still stood by itself on the 
top of a commanding hill just east of Kemmel. Its days even 
then were numbered, and, after being heavily shelled, it was 
completely destroyed later in the battle. While this tower 
remained it made an excellent lookout post. I spent some 
time there on the 27th, when the crisis of the battle was 
approaching. 

A glance at the map will show that from this point of view 
an observer with strong glasses can compass almost the 
whole battle-field of Ypres, where seven British infantry and 
three cavalry divisions were extended on a front of from 
twenty-five to thirty-six miles. 



242 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

It was a bright October day with briUiant sunshine, and 
the Hne of fire could be seen all along the high ground en- 
circling the Ypres salient to the north, the Wytschaete- 
Messines Ridge to the east, and away to the southeast down 
to the Lys valley almost as far as Armentieres, beyond which 
place the shell-bursts in the sky brought the right of the 
British battle-line well into the picture. 

For four or five days this line was being still further re- 
duced in strength by the successful efforts of our troops to 
stem the tide of the enemy's advance, whilst on their side 
the Germans were being gradually reenforced to a strength 
which, by the 30th, reached about double our numbers. 

In the great onslaught made by the enemy on October 31 
and November 1, sufficient recognition has never yet been 
given to the glorious stand made by the cavalry corps under 
AUenby, and when I speak of the gallantry of the cavalry, I 
hasten to add that the splendour of their work was equally 
shared by Shaw's Ninth Brigade of the Third Division (First 
Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Fourth Battalion Royal 
Fusiliers, First Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, and First 
Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers), Egerton's brigade of the 
Indian Corps (First Connaught Rangers, One Hundred 
and Twenty-ninth Duke of Connaught's Own Beluchis, 
Fifty-seventh Wilde's Rifles, Ninth Bhopal Infantry), the 
London Scottish, and the Oxfordshire Yeomanry. 

For close upon forty-eight hours these troops held the 
Wytschaete-Messines Ridge against the utmost efforts of 
no less than two and a haK German army corps to dislodge 
them. Here was the centre of our line of battle, and, had 
it given way, disaster would have resulted to the entire left 
wing of the Allied line. 



STUBBORN FIGHTING 243 

In almost the same degree I would allot the honours of 
those splendid days to the defenders of the Ypres salient, 
namely, the Ninth (French) Army Corps, the First (British) 
Corps, and the Seventh (British) Division. 

It was only a slightly less arduous task which fell upon the 
Second Corps in this great battle, for they had a long line to 
hold, in a much more difficult country, and were subjected to 
powerful attacks by superior numbers. 

There is, indeed, little distinction to be made between the 
troops who fought so bravely all along the line. All were dog- 
gedly tenacious; all were superhumanly brave. The fullest 
measure of mutual support was assured by the complete 
understanding and perfect loyalty which existed amongst 
leaders of all ranks, combined with the alertness shown by all 
commanders in filling up gaps in the line without delay, and in 
using the troops at their disposal with the utmost economy. 

All said and done, however, the main element of success 
was to be found in the devoted bravery and the stern, un- 
yielding determination to " do or die," displayed by the rank 
and file of the "contemptible little army" and its reenforce- 
ments. 

On the 27th I had received an urgent message from Haig 
about the exhausted condition of the Seventh Division. 
During the day I went to Haig at Hooge and had a confer- 
ence with him and Rawlinson. I decided to break up the 
Fourth Corps for the present, and to send Rawlinson and 
his Headquarters home to supervise the preparation of the 
Eighth Division pending its despatch to France. 

The Seventh Division, under Capper, was to be attached 
to the First Corps until the Eighth Division arrived and the 
Fourth Corps could be again re-formed under Rawlinson. 



244 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

Byng with the Third Cavalry Division was placed under 
AUenby. 

The Seventh Division took over the ground south of the 
Ypres-Menin road, then occupied by some troops of the First 
Division which were withdrawn in reserve. 

The further progress of the enemy between La Bassee and 
the sea was probably now in suspense, awaiting the arrival of 
reenforcements. We had reliable reports that the detraining 
of troops was rapidly proceeding at Lille and Courtrai. 

During the next two days they began pouring in, and, by 
October 30, from La Bassee to the north the following Ger- 
man corps opposed us: — 

La Bassee to Armentieres, Seventh, one Brigade of Eight- 
eenth, Nineteenth. 

North of Armentieres to east of Ypres, Thirteenth, Fif- 
teenth, Twenty-fourth Reserve, Twenty-seventh Reserve, 
and two ersatz divisions. 

East of Ypres to Dixmude, Twenty-sixth Reserve, Twenty- 
third Reserve, Twenty-second Reserve. 

Dixmude to Nieuport, Third Reserve and Fourth Ersatz 
Division. 

Roughly speaking, there were some twelve German corps 
opposed to seven of the Allies, whilst the enemy enjoyed 
enormous artillery superiority, both numerically and in cali- 
bre of guns. 

The condition of the Second Corps was again causing me 
anxiety, and the corps commander was calling out for help 
and reenforcements. It had also given cause for apprehen- 
sion to our allies. 

WUlcocks arrived on the 27th, and took over command of 
the Indian corps in the field. 



LOSS OF NEUVE CHAPELLE 245 

On this day Prince Maurice of Battenberg died of his 
wounds. He was a young officer of great promise, and much 
beloved in his regiment, the Sixtieth Rifles. 

The 28th saw the loss of Neuve Chapelle by the Second 
Corps. 

I met Smith-Dorrien and Willcocks together at Merville, 
and arranged for the Indian Corps to take over the line now 
held by the Second Corps. The Second Corps was to fall back 
to Bailleul in reserve. 

On the morning of the 28th I had got a message from Gen- 
eral de Maud'huy, commanding the Tenth French Army 
on our right. It was sent through the French Mission, and 
was to the effect that the state of the Second Corps made 
him very anxious about his left flank. He added some criti- 
cism of its leadership and the way in which its artillery was 
being handled. 

The Sixth Division under Keir scored a success on the 
28th. On their front, just south of Armentieres, they repulsed 
a severe counter-attack in which the enemy left several hun- 
dred dead in front of their trenches. 

The supply of ammunition now began to cause me increas- 
ing anxiety, and my apprehension imder this head continued 
more or less throughout the whole period of my command ia 
France. 

October 29 witnessed the opening of that most critical 
stage in the first period of the war, to which I have already 
referred. 

At nine in the morning of that day the centre of the Ypres 
salient, held by the First and Seventh Divisions, was at- 
tacked in the neighbourhood of Gheluvelt by large masses of 
the enemy, who forced back our troops on the latter place. 



246 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

Well-organized counter-attacks, which were splendidly led, 
repulsed the enemy during the day with heavy casualties. 
By nightfall the First and Seventh Divisions had recovered 
all the ground they had lost, and the position that night 
(October 29) was somewhat as follows: — 

The Seventh and part of the First Division held a line 
which extended on the left from a point about five hundred 
yards north of the cross-roads on the Ypres-Menin road, and 
ran thence south through the cross-roads to the village of 
Kruiseij on the right, where the Seventh Division joined up 
with the cavalr3^ This line was well to the east of Gheluvelt, 
and consequently represented a considerable gain as com- 
pai-ed with the ground held the day before. 

The left or northern portion of Haig's line extended 
slightly to the west of Reutel and Poezelhoek (both these 
places being held by the enemy), and was continued by the 
Second Division to the east of Zonnebeke Station, where 
they joined the right of the Ninth French Corps. The attack- 
ing troops consisted of the Twenty-seventh German Reserve 
Corps and the Sixth Bavarian Division, which suflfered a 
very severe check; their losses were known to be hea^'y. In 
the middle of the day I sent Haig the London Scottish, 
which was the only reserve I had left. They were moved in 
motor omnibuses to Ypres. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I went to Cassel and had a 
long conference with Foch. The canal and the river Yser, 
from Ypres to the sea, were capable of wide inundation 
which would afford excellent cover and protection all along 
that battle front. From the first I had been most anxious 
that this inundation should be carried out; but there was 
great opposition to it. Whether this came from the French 



INTENSE FIGHTING 247 

or tlie Belgians I did not know, but I am much inclined to 
think that the French generals, in their sanguine anticipa- 
tion of an immediate advance east, feared that such an ob- 
stacle would hamper them. When I saw Foch on this after- 
noon, however, he was all in favour of the inundation. He 
told me he thought the enemy was very " slack" in the north, 
that fresh French troops were being landed at Dunkirk, and 
that he still expected to see his hopes of an early advance 
realized. It was impossible to be closely associated with Foch 
and not come under the spell of his sanguine temperament, 
which was always a great help to me, although on this occa- 
sion I knew perfectly well that the enemy was increasing in 
numbers on oiir front, and that it was utterly impossible for 
us at that time to do more than hold our own with the ut- 
most difficulty. 

At dawn on October 30 the Nineteenth Brigade (Second 
Battalion Royal Welsh FusUiers, First Battalion Scottish 
Rifles, First Battalion Middlesex Regiment, and Second 
Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) carried out a 
brilliant counter-attack with the bayonet, heavily repulsing 
the enemy on the right of the Third Corps. 

An hour later Haig reported that he was being heavUy 
shelled all along his front, and that the enemy was moving in 
great force to attack Byng's Third Cavalry Division on his 
right. Gough had sent two regiments and a battery of horse 
artillery to support Byng. One of these regiments (the Royal 
Dragoons) had, with great dash and gallantry, repulsed an 
attack on the chateau at Hollebeke. 

I went early in the morning to Allenby's Headquarters at 
Kemmel, where Barrow (his Chief of Staff) reported the 
situation to me. I ascended the tower I have spoken of al- 



248 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

ready, to get a view of the field, which by this time had been 
drawn nearer, but mist prevented good observation. 

Hearing heavy firing towards Ypres, I went to Haig's 
Headquarters at Hooge. Whilst I was with Haig, AUenby 
came in. 

It appeared that strong forces were attacking the Third 
and Second Cavalry Divisions under Byng and Gough re- 
spectively, in and around HoUebeke. Allenby had sent a 
brigade from the First Cavalry Division on his right to sup- 
port Gough, who had also been obliged to recall the support 
which he had previously sent to Byng. Haig had sent the 
London Scottish to support Gough, and had brought down 
Bulfin with most of the Second Brigade to strengthen the 
Seventh Division on his right. Furthermore, he had ordered 
Lord Cavan with the Fourth (Guards) Brigade (Second 
Battalion Grenadier Guards, Second Battalion Coldstream 
Guards, Third Battalion Coldstream Guards, First Battalion 
Irish Guards) to move south of the Menin road, ready to 
counter-attack towards HoUebeke. 

By the evening the Second and Third Cavalry Divisions 
had fallen back to the canal, and the enemy was in possession 
of HoUebeke. 

On AUenby's right the First Cavalry Division was heavily 
pressed at Messines; the enemy gained a footing in the vil- 
lage, but were driven out later in the evening. 

On Haig's left the Sixth Infantry Brigade (First Battalion 
The King's (Liverpool) Regiment, Second Battalion South 
Staffs Regiment, First Battalion Royal Berks Regiment and 
First Battalion K.R.R.) was attacked three times during the 
day, and on one occasion the enemy infantry reached the 
barbed wire, close to the trenches. 



THE CAVALRY HARD PRESSED 249 

North of the First Corps and on the Yser, heavy fighting 
went on throughout the 30th, but the situation there re- 
mained practically unchanged. 

Late on this night, orders were sent to Smith-Dorrien 
to move Shaw's (Ninth) Brigade of the Third Division to 
Neuve-Eglise (about five miles east-northeast of Bailleul), 
to come under AUenby's orders. 

About 6 P.M. the line of the Eleventh Brigade (First 
Battalion Somerset Light Infantry, First Battalion East 
Lanes Regiment, First Battalion Hampshire Regiment, and 
First Battalion Rifle Brigade) in the Fourth Division under 
Hunter Weston was broken at Saint-Yves, but the ground 
lost was brilliantly recaptured by the brigade later in the 
evening. 

Such was the general situation at 2 a.m. on October 31, 
at which hour I received a visit from Foch, who promised to 
let me have effective support for Haig on this day, namely, 
five battalions of French infantry and three batteries of 
artillery. 

Shortly after dawn on this fateful 31st of October, we had 
news that a serious infantry attack was developing on the 
left of the Fourth Division in the valley of the river Douve. 
The Fourth Division was able to extend its line some little 
way to the north of the river and thus release troops of the 
First Cavalry Division, which subsequently fought fiercely all 
day at Messines. Throughout the day the left of the Fourth 
Division rendered valuable and efficient support, as did the 
artillery on Hill 63, about one mile north of Ploegsteert. 

But the great events of the day took place between Ghelu- 
velt on the north and Messines on the south. 

Early in the morning AUenby reported that Messines 



250 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

was being heavily attacked, and that the Ninth Lancers 
had been withdrawn after suffering severely; that the eastern 
exit of the town was held by the Fourth and Fifth Dragoon 
Guards, and that the situation was "decidedly critical." 

A heavy attack had been delivered against the right of 
the First Cavalry Division shortly after 7 a.m., and an Indian 
battalion of rifles (the Fifty -seventh, attached to the First 
Cavalry Division) were driven from their trenches. The 
reserves, however, held on, and the Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
retook the trenches which the Fifty-seventh had lost. 

At 9.30 A.M. large masses of infantry were reported to be 
advancing against the Second Cavalry Division between 
Oesttaverne and Roozebeek, and long columns of the enemy 
were seen on the road leading from the former place to 
Saint-Eloi. 

Shortly afterwards I reached AUenby's Headquarters, 
which were now at Groote Vierstraat (between Mont Kem- 
mel and Ypres). After we had discussed matters, Gough ar- 
rived. Explaining the situation to me, he said he was in occu- 
pation of the canal to the northeast of Hollebeke, whence he 
had been driven back the day before. Thence his line extended 
south till it joined the left of the First Cavalry Division. 
He was in complete possession of Wytschaete, but he asked 
Allenby for some further support on the canal. Kavanagh's 
Brigade (First Life Guards, Second Life Guards, and Royal 
Horse Guards), which had been returned by Haig, was sent 
to him. 

Just then I got a report that the five battalions of French 
infantry which had been promised by Foch were now 
directed to make a counter-attack from Verbranden Molen 
towards the canal at the dangerous point. 



FIERCE FIGHTING AT MESSINES 251 

The Second and Third Cavalry Divisions were heavily 
attacked during the day, but by dark they held the same 
ground as on the night before. 

The most critical fighting of the day in this part of the line 
was at Messines, on AUenby's right. 

By 9 A.M. the cavalry were driven out of Messines, holding 
only one or two houses on the eastern side. Owing to heavy 
pressure elsewhere, no support was available until Shaw's 
(Ninth) infantry brigade could arrive. It reached Kemmel 
at 10 A.M. 

Gough sent the London Scottish to join the Third Hussars 
in support of Bingham's Fourth Cavalry Brigade (House- 
hold Cavalry, composite regiment. Sixth Dragoon Guards, 
and Third Hussars) on the left of the Third Division. 

At the same time three battalions of French infantry, sup- 
ported by twelve guns, were just starting their attack from 
Saint-Eloi on Oesttaverne. 

At about 11.45 a.m., two battalions. King's Own Scottish 
Borderers and King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, were 
sent forward to retake the Messines Ridge. 

General de Lisle, commanding the First Cavalry Division, 
was commanding at Messines. The Oxfordshire Yeomanry 
and an Indian battalion were the last reserves sent up to 
him. 

About noon, when the First Cavalry Brigade were still 
clinging to the western edge of Messines, a counter-attack 
by the Third Hussars and London Scottish began on the 
north of the village. By 1 p.m., considerable progress had 
been made. The Third Corps had regained the trenches north 
of the river Douve to within half a mile of Messines. 

The King's Own Scottish Borderers were on the right of 



252 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

the town, and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry on 
the left. The London Scottish and Third Hussars were en- 
gaged on the north of the latter, and an intense struggle 
for the convent and southern portion of the town, which was 
a point from which the lost ground could be recovered, was 
proceeding to our advantage. 

At this hour the news appeared more hopeful, and I left 
Allenby in order to join Haig at Hooge, east of Ypres. A 
battalion of French arrived to support the troops fighting 
at Messines just as I was leaving. 

I learned later that the London Scottish attack reached 
the north edge of Messines shortly after 2 p.m. ; that towards 
4 P.M. the attack was checked on the Messines- Wytschaete 
road by heavy artillery; that fierce fighting went on in the 
streets, and that the town was severely shelled; but that, 
later, the Germans were driven completely out, and were 
holding the ridge to the east, including a ruined factory and 
some farms to the south. 

At nightfall the line held about Messines was the same as 
in the morning. 

As I passed through Ypres on my way to Haig, there were 
manifest signs of unusual excitement, and some shells were 
already falling in the place. It is wonderful with what rapid- 
ity the contagion of panic spreads through a civilian popula- 
tion. I saw loaded vehicles leaving the town, and people were 
gathered in groups about the streets chattering like monkeys 
or rushing hither and thither with frightened faces. 

As we passed by the ancient Cloth Hall, the old cathedral, 
and the other splendid examples of Flemish architecture for 
which this town was famed, I did not realize how soon the 
atmosphere of German "f rightfulness" was to reduce all 



SERIOUS POSITION ON HAIG'S FRONT 253 

these noble buildings to a heap of ruins. Although to-day 
Ypres as a city has ceased to exist, I am thankful to know 
that no German soldier has ever set foot within its walls save 
as a prisoner. Here, as at Verdun, they did not pass; and the 
glory is that of every soldier in the ranks. 

On reaching the eastern exit of the town, on my way to 
Hooge, I was stopped by a guard specially posted by First 
Corps Headquarters, with orders to prevent any one leaving 
the city. 

Satisfying them as to my identity, I proceeded on my way. 
I had not gone more than a mile when the traffic on the road 
began to assume a most anxious and threatening appearance. 
It looked as if the whole of the First Corps was about to 
fall back in confusion on Ypres. Heavy howitzers were mov- 
ing west at a trot — always a most significant feature of 
a retreat — and ammunition and other wagons blocked the 
road almost as far as the eye could see. In the midst of the 
press of traffic, and along both sides of the road, crowds of 
wotmded came limping along as fast as they could go, all 
heading for Ypres. Shells were screaming overhead and 
bursting with reverberating explosions in the adjacent 
fields. 

This spectacle filled me with misgiving and alarm. It was 
impossible for my motor car to proceed at any pace, so we 
alighted and covered the rest of the way to Haig's Head- 
quarters on foot, nor did I receive any encouragement on 
the way to hope for better things. 

The Chateau of Hooge, where First Army Headquarters 
were situated, has long since been erased from the face of 
the earth in the severe fighting which has raged about it. 
But as I found it on that October afternoon, it was a typical 



254 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

modern red-brick chS,teau, approached by a gate and a short 
avenue from the road. Shells were falling about the place, and 
the chateau was already beginning to show the effects of 
artillery fire. 

I found Haig and John Gough, his Chief of Staff, in one 
of the rooms on the ground floor, poring over maps and 
evidently much disconcerted. But, though much perturbed 
in mind and very tired in body and brain, Haig was cool and 
alert as ever. 

Both he and Gough gave me a bad account of the state of 
affairs. 

This is what happened on the front of the First Corps. 
In the morning the position along the line was normal. 
About ten o'clock rather a disturbing situation developed 
south and southeast of Gheluvelt. A local counter-attack 
failed, and some trenches east of the village had to be aban- 
doned. There was heavy shelling along the front of the 
Seventh Division and of the Second Brigade (Second 
Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, First Battalion North 
Lanes Regiment, First Battalion Northampton Regiment, 
and Second Battalion K.R.R.), but no infantry attack. 

At 10.30 A.M. the First Division line, north of the Ypres- 
Menin road, was forced to retire in face of a heavy infantry 
attack covered by artillery. Lomax, commanding the divi- 
sion, ordered the First (Guards) Brigade (First Battalion 
Coldstream Guards, First Battalion Scots Guards, First 
Battalion Black Watch, and First Battalion Cameron High- 
landers) north of the road to be ready to enfilade the enemy's 
advance. 

By 11.30 A.M., thanks to strong support from our artillery, 
the situation about Gheluvelt became easier; but at 12.15 p.m. 



GHELUVELT LOST 255 

the enemy were again reported to be massing east of the 
village, and the situation once more became threatening. 

The G.O.C. First Division made arrangements for caUing 
on the Second Worcesters (Fifth Brigade, Second Division) 
for a counter-attack due south, if necessary. Shortly before 
this, owing to a report from the Second Cavalry Division that 
successive lines of German infantry were massing for attack 
against Oesttaverne, and, in response to an urgent call by 
the cavalry corps, the Sixth Cavalry Brigade (Third Dra- 
goon Guards, First Dragoons, and Tenth Hussars),^ one 
battery Royal Field Artillery, and one battery howitzers, 
were sent at 11 a.m. to their support. The Seventh Cavalry 
Brigade (First and Second Life Guards and Royal Horse 
Guards) was moved at 10.30 a.m. to a point midway between 
Hooge and Zillebeke. 

At 12.30 P.M. the Germans developed their attack against 
Gheluvelt in great force, and the line of the First Division 
was broken. A General Staff Officer from the First Corps, 
who was sent forward to discover the exact position of the 
Third Cavalry Division, reached First Division Head- 
quarters in time to find the situation critical, the line being 
broken and a part at least of the division falling back rapidly 
along the main road. General Lomax ordered his reserves to 
hold the east edge of the woods just southeast of the bend of 
the road, while the Seventh Cavalry Brigade was ordered to 
take up a line astride the road on the east side of the chateau 
grounds, behind which the First Division could rally. 

At this time all was quiet on the front of the Second Divi- 
sion, while on the south the Seventh Division, assisted by 
troops which General Bulfin had collected under his orders, 
were being heavily shelled. The retirement of the First 



256 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

Division exposed the left of the Seventh Division and, owing 
to this, the Royal Scots Fusiliers (Twenty-first Brigade), 
who stuck to their trenches, were cut off and surrounded. 
A strong infantry attack was delivered against the right of 
the Seventh Division at 1.30 p.m., a short time after the 
G.O.C. Seventh Division had moved two battalions of his 
reserve in rear of his right. 

On receivings report of the situation on the front of the 
First Division, Haig issued the following order: — 

"The line Frezenberg-Westhoek-bend of Menin road- 
Klein ZUlebeke-bend of canal to be held at all costs." 

From Haig and Gough I learned that Lomax had been 
badly wounded, Monro, commanding the Second Division, 
temporarily disabled, and several divisional staff ofiicers 
killed at 1.15 p.m. that afternoon, when the Headquarters of 
the First and Second Divisions were shelled. On this General 
Bulfin was ordered to take command of the First Division, 
handing over the command of the Second and Third Bri- 
gades to General Lord Cavan, commanding the Fourth 
(Guards) Brigade. Amongst the dead was poor Freddie Kerr, 
of the Highland Light Infantry, whom I had known very 
well at Aldershot. He was a rising man, and one of the most 
promising young staff officers in the army. But the worst 
news was that the First Division had broken back and were 
in full retreat, only a mile or so to the east of where we were 
standing, with the Germans at their heels. 

What grieved me almost more than anything else was that 
the First Corps should at last be forced back after the glori- 
ous stand they had made. I felt that they had done far more 
than could be expected of any men, and that even if they 



FIEST CORPS LINE BROKEN 257 

were driven to the sea they had earned their country's lasting 
gratitude for the determined fight they had made. No shadow 
of blame could be laid upon them or their commander. 

I sought to express what I felt to Douglas Haig in order 
to try and soften the cruel blow I knew this catastrophe 
would be to him and to his command. To me, indeed, it 
seemed as though our line at last was broken. If this were the 
case, the immense numerical superiority of the enemy would 
render retreat a very difficult operation, particularly in view 
of the fact that Ypres and the river Yser lay in our immediate 
rear. Our only hope now seemed to be to make a stand on the 
line Ypres-Messines; but it was a great question whether 
this would be possible in face of a close and determined pur- 
suit. Personally I felt as if the last barrier between the Ger- 
mans and the Channel seaboard was broken down, and I 
viewed the situation with the utmost gravity. 

It was a dramatic half -hour, the worst I ever spent in a 
life full of vicissitudes such as mine has been. 

It had a truly dramatic climax. 

At about 3 P.M. a staff officer galloped up to the front of 
the chateau with the news that the First Division had rallied 
and again moved forward. Gheluvelt was once more in our 
hands ! 

The First Division had rallied on the line of the woods east 
of the bend of the Menin road; the German advance by the 
road had been checked by enfilade fire from the north. 

What had happened was that the attack against the right 
of the Seventh Division had forced its Twenty-second Bri- 
gade to retire, thus exposing the left of the Second Brigade 
(First Division). The G.O.C. Seventh Division used his re- 
serve, already posted in this flank, to restore the line, but. 



258 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

in the meantime, the Second Brigade, finding their flank laid 
bare, had been forced to withdraw. The right of the Seventh 
Division thus advanced as the left of the Second Brigade 
went back, with the result that the right of the Seventh Divi- 
sion was exposed, but managed to hang on ia its old trenches 
till nightfall. 

At 2.40 P.M. the situation appeared so serious that orders 
were issued that although every effort should be made to 
hold on to the line originally given, if that should be impos- 
sible, the line Verbranden Molen-Zillebeke-Halte-Potijze 
was to be held to the last. 

But, as the events turned out, the pendulum was swinging 
towards us once more. On the Menin road a counter-attack 
delivered by the left of the First (Guards) Brigade and the 
right of the Second Division against the left flank of the Ger- 
man line was completely successful. By 3.30 p.m. Gheluvelt 
had been retaken with the bayonet by the Second Worces- 
ters, admirably supported by the Forty-second Brigade 
Royal Field Artillery. The left of the Seventh Division, prof- 
iting by the recapture of Gheluvelt, advanced almost to its 
original line, and connection between the First and Seventh 
Divisions was reestablished. 

I could not then discover who was actually responsible for 
this dramatic success or to whom the chief credit was due. 
The rally had been centred on the Second Worcesters (Fifth 
Brigade, Second Division) who behaved with the utmost 
gallantry. 

It was not until some time after the battle that I ascer- 
tained that the original moving spirit had been Brigadier- 
General FitzClarence, V.C, commanding the First Guards 
Brigade (First Division). 



GENERAL FITZCLARENCE 259 

Captain Thorne, who was Staff Captain of the First 
Guards Brigade on October 31, made the following state- 
ment: — 

"On October 31, 1914, the Second Battalion Worcester 
Regiment were in reserve to the Second Division, who were 
on our left. About 8 a.m., finding the First Brigade rather 
pressed and having no reserve of our own. General Fitz- 
Clarence got the loan of one company of the Worcesters, and 
this was placed along the railway line to Bercelaere, just 
north of Gheluvelt, to cover our right flank and to catch any 
Germans emerging from the village. This they did most suc- 
cessfully. Then a little later, when General FitzClarence 
found out how badly things were going on the right of the 
Scots Guards, he at once decided that an immediate counter- 
attack was to be made, and sent me off with orders to get 
hold of the remaining three companies of the Worcesters, 
and instruct the CO. to counter-attack on the Scots Guards' 
right; the latter were holding the chateau. The three com- 
panies then went up through the company lining the railway, 
through the chateau garden, drove the Germans out of the 
village north of the main road, and reestablished the line. It 
was undoubtedly entirely on General FitzClarence's initia- 
tive that this counter-attack was made, as he gave me the 
order personally." 

Major Hankey, who was commanding the Second Battal- 
ion of the Worcester Regiment on that day, fully corrobo- 
rated Captain Thome's account. He wrote : " I feel perfectly 
certain that by shoving us in at the time and place he did, 
the General saved the day. If he had waited any longer, I 



260 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — SECOND PHASE 

don't think I could have got the battalion up in time to save 
the South Wales Borderers, and fill up the gap." This most 
distinguished Irish Guardsman, FitzClarence, was killed a 
week or two later in the same part of the field, and his loss 
was most deeply felt. 

I determined that every possible effort must be made to 
prevent the recurrence of such a situation as I had just wit- 
nessed, and at once hurried off to find Foch. He was with 
d'Urbal, and we all went thoroughly into the situation. 

Foch told me that on the morning of the next day (Novem- 
ber 1) a French mixed force, up to the strength of a division, 
would concentrate on the line Saint-Eloi-Wytschaete at 
daybreak, and advance from that line to attack the left 
flank of the forces in front of Haig. Similarly the Ninth 
French Corps on Haig's left would be ordered to attack 
southeast against the enemy's right. 

I sent Barry (one of my A.D.C.'s) and Brinsley Fitz- 
Gerald (my private secretary), who were both with me 
throughout the day, back to Haig with a full account of my 
interview with Foch. They returned later with the informa- 
tion that the line of the First Corps had been completely 
reestablished, and that just before dark Kavanagh's Seventh 
Cavalry Brigade (First and Second Life Guards and Royal 
Horse Guards) had done some good work in driving back the 
enemy. At the end of the day the brigade again became avail- 
able to close a dangerous gap which had occurred on the 
right of the Seventh Division. In the woods the Household 
Cavalry encountered large numbers of Germans, whom they 
cleared out, capturing many prisoners and inflicting heavy 
losses. Haig reported that they were of great assistance in 
restoring the line. 



THE FIRST CORPS LINE FIRM 261 

Throughout this great day (October 31) the flank of the 
First Corps had held fast to their ground. But the wooded 
country which intervened enabled superior forces of the 
enemy to penetrate to a dangerous extent amongst them. 

In fighting such as this it was inevitable that troops should 
become much intermingled and mixed up. It was not only so 
as between larger or smaller imits of the same army, but also 
by reason of the fervent loyalty and fine feeling which has 
happily always been so strongly marked a feature amongst 
the Allies. Throughout the day no effort was spared by 
any of the units engaged to afford each other the utmost 
mutual support without any regard to nationality, nor was 
there a moment's hesitation and time lost in waiting to get 
orders from superior authority. 

Not many hours of darkness had elapsed, however, before 
new anxieties arose in connection with the line held by the 
cavalry on the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. Events hardly 
less momentous than those of October 31 were before us. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE BATTLE OF YPRES 
Third Phase, November 1 to November 10 
The importance attached by the Germans to the fighting of 
October 31 and November 1 was emphasized by the pres- 
ence of the Emperor at Courtrai. An intercepted wireless 
message informed us that he was to go to HoUebeke, no 
doubt with the intention of heading a "triumphal entry" 
into Ypres. 

Our airmen endeavoured to give him as warm a reception 
as possible, and we had information that his quarters were 
changed at least once in consequence of their activity. 

I issued an Order of the Day to the troops, announcing the 
presence of the august visitor on our front, and urging them 
to give His Majesty a good demonstration of what the " con- 
temptible little army" could do. Right splendidly did they 
respond. 

Throughout the night of the 31st-lst, the Second Cavalry 
Division was heavily attacked all along the Wytschaete- 
Messines Ridge. The enemy gained a footing in the village 
of Wytschaete, broke through the line north of Messines 
and turned the left flank of the trenches held by the London 
Scottish. With devoted gallantry the reserve company of 
this battalion made repeated charges with the bayonet, 
which checked the enemy's advance and enabled the battal- 
ion to hold the position. This it did until daylight. The Ger- 
mans were then discovered to be well round both flanks, and 
a retirement became inevitable. This was carried out very 



THE GERMANS CAPTURE WYTSCHAETE 263 

steadily under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire in the direc- 
tion of Wulverghem. 

At 3 A.M. the Twelfth Lancers, the Northumberland Fusi- 
liers, and the Lincolns made a counter-attack and reestab- 
lished the original line. The cavalry fought on foot with the 
bayonet in the narrow streets of the village, and were re- 
ported to me as equal to the best infantry in such work. 

By 6.30 A.M. the enemy had been reenforced, and were able 
to drive back the Second Cavalry Division with the troops 
attached and re-occupy Wytschaete. This loss, coupled with 
the enemy's seizure of the ridge north of Messines, rendered 
the latter place untenable by the First Cavalry Division. 
They retired slowly to an entrenched line north of Wulver- 
ghem. 

Somewhat the same kind of situation arose here now as on 
the day before at Gheluvelt. Since the night of October 30 
the cavalry corps and attached troops had been holding 
on to the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge against overwhelm- 
ing numbers of the enemy. They were utterly exhausted, 
and the French marching to their succour were still some 
way off. 

At 5 A.M. two battalions of the Second Corps were de- 
spatched from Bailleul to Neuve-Eglise, and further reen- 
f orcements were ordered to follow them an hour later. These 
troops had only themselves just got back into reserve, after 
a most trying and exhausting experience on the right of our 
line lasting for nearly three weeks. They also stood in dire 
need of rest, but they were the only reserves of any kind at 
my disposal. 

At 10 A.M. on the 1st, the exhausted Second Cavalry Divi- 
sion was retiring on Mont Kemmel, which they were in no 



264 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

condition to hold if the enemy pressed on vigorously after 
them. But once again, as on the 31st, the situation was saved 
by a desperate effort. Some battalions of French infantry- 
attacked on the left of the Second Cavalry Division and 
checked the enemy's advance, which was finally held off 
until, some time later, the head of the Sixteenth French 
Army Corps arrived and regained the western end of 
Wytschaete. 

The Third Corps had reported early in the morning that 
the position of its left flank was rendered precarious by the 
loss of Messines. With the support furnished by the Second 
Corps, as narrated above, Pulteney was able to draw back 
his left towards Neuve-Eglise and form a flank facing north, 
covering the important artillery position on Hill 63. This 
move had threatened in flank the German advance on the 
Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, and assisted greatly in securing 
the retirement of the cavalry in good order. 

At 12.15 P.M. the situation was as follows: — 

The First Cavalry Division occupied an entrenched posi- 
tion running to the east and northeast of Wulverghem, in 
touch on the right with the reconstructed line of the Third 
Corps and on the left with the Second Cavalry Division. 

After the successful advance of the French, the Second 
Cavalry Division was drawn in to the south of Wytschaete, 
and its left was in touch with the Sixteenth French Corps 
holding the western border of that village. 

The First Corps was also heavily attacked on November 1. 
On the front held by the First Division part of the First 
Brigade was driven from its trenches; but the position was 
retaken by counter-attack, and in the evening the line held 
was the same as on October 31. The First Division was much 



REVIEW OP THE SITUATION 265 

exhausted and weakened by heavy losses. The Seventh Divi- 
sion remained only two thousand strong. The Third Cavalry 
Division was given temporarily to the First Corps, and as- 
sisted to hold the position. The Ninth French Corps on the 
left of our First Corps was unable to make any progress 
during the day. 

Information came in towards evening that the enemy was 
again massing against Gheluvelt. I went to Vlamertinghe 
to consult with Foch and d'Urbal, who told me that nine 
French battalions and some batteries would reach Ypres 
early on the morning of the 2d. Foch promised me that he 
would at once despatch two battalions of Zouaves to support 
Haig's centre. 

Reviewing the situation as it presented itself on October 
31 and November 1, 1914, I believe that the vital interests 
of the British Empire were in great danger on both these 
days. That is to say, the whole coast-line from Havre to 
Ostend was within an ace of falling into the hands of the 
enemy. 

In recalling the fateful hours of those two wonderful days 
and nights, I think we were perhaps in the greatest danger 
between 2 a.m. and 11 a.m. on Sunday, November 1. Had 
the French Sixteenth Corps arrived only an hour later than 
it did, the German advance from the line Wytschaete- 
Messines would have gained such voltmae, strength, and 
impetus that nothing could have saved Mont Kemmel from 
falling into their hands. A vital wedge would have been 
driven into the very centre of our line. 

The enormous numerical and artillery superiority of the 
Germans must be remembered. If they had turned the situa- 
tion to full account, we should have seen all the French, 



266 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

British, and Belgian troops lying to the north of an east-and- 
west line through Mont Kemmel cut off and hemmed against 
the coast. 

The greatest threat of disaster with which we were faced 
in 1914 was staved off by the devoted bravery and endurance 
displayed by the cavalry corps under a commander, General 
AUenby, who handled them throughout with consummate 
skill. The same high praise must be given to those two re- 
doubtable divisional leaders, Hubert Gough and de Lisle. 

The cavalry was admirably supported and helped by 
Shaw and Egerton with the splendid battalions of infantry 
which composed the brigades they commanded, and none of 
us will ever forget how those French battalions on the left 
of the Second Cavalry Division checked the enemy by their 
gallant and determined advance at the most critical 
moment. 

It is no disparagement, however, to the other troops en- 
gaged if I lay stress on the fact that it was the cavalry alone 
who, for more than a fortnight previously, had been disput- 
ing foot by foot every yard of the ground to the river Lys. 
They had fought day and night with the utmost tenacity, 
and the battles of October 31 and November 1 were but the 
climax to a long and bitter spell of heroic effort. 

For the information of non-mUitary readers, it is necessary 
for me to explain that a cavalry division fighting on foot is 
at a great disadvantage as compared with an infantry divi- 
sion. When horses cannot be used in the fighting, they have 
still to be looked after, and this takes many men away from 
the fighting line. 

A cavalry division consists ordinarily of three brigades, 
but when employed in the trenches they get little more than 



FIGHTING BY THE CAVALRY 267 

half that number into the firing line. They have nothing 
like the same "gun power" as an infantry division. But the 
mobility of the cavalry arm will always be found to com- 
pensate in large degree for these manifest disadvantages. 
Taking into account the losses they had suffered, they can 
hardly have opposed two thousand rifles to the onslaught 
of what has been computed at more than two German army 
corps. 

Of late years our custom has been to train our cavalry 
to fight on foot, and in the present war we have reaped the 
fruit of this wise policy. But the instinct which must be 
inculcated in the horse soldier to regard his horse as his chief 
reliance, must always disqualify him to some extent for the 
role which our cavalry were called upon to fulfil throughout 
the momentous issues in the history of the war of which this 
chapter treats. I may mention in passing that it was this 
same cavalry spirit, or instinct, with which the British cav- 
alry is so strongly imbued, which enabled them to show to 
such splendid advantage in the mounted combats of the 
earlier phases of the war. 

I must add a few words as to the fine part played in the 
fighting of November 1 by the Oxfordshire Hussars and the 
London Scottish. They were the first Territorial troops who 
fought in the war. 

After disembarking at Dunkirk the Oxfordshire Hussars 
took part in the important operations connected with the 
Belgian retreat from Antwerp, and rendered most valuable 
aid in the defence of the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge when 
that piece of ground was held with such marvellous tenacity 
by the cavalry division against overwhelming odds. 

As for the London Scottish, their services on these two 



268 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

days are well summarized in a memorandum sent in to me 
by AUenby. 

"The London Scottish," he wrote, "came under my orders 
on the evening of October 30, 1914, and were detailed to the 
support of the Second Cavalry Division on the following 
morning. They went into action at 10 a.m., October 31, with 
a strength of 26 officers and 786 men, and occupied trenches 
in conjunction with the Fourth Cavalry Brigade. They held 
these trenches throughout the day, being subjected from 
time to time to heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. From 
9 P.M. onwards during the night October 31-November 1, 
the Germans attacked the trenches of the London Scottish 
continuously, and at 2 a.m. they succeeded in turning the left 
in large numbers. The situation was restored at the point of 
the bayonet by the reserve company. By daylight on No- 
vember 1 the Germans had, however, turned both flanks, 
and it became necessary to retire. The retirement was di- 
rected on Wulverghem, and was carried out steadily under 
heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. At 8 a.m. the same morn- 
ing, the London Scottish went forward again to take their 
places in the trenches alongside the First Cavalry Divi- 
sion, and there they remained until relieved at dusk that 
evening. 

" Throughout these operations, which lasted for two days, 
viz., October 31 and November 1, the losses of the London 
Scottish amounted to 278, or about 34 per cent of their 
strength. Rarely, if ever, have second-line troops sustained 
unshaken so high a percentage of casualties. 

" E. H. H. Allenby, Lieutenant-General, 

" Commanding Cavalry Corps " 



THE LONDON SCOTTISH BATTALION 269 

I sent the following message to the officer commanding 
the London Scottish: — 

"I wish you and your splendid regiment to accept my 
warmest congratulations and thanks for the fine work you 
did on Saturday. You have given a glorious lead and example 
to all Territorial corps fighting in France." 

I saw the battalion personally a few days later, and said 
a few words to the men on parade. How they had suffered 
was only too pathetically apparent. Whilst there was work 
to be done and an enemy to be held at bay no other thought 
filled any of their minds than to die fighting, if necessary, to 
the last man. But when these Territorials returned for a term 
of well-earned rest to their cantonments, with the excitement 
and danger behind them, a severe reaction came upon them. 
The heavy losses amongst their friends and comrades bowed 
them down with grief; for they necessarily lacked as yet the 
professional training and stoicism of men whose real business 
is war. 

This exhibition of natural feeling only excited in me a 
deeper admiration for the splendid courage and endurance 
they had displayed when unsustained and imassisted by the 
influence of that iron discipline which only a long course 
of military training can inculcate. They were urged only 
by the spirit of noblesse oblige, and the higher ideals which 
inspire all who have taken up arms against the Germans in 
this war. 

On November 2, the Sixteenth French Corps and Con- 
neau's French cavalry division were holding the Wytschaete- 



270 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

Messines Ridge, with a detachment of our First Cavalry 
Division supporting Conneau. 

The troops who had fought so well on the 1st were abso- 
lutely tired out. They had suffered tremendous casualties 
and could not be counted on for the moment even as a reserve. 
They were withdrawn to rest and refit. 

It was with great difficulty that the French troops were 
able to maintain themselves on the ridge. The Germans 
were very active, and the fight constantly swayed backwards 
and forwards. The western edge of the plateau and the out- 
skirts of the villages marked the extreme limit of the Allied 
advance line. 

For some days I had felt considerable anxiety as to the 
condition of the First Corps (First and Second Divisions and 
the Seventh Division). 

I had constant messages from Haig asking that his tired 
troops might be given some rest after all their hard work; 
but I was driven almost to my wits' end to find means of giv- 
ing him the relief he sought. His Chief of Staff (John Gough) 
came to my advanced Headquarters at Bailleul and dis- 
cussed the subject fully with me. 

I thought perhaps Foch might be able to help me; but 
when I went to interview him he said that, whilst the pres- 
ent crisis lasted, he could not spare a single man for this 
purpose. All I could do was to send two very tired brigades 
of the Second Corps up to Ypres on the morning of the 5 th 
to relieve the Seventh Division, who then came back into 
billets round Locre in a shattered condition. 

The next day the remainder of the Second Corps (which 
was resting) followed to Ypres to afford what further relief 
was possible to the First Corps. The Second Corps was now 



SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY 271 

scattered in detachments along the whole line, and the only- 
reserves available were two or three lately arrived Territorial 
Battalions and the worn-out Seventh Division, reduced to 
less than a brigade in strength. 

WUlcocks about this time felt anxiety as to the line his 
Indian troops were holding, and sent his Chief of Staff to me 
at BaUleul to ask if he could be reenforced. Under the con- 
ditions then existing, I was most anxious that the Indian 
corps should hold its own without assistance and, after call- 
ing into consultation other officers of great Indian experi- 
ence, I refused to do so, pointing out that he had four bat- 
talions of the Second Corps in close reserve behind him. 

My faith in the Indian troops was justified, and a day 
or two later he reported that the Indians were doing well 
and that he was full of confidence in them. 

On the night of the 3d, I issued two Special Orders of the 
Day to the troops. 

They ran as follows: — 

" Special Order of the Day 
"By Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., 
K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, British Army in the 
Field. 
"1. The sphere of operations over which the British 
Army in France has been operating is now much contracted 
and rendered more compact. Since October 21 it has been 
possible to keep a considerable force in general reserve. 

"2. For several days past the enemy's activities against 
our front have been sensibly slackened, and it is quite pos- 
sible that we may have entered upon the last stage of the 
great battle in which we have been engaged since October 11. 



272 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

"At this moment I am anxious to address a few words to 
the splendid troops I have the great honour to command. 

"In view of the magnificent way in which the troops of 
the British Army have fought, the hardships they have had 
to endure, and the heavy losses they have suffered, it is right 
that aU ranks, collectively and individually, should form a 
just and reasonable conception of the general situation and 
the object which we are endeavouring to attain. 

"3. It is necessary for this purpose to realize in the first 
place the true limits of the theatre of war as a whole, and 
then to take a comprehensive view of the entire course of 
operations as they have proceeded up to the present mo- 
ment, in order to estimate the value of the results attained. 

"4. It must clearly be imderstood'that the operations in 
which we have been engaged embrace nearly all the Con- 
tinent of Central Europe from East to West. The combined 
French, Belgian, and British Armies in the West and the 
Russian Army in the East are opposed to the united forces 
of Germany and Austria acting as a combined army between 
us. 

"Our enemies elected at the outset of the war to throw 
the weight of their forces against the armies in the West, 
and to detach only a comparatively weak force, composed 
of very few first-line troops and several corps of the sec- 
ond and third line, to stem the Russian advance until the 
Western forces should be completely defeated and over- 
whelmed. 

"5. The strength of our enemies enabled them from the 
outset to throw greatly superior forces against us in the 
West. This precluded the possibility of our taking a vigorous 
offensive, except when the miscalculations and mistakes 



SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY 273 

made by their commanders opened up special opportunities 
for a successful attack and pursuit. 

"The Battle of the Marne was an example of this, as was 
also our advance from Saint-Omer and Hazebrouck to the 
line of the Lys at the commencement of this battle. The role 
which our armies in the West have consequently been called 
upon to fulfil has been to occupy strong defensive positions, 
holding the ground gained and inviting the enemy's attack; 
to throw these attacks back, causing the enemy heavy losses 
in his retreat, and following him up with powerful and suc- 
cessful counter-attacks to complete his discomfiture. 

" 6. While we have been thus engaged, the Russian armies 
in the East, numbering some three to four millions of men, 
have had time to mobilize and concentrate their immense 
forces scattered over all parts of their vast Empire. Our 
eastern allies have already inflicted a series of crushing de- 
feats on the Austro-German forces, and are now rapidly 
advancing on East Prussia and Silesia in great strength. 

"7. The value and significance of the splendid role ful- 
filled since the commencement of hostilities by the Allied 
forces in the West lies in the fact that at the moment when 
the Eastern Provinces of Germany are about to be overrun 
by the numerous and powerful armies of Russia, nearly the 
whole of the active army of Germany is tied down to a line 
of trenches extending from the fortress of Verdun on the 
Alsatian frontier round to the sea at Nieuport, east of Dun- 
kirk (a distance of two hundred and sixty miles), where they 
are held, much reduced in numbers and morale, by the 
successful action of our troops in the West. 

"8. What the enemy will now do we cannot tell. Should 
they attempt to withdraw their troops to strengthen their 



274 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

weakened forces in the East, we must follow them up and 
harass their retreat to the utmost of our power. If they make 
further futile attempts to break through our lines, they must 
be again thrown back with greater and greater loss. 

" The Armies of Russia are at their eastern gates and will 
very soon be devastating their country and overthrowing 
their armies. 

"The great fight which you have so splendidly maintained 
against superior numbers in the Western theatre will be 
decided and completed by our brave allies in the East, and I 
think that we on this side have reason to hope that we have 
completed the most severe and arduous part of our task. 

"We must, however, be prepared for all eventualities, 
and I feel sure no effort will be relaxed to meet with the 
same undaunted front any situation, however unexpected, 
which may arise. 

"9. I have made many calls upon you, and the answers 
you have made to them have covered you, your regiments, 
and the Army to which you belong with honour and glory. 

"Your fighting qualities, courage, and endurance have 
been subjected to the most trying and severe tests, and you 
have proved yourselves worthy descendants of the British 
soldiers of the past who have built up the magnificent tradi- 
tions of the regiments to which you belong. 

"You have not only maintained those traditions, but you 
have materially added to their lustre. 

"It is impossible for me to find words to express my appre- 
ciation of the splendid services you have performed. 

(Signed) "J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal, 

" Commander-in-Chief, the British Army in the Field 
"November 2, 1914." 



SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY 275 

" Special Order of the Day 

"By Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B.,G.C.V.O.,K.C.M.G., 

Commander-in-Chief, British Army in the Field. 

" General Headquarters 
" November 2, 1914 
"The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has watched 
with the deepest admiration and solicitude the splendid 
stand made by the soldiers of His Majesty the King in their 
successful effort to maintain the forward position which 
they have won by their gallantry and steadfastness. 

"He believes that no other army in the world would show 
such tenacity, especially under the tremendous artillery fire 
directed against it. 

"Its courage and endurance are beyond all praise. It is 
an honour to belong to such an army. 

"The Field-Marshal has to make one more call upon the 
troops. It is certainly only a question of a few days, and it 
may be of only a few hours, before, if they only stand firm, 
strong support will come, the enemy will be driven back, and 
in his retirement will suffer at their hands losses even greater 
than those which have befallen him under the terrific blows 
by which, especially during the last few days, he has been 
repulsed. 

"The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that he does not 
make his call in vain. 

(Signed) "J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal, 

" Commander-in-Chief, the British Army in the Field " 

During the early days of November, strong French 
reenforcements began to reach Ypres. The Twentieth French 
Corps detrained in that area on the 4th and 5th. 



276 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

It was about this time that both our intelHgence depart- 
ment and that of the French became very optimistic on the 
subject of a great withdrawal of the Germans from the 
Western Front. The Russians were going on from one suc- 
cess to another, and large entrainments of German troops 
were reported at Roulers, Thourout, Tourcoing, and other 
places. 

Whatever may have been really going on, our hopes were, 
as usual, doomed to disappointment, for the pressure on our 
front became greater and greater. But our eyes were always 
turned towards the East, and, as I have explained in a 
former chapter, the Russian "will-o'-the-wisp" continued 
to uphold us and keep our eyes centred upon it. 

Several Territorial units now began to be landed in 
France, amongst others the Artists' Rifles, the Honourable 
Artillery Company, the Queen's Westminsters and Hert- 
fordshire Territorials, and the Warwickshire Battery of 
Horse Artillery. I spent a morning riding about amongst 
them, and was deeply impressed by the wonderful spirit 
which pervaded them. The only thought they had was to 
prepare themselves in the shortest possible time to take their 
part in the fighting at the front. 

The Hertfordshire Battalion was commanded by an old 
friend of mine, whom I can never think of as other than 
"Tom Brand," under which patronymic I had served with 
him for a long time both in peace and war, and learnt his 
great soldierlike qualities. By this time, however, he had suc- 
ceeded his father, the famous Speaker of the House of Com- 
mons, and had become Viscount Hampden. I watched him 
at the time of which I am writing exercising to the full the 
power, which he possessed in an extraordinary degree, of 



AN OFFICERS' TRAINING SCHOOL 277 

instilling the real fighting spirit in the men he commanded 
and afterwards led with such great skill and gallantry. 

It was a power which he possessed in common with his 
intimate friend Lord Cavan, who fought for a long time 
side by side with him in France. These two men bore a 
strong resemblance to one another in the marvellous influ- 
ence they seemed to exercise over those under them. Both 
men struck me very much. Lord Cavan, like Hampden, was 
"a dug-out" and commanded first a brigade and then a 
division of the Guards, until he was selected for the com- 
mand of an army corps, with the utmost gallantry and 
success. 

Closely associated with my early recollections of the 
Territorials in France is the Artists' Rifles. They were, before 
the war, classified, with some few others, as an Officers' 
Training Corps. Our losses in officers in the campaign up to 
then had been prodigious, and I was trying to devise some 
means to fill up their ranks. What I saw of the Artists' Rifles 
and the men of which the corps was composed, induced me 
to think of turning them to this purpose. 

They were commanded by a most valuable and efficient 
officer. Colonel May. Him I consulted about it, and with 
his help an Officers' Training School was established, which 
was the first of many which have since sprung into existence. 
The Artists' Rifles were instrumental in quickly meeting 
some of our pressing needs in this important respect, and 
may be said to have laid the foundation of that Officers' 
School of War whose ramifications were soon to extend not 
only behind aU the fighting lines, but throughout the United 
Kingdom. It is interesting to recall the fact that the conver- 
sion of certain picked Territorial battalions into Officers' 



278 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

Training Corps before the war was another of Lord Haldane's 
brilliant conceptions. 

Some fine work was done on the evening of the 6th by 
Kavanagh's Seventh Cavalry Brigade, Cavan's Fourth 
Guards Brigade, and Lawford's Twenty-second Brigade of 
the Seventh Division. Moncey's detachment of French 
troops, posted on the right of the First Corps, had been 
driven back over the canal, and a serious position was 
created. 

Our troops counter-attacked with great effect, Lawford's 
Brigade (Second Battalion The Queen's, Second Battalion 
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, First Battalion Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers, and First Battalion South Staffs Regiment) cap- 
turing a good many prisoners and machine guns. The coun- 
ter-attack was successful, and the situation was restored. 

We paid dearly for this success, however, in the loss of 
some very valuable lives. Amongst others Gordon Wilson, 
commanding the Blues, and Hugh Dawnay, commanding 
the Second Life Guards, were killed. Wilson was an excellent 
cavalry leader. He had done splendid work with the Third 
Cavalry Division ever since they landed, and his death left 
a big gap. 

Up to three or four days before his death, Hugh Dawnay 
had been my liaison officer with the First Corps. The occa- 
sion of his going back to his regiment arose in this way. The 
Second Life Guards were getting very weak in officers, and 
he had an idea that he ought to be with them. He felt this 
very deeply, and told me so in a conversation we had to- 
gether on the subject. The first time he spoke to me about it 
I told him that, whilst I sympathized with all he said, yet I 



HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS 279 

considered it was his duty to remain where he was. I reminded 
him of the highly important work he was doing so well, and 
told him that it would be most difficult to replace him in that 
work, whereas it would be comparatively easy to put his regi- 
ment right as regards officers. 

The next day he came back to me and repeated his re- 
quest with great earnestness. He told me he could never be 
happy or contented in his mind if at this juncture he did not 
take his place beside his brother officers in his old regiment. 
It would indeed have been difficult for any soldier to refuse 
such a request, or fail to understand and enter into Dawnay's 
feelings. 

I felt that it was weak of me to give way to him, but I did 
so on the understanding that his absence was only to be tem- 
porary. Of course, he might easily have been killed in the 
performance of his staff duties; nevertheless, when I heard 
he had fallen I felt that, in the interests of the service, I had 
done wrong in allowing him to go. 

It is necessary to steel one's heart against any kind of 
sentiment when conducting a great war, and in the loss 
of one of the finest and most valuable young staff officers 
I have ever come across, I learnt a lesson never to be for- 
gotten. 

On several subsequent occasions similar requests were 
made to me without avail, notably in the case of my friend 
Clive of the Grenadiers, whose services and help I can never 
recall without admiration and gratitude. 

On the night of the 6th came the information that the Aus- 
trians had been badly routed and driven across the San 
River by the Russians. Up went our hopes again like quick- 
silver; another week gone and we expected to see the Ger- 



280 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — THIRD PHASE 

mans on our front weakened and reduced by the necessity 
of sending troops to save Silesia. 

Our hopes and plans were fully discussed at a meeting held 
on Sunday, November 8, at Foch's Headquarters at Cassel. 
Foch was in one of his most sanguine moods, and I must 
confess to having strongly felt the infection of his hopeful 
disposition. Our military barometer, however, went up 
and down as swiftly and suddenly as that of a ship in a 
typhoon. 

"What filled my immediate thoughts was the dire necessity 
of relieving the tired-out troops in the Ypres salient, and 
this was the point I impressed most strongly upon Foch, who, 
it seemed to me, found it diflScult to talk of anything but 
"Attaque! Attaque! Attaque!" 

He gave me some help in this matter; indeed, as much as 
he could, I feel sure, but not before most of those gallant 
troops were called upon to withstand the new and terrible 
onslaught which I shall describe in the next chapter. 

On the 9th we received the following gracious message from 
His Majesty the King: — 

"November 9, 1914 
"To Sir John French, 

"Expeditionary Force. 
"The splendid pluck, spirit, and endurance shown by my 
troops in the desperate fighting which has continued for so 
many days against vastly superior forces fills me with ad- 
miration. 

" I am confident in the final results of their noble efiforts 
under your able command. 

"George, R.I." 



HARD FIGHTING 281 

The following reply was sent: — 

"November 9, 1914 
"To His Majesty the King, 

"Buckingham Palace, London. 
"Your Majesty's most gracious message has been re- 
ceived by the officers and men of Your Majesty's Army in 
France with feelings of the deepest gratitude and pride. We 
beg to be allowed to express to Your Majesty our most 
faithful devotion and unalterable determination to uphold 
the highest traditions of Your Majesty's Army and carry 
the campaign through to a victorious end. 

"French" 

Throughout the phase of the battle narrated in this chap- 
ter, fighting went on with varying success all along the line 
from La Bassee to the sea. Ploegsteert Wood was the scene 
of many violent engagements. The Sixth Division and Nine- 
teenth Brigade to the south were constantly at grips with 
the enemy. All along the valley of the Douve and the Wyt- 
schaete-Messines Ridge the enemy was continuously active. 
But the point in the line which caused me the greatest 
anxiety was the dent between the First (British) and the 
Sixteenth (French) Corps at the canal to the north of Holle- 
beke. It is not too much to say that only by the display of 
the greatest gallantry and endurance on the part of the 
Third Cavalry Division and the other troops engaged at that 
point was the enemy prevented from getting dangerously 
near our communications. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE BATTLE OF YPRES 

Fourth and Final Phase, November 1\ to the end of the Battle 

Each of the four phases into which I have divided this very 

brief and incomplete narrative of the Battle of Ypres is 

marked by one important and far-reaching crisis. 

In the beginning of the battle came the arrest of the Ger- 
man advance on the Channel ports, and the brilliant repulse 
of the enemy back to the Lys by the cavalry under AUenby 
and the Third Corps under Pulteney. The second phase is 
distinguished by the crisis of October 31, while in the 
third phase occurs the memorable stand of the cavalry and 
other troops under AUenby on the Wytschaete-Messines 
Ridge. 

The great feature of the fourth and last phase was the des- 
perate assaults made against the Ypres salient on the 11th 
and 12th of November, in which the flower of the Prussian 
Guard participated, having received the Emperor's personal 
command to make certain of finally breaking our line. 

It was in the same conference room at Cassel in which I 
had been with Foch on the 8th, and where, as I have said, 
we mutually indulged in day-dreams of imminent victory, 
that, on the evening of November 10, 1 received the reports 
which warned me that another great crisis was at hand. 

Foch informed me that an attack on a great scale had just 
begun against his line between Ypres and the sea. He had re- 
ceived reliable reports that the enemy had brought up five 
fresh corps from the south. He said that the Germans had 



THE GERMANS' FINAL BLOW 283 

already gained possession of the village of Dixmude, but had 
not yet crossed the Yser, which French marines and Belgians 
were holding against them. He added that he was being 
heavily pressed and was losing ground near Langemarck, 
and declared that he must move Conneau's cavalry division 
(holding the line opposite Messines) north to support him, 
and he asked me to put AUenby in to relieve Conneau. I 
agreed to this, and gave orders accordingly. 

Early on the morning of the 11th, Haig reported that his 
position was being heavily shelled, and that he was threat- 
ened with a powerful attack. Two fresh German army corps 
had come up in his front, namely, the Guard and the Fif- 
teenth. 

In short the Germans were about to deliver their final 
desperate blow, which they hoped and believed would at 
last open up to them the road to the sea. 

The situation was met by Haig with the same grim deter- 
mination, steadfast courage, and skilful forethought which 
had characterized his handling of the operations throughout. 
A volume might easily be written of this day's fighting of 
November 11, but it is only possible in these pages to glance 
at the particular points in the line of battle where the fighting 
was fiercest, and where the issues were most vital at different 
hours of the day. 

Up the Menin road came the first tremendous onslaught 
at 9.30 A.M. on the front held by the First (Guards), Seventh, 
and Fifteenth Brigades. At the first clash of arms the Ger- 
mans pierced our line with a rush. This was splendidly dis- 
puted by the Royal Fusiliers under McMahon, their devoted 
and gallant leader, who was killed, while the battalion was 
almost annihilated. Reserves, however, quickly came up. 



284 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FINAL PHASE 

counter-attacks were organized and delivered, and the line 
was reestablished. 

About noon the critical point changed to the right at the 
canal, where the French were driven out of their trenches 
and fell back on Verbranden Molen. General Vidal called on 
our First Corps for support and help. The heavy fighting in 
the neighbourhood of the Menin road had used up most of 
his reserves, and the enemy were still clinging to the woods 
in that part of the line and threatening renewed attacks; but, 
in spite of this, Haig was able to render the French sufficient 
help to enable them to make a little headway, though the 
situation in this part of the line was in doubt and caused 
anxiety all day. 

About 1.30 P.M. a fresh attack of great violence was de- 
livered farther north against the Fifth Brigade. This was 
thrown back mainly by our artillery fire. 

About 3 P.M. the enemy began to mass in the woods about 
the Menin road, near the centre of our line. On attempting 
to advance, however, they were caught between two fires, 
from the northeast and southwest, the Oxfordshire Light 
Infantry and the Northamptons turning them out of the 
woods at the point of the bayonet. 

Severe fighting went on till nightfall, units becoming much 
intermixed. The losses were very heavy indeed, the First 
(Guards) Brigade mustering at night only four officers and 
three hundred men. 

The final result of this magnificent defence was that the 
attack was repulsed with terrible loss to the enemy, and the 
original line practically held throughout, save for the loss of 
some few and unimportant trenches. 

Brigadier-General FitzClarence, V.C., to whom reference 



HEROIC RESISTANCE 285 

has already been made, was killed. His name has justly be- 
come famous for many gallant deeds, but more particularly 
in connection with the crisis of October 31. 

The success of this great defence, like those which pre- 
ceded it, was due in the first place to the quick grasp 
of the situation by Sir Douglas Haig, who so skilfully 
handled the scanty forces at his disposal, and economized 
his few reserves with such soldierlike foresight. Mutual 
support at critical moments was ensured by the whole- 
hearted cooperation of commanders of all units, great and 
small. 

No words can express my sense of the gratitude which the 
country owes to the young oflficers, to the non-commissioned 
officers, and to the rank and file of this invincible army. 
When all has been said, it was their courage and endurance 
which spoke the last word. 

Whilst we were thus fully occupied about the Menin road, 
the French were also being attacked all along their line to 
the north of Ypres, but the enemy was held off. 

In accordance with the arrangements made with Foch, 
the cavalry corps took over the line opposite Messines on 
the morning of the 11th, when Conneau's cavalry marched 
north. Allenby was reenforced by two battalions of the 
Eighth Division, these battalions being replaced by two 
Territorial battalions. 

In the evening de Lisle's (First) cavalry division was sent 
to reenforce Haig, to whom were also despatched the Hert- 
fordshire Territorial Battalion and two yeomanry regiments 
from Saint-Omer. 

The situation north of HoUebeke at the canal (which the 
Germans had now crossed) was a source of much anxiety to 



286 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FINAL PHASE 

me, and I made strong representations to Foch as to the 
necessity of strengthening his troops at that important point. 
He promised to reenforce Vidal at once with three battaUons 
of chasseurs. 

On the evening of the 11th, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts 
arrived at my Headquarters on a visit, accompanied by his 
daughter, Lady Aileen (now Countess) Roberts. It is need- 
less to say with what enthusiasm the Field-Marshal was 
welcomed everywhere. 

The martial fire which was the lifelong characteristic of 
this great soldier burnt as brightly within him during these 
last few days of his life as when he earned his Victoria Cross 
on the Eastern battle-fields over sixty years before. His pres- 
ence, particularly at this critical time, in the midst of the 
army he loved so well — love which they returned to the 
full — acted as a timely inspiration and incentive to our 
weary and hard-pressed troops. 

That the tremendous energy of the great soldier remained 
unimpaired to the last was proved to me on the night of his 
arrival. He dined at my Headquarters' mess, and after din- 
ner I had a long conversation with him on the situation. It 
was getting late, and I suggested that, as he had a hard day 
before him on the morrow, he should go to his quarters and 
get some rest. 

He asked me when I generally got to bed. I told him 
that I took rest when I could, but never knew exactly when 
it would be possible. I added as an example of this that a 
conference was fixed for that night between twelve and one 
o'clock, when we hoped all the reports would be in. Nothing 
that I urged could dissuade him from remaining up and at- 
tending that conference, which he followed with his usual 



DEATH OF LORD ROBERTS 287 

clearness of mind and acute perception, although it lasted 
into the small hours of the morning. 

The early dawn of the next day saw him perfectly fresh, 
going out to visit his beloved Indians. 

On the evening of Friday the 13th the Field-Marshal was 
suddenly taken very ill on his return home from visiting 
troops in the front, and he died on Saturday, the 14th, at 
about 8 P.M. 

On the morning of Tuesday, November 17, a military 
fimeral service was held at Saint-Omer, which was attended 
by every one who could get there. Generals Foch and de 
Maud'huy represented the French Army. The Indian Princes 
attached to the Indian corps were also present, and the 
Maharajah Sir Pertab Singh took his place on the motor 
hearse and acted as a personal guard over the remains of the 
great chief on his last sad journey to England. 

General de Maud'huy paid an impressive tribute to the 
dead Field-Marshal in the following General Order which he 
issued to the Tenth Army, dated November 16, 1914: — 

"General Order No. 44 

"Lord Roberts, Field-Marshal in the British Army, died 
yesterday at General Headquarters of the British Army. 

"The illustrious conqueror of Afghanistan and South 
Africa had come, in spite of his great age, to visit the battle- 
fields where at the present time his valiant soldiers are fight- 
ing. Up to the moment when death struck him down, he 
pursued the object to which he devoted his whole life, the 
greatness of England. 

"The General Commanding the Tenth Army is voicing 
the feeling of all ranks under his command, both officers and 



288 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FINAL PHASE 

men alike, when he says to Marshal French and to the Gen- 
eral Officer Commanding the Indian Corps that the Tenth 
Army fully shares in the mourning of our Allies to-day. 

"May the example afforded by the famous British Mar- 
shal up to the end be understood and felt by us all. Lord 
Roberts has died in an hour of mighty battles, in the midst 
of the troops which he loved so well. No end can be more 
enviable, none more glorious for a soldier. 

(Signed) "de Maud'huy" 

During the 12th the enemy attempted renewed attacks 
on either flank of the First Corps, but was repulsed with 
great loss. Although the troops holding the Ypres salient 
were hard pressed and got little rest until they were relieved 
by the French, still it may be said that these attacks were 
practically the last of the really determined and nearly suc- 
cessful efforts made by the Germans during the First Battle ' 
of Ypres. 

The French were able to retake some of the ground they 
had lost, although the enemy still held on to Dixmude. 

From November 12 onwards, the chief anxiety I had was 
to get relief and rest for the troops which had been fighting 
so desperately in the Ypres salient, particularly the First 
Corps. I had long interviews with Foch, and represented to 
him the necessity for French troops to take over the whole of 
the ground there, at any rate for a time. At first he said 
there would be a great difficulty in doing this; but finally he 
promised to meet my wishes and agreed to start carrying out 
the relief on Sunday, the 15th, at latest. 

On this I told Haig that no more troops would be sent to 
him, but that he would be gradually withdrawn into reserve 



CONTINUED GERMAN ATTACKS 289 

as he was relieved by French troops. The First Corps troops 
were to be withdrawn before any others, and brought into 
reserve as quickly as possible. 

Foch was as good as his word. On the night of the 15th, the 
French Ninth Corps took over some of Haig's trenches and 
released two brigades of the First Division, as well as some 
artUlery. These all came into reserve on the 16th at Locre 
and Westoutre. 

On the 13th our front on the Ypres salient was heavily 
shelled from 10 a.m., and infantry attacks commenced at 
1 P.M. up the Menin road and against the Sixth and Sev- 
enth Brigades (First Battalion The King's (Liverpool) 
Regiment, Second Battalion South Stafifs Regiment, First 
Battalion Royal Berks Regiment, First Battalion King's 
Royal Rifles, and Third Battalion Worcester Regiment; 
Second Battalion South Lanes, First Battalion Wilts Regi- 
ment, and Second Battalion Royal Irish Rifles). The latter 
had their line broken, but it was restored by a counter- 
attack. The enemy lost heavily. 

Heavy attacks were made early on the 14th against the 
Ninth Brigade (First Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 
Fourth Battalion Royal Fusiliers, First Battalion Lines Regi- 
ment, and First Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers) in the same 
area, and later these developed along the whole front, but 
the Germans were everywhere driven back. 

On the 15th the Indian corps became heavily engaged be- 
tween Armentieres and La Bassee. Some trenches were lost 
and regained during the day, and the enemy made no 
progress. 

On the early morning of this day a very gallant piece of 
work was carried out on our Ypres front by a storming party 



290 THE BATTLE OF YPRES — FINAL PHASE 

which was led by Company Sergeant-Major Gibbon of the 
Fifth Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers. On the previous 
evening the enemy had gained possession of some buildings 
within our line. A gun was brought up by a cleverly con- 
cealed route to the closest range, the buildings were battered 
down, and our position was restored at the point of the 
bayonet. 

On the 17th the Ypres salient was again the scene of 
heavy encounters. There was severe fighting, but we had a 
very successful day, inflicting great loss on the enemy south 
of the Menin road. 

The 21st marked the end of the Battle of Ypres, and I had 
the satisfaction of seeing our troops completely evacuate the 
Ypres salient. The whole of the First Corps and the cavalry 
were in reserve. The fourteen battalions of the Second 
Corps, which had been moved up to support the First Corps 
in the north, marched to rejoin their corps north of Bailleul. 

I cannot close the narrative of this great battle without 
particularly emphasizing the part which was played by the 
First Corps. They were thrown in suddenly to fill up the gap 
through which the Germans were preparing to pour in troops 
in order to seize the Channel seaboard. They were called 
upon to advance and make good their ground in the teeth of 
numbers three or four times their own strength and against 
a much more powerful artillery. For five weeks they fought 
day and night continuously against vastly superior forces, 
and against artillery always far above their own in strength 
and numbers. 

In the great campaigns of the past we find special units 
singled out and handed down to fame, such as "The Light 



THE FIRST CORPS AT YPRES 291 

Division" under Crawford in the Peninsular War, or "The 
Brandenburg Corps" under Prince Frederick Charles of 
Prussia in the Franco-German War of 1870. 1 think we may 
rest assured that history will label the First British Corps 
in this war with some such distinguished sobriquet. Well and 
truly did they earn it. 

I append the record of the losses of the First Corps in 
the battle up to November 21, when they were relieved. 
It speaks more eloquently than any words of mine of the 
great role it played in this tremendous struggle. 



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CHAPTER XIV 

THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 
On November 16 the Prince of Wales joined the Army in 
the Field. It was the first time since the days of the Black 
Prince that the Heir Apparent to the Throne had taken the 
field in war. His Royal Highness was received by the troops 
with delight and acclamation. The courage, devotion, and 
endurance which he has since displayed on active service 
have secured him the love and admiration of every officer, 
non-commissioned officer, and man of His Majesty's Army, 
and his name will descend in history, bright with the honour 
which he won in the field. 

Early in the month a certain amount of heavy artillery 
began to arrive in France. Special positions were selected 
and prepared all along the front, and the few gxins we had 
were interchanged between them as occasion required. 

It was from such crude beginnings that we reached the 
wonderful developments in the use of heavy artillery which 
have been witnessed during the progress of the war. It is of 
some interest to compare the number of gims of six-inches 
and over which we had at that time, with the number which 
were deployed on the same front later in the war. 

During the latter part of the First Battle of Ypres the 
weather was very wet and stormy. The rain gave place to 
cold northerly winds, and on the afternoon of November 19 
there was a heavy fall of snow. That evening a hard frost 
set in which lasted for several days. The men in the trenches 
began to suffer severely. 



294 THE ENTEY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

It was at this time, the third week of November, 1914, 
that the serious evil known as "trench feet" first made its 
appearance in the Army in France. The cases were at first 
labelled "frost-bite," but as they were subsequently found 
to occur without any fall of the temperature to freezing- 
point, this term was evidently a misnomer. Indeed, cases 
have occurred during the month of August. 

The condition is caused by prolonged immersion in water, 
and certainly can occur when the temperature of the water 
is as high as 50° F. It is seldom caused unless the immersion 
is as long as twenty -four hours, but the cooler the water the 
less is the time required to produce it. In most cases the tem- 
perature of the water has been below 40°. 

In addition to cold water, the onset is favoured by — 

(a) Prolonged standing in one position, as is often the case 
with men deep in mud. 

(6) Tight puttees and tight boots. 

(c) Exhaustion and want of food. 

(d) A natural tendency to feeble circulation; e.g., men 
who suffer from chilblains. 

(e) Lying out, after being wounded, in wet and cold 
weather. 

The condition observed varies very much according to the 

severity of the case : — 

(a) The feet may be merely very painful and tender, 
(6) Much more often they are very swollen and cold, with 

but little feeling in them. 

(c) Frequently the whole foot is like a big "chilblain" and 
is very hot, red, and swollen. Blisters are common in all such 
cases. 

(d) The toes may be black and the foot blue. 



TRENCH FEET 295 

(e) The toes especially, and the foot much more rarely, 
may die and become gangrenous. 

Except in slight cases, the men affected are quite unfit 
for duty for two or three months at least, especially for duty 
in trenches in cold weather. If men are sent back to duty too 
soon, a short exposure at once brings back all the trouble in 
an aggravated form. Of course, if gangrene occurs, the man 
is permanently invalided. 

The only real preventative is to arrange that the men do 
not remain deep in mud or cold water for prolonged periods. 
If this is not possible, cases of "trench feet" are inevitable. 
Apart from avoiding this, the primary cause, various sub- 
sidiary causes can be guarded against; and, from the ex- 
perience gained in dealing with the condition, the follow- 
ing instructions were formulated and communicated to the 
officers in charge of the men: — 

(1) Boots and puttees should not fit tightly and must be 
taken off once at least every twenty-four hours and the feet 
well rubbed and cleaned and dry socks put on. 

(2) The feet should be kept as clean as possible so as to 
avoid septic complications in case of blistering. 

(3) Rubber thigh-boots should be supplied to all men in 
waterlogged trenches, and these should be large enough to 
take two pairs of socks. 

(4) Trench-boards should be provided, or brushwood or 
straw laid down. 

(5) Men should be kept dry by the use of mackintosh 
over the shoulders. 

(6) Hot food should be supplied whenever this is possible. 
It is, of course, evident that all these precautions are of- 
ten quite unobtainable. In the Ypres region in the winter of 



296 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

1914-15 many men stood for days and nights up to the 
middle in water, and some of the communication trenches 
were impassable because of the depth of the water. Indeed, 
a good many men were drowned. 

The treatment varies with the severity of the case. Rest 
with the feet up and careful washing of the feet is all that is 
at first needed in slight cases. If there are blisters or sores 
these must be treated. Later on various forms of electrical 
treatment and massage are of use. In all but slight cases 
treatment does not prevent the man being unable to walk 
for many weeks without pain. 

The number of men invalided for "trench feet" during 
the winter of 1914-15 was over twenty thousand. The 
Twenty-seventh Division lost three thousand men the first 
week they were in the trenches in February. With good 
trenches and proper care "trench feet" should be of rare 
occurrence. If under these conditions they are numerous, 
some one is to blame. As a result of the experience gained 
during the winter of 1914-15 and the adoption of the recom- 
mendations issued, in the winters 1915-17, in the Ypres 
salient, the "trench feet" cases did not average more than 
two a day in an army of over two hundred thousand men. 

It was in the closing days of the First Battle of Ypres that 
the bulk of the Territorial troops sent to France at that time 
entered the fighting line. 

In the course of a telegram which I received from Lord 
Kitchener on November 2, the Secretary of State for War said : 

"The total number of Territorial battalions in France and 
ordered there is nineteen. I am selecting two more to make 
up one per brigade." 



THE TERRITORIALS IN FRANCE 297 

These arrangements had been made in response to my 
urgent requests that whatever Territorial regiments of 
Yeomanry or battahons of infantry were ready and avail- 
able should be sent to France at once and incorporated with 
the regular forces there, and that we should not wait for the 
divisional formations to be prepared and completed. 

The history of the Territorials is well known. The Volun- 
teers, from which the Territorial Army sprang, came into 
being in the years just following the Crimean War. 

For some ten to twenty years afterwards the Volunteers 
may be said to have met with little better than derision. It 
was said that they only wanted to wear a uniform and play 
at soldiers, and hardly any one believed in the wonderful 
spirit which really animated them from the start. The mili- 
tary and other authorities gave them but little help and 
hardly any encouragement, in fact they refused to take the 
Volunteers seriously. 

In spite of all these drawbacks this wonderful force, 
under the leadership of such men as the late Lord Wemyss, 
Lord MacDonald, and others, went steadily on, struggling 
against adversity, but increasing in strength all the time. 
The great patriotic spirit which has always been the soul of 
the Volunteers, was kept alive by their great leaders in face 
of slights and neglect, but it was reserved for Lord Haldane 
to devise the scheme which was to make the fullest use of the 
Volunteers and bring them to the zenith of their reputation. 
He realized that their patriotic ardour might be put to good 
purpose, and drafted the scheme whereby, whilst remaining 
Volunteers, they were formed into a great Territorial army, 
administered by the so-called Territorial County Associations, 
to whose energy and devotion the country owes so much. 



298 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

The result of Lord Haldane's statesmanlike foresight has 
been clear to any one who, during the past four years, has 
cast his eyes across the Channel and seen the splendid be- 
haviour of our citizen soldiers in the field. 

I have spoken already elsewhere of what I have always 
regarded as our great initial administrative mistake in the 
war, namely, the raising of an entirely new army, when the 
machinery for expanding the Territorial force especially 
established by Lord Haldane for the purpose — I mean the 
Territorial County Associations — was already at hand 
and would have proved by far the most efficient and eco- 
nomical method of raising the troops required. 

Lord MacDonald and those who are left of the early 
Volunteer soldiers must, in their old age, rejoice in the knowl- 
edge that they have lived to see the force which they tended 
and nurtured against such appalling difficulties actually for 
several months standing between the Empire and disaster. 

Such a spirit as that which the Volunteers cultivated and 
maintained is bound sooner or later to make itself felt, and, 
as the years rolled on, the country came at last dimly and 
slowly to realize the Volunteers' true value. They figured 
in the field as early as 1882 in the Egyptian campaign, and 
played their part afterwards in much greater numbers 
throughout the South African War. 

After Lord Kitchener had made his call upon the country 
for the new armies, the Territorials found themselves neg- 
lected and put in the shade. 

It is true that by the terms of their engagement. Terri- 
torial soldiers were only available for home defence; but even 
in peace time a certain proportion of the force had volun- 
teered to serve anywhere in case of war, and it was always 



THE CALL TO THE TERRITORIALS 299 

anticipated that, when the necessity arose, a renewed call 
would be made upon the whole force to do likewise. The re- 
sponse to the call which was subsequently made upon them 
shows quite clearly that, had they been asked at first, they 
would have come forward almost to a man. 
) However, as it turned out, they were ignored and the call 
was not made upon them. Officers and men alike naturally 
and inevitably made up their minds that they were not 
wanted and would never be used for any other purpose than 
that for which they had originally taken service, namely, the 
defence of the United Kingdom. 

But the time for the employment of troops other than the 
regulars of the old army arrived with drastic and unexpected 
speed. The wastage of war proved to be so enormous that the 
fighting line had to be reenforced almost before the new 
armies were in existence. It was then that the country in 
her need turned to the despised Territorials. 

The call came upon them like a bolt from the blue. No 
warning had been given. Fathers and sons, husbands and 
brothers, left families, homes, the work and business of their 
lives, almost at an hour's notice to go on active service 
abroad. 

It seems to me that we have never realized what it was 
these men were asked to do. They were quite different to 
professional soldiers, who are kept and paid through years 
of peace for this particular purpose of war; who spend their 
lives practising their profession and gaining promotion and 
distinction; and who, on being confronted with the enemy, 
fulfil the great ambition of their lives. 

Equally distinct were the Territorials also from what has 
been called the "New Army," whose officers and men had 



300 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

ample time to prepare themselves for what they were re- 
quired to do. 

I wonder, sometimes, if the eyes of the country will ever 
be opened to what these Territorial soldiers of ours have done. 

I say without the slightest hesitation that without the 
assistance which the Territorials afforded between October, 
1914, and June, 1915, it would have been impossible to hold 
the line in France and Belgium, or to prevent the enemy from 
reaching his goal, the Channel seaboard. 

Between the beginning of November and the end of the 
Battle of Ypres, Territorial battalions were constantly ar- 
riving. A special training camp was formed for them at 
Saint-Omer under a selected commander. This post was 
admirably filled first by Brigadier-General Chichester, and 
later by Brigadier-General Oxley. 

I have already told of the fine work done by the Oxford- 
shire Hussars and the London Scottish — the first Territo- 
rials to enter the line of battle.^ Their splendid example was 
well followed, and the record they established nobly main- 
tained by each unit of the Territorial army as it successively 
took its place in the trenches. 

Of these units, the Warwickshire Horse Artillery Battery 
detrained at Saint-Omer in the beginning of November. Of 
the cavalry, the Oxfordshire Hussars disembarked at Dun- 
kirk about the middle of September; the Northumberland 
Hussars came to France in October; the Leicestershire, North 
Somerset, Essex, and Northampton Regiments of Yeomanry 
during November; and the Surrey towards the end of De- 
cember. 

* The North and South Irish Horse went to France much earlier than these 
troops but were employed as special escort to General Headquarters. 



EFFICIENCY OF THE TERRITORIALS 301 

All these units received a course of training in the Saint- 
Omer camp of instruction. I often rode amongst them, and 
was much impressed by the jBne material in men, horses, and 
equipment of which they were composed, and with the rapid 
progress which they made. 

I knew from my experience as Inspector of Yeomanry a 
good many years ago what efforts these Yeomanry regi- 
ments had for a long time made to live up to the times and 
render themselves efficient. Although I now found that the 
old type of hunting farmer was not so fully represented in 
their ranks as formerly, yet a valuable leavening of this class 
still remained, and they were for the most part commanded 
and officered by county men of position and influence, ac- 
customed to hunting, polo, and field sports. 

In a very short time we were able to use the Yeomanry 
in the front line. The Oxfordshire, Leicestershire, North 
Somerset, and Essex were incorporated in brigades of the 
cavalry divisions, and the Northumberland, Northampton, 
and Surrey were employed as divisional cavalry. The same 
practical value attached to the Warwickshire Battery of 
Horse Artillery, upon which Lord Brooke had expended so 
much time and energy for years preceding the war. 

Twenty-three battalions of Territorial infantry were sent 
to France in 1914. Of these the London Scottish and the 
infantry battalion of the Honourable Artillery Company 
arrived in September. The Fifth Border Regiment, Artists' 
Rifles, Sixth Welsh, Fifth Black Watch, Queen's West- 
minsters, Tenth Liverpools (Scottish), Thirteenth London 
(County of London), Eighth Royal Scots, Ninth Highland 
Light Infantry, Fifth Scottish Rifles, Ninth London Regi- 
ment, Fourth Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Second Momnouths, 



302 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

Hertfordshire, Fourth Seaforth Highlanders, Fourth Suf- 
folks, Sixth Cheshires, and Sixth Gordon Highlanders ar- 
rived in November, whilst the Seventh Argyll and Suther- 
land Highlanders and the Twelfth London came in De- 
cember. 

These units were all put through a course of training at 
Saint-Omer. There was a great difference between individual 
battalions as regards their actual condition when they came 
out, and the time required to prepare them to take their 
places in the trenches. 

Some were much better commanded and officered than 
others. There was a marked distinction to be noted in their 
physique and quality. But, on the whole, it may be fairly 
said that tliey promised to furnish most valuable reenforce- 
ments to our severely tried army. The energy they displayed 
and the progress they made were really wonderful. 

As Inspector-General of the Forces between 1908 and 
1912, I had constant opportunities of watching the training 
of the Territorial army in the first years of its existence as 
Buch. I was familiar with the earnest and successful en- 
deavours they had made to profit by the vastly improved 
conditions and status secured to them by Lord Haldane's 
wise and skilful administration. 

The same zeal which characterized them so remarkably 
as Volunteers was applied in greater force and with intensi- 
fied confidence when, as Territorials, they were organized, 
commanded, staffed, equipped, and trained on sound methods 
and up-to-date lines. 

All this seven or eight years' experience operated to the 
greatest advantage when these Territorial battalions arrived 
in the theatre of war and commenced their final preparation 



EFFICIENCY OF THE TERRITORIALS 303 

to fill the gaps in our line, through which, as I have shown, 
the Germans must have penetrated had the Territorial army 
not existed to step into the breach. 

The Honourable Artillery Company was the first unit to 
follow the London Scottish. I inspected them at the front 
on November 9 — the day upon which they joined the In- 
dian corps — and they presented a splendid appearance. 
I never saw a finer lot of men. They afterwards established 
a record in the war which is well worthy of the fine old corps 
from which they spring. 

The Queen's Westminsters and the Eighth Royal Scots 
only embarked on the 1st and 4th of November respectively, 
yet their condition was so good that they were able to be 
sent to the front immediately after the Honourable Artillery 
Company. 

The Queen's Westminsters were sent to the Seventh Divi- 
sion to relieve the Artists' Corps, which then became an 
Officers' Training Corps. 

I saw a great deal of the Hertfordshires during the very- 
few days they were training at Headquarters, and found 
them a particularly fine regiment. Although they only em- 
barked on November 5, they were at Ypres in the First 
Corps Reserve ten or eleven days later and before the end of 
the battle. The Tenth Liverpools have a fine record. They 
embarked on November 1 and joined the Ninth Brigade on 
the 25th of the month south of Wytschaete, where they were 
in the first line trenches on the 27th, between the Royal 
Fusiliers on the left and the Fifth (Northumberland) Fusi- 
liers on the right. 

The Ninth Highland Light Infantry were incorporated in 
the Fifth Brigade (Second Division) on November 24, about 



304 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

ten days after their arrival in the country. The Second Mon- 
mouths, the London Rifle Brigade, and the Fifth Scottish 
Rifles were incorporated in the Third Corps on November 
19, after some eleven or twelve days in the country. 

Many other examples can be quoted to show how quickly 
these Territorial troops, following the lead given to them 
by the Oxfordshire Hussars and the London Scottish, 
accustomed themselves to the severe and trying condi- 
tions of war, and of what real value they were at this critical 
time. 

The inexperience of regimental ofiicers was, of course, the 
greatest difiiculty we had to contend with when these troops 
first took the field. This was a most serious drawback in view 
of the vastly increased responsibility which falls upon leaders 
of all ranks in war as it is conducted to-day, but they im- 
proved beyond all expectation, and every week found them 
more eflScient. 

I have so far spoken of the Territorial army in regard to 
its employment in units of regiments and battalions at a most 
critical time in the w^ar, when reenforcements were badly 
needed. I come now to the time when, a few months later, 
they entered into the campaign as complete divisions. 

The great mass of miUtary opinion held that the highest 
practical unit in which Territorial soldiers could be organ- 
ized was the brigade of four battalions. The regular gunner 
had no use for Territorial horse and field artillery. Engineer 
Volunteers had for some time existed, but only in small num- 
bers and in particular localities. Although the Army Service 
Corps and the Army Medical Corps had for years been rep- 
resented in the Volunteer forces by small units and detach- 
ments, it was never considered that those services could be 



EFFICIENCY OF THE TERRITORIALS 305 

efficiently and practically performed by any but "whole- 
timers." 

Backed up by the opinion and advice of a very few soldiers 
of experience, the Secretary of State for War cast all this pre- 
judice to the winds, and determined upon a regular and com- 
plete divisional organization for the Territorials. It was in- 
deed a great and courageous decision. "What!" exclaimed 
the gold-bedizened smart young horse artillery commander, 
"do you mean to say you are going to allot Territorial horse 
artillery batteries to your mounted brigade? You must be 
mad! It takes years even to approach the necessary degree 
of efficiency." 

The field gunner, immersed in his latest developments 
to ensure the utmost accuracy of fire, the howitzer and 
heavy field artillery expert, the scientific and highly trained 
sapper, all joined in the hue and cry, untU Lord Haldane's 
conceptions almost collapsed and expired in a ferment of 
ridicule. But he remained steadfast. The mounted brigades 
received their Territorial batteries of horse artillery. Four- 
teen complete Territorial divisions were formed of three 
brigades of infantry, three brigades of field artillery, one 
brigade of howitzers, one brigade of heavies, field and signal 
companies of Engineers, companies of Army Service Corps, 
and Army Medical Corps. 

Lord Haldane had only some eight or nine years to wait for 
his reward. Within that time he saw his Territorials doing 
splendid and invaluable work as complete divisions in the 
field, and fighting with success against the most powerftd 
and efficient army in the world. When I say he " got his 
reward," I may well be misunderstood. He got nothing but 
calumny and grossly unjust abuse; but the "reward" to 



306 THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY 

such a man does not come in the ordinary way. He had 
proved the value of his great work, and that is all the reward 
he ever wanted. 

It is to this organization that I largely attribute the suc- 
cess of the Territorials in the field throughout the war. 
Each unit learned by degrees its own relative place and posi- 
tion in the great divisional machine. Enthusiasm was raised 
in the idea engendered in all ranks that they formed part of 
a great engine of war, furnished by their own counties and 
immediate neighbourhoods. At first, certainly, they were 
crude and untrained, but every day they improved through 
instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thor- 
ough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at. 

The strength of the new arrangement lay chiefly in the 
fact that each division was commanded by an experienced 
general officer of the regular forces, assisted by a well-selected 
and competent staff of regular officers. 

Six divisions in all arrived in France between November 
3, 1914, and April 30, 1915, namely, the Forty-sixth (North 
Midland), the Forty -seventh (London), the Forty -eighth 
(South Midland), the Forty-ninth (West Riding), the 
Fiftieth (Northumbrian), and the Fifty-first (Highland). 

A prominent part was taken in the fighting of 1915 by 
all these divisions, as will be more fuUy recounted in subse- 
quent pages. 



CHAPTER XV 

A REVIEW OF THE ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST AT THE CLOSE 
OF THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES 

At this time all our ideas in regard to the framing of plans 
in the West were evolved and guided almost entirely by the 
progress of the campaign in Poland and Galicia. 

After the Battle of the Marne, when we were at the Aisne, 
we were still hopeful of effecting a great flanking movement 
which should lead to more or less decisive results, or at least 
clear Northern France and Belgium of the enemy's troops. 
It has been shown how the development of events obliged us 
to modify our hopes and anticipations xmtil, at the close of 
the first battle of Ypres, we certainly felt at our own General 
Headquarters that the AUied forces of Great Britain, France, 
and Belgium could effect nothing of importance unless and 
until one of two things happened. 

Either there must be a considerable augmentation of our 
forces, including a vastly increased supply of heavy artillery, 
machine guns, trench artillery, and ammunition, or, the 
enemy's forces on the Western Front must be so weakened 
by the necessity of sending troops to stem the Russian 
advance in the East as to enable the Allies with their avail- 
able forces to assume the offensive with success. 

Now the only resource in regard to personnel which the 
Allies had at that time to depend upon for any considerable 
accession of strength was the British "New Army," whose 
entry into the line of battle must perforce be gradual. It 
could not be expected to make its weight felt for a long time 
to come. 



308 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

After the fall of Antwerp I realized that by taking up our 
position on the extreme left flank we should find ourselves 
very near to the coast, and a good opportunity would be 
afforded of gaining the cooperation of the Fleet. In other 
words, the paramount thought in my mind was that the 
British and Belgian forces, cooperating with the British 
Fleet, should constitute in themselves the left flank of the 
Allied line in the West. 

Whilst on the Aisne, as I have said, I had a visit from 
Mr. Winston Churchill, who was then First Lord of the 
Admiralty. He arrived on the night of September 26 and 
left on the 28th. Winston Churchill had been for several 
years one of my most intimate friends. I saw much of him 
during the South African War, but it was not until about 
1905 or 1906 that I really got to know him well. His com- 
plex character is as difficult to describe as it is to analyze. 
To those who do not understand him, the impetuous disjK)- 
sition, which is one of his strongest characteristics, is apt 
to throw into shadow the indomitable courage, tireless en- 
ergy, marvellous perspicuity, and quick, virile brain-power 
which are the main features of Winston Churchill's extra- 
ordinary personality. 

His experience and knowledge of public aflFairs must be 
unrivalled; for, at an age when most men are undergoing 
the grinding drudgery which falls to the lot of nearly all suc- 
cessful statesmen, lawyers, soldiers, or ecclesiastics, he was 
holding the highest offices in the Government; and not even 
his most inveterate enemies can say that he has failed to 
leave his mark for good on every department he has super- 
vised. 

Possessing a combative nature, he engages constantly 



WINSTON CHURCHILL S09 

in political strife which is marked by the sharpyest contro- 
versy, and it is, therefore, perhaps only his iatimate friends 
who know the real manly, generous kindliness of his disposi- 
tion and his perfect loyalty. 

The perspective of history will show the part he has played 
throughout the Great War to have been consistently con- 
structive and of direct value to the nation. 

His visit to my Headquarters at this time was productive 
of great good. The Government were getting nervous about 
the military situation and the arrest of our forward advance. 
With his characteristic energy and activity, Churchill visited 
and examined every part of the battle-field, and what he 
saw and heard put him in a position to send reassuring in- 
formation to his colleagues. 

I discussed with him fully my views as to the desirability 
of establishing the British forces in a theatre where they 
could cooperate with the Navy and link up with the troops 
in Belgium, We examined the possibility of a failure to effect 
a decisive turning movement, and agreed in thinking that, in 
the last resort, we might still be able, with the flank support 
of the Fleet, to snatch from the enemy's possession the Bel- 
gian coast-line as far, at any rate, as Zeebrugge. 

When he left me on September 28 it was with a complete 
understanding that he would prepare the Navy to fulfil this 
r6le, and a few extracts from letters which I subsequently 
received from him wiU show how well he redeemed his 
promise. 

On October 26 he writes : — 

"... But, my dear friend, I do trust you will realize how 
damnable it will be if the enemy settles down for the win- 



310 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

ter along lines which comprise Calais, Dunkirk, or Ostend. 
There will be continual alarms and greatly added difficul- 
ties. We must have him off the Belgian coast even if we 
cannot recover Antwerp. 

"I am getting old ships with heavy guns ready, protected 
by barges with nets against submarines, so as to dispute the 
whole seaboard with him. On the 31st inst. the Revenge, 
with four 13|-in. guns, can come into action if required, 
and I have a regular fleet of monitors now organized, 
which, they all say, have hit the Germans hard this week, 
a fleet which is getting stronger every day. 

"If you could gain a passage off to the left, I could give 
you overwhelming support from the sea, and there you will 
have a flank which certainly they cannot turn. . . ." 

In a letter dated November 22, again: — 

"... If you push your left flank along the sand-dunes of 
the shore to Ostend and Zeebrugge, we would give you 100 
or 200 heavy guns from the sea in absolutely devastating 
support. For four or five miles inshore we could make you 
perfectly safe and superior. Here, at least, you have their 
flank, if you care to use it; and surely, the coast strip, held 
and fed well with troops, would clear the whole line out 
about Dixmude and bend it right back, if it did not clear 
it altogether. 

"... We could bring men in at Ostend or Zeebrugge to 
reenforce you in a hard southeastward push. There is no 
limit to what could be done by the extreme left-handed push 
and swoop along the Dutch frontier. ... In a few hours I 
could have fifty 12-in. guns and seventy 6-in. firing on the 



NAVAL COOPERATION 311 

enemy's right and rear. It is difficult for submarines to attack 
because of the sandbanks. . . ." 

On December 7 the First Lord was again my guest at 
General Headquarters. We discussed the situation, and were 
completely in agreement as to the advisability of my pro- 
jected coastal advance and close cooperation with the Fleet. 
I told him there was fear of disagreement with the French, 
and that political difficulties would certainly arise. He 
said he did not think that they were insuperable, and 
shortly after our conversation he left for England, prom- 
ising to arrange everything with the Prime Minister and 
Kitchener. 

Then came his letter, despatched on December 8, after he 
had seen his colleagues in the Cabinet: — 

"... Kitchener agrees entirely with your view. We held 
an immediate conference with the Prime Minister and Sir 
Edward Grey, and, as the result, the strongest possible tele- 
gram is being drafted. The Admiralty attach the greatest 
importance to the operation and will aid in every way. We 
are already making the necessary preparations on an exten- 
sive scale. Later I will let you have very full and clear details. 
The combination must be perfect. 

' "Kitchener proposes to let you have the Twenty-seventh 
Division in time. ... I hope you will continue to press 
the new plan hard, both here at home and on the French 
generals." 

I quote in full Sir Edward Grey's telegram, dated Decem- 
ber 9, to Sir Francis Bertie at Bordeaux: — 



312 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

"The military situation points to the advisability of 
shortly taking steps to prevent the Germans withdrawing 
their best first-line troops from the Western theatre for em- 
ployment against Russia and replacing them by second-rate 
troops. 

"As some forward movement to achieve this object may 
be decided on, I desire to bring to the serious attention of 
the French Government the very strong opinion held by His 
Majesty's Government that British troops should be so 
placed in the line as to advance along the coast in immediate 
cooperation with our Fleet, and thus enable us, if necessary, 
to land further forces at any critical juncture during the 
operation. 

"To obtain this result a slight change in the present position 
of Sir John French's forces in the line would be necessary. 

"The British troops would have to be moved to the left of 
the Allied line, being replaced in their present position by the 
French troops now on the left. They would thus be again 
taking up the position in the line they held after moving from 
Soissons. 

"I would point out to the French Government that the 
people of this country realize that the Belgian coastal posi- 
tions are now held by Germany as a menace to Great Britain, 
They would, therefore, regard any losses entailed by an ac- 
tive offensive taken by our troops against these coastal po- 
sitions as fully justified. British public opinion will even 
demand that the menace should be removed, for the forts 
on the coast of Belgium are being prepared as a base of oper- 
ations by sea and air against Great Britain especially, and 
this may in time hamper the safe transport of fresh troops 
from England to France. 



THE BELGIAN COAST LINE 313 

"Moreover, we feel sure that our cooperation with any 
contemplated French effort to drive the Germans back from 
their present positions would be rendered much more effec- 
tive, and lead to more decisive and far-reaching results, if 
this preliminary step in the redistribution of the troops were 
now taken and our troops subsequently used in the manner 
indicated. 

"His Majesty's Government consider it most urgent and 
important that this step should be taken, and you should ask 
the French Government to agree to it and to arrange with 
General Joffre for carrying it out." 

The French Government received these proposals very 
coldly. It was quite evident that they had no intention of 
leaving the British forces in sole charge of the Allied left, but 
for the moment they agreed to regard the question as a mili- 
tary one and to refer it to General Joffre. 

I had several conversations with him on the subject, but 
there appeared to be no disposition on his part to acquiesce 
in my plans. 

This attitude on the part of the French was evidently well 
known in London, for, on December 13, I received a letter 
from Winston Churchill in which he said: "Of course, we are 
disappointed here with the turn events have taken, but we 
shall do our best to help the French." 

This meant that Joffre had rejected my scheme, but had 
substituted the idea of another kind of attack, to be made 
chiefly by the French, with fewer troops, in a different direc- 
tion and with quite another objective. I will return to this 
presently, for such an operation actually took place and 
proved to be a very feeble substitute for what I had intended. 



314 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

Yielding thus to French representations, our Government 
began to weaken. Churchill adhered to his views throughout, 
but was not supported. 

The terms of Sir Edward Grey's communication of De- 
cember 9 were unanswerable. Everything which subse- 
quently happened in the course of the war has proved it. 
The possession by the Germans of that strip of Belgian 
coast-line has been the sharpest of all thorns with which they 
have succeeded in pricking us. It has been one of the main 
causes of the prolongation of the war. Their vigorous and 
successful defence against all our attacks in the autumn of 
1917 showed the value which they attached to the retention 
of this coast-line. 

Lord Kitchener addressed a memorandum to me on 
January 9, 1915, from which I quote in extenso: — 

"The questions raised in your recent Memorandum of 
January 3, 1915," — he wrote, — "and in your appreciation 
of the situation in the various theatres of war, were con- 
sidered by a War Council, presided over by the Prime Min- 
ister, on Thursday, January 7, and Friday, January 8. 

"The principal questions discussed were — 

"1. The proposed advance to Zeebrugge. 

"2. The organization of the New Armies. 

"3. The possibility of employing British Forces in a differ- 
ent theatre to that in which they are now used. 

"With regard to the proposed advance to Zeebrugge, the 
First Lord's telegram, No. 2623, sent to you on January 2, 
explained the difficulties imposed on the Admiralty by the 
development of Zeebrugge as a base for submarines, and the 
War Council realized that one of your principal motives in 



KITCHENER'S MEMORANDUM 315 

suggesting an oflFensive to effect the capture of Ostend and 
Zeebrugge was to ease the naval position. 

"On a general review, however, of the whole situation, 
naval and military, the Council came to the conclusion that 
the advantages to be obtained from such an advance at the 
present moment would not be commensurate with the heavy 
losses involved, as well as the extension that would be thus 
caused to the lines of the Allies in Northern Flanders. 

"The Council was also influenced in this conclusion by the 
following considerations. The first of these was that the reen- 
forcements of fifty battalions of Territorial troops, which you 
considered indispensable, could only be supplied at a con- 
siderable dislocation of the organization of the future reen- 
forcements to be sent to you. It must be borne in mind that 
the original organization of the Territorial force included no 
provision for drafts. Great difficulties have already been 
encountered in providing drafts for the twenty-four battal- 
ions already in your command; and, although arrangements 
for the necessary machinery to create a special reserve for the 
Territorials are in hand, it would not at present be possible 
to supply fifty more battalions with drafts without an entire 
reorganization of the forces allotted to Home Defence, and 
this would modify the programme for reenforcements to join 
our army in the future. 

"The second consideration was that it is impossible at the 
present time to maintain a suflBcient supply of gun ammuni- 
tion on the scale which you considered necessary for offen- 
sive operations. Every effort is being made in all parts of the 
world to obtain an unlimited supply of ammunition; but, as 
you are well aware, the result is still far from being sufficient 
to maintain the large number of guns which you now have 



816 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

under your command adequately supplied with ammunition 
for offensive purposes. 

"You have pointed out that offensive operations under 
the new conditions created by this war require a vast ex- 
penditure of artillery ammunition, which may, for even ten 
or twenty days, necessitate the supply of fifty or one hundred 
rounds per gun per day being available, and that, unless the 
reserve can be accumulated to meet expenditure of this sort, 
it is unwise to embark on extensive offensive operations 
against the enemy in trenches. It is, of course, almost im- 
possible to calculate with any accuracj^ how long offensive 
operations, once undertaken, may last before the object is 
attained; but it is evident that the breaking off of such oper- 
ations before accomplishment, owing to the want of artillery 
ammunition, and not on account of a successful termination 
or a convenient pause in the operations having been reached, 
might lead to a serious reverse being sustained by our forces. 

"The abandonment of the Zeebrugge project does not 
prevent you from cooperating to the utmost extent, com- 
patible wuth your present resources, with any offensive 
movement contemplated by General Joffre, and your previ- 
ous instructions in this sense are in no way modified. 

"The Council further thought that there were certain indi- 
cations, which should not be neglected, of German reenforce- 
ments reaching their armies in the Western theatre in the 
near future, which may lead German commanders to under- 
take a fresh attempt to force the lines you and the Frencli 
Army hold. If this movement should develop, it could prob- 
ably be better met and defeated by holding your present lines 
of prepared positions than by extending the line to the Dutch 
frontier and placing the Belgian Army in probably a more 



KITCHENER'S MEMORANDUM 317 

exposed position than they now occupy. You may rest as- 
sured that, as they become available, fresh troops will be 
sent to you with the least possible delay to strengthen your 
forces as far as is practicable. The Twenty-eighth Division 
have already received orders to leave for France on the 14th 
inst." 

The telegram from the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 
January 2, referred to in the above memorandum, ran as 
follows : — 

"The battleship Formidable was sunk this morning by a 
submarine in the Channel. Information from all quarters 
shows that the Germans are steadily developing an impor- 
tant submarine base at Zeebrugge. Unless operations can be 
undertaken to clear the coast, and particularly to capture 
this place, it must be recognized that the whole transporta- 
tion of troops across the Channel wUl be seriously and in- 
creasingly compromised. The Admiralty are of the opinion 
that it would be possible, under cover of warships, to land a 
large force at Zeebrugge in conjtmction with any genuine for- 
ward movement along the shore to Ostend. They wish these 
views, which they have so frequently put forward, to be 
placed again before the French Commander, and hope they 
may receive the consideration which their urgency and im- 
portance require." 

It will be seen from this that Mr. ChurchiU was not 
in accord with the views expressed in Lord Kitchener's 
memorandum. ■ - 

The situation was well known to the Cabinet before the 



318 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

despatch of Sir Edward Grey's telegram of December 9. 
It is clear that the points raised in the memorandum of 
January 9 were excuses used as a veil to screen the disinclina- 
tion of the British Government to taking a firm stand against 
the attitude adopted by the French. But there was something 
more. 

Lord Kitchener's objections can be easily answered. 
They may be generally stated thus : — 

(1) That the seizure from the Germans of this strip of sea- 
coast would not be an adequate return for the heavy losses 
likely to be incurred in the operation. 

(2) That the line then to be held would be unduly 
extended. 

(3) That the reenforcement of the additional troops de- 
manded "would only be supplied at a considerable disloca- 
tion of the organization of the future reenforcements to be 
sent you." 

(4) That the supply of gun ammunition on the scale de- 
manded would be impossible. 

(5) That embarking on such an enterprise would prejudice 
our power of resisting a possible German counter-offensive 
in the immediate future. 

My answer to (1) is this: Had we been in possession of 
the Belgian coast-line between Nieuport and the Dutch 
frontier in the early part of 1915, and had we maintained 
it to the end of the war, the Germans would have been de- 
prived in a great measure of the power they have exercised 
throughout with such success to prosecute their sub- 
marine campaign. Any price we might have had to pay 



ANSWER TO KITCHENER'S OBJECTIONS 319 

in the way of losses would have been well worth the object 
attained. 

In a lesser degree this may be said of the enemy's aircraft 
enterprises. I claim that the naval history of this war clearly 
bears out my contention. 

As to (2), the extent of the line to be held would depend 
upon the degree of success attained by the operations. If we 
had been able to make good our advance from the left flank 
(between Nieuport and Dixmude) by means of powerful 
naval support from the sea, the least we should have effected 
would have been to clear the Germans out of the triangle 
Nieuport-Dixmude-Zeebrugge. 

If the operation had then had to be suspended, we should 
have had to hold the line Dixmude-Zeebrugge instead of Dix- 
mude-Nieuport. In actual distance the former space is about 
double the latter. But our position at Zeebrugge would have 
afforded a large measure of naval support, and the country 
to the southwest of that place lends itself to inundations. 
This would have enabled us to occupy the northeastern por- 
tion of the line in much less strength. Further, it was just 
in anticipation of such a necessity that the extra troops were 
asked for. 

Inasmuch, however, as such a situation would have forced 
upon the enemy the necessity of holding a dangerous and 
exposed salient which could be reached on the north side by 
our gims from the Fleet, it is more than possible that he would 
have effected such a retirement as would have considerably 
shortened our line. 

(3) This contention is disputed; but even if it were true, 
it is no sound military argument against embarking on an 
operation which promised such valuable results. 



320 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

(4) There is a complete answer to this objection. Some 
two or three months later, large trainloads of ammmiition 
— heavy, medium, and light — passed by the rear of the 
army in France en route to Marseilles for shipment to the 
Dardanelles. 

(5) The best possible means of warding oflF an attack is to 
take a strong and powerful initiative. 

I cannot characterize these reasons for rejecting my plans 
as other than illogical, and I feel sure they must really have 
appeared so to their authors. 

Perhaps the true explanation which underlay all this is to 
be found in the following memorandum of the War Coun- 
cil of January 9, 1915. It runs as follows: — • 

THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING BRITISH FORCES IN A 

DIFFERENT THEATRE THAN THAT IN WHICH THEY 

ARE NOW USED 

"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this 
subject in reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the 
conclusion that, certainly for the present, the main theatre 
of operations for British forces should be alongside the 
French Army, and that this should continue as long as 
France was liable to successful invasion and required armed 
support. 

"It was also realized that, should the offensive operations 
subsequently drive the Germans out of France and back 
to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. 
It was thought that, after another failure by Germany to 
force the lines of defence held by the French Army and 
yours, the military situation in France and Flanders might 
conceivably develop into one of stalemate, in which it would 



MEMORANDUM OF WAR COUNCIL 321 

be impossible for German forces to break through into 
France, while at the same time the German defences would 
be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without 
great loss of life and the expenditure of more ammunition 
than could be provided. In these circumstances, it was con- 
sidered desirable to find some other theatre where such ob- 
structions to advance would be less pronounced, and from 
where operations against the enemy might lead to more de- 
cisive results. 

"For these reasons, the War Council decided that certain 
of the possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres 
should be carefully studied during the next few weeks, so 
that, as soon as the new forces are fit for action, plans may be 
ready to meet any eventuality that may be then deemed ex- 
pedient, either from a political point of view, or to enable our 
forces to act with the best advantage in concert with the 
troops of other nations throwing in their lot with the 
AUies." 

In fact, the idea became fixed in the minds of the War 
Council that a condition of stalemate was bound to occur 
on the Western Front, and therefore other theatres which 
might afford greater opi)ortunities of prosecuting a success- 
ful offensive must be sought. 

I was asked for my views as to this, and I gave them in 
full. Space does not allow me to quote my memorandum on 
the subject in eodenso, but my ideas will be gleaned from the 
concluding paragraphs, which rim as follows: — 

"Assuming, however, that all the foregoing argimients are 
brushed aside, it remains to be seen where any effective ac- 



322 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

tion could be taken. The countries to be considered are the 
following: — 

" (a) Russia. Impossible, as there is no means of sending 
an army there, the Baltic being closed. Archangel shut in 
winter and unsuitable at other seasons, and Vladivostok 
much too far away. 

" (6) Denmark and (c) Holland. One or other of these coun- 
tries would have to declare war on Germany unless her 
neutrality were violated, and in both cases the overseas 
communication would be so vulnerable to mine or torpedo 
attack as to be in the highest degree insecure. 

" (d) North German Coast. Communications would be 
equally vulnerable. 

" (e) Italy. Assumes that Italy is a friendly belligerent, 
in which case she would probably not require the assistance 
of British troops, as her own action should be sufficient to 
finish Austria. It is unlikely that Italy would be induced 
to join in simply by the offer of troops which her military 
intelligence must know would be better employed else- 
where. 

"(/) Istria and Dalmatia. A very dangerous line of com- 
munication, and one which would be impossible in the face 
of a hostile Italy. The islands on the Dalmatian seaboard 
are specially favourable for the action of defending subma- 
rines and torpedo craft, while mines might render any ap- 
proach to the coast out of the question. With an actively 
friendly Italy an advance through her territory would be 
more practicable, but, as stated in preceding paragraph, un- 
necessary. 

" (g) Through Greece to Servia, presumably via Saloniki, 
presumes Greece to be a friendly belligerent. Probably the 



VIEWS OF GENERAL FRENCH 323 

least objectionable of any possible proposal, but necessitating 
the strict neutrality of Bulgaria, as otherwise the land com- 
munications would be very open to attack. A hostile Italy 
would also jeopardize the whole force. 

"Qi) GalUpoK, Asia Minor, Syria. Any attack on Turkey 
would be devoid of decisive result. In the most favourable 
circmnstances it could only cause the relaxation of the pres- 
sure against Russia in the Caucasus and enable her to trans- 
fer two or three corps to the West — a result quite incom- 
mensurate with the effort involved. To attack Turkey would 
be to play the German game and to bring about the end 
which Germany had in mind when she induced Turkey 
to join in the war, namely, to draw off troops from the de- 
cisive spot, which is Germany itself. 

"To sum up, my opinions are — 

" (1) That the impossibility of breaking through the Ger- 
man line in Flanders has not been proved, and that that oper- 
ation is feasible provided a sufficiency of high-explosive shells 
and of guns is provided. 

" (2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the 
German line, so large a margin of safety is needed that troops 
could not be withdrawn from this theatre. It is to be remem- 
bered that the AUies are in a much better position to await 
the outcome of events. Time is against Germany; she will 
not sit forever behind her entrenchments, and the AUies 
must be prepared with an adequate force to strike her when- 
ever she may attempt to break out or withdraw. 

" (3) That there are no theatres, other than those in which 
operations are now in progress, in which decisive results 
could be attained. 



324 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

"I have not gone into details in considering the question 
of the employment of forces in other theatres, as such oper- 
ations were considered by the M.O. Directorate of the War 
Office when I was C.I.G.S., and I have no doubt that a full 
record of the conclusions which were reached are filed 
there." 

General Joffre's final opinion is expressed in a memoran- 
dum, dated January 19, 1915, of which the following is a 
summary: — 

"1. I wish to call your particular attention to the follow- 
ing points : — 

"2. The French General Staff consider a German offen- 
sive possible — even probable — in the near future. The 
Germans are certainly making new formations; the Thirty- 
eightli Corps has been identified in Bavaria. 

"3. Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. 
If broken, for example, about Roye and Montdidier, the 
consequences for the Allies would be of the most serious 
description. 

"4. In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the 
position of being able to assume the offensive. 

"5. Because of (3) and (4), reserves are absolutely neces- 
saiy. 

"6. For these reasons, I am anxious for a rapid release 
of the corps north of the British line. 

"7. We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and 
all secondary operations must give way. 

"S. Operations towards Ostend-Zeebrugge, though im- 
portant, are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion 



Vlf:WS OF GENEIIAL FRENCH 825 

should follow ratiior tjian prccofJe the principal action, 
namely, the collection of reserves. 

"To resume: - 

"(a) To heat the enemy it is necessary to have reserves. 

"f^j These reserves can only come from the north, as 
British reenforcerncnts set them free. 

"(c) The German menace, not a vain thinj^, makes it 
necessary to collect these reserves in tlie shortest fjossible 
time. 

"(d) The main object, namely, the defeat of the enemy, 
makes it necessary to delay the fjffensive towards Ostend- 
Zeehrugge." 

I always disagreed with these views, and remain rycm- 
vinced that my plans should have been accepted and tried. 
I will only add, as a further argument against embarking 
ujjon operations in other theatres of war, that our military 
forces at that time, and for at least fifteen months ai'Utr- 
wards, wcra not sufficient to enafJe us to carry on great 
operations in more than one tfieatre with the necessary 
power and energy required for success. They could only have 
resulted in what actually hajjpened in 1915, namely, the 
series of feeble and on the whole unsuccessful attempts to 
break through the German line in France, and an absolute 
failure, compelling uUJmaf.e withdrawal of our troops, in 
the J^ardanelles. 

I have dealt at perhaps wearisome length with the strate- 
gic alternatives and the problems which presented tfiem- 
selves for solution after the clo.se of the First Battle of Ypres. 
It has been necessary to do so in order that my countrymen 
may understand the situation as it actually existed at the 



326 ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST 

time, and that they may appreciate what seemed to me 
conclusive reasons why greater progress was not made in 
1915. 

Divided counsels lead to half-measures and indecisive 
action. Such counsels have always had, and always will have, 
the most deterrent and disadvantageous effect on any vigor- 
ous prosecution of a war, great or small. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

For the plan sketched out in the last chapter, a certain 
amount of naval cooperation was secured. The Admiralty 
were always strongly in favour of my original proposal, and 
did not at all like the half-hearted operation which Joflfre 
was substituting for it. They urged, with great force and 
reason, that the risks run by the ships in cooperation on the 
Belgian coast were increasingly great owing to the powerful 
fortifications erected by the Germans, and the presence of 
enemy submarines at Zeebrugge. Whilst, therefore, those 
risks might well be run in support of a real, strenuous, and 
powerful endeavour to wrench the coast-line from the ene- 
my's grasp, the Admiralty felt that the Navy could not 
afford to sacrifice strength in hanging about day after day 
exposed to such risks, in the sole hope of rendering some 
slight help to an attack which had no great or decisive object 
in view. In proof of this, I quote the following telegrams 
which were received from the Admiralty. On December 20, 
1914, they wired as follows: — 

"We are receiving almost daily requests from the French 
for naval support on the Belgian coast. We regret we are 
unable to comply. The small vessels by themselves cannot 
face the new shore batteries, and it is not justifiable to ex- 
pose battleships to submarine perils unless to support a land 
attack of primary importance. 

"If such an attack is delivered, all the support in my 



328 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

memorandum forwarded to you through Secretary of State 
for War will, of course, be afforded. I would be glad if you 
would explain this to General Foch, as it is painful to the 
officers concerned to make repeated refusals." 

A previous wire had arrived on the 18th, the last few lines 
of which ran as follows: — 

"It is not justifiable to expose Majestic to submarine 
risks unless to support a real movement, in which case every 
risk will be run and ample support provided." 

And before this, on the 12th, the following was received: — 

"Will you please put us in communication with the 
French general who will conduct the operation. . . . Mean- 
while, all our preparations as outlined are proceeding, . . . 
but the serious risks to our ships, both from batteries and 
submarines, ought not to be incurred except in an operation 
of the first importance." 

Admiral Hood, who afterwards fell so gloriously in the 
hour of victory at the Battle of Jutland, was then in com- 
mand at Dover. He was responsible for the naval coopera- 
tion arranged for, and came to my Headquarters on the 13th 
to discuss plans. It was arranged that at daybreak on the 
15th the advance from Nieuport was to be supported by 
two battleships, three monitors, and six destroyers. 

I urged the Quartermaster-General to do his utmost to 
provide more machine guns. At that time we had consider- 
ably less than one per company, and it was an arm in which 



SHORTAGE OF MACHINE GUNS 329 

the Germans were particularly well found. They must at 
that time have had at least six or seven to our one. 

In the operations now under discussion, this disability 
was felt very severely. In discussing the progress of the 
fight with General d'Urbal on the 15th at Poperinghe, he 
told me that the slight and disappointing advance made 
by the French was due to their being everywhere held up 
by machine-gun fire. He said the enemy had received large 
machine-gun reenforcements, and he was then sending down 
special guns in armoured motors to endeavour to crush them. 

From all parts of the line the same complaint came of 
the preponderance of the enemy's machine-gun fire. 

The operations opened on the morning of the 14th by a 
combined attack on the line HoUebeke-Wytschaete Ridge. 
It began when it was hardly daylight, at 7 a.m., by heavy 
artillery bombardment. At 7.45, the French right (five regi- 
ments of the Sixteenth Corps) moved forward and cap- 
tured the enemy's advance trenches on our left flank. 

The Second Battalion Royal Scots and First Battalion 
Gordons (of Bowes' Eighth Brigade, Third Division) then 
advanced on Petit Bois and Mendleston Farm. The Royal 
Scots seized and held the wood, which in the evening they 
entrenched on the eastern side. They captured about sixty 
prisoners, including some officers. 

The Gordons at dusk had captured the enemy's trenches 
surrounding Mendleston Farm, but were again driven out 
of them by a powerful machine-gun counter-attack. They 
had to fall back on their own trenches. 

The French Thirty-second Corps attacked to the north 
of the Sixteenth on the line Klein Zillebeke-Zillebeke, and 
advanced some two hundred to three hundred yards. They 



330 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

repulsed a German counter-attack from Zandvoorde and 
captured the trenches in front of the chateau of Hol- 
lebeke. 

As the French had not established themselves in the 
position agreed upon, the Third Division was unable to 
advance farther, whilst the Fifth Division (right of Second 
Corps) and all the Third Corps were confined the whole 
day to demonstration and holding the enemy. 

I visited the Poste de Commandement of the Third Division 
commander (Haldane) on the Scherpenberg — a hill near 
Bailleul, surmounted by a windmill — in the afternoon, and 
witnessed the fighting for some time. It struck me that the 
enemy artillery fire was much weaker than ours. 

The operations were continued on the 15th, and I again 
spent some time on the Scherpenberg watching the progress 
of the fight, so far as the weather permitted any view; we 
were again prevented from advancing owing to the delay 
of the French on our left. Our joint plan was that successive 
points had to be taken from north to south. It is obvious that 
the movement had to commence on the French left, but 
from the first our allies failed to execute their task and we 
had to wait for them. 

The weather was terrible and the ground simply quagmire, 
whilst the rain, cold, and the awful mud of the holding soil 
paralyzed any energetic attempt to drive the enemy back. 
A desultory fire was kept up at all points along the line; but 
no great activity appeared to be possible. The role of the 
Second Corps was quite plain and clear: it had to wait for 
the Sixteenth French Corps to reach its allotted points. 

Later in the day I went round to the Third Corps Head- 
quarters and there met the corps commander (Pulteney), 



THE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 14-16 331 

Du Cane, his chief of staff, and Allenby, commanding the 
cavalry. 

I discussed the general course of the operations with them. 
I had in my mind the possibility of giving some impetus to 
the general advance by making an attack with troops of the 
Third Corps across the river Douve, and thus directly sup- 
porting an advance by Smith-Dorrien's right, perhaps sup- 
ported by the cavalry. The mud and water in the valley of 
that river, however, presented insuperable diflSculties. 

During the night of the 15th-16th, troops of the 
Fifth Division captured some trenches to the south of 
Messines. 

I was much perturbed at the slow progress we were mak- 
ing, as no better reports came from anywhere along the 
whole of the Allied line. 

On the 16th I again visited the Scherpenberg, where I 
was met by Smith-Dorrien and Haldane. Smith-Dorrien 
assured me that the understanding between himself and the 
commander of the Sixteenth French Corps on his left (Gen- 
eral Grosetti) to provide for mutual support and cooperation 
had been complete. 

As our great aim was now to reduce the enemy's machine- 
gun fire, I directed Smith-Dorrien to send his pack artillery, 
which had recently been given him, close down behind the 
trenches and dig them well in. 

De Maud'huy's attack north of Arras was begim on the 
16th by a heavy artUlery bombardment. The infantry attack 
followed on the 17th, but the results were disappointing, 
although a little ground was gained near Notre Dame de 
Lorette. Some slight progress was made by the French 
Twenty-first Corps. 



332 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

I tried to see Foch, but he was away from his Head- 
quarters with de Maud'huy. I sent Henry Wilson after him 
to explain my views, namely, that our present plan must be 
modified, owing largely to the fact that we had considerably 
underestimated the enemy's strength, particularly in the 
matter of machine guns. Foch sent Wilson back to tell me 
that he agreed in thinking that the present operations had 
not proved a success. He proposed to break them off as soon 
as we could reconsider our arrangements. He begged me, 
however, to continue demonstrating all along my front as 
much as possible, with a view to supporting the attack upon 
which de Maud'huy was now embarked. 

It was at this time that one of the many instances occurred 
of the evils which attend divided command. There was un- 
doubtedly a great opportunity on and about December 18 
for a powerful attack opposite Wytschaete. I proposed to 
mass the Sixteenth French and Second British Corps at this 
point, when I discovered that the Sixteenth Corps was prac- 
tically melting away on my left flank. Two brigades had 
been despatched to the north, and other units had been sent 
away to support de Maud'huy's attack on Arras. I was in 
complete ignorance of these moves until they were accom- 
plished facts. I therefore had to give up all idea of a joint 
attack on any large scale for the present, and issued or- 
ders to corps commanders enjoining them to demonstrate 
on their immediate front, to keep the enemy occupied and 
seize any opportunity which might ofi'er to capture hostile 
trenches. 

Colonel Thomson (liaison officer with General de Castel- 
nau) told me that the Second French Army had made some 
progress; the first line of the enemy trenches near Albert had 



CAPTAIN SPIERS 333 

been taken and the ground made good. Progress was also 
made near Roye. 

Captain Spiers (Eleventh Hussars), who was now my 
liaison officer with General de Maud'huy, came to me. He 
told me that a German coimter-attack on Notre Dame de 
Lorrette had regained all ground lost by the enemy on the 
day before, but that the attack on Givenchy-les-La Bassee 
had succeeded only to the extent of capturing a trench west 
of the village, and that progress was being slowly made to 
the north. The ground won at Saint-Laiu-ent was retained in 
spite of repeated German counter-attacks. Some trenches 
north of Notre Dame de Consolation (east of Vermelles) 
were also taken and held. 

I have had occasion to mention Spiers's name before. 
He has since deservedly risen to much higher rank. In 
my mind I always used to class him with Captain Colqu- 
houn Grant of Peninsular fame — one of Wellington's most 
trusted scouting officers. 

I have a most vivid and grateful recollection of the invalu- 
able services performed by this intrepid young officer. He is 
possessed of an extremely acute perception, and is able to 
express himself and deliver his reports in the clearest and 
most concise terms. He was always exact and accurate, and 
never failed to bring me back the information I most par- 
ticularly wanted. I seldom knew him at fault. He was a 
perfect master of the French language and was popular with 
the staffs, and made welcome by the various generals to 
whom he was attached. His unfailing tact, judgment and 
resource were very marked. His reckless, daring courage 
often made me anxious for his safety, and, indeed, he was 
severely wounded on at least five separate occasions. 



334 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

I remember well his coming back to report to me late one 
evening. He spoke with his usual confidence and decision, 
and the information which he gave me proved to be very 
important and accurate, but I noticed that his voice was 
weak and he looked very tii-ed and worn in the face. I sent 
him away to his quarters as quickly as possible, thinking he 
wanted rest. All this time he had a bullet in his side, and in 
that condition he had travelled back several miles to make 
his report. He fainted after leaving my room, and lay in 
considerable danger for several days. 

To resume my narrative. The Third, Fourth, and Indian 
Corps were all energetic in carrying out my latest orders, 
and demonstrated with considerable activity. On the 19th 
the Eighth Division captured some trenches at Neuve Cha- 
pelle, and the Seventh Division at Rouges Bancs, but of the 
latter, the Second Battalion Scots Guards, in the Twen- 
tieth Brigade, were driven back by a counter-attack; as 
also were the Devons. 

Attacks were made very early in the morning by the 
Garhwal, Sirhind, and Ferozepore Brigades. Each was 
successful, and parts of the enemy's trenches were cap- 
tured. 

The Garhwal Brigade captured two machine guns and 
some prisoners, but had to return to their own trenches in 
the evening. 

The Eleventh Brigade of the Fourth Division, under 
Hunter Weston (First Battalion Somerset Light Infantry, 
First Battalion East Lanes Regiment, First' Battalion 
Hampshire Regiment, First Battalion Rifle Brigade), made 
a concerted attack on the morning of the 19th on the edge of 
Ploegsteert Wood. Some houses were captured, but the mud 



THE INDIAN TROOPS 335 

and the wet made progress difficult. However, they main- 
tained their position well. 

The success of the Indian Corps was destined to be of but 
short duration. During the night of the 20th the enemy re- 
gained all the trenches they had taken except some sap- 
heads near Givenchy. The Germans attacked at daybreak 
all along the line between Givenchy-l^s-La Bassee and La 
Quinque Rue. The Sirhind Brigade were driven back on 
Festubert, and Givenchy was lost, but retaken in the after- 
noon. 

On the front of the Meerut Division only the Garhwal 
Brigade on the left held its ground, and in the evening the 
situation was serious, the Germans occupying nearly all our 
line between Givenchy and Richebourg, whilst the corps 
reserves were all engaged. In the evening the three brigades 
of the Indian Cavalry Corps were thrown into the fight. 

At night Sir James Willcocks reported his troops as much 
exhausted, and urged their immediate relief; the First Corps 
was therefore ordered to send two brigades (First and Third) 
up to the line occupied by the Indian Corps. 

At 2.35 P.M. these two brigades advanced and partially 
restored the situation on the front Givenchy-Festubert, 
driving the enemy out of Givenchy. The Second Brigade 
(Second Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, First Battalion 
North Lanes, First Battalion Northants Regiment, Second 
Battalion Kings Royal Rifles) had now also been ordered 
up, and advanced in support of the Lahore Division. 

On the evening of the 21st the First Corps were ordered 
to take over the Indian Corps' line. In the early hours of the 
22d the First Brigade (First Battalion Coldstream Guards, 
First Battalion Scots Guards, First Battalion Black Watch, 



336 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

First Battalion Cameron Highlanders) made Givenchy se- 
cure. The Third Brigade (Second Battalion Royal Munster 
Fusiliers, First Battalion South Wales Borderers, First 
Battalion Gloucester Regiment, Second Battalion Welsh 
Regiment) was unable to reestablish the original line on the 
left of the First Brigade, but occupied a line thrown slightly 
back. 

The Second Brigade endeavoured to gain the old line at 
La Quinque Rue, but was unable to do so, and secured a 
position with its right in touch with the Meerut Brigade 
and in front of Festubert. 

At 1 P.M. on the 22d Sir Douglas Haig (commanding the 
First Corps) assumed command in this area. 

On the 23d the Twenty-seventh Division, which had been 
despatched from England, completed its detrainment and 
concentrated in the area about Arques (near Saint-Omer). 

On the 17th I received a letter from Kitchener from which 
I gleaned that the Cabinet were much perturbed by rumours 
of a contemplated invasion by the enemy, which apparently 
emanated from the Admiralty. The authorities at home were 
far from happy about the whole situation on the Western 
Front, and it was greatly feared that our line might still be 
broken through by a determined German offensive. 

I received orders to go home and consult with the Cabinet, 
and arrived at Folkestone about 11 a.m. on Sunday the 
20th. Lord Kitchener met me there with his motor and we 
drove together to Walmer Castle, where the Prime Minister 
(Mr. Asquith) was then staying. I had not seen Kitchener 
since our memorable meeting at Paris, early in September, 
but he met me in the most friendly manner, and said many 
kind things about our work in France, of which he clearly 



A COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY 337 

appreciated the difficulties. We discussed the situation fully 
en route, and I remember his putting many questions to me 
about all the principal members of the Headquarters Staff. 
Whilst assuring him of my entire satisfaction with each and 
all of them, I reminded him that, if any fault was to be found, 
I and no one else was responsible. 

In this and many subsequent conversations of a similar 
kind, I always maintained that a commander-in-chief can 
only be held in contempt who allows any member of his staff, 
or, indeed, any officer under his orders, to bear blame which 
must always most properly belong to him and to him alone. 
A chief in supreme command has always the absolute power 
of replacing any officer who fails in his duty. To him comes 
the principal credit and reward when things go well, and 
to him and him alone must the blame be apportioned when 
they do not. Until any officer under him is found by him 
to be unfit for his position, it is contrary to all efficient dis- 
cipline to allow such officer to be censured or removed by 
any outside authority. 

This principle is one of the most sacred traditions of the 
British Army. It is the foundation upon which there has been 
slowly and carefully built up that mutual confidence which 
exists between officers and men, which is the real secret of 
their wonderful fighting power. I recalled to Kitchener's mem- 
ory our service together in South Africa, and reminded him 
how truly and faithfully he had always kept up this tradi- 
tion in his own exercise of command. 

After four months of the most ruthless war the world has 
ever seen, it was a curious sensation to find myself once again 
on English soil and in the midst of peaceful surroxindings. 
It was one of those mild, balmy days which we very seldom 



338 OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14-19, 1914 

get in the month of December, and the usual English Sunday 
atmosphere of rest and repose was over every object, animate 
and inanimate. 

I could not help feeling deeply the extraordinary contrast 
which the scene presented to that which I had left behind 
me a few hours before. Except that one noticed a few men 
in khaki, there was nothing to indicate the terrific war which 
was raging all the time just across the Channel. 

The people of this coimtry have never truly realized the 
wonderfvd immunity from the horrors of war which they 
alone of all the belligerent countries have enjoyed. I wonder 
if it has really struck any large number of them that, after 
more than four years of desperate strife, we are the only 
people in Europe who can proudly claim that no enemy 
has ever occupied one square inch of all our vast Empire 
throughout the world, except for a short time in East Africa. 
The soil of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
France, Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania has been re- 
peatedly violated. It is truly a great record when we come 
to think that the sun never sets on the British flag. 

On arriving at Wakner Castle I was very kindly and 
cordially welcomed by the Prime Minister. Entering the 
historic old stronghold, where the great Iron Duke breathed 
his last, I remember being at first seized with a pang of 
regret; for I thought his spirit would have rested in greater 
peace, if, under that famous roof, I could have told the first 
Minister of the King that we had once again planted the 
British flag in the face of the enemy on the field of Waterloo. 
It was a dream I had indulged in from the first, but, alas! 
like many others, it was destined never to be realized. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 
I HAD a long discussion with the Prime Minister at Walmer. 
Mr. Asquith possesses the rare quality of being able to dis- 
cuss the most difficult and threatening situation with the 
utmost calmness and deliberation. He is a very attentive 
listener, and as he quickly appreciates and understands all 
that is told him, it did not take him long to become fully 
acquainted with the entire situation. 

As I have said before, all the Cabinet were at this moment 
very anxious as to the general outlook, but neither by word 
nor gesture did the Prime Minister display the least want of 
hope and confidence. 

During my sojourn in France I had received several most 
kind and encouraging letters from Mr. Asquith, in which 
he expressed his warm appreciation of all that we had done, 
and said how truly he realized the very trying circumstances 
which surrounded us. He personally reiterated these kindly 
sentiments; but it was evident that the Government had 
just begun to entertain doubts and fears which had induced 
them to call me into coimcil. It was the faith inspired by this 
constant kindly sympathy, and his power as Prime Minister, 
which helped me to believe that the shortage in guns and 
ammunition which threatened ultimate destruction would 
be overcome. The glorious troops under my command had 
gone valiantly to their death when a few more guns and a 
few more shells would have many times saved their sacrifice. 
And still no sufficient supplies came. 



340 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

The question of munitions and the fear of invasion formed 
the basis of our long conversation at Walmer. After lunch, I 
left with Kitchener and travelled by motor to London. With 
deep sorrow I recall the fact that this was the last of all the 
many days of happy personal intercourse which I spent with 
my old South African chief. As a soldier and a commander 
in the field I had always loved and venerated him; in his 
capacity as a politician and Minister my sentiments and 
feelings towards him were never the same. I am willing 
to admit that our differences — which were great and far- 
reaching — may have been to some extent my own fault; 
but, be that as it may, our subsequent relations, down to 
the time of his tragic death, were always clouded by a cer- 
tain mistrust of one another. 

It rejoices my heart, and alleviates the pain and regret 
which I feel, to look back upon this one day spent almost 
entirely tete-a-tete with him. On our way to London we had 
to pass by his country place at Broome, and he insisted on 
stopping for an hour to show me round it. To describe what 
I saw would only be a repetition of what is already very well 
known. As he stood in the midst of its beautiful scenery and 
surroundings, the true spirit of the great soldier shone out as 
distinctly and clearly as it ever did in the many and varied 
experiences we went through together in the South African 
War. 

The eloquent and touching tribute paid to this great sol- 
dier's memory by Lord Derby in the House of Lords in June, 
1916,^ brought out with telling force and happy expres- 
sion Kitchener's deep affection for his "beloved Broome." 
Indeed, beneath that seemingly hard and stern exterior 
there existed a naighty well of sensitive feeling and even of 

' See note on page 354. 



DISCUSSIONS WITH WAE CABINET 341 

romance, whicli it appeared to be the one endeavour of his 
life to conceal from the observation even of his most intimate 
friends. 

All the next day, and far into the following, my whole 
time was employed in discussing the situation with the 
War Cabinet. 

The principal ground for all their fears proved subse- 
quently, in the course of the year 1916, to be only too well 
founded as regards the Eastern Front. But the reports of 
large movements of German troops to the West, which really 
induced Mr. Asquith to send for me, were not true. Constant 
reports, however, continued to reach the Government from 
secret and reliable sources, that the Russians were even then 
running very short of ammunition, and that their condition, 
as regards the supply of war material generally, would cer- 
tainly oblige them to evacuate the enemy territory they had 
already won, and even necessitate a retirement behind the 
Vistula, if not the Bug, with the loss of Warsaw and other 
important fortresses. The home authorities were undoubt- 
edly influenced in forming this opinion by reports which, 
however, did not emanate from any part of the Western 
theatre of war, and I believe their judgment was generally 
hampered and warped by paying too much regard to un- 
authorized statements. The divergence of views which existed 
on various dates during the month of December is curiously 
illustrated by the following quotations from letters and 
telegrams. 

On the 2d, Kitchener wired to me: — 

"It is reported new corps are arriving in Russia and that 
some of the old corps lately between La Bassee and the sea 



342 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

have disappeared from that front. Can you ascertain what 
truth there is in this? It is thought possible the Germans 
may be replacing active corps by immature formations 
along northern portion of Allied lines so as to use their best 
troops in the Eastern theatre, where they are apparently 
developing great strength." 

On the 18th he writes: — 

"The Russian news is very serious. I fear we cannot rely 
on them for much more for some time." 

On the 26th I received the following telegram from him: — 

"I think before you see Joffre it may be useful for you to 
know I am inclined to think Russians have been bluffing to 
a certain extent. I cannot get answers to my questions from 
Petrograd which would clear up the situation. For instance, 
amount of reserve ammunition in hand, which, according 
to Military Attache here, who is kept entirely in the dark by 
his Government, ought to be very considerable. 

"A reason for a certain amount of bluff on their part 
might be that they are now negotiating to obtain from us 
a loan of forty millions. Anyway, their action in the field 
does not look as if they were as badly off as they make out." 

All kinds of reports continued to arrive, insisting that 
masses of German troops were passing through Luxemburg 
and Belgium en route to the Western Front; but these turned 
out subsequently either to be greatly exaggerated or to have 
no foundation whatever in fact. 

The upshot of it all was that I received directions from 



INACCURATE REPORTS 343 

the Prime Minister to seek out Joffre as soon after my return 
as possible, put these views and fears of the War Cabinet 
before him, and report to them what he was prepared to do 
in order to meet the supposed threat. 

Before leaving I was received in audience by His Majesty 
the King. 

On my journey back to the front, I pondered long and 
anxiously over all that had passed in London. I had plainly 
told the War Cabinet that I did not share these alarmist 
views, which I considered were not founded on any definite 
or reliable information, and I had warned them that these 
views disagreed altogether with our appreciation of the situ- 
ation at the front. I by no means liked my mission to Joffre; 
but the orders received were imperative. 

On the morning of the 24th, I had a long conference with 
Murray and Macdonogh, and we once more thoroughly 
examined the situation in all its bearings. 

The daily ofiicial reports tended to show that the Rus- 
sians were still holding their own well, and that there was 
no immediate fear of a retirement behind the Vistula. Even 
if pessimistic views held in London were warranted by the 
actual facts, it did not appear that there was any reasonable 
probability of the Germans ever being able to mass a suffi- 
cient force in the Western theatre to enable them to break 
through our line. 

In accordance with the Prime Minister's decision, I ar- 
ranged a meeting with Jofifre at Chantilly for the 27th. 

I found things were going on better in the north on the 
Yser. The Belgians had been able to resume active hostili- 
ties, and the Fifth Belgian Division had made good the 
ground on the right bank of the river about Dixmude. 



344 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

I began the last of the six Christmas days I have during 
my life passed in the field by visiting Foch. I told him of my 
mission to Joffre, and discussed with him the situation in the 
East. He said he felt sure that the Russians were exagger- 
ating their deficiencies in ammunition, rifles, etc., in their 
representations both to the British and French Governments. 
He thought that they were afraid that the troops in the West 
were not displaying sufficient energy, and their idea was to 
stimulate this. Moreover, he said he was confirmed in this 
view by what the Russians were then doing in Poland and 
Galicia, which was also confirmed from German sources. 
He could not believe that, if they were, as they said, so short 
of ammunition, they could continue these aggressive tactics. 

He went on to speak of the work of the French at Arras, 
and said they had been much hampered by weather condi- 
tions, but that they were making some slight progress every- 
where. He thought we might shortly find some opportunity 
for action in the neighbourhood of La Bassee. 

On my return to Headquarters I met Haig and Smith- 
Dorrien, who had come to lunch, and I discussed with them 
my wish to form "armies" immediately. I wished Haig to 
command the First, Fourth, and Indian Corps as the First 
Army, and Smith-Dorrien the Second, Third, and Fifth 
Corps as the Second Army. The cavalry was to remain at 
my immediate disposal. Orders to this effect came out on 
Christmas night. 

Although I have never heard it actually confirmed, I 
believe a suggestion was made by the Pope to all the bel- 
ligerent powers that an armistice should be arranged for 
Christmas Day. It was further reported that the Central 
Powers had signified their assent, but that the Allied Govern- 



GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO FRATEENIZE 345 

ments refused to entertain the proposal. The suggestion was 
certainly never referred either to Joffre or to me. 

Whether this statement was true or not, it is certain that, 
soon after daylight on Christmas morning, the Germans took 
a very bold initiative at several points along our front, in 
trying to establish some form of fraternization. It began by 
individual unarmed men running from the German trenches 
across to ours, holding Christmas trees above their heads. 
These overtures were in some places favourably received 
and fraternization of a limited kind took place during the 
day. It appeared that a little feasting went on, and junior 
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men on either side 
conversed together in "No Man's Land." 

When this was reported to me I issued immediate orders 
to prevent any recurrence of such conduct, and called the 
local commanders to strict account, which resulted in a good 
deal of trouble. 

I have since often thought deeply over the principle in- 
volved in the manifestation of such sentiments between hos- 
tile armies in the field. I am not sure that, had the question 
of the agreement upon an armistice for the day been sub- 
mitted to me, I should have dissented from it. I have always 
attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of that 
chivalry in war which has almost invariably characterized 
every campaign of modern times in which this country has 
been engaged. The Germans glaringly and wantonly set all 
such sentiments at defiance by their ruthless conduct of the 
present war; even from its very commencement. 

Judging from my own experience, we never had a more 
chivalrous or generous foe than the Boers of South Africa, 
and I can recall numerous proofs of it. 



346 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

For instance, I was in charge of the operations against 
General Beyers in the Western Transvaal during the latter 
part of December, 1900. On the afternoon of Christmas 
Eve a flag of truce — that symbol of civilization and chiv- 
alry in war which has been practically unknown during 
this war with Germany — appeared at otu- outposts, and 
a young Dutch officer was brought to my Headquarters 
carrying a request from Beyers regarding the burial of his 
dead. 

Some important movements were then in progress, and I 
told him we must of necessity detain him there till the next 
day, but I hoped we should be able to make him as comfort- 
able as possible. When he started back to his General on 
Christmas morning, I gave him a small box of cigars and a 
bottle of whiskey, asking him to present them to Beyers as 
a Christmas offering from me. 

1 had forgotten the incident when, a few days later, two 
cavalry soldiers who had been taken prisoners by the enemy 
marched back into camp with horses, arms, and equipment 
complete. They brought me a note from Beyers, thanking 
me for my gift on Christmas Day and telling me that, 
although he had no whiskey or cigars to oflFer in return, he 
hoped I would regard his liberation of these men in the light 
of a Christmas gift. 

When I told this story at the end of the war to my 
old friend and redoubtable opponent. General Christian 
Smuts, he expressed himself as very displeased with Beyers's 
improper use of what was not his own but his country's 
property. I pointed out to Smuts that it was the spirit which 
Beyers displayed which mattered — that spirit which was 
never more conspicuously displayed throughout the war than 



THE INDIAN CORPS 347 

in the conduct of this same great soldier and statesman, 
General Smuts himself. 

In the swift and kaleidoscopic changes which occur in 
world politics, the friend of to-day may be the enemy of 
to-morrow. Soldiers should have no politics, but should cul- 
tivate a freemasonry of their own and, emulating the knights 
of old, should honour a brave enemy only second to a com- 
rade, and like them rejoice to split a friendly lance to-day 
and ride boot to boot in the charge to-morrow. 

It is satisfactory to know that some such kindly and 
chivalrous spirit has at least made itself felt at times between 
the opposing flying services in the present war, for I have 
heard authentic stories which go to show that this has been 
the case. 

On the 26th I met Willcocks and discussed the recent 
fighting of the Indian corps with him. I considered that a 
certain amount of blame attached to the commanders of 
the units engaged, for embarking in an attack on trenches 
so far away from their own line before ensuring adequate 
support, especially in view of the muddy condition of the 
ground, and knowing, as they did, the exhausted state of the 
Indian troops and the eflfect of cold upon them. At first the 
General tried to combat this view; but he soon acknowledged 
the justice of my criticism. 

I decided, regretfully, to make a change in the command 
of the Lahore Division. A commander very often, after hav- 
ing directed operations of a critical nature, needs rest and 
change of occupation to restore him to his full capacity for 
command. 

I met Joffre at Chantilly on the morning of the 27th, as 
arranged. 



348 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

I explained the mission I had from the British Govern- 
ment, and told him of their fears of impending severe Rus- 
sian defeats and of the possibility which they thought might 
be open to the enemy of withdrawing large numbers of troops 
and massing a force on the Western Front strong enough to 
break our line and attain, after all, their original objectives, 
namely, Paris and the Channel ports. I told Joffre that the 
English Government were anxious to hear his views and 
ideas on the points raised. 

The French Commander-in-Chief was much astonished 
to hear that such a view of the situation could be really 
and seriously entertained. But he added that, of coin-se, 
the French General Staff had plans ready to meet any even- 
tuality. He expressed the opinion that the time was not now 
opportune for the discussion of such contingent possibilities 
as these. 

We then talked over the reported Russian deficiencies in 
munitions of war, and he entered into some most interesting 
details as to the state of the French manufacture of ammu- 
nition and guns. He told me that they were producing almost 
entirely high-explosive shells and hardly any shrapnel, and 
that an enormous improvement was being made in the pat- 
tern of fuse, from which great results were expected. The 
latest manufactured ammunition for the "75" gun had 
shown wonderful results, particularly in the matter of de- 
stroying wire entanglements. 

Joffre went on to say that the Russians were in close 
touch with the French factories, and were benefiting greatly 
by the experiments which had been carried out. Moreover, 
the French were able to supply the Russians with a consid- 
erable quantity of munitions of war. It took a long time to 



JOFFRE'S PLANS 349 

transmit; but he entertained great hopes that Roumania and 
Bulgaria would soon be in such sympathy with the Allies 
as to permit the transport of material to Russia via Saloniki. 
The reports he had received indicated that the Russians had 
sufficient ammunition at hand, if they remained on the 
defensive, for six weeks. 

He expressed himself as fairly satisfied with the Russian 
position and outlook, and thought the Germans were being 
so heavily punished that whole corps would have to be re- 
organized. 

These views were subsequently embodied in a memoran- 
dum which I sent to Lord Kitchener for the information of 
the War Cabinet. 

I then arrived at an understanding with Joffre as to 
future plans. I again urged strongly upon him my conviction 
that an advance on the extreme north, in cooperation with 
our Navy, was the proper role for British troops to fulfil, 
and went over all the old arguments. In effect he rejected 
my plans again, although holding out hopes that, at a later 
stage, the French Army might cooperate in such an advance. 

In the absence of support from my own Government, 
it was hopeless to say anything more. Joffre 's plan was as 
follows. He meant to break through the enemy's line from 
the south at Rheims and from the west at Arras. He desired 
to mass as many French corps as possible behind these two 
points; therefore, at all other points of the Hne the roles 
must be twofold: (1) to economize troops as much as possible 
in the trenches, so as to spare more men for action at decisive 
points, and (2) to organize good local reserves to keep the 
enemy in the front employed and prevent his sending troops 
to threatened points in the line. 



350 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

As the history of the operations during 1915 will show, 
this general strategic idea was the foundation of all our efforts 
throughout that year. It brought about for the British Army 
the Battles of Neuve Chapelle, Ypres (second), Festubert, 
and Loos; and for the French other important actions, 
which, although local successes, did not result in achieving 
any appreciable advance towards the objectives which the 
plans sought to attain. 

Those objects were not clearly defined till September, 
when we began our last combined attack to attain them and 
practically failed. 

The attitude of our War Office in failing to speed up the 
manufacture of munitions of war and the practical collapse 
of the Russian armies were to some extent responsible for 
the lack of success of our endeavours. But the detailment of 
troops and war material to the Dardanelles was undoubtedly 
the chief cause. 

There was no other course for me to take, under the 
circumstances, than to fall in with Joffre's view; and in 
accordance with his plan I agreed to take over, in conjunc- 
tion with the Belgians, the whole line from La Bassee to the 
sea, but only by degrees as troops became available. 

Although Joffre at the time agreed in my wish to work the 
northern section entirely with the Belgian Army, it would 
appear that the French Government still insisted on keeping 
some hold on that part of the line with French troops. 

On returning to my Headquarters I sent for Bridges, who 
was now my representative with His Majesty the King of 
the Belgians. On the morning of the 28th, we had a long 
conference on the subject of cooperation with the Belgian 
Army. 



COOPERATION WITH THE BELGIANS 351 

I had evolved a scheme in my own mind of amalgamating 
the Belgian and British Armies. I wanted to see Belgian 
brigades of infantry embodied in our own army corps at 
convenient sections in the line, and to apply the same 
process to the cavalry and artillery. This apparent surrender 
of independence was no doubt a heavy trial to impose upon 
the Belgian General Staff; but I believed it to be the surest 
and best method to adopt if we wished to get the highest 
efforts out of the two armies. 

When all is said, it must be acknowledged that the stand- 
ard of training and war efficiency was higher in our troops 
than in the Belgian. This applied particularly to the leaders 
and the staff; and, in spite of the drastic experiences of the 
Belgian Army during August and September, our own higher 
ranks certainly possessed a wider and more extensive experi- 
ence in the field. 

It can indeed hardly be doubted that a division composed 
of two British infantry brigades and one Belgian would 
probably have done more, either in attack or defence, than 
such a unit composed entirely of Belgian troops. 

Whatever views may be held on this point, it must be 
allowed that the scheme I proposed would have ensured a 
much greater unity of effort. 

I talked it all over at great length with Bridges, and on 
leaving me he went back to put the proposal before the King 
of the Belgians. I entertained little hope of getting a favour- 
able hearing; for, although I knew the King's lofty spirit 
and generous impulses would prompt him to make any per- 
sonal sacrifice to attain greater power and efficiency for our 
united forces, yet I was also well aware of his difficulties with 
his own Ministers. 



352 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

Two days later Bridges brought me His Majesty's answer. 
He told me it was possible the King himself might fall in with 
my suggestion. Ten thousand rifles would have to be retained 
for the "inundated" line, leaving forty thousand rifles avail- 
able for the proposed amalgamation. This, I thought, would 
at once render the united armies strong enough in the north 
to justify me in allowing Joffre to remove the Ninth and 
Twentieth French Corps to the points where he so much 
needed strength for his own line. 

This amalgamation of the British and Belgian Armies 
would certainly have effected a great economy of force and 
fighting power, and have perhaps led to important results; 
but the scheme never came to fruition, both because the King 
of the Belgians was unable to gain the consent of his Govern- 
ment and because the French would not agree to the plan. 
Finally, I could get no support or help from our own people 
at home. 

On the 27th, the French had some success at Carency 
(north of Arras), capturing several German trenches and 
advancing the line some five hundred yards. 

In spite of the "growls " in which I have so freely indulged, 
the close of 1914 yet found me in a hopeful and sanguine 
frame of mind. 

When the state of affairs which might have been came to 
be compared with the situation as it was, there was really 
very little reason for pessimism. We had scored one great 
offensive and another great defensive victory, and we had 
suffered no severe defeat. 

The Germans were boimd down behind their entrench- 
ments from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, and, under 



GROUNDS FOR CONFIDENCE 353 

the highest trial, the Allies had proved their ability to hold 
their actual lines inviolate. 

Our Fleet had gained command of the sea, from which 
they had finally and completely driven the German flag. 
The spirit of the Allied nations was high and confident. On 
the other hand, had the enemy shown more of the skill and 
intrepidity of those great leaders of the past — Frederick, 
Napoleon, and von Moltke (whose teachings German writers 
of to-day claim that their commanders have so closely assim- 
ilated) — and the Allies a little less watchfulness and keen- 
ness, we might have seen Paris and the Channel seaboard in 
the enemy's hands, the British Army, irretrievably separated 
from its allies, driven to the coast, and the French holding 
the southern provinces of the Republic with their capital at 
Bordeaux. 

Finally, Russia, our great hope and mainstay for the 
future, was inspiring the utmost hope and encouragement 
amongst the Allies by the splendid deeds with which she her- 
alded the close of the year. 

The last entry in my diary — December 31, 1914 — is as 
follows: — 

"Our night conference showed more and increasingly im- 
portant Russian successes." 

It was good to end the year with courage born of hope and 
confidence in the future. Time works wonders in all direc- 
tions. Just as we could not foresee the utter collapse and failure 
of our great Eastern ally, so we could not discern the hidden 
forging of that sword of justice and retribution whose des- 
tined wielders were even then stirring from their fifty years 



354 THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 

of slumber and dreams of everlasting peace, to rise like some 
giant from the shores of the Western Atlantic and, with 
overwhelming force, to stride eastward and help lay low the 
German dragon once and for all time in the dust. 

NOTE TO PAGE 340 

A short speech which I made on this occasion expressed my great appreciation 
of Lord Kitchener's capacity as a leader in the field. I told the House that after 
I received intimation of my appointment to command in France my first act 
was to seek out my old South African chief and suggest to him that we should 
repair together to the Prime Minister and ask tliat he might be appointed to 
command, with me as his Chief of Staff. He could not be persuaded to do this. 
He was then on the point of leaving to return to Egypt and had no idea that he 
was to be Secretarj' of State for War. 

I do not think Lord Kitchener was always credited by the country with the 
talent for command in the field which I know he really possessed, whilst on the 
other hand a r61e for which he was not weU fitted was thrust upon him. As 
Commander-in-Chief in France it would have helped him very much to have 
had a Secretary of State other tlian himself to deal with. 



CHAPTER XVin 

AJVIMUNITION 

From the beginning of the Battle of the Aisne up to the close 
of the Battle of Loos, at the end of 1915, the scanty supply 
of munitions of war paralyzed all our power of initiative 
and, at critical times, menaced our defence with irretrieva- 
ble disaster. Great anxiety on thLs subject overshadowed all 
my direction of military operations, and deep concern at the 
failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our 
difficulties from this cause dominated all my work. In this 
chapter it is my object to make known some of the efforts 
I made to awaken both the Government and the public 
from that apathy which meant certain defeat. I exhausted 
every effort, by urgent official demands to the War Office, 
and personal appeals to Lord Kitchener and such Cabinet 
Ministers as I came in contact with. WTien these efforts got 
no response, I gave interviews to the press and authorized 
public men who visited me to urge this vital necessity in 
their addresses. Nothing less than my deliberate conclusion, 
after all these measures had failed and nine months of war 
had elapsed, that the Empire itself was in jeopardy, forced 
me to act in May, 1915, as I did. I was conscious before tak- 
ing this step, which meant the overthrow of the Government, 
that it also meant the end of my career in France, with all 
the hopes and ambitions that only a soldier can understand. 
But the consciousness of the great results achieved in this 
upheaval has been my reward, and I trust that a recital of 
my difficulties may, if occasion arise in the future, protect 



356 AMMUNITION 

the British Army in the field frora the recurrence of any 
similar situation. 

During my term of office as Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, from March, 1912, to April, 1914, I had urged these 
vital necessities upon the Government, but my demands 
were steadily opposed by the Finance Department and the 
Treasury. All our experiences in the South African War, and 
the warnings which the Manchurian campaign plainly gave, 
passed altogether unheeded in the years preceding the pres- 
ent war. I was always a strong advocate for the supply of 
high-explosive shell to our horse and field artillery, but I got 
very little support, and even such as was given to me was 
lukewarm in the extreme. I believe the Ordnance Board was 
not in favour of it. 

As early as the middle of September, 1914, the British 
Army in France was subjected to heavy bombardment 
from German eight-inch howitzers, to which they were quite 
unable to reply. At the same time the daily expenditure of 
artillery ammunition became far in excess of the receipts 
from home, and we were unable to maintain the stocks on 
the lines of communication up to anything like the proper 
war establishment. For" example, the eighteen-pounders 
fired an average of fourteen rounds a day, whilst the receipts 
were barely seven. The sixty-pounder gims and the 4.5 inch 
howitzers fired over forty rounds a day, against a supply of 
eight or nine rounds at most. In private letters and telegrams 
I had repeatedly brought this to the notice of the Secretary 
of State, and a strong official memorandum on the subject 
was sent to the War Office on September 28. A further com- 
munication to the same effect was made on October 10; and 
on the 29th of the same month the War Office were officially 



SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION 357 

told that tlie state of the ammunition supply had necessitated 
the issue of an order restricting expenditure to twenty rounds 
per grni daily, and that a further restriction to ten rounds 
would be necessary if the supply did not improve. This 
was during the most desperate period of the first Battle 
of Ypres, when the average daily expenditure of eighteen- 
pounder ammunition had amounted to eighty-one rounds 
per gun. In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached 
the enormous total of three hundred roxmds daily. 

A proportion of at least twenty-five per cent of high- 
explosive shells for thirteen and eighteen pounders was 
included in the demands to which I have referred above. 

In a communication to the War Ofiice on December 31, 
the view was expressed that considerably more high explo- 
sive was necessary, and the following table was laid down 
as our mininnmi requirements to carry on the war with any 
prospect of success: — 

EEQUIRED OUTPUT OF AMMUNITION 

Bounds per gun 
a day 

IS-pounder 50 (25 H.E.) 

18-pouiider 50 (25 H.E.) 

4.5-mch howitzer 40 (35 H.E.) 

6-inch howitzer 25 (all H.E.) 

60-pounder 25 (15 H.E.) 

4.7-inch gim 25 (15 H.E.) 

6-inch gun 25 (all H.E.) 

9.2-inch howitzer 12 (all H.E.) 

It was explained that this output was necessary for a period 
of active operations, and should be continued even during a 
lull, till a reserve of three or four times the amount laid down 
in war establishments had been accumulated. To this re- 



358 AMMUNITION 

quest there was no reply until January 19. The War OflSce 
then declined to work up to more than twenty rounds a day, 
and refused a request for fifty per cent of high explosives. 

This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled 
me to consider means by which the several members of the 
Government, and the public also, might be advised of this 
deplorable apathy, which, if long continued, meant the 
destruction of our army. 

In this letter from the War Office, of January 19, which 
I have already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the 
receipts which we might rely upon up to and including the 
month of May. This estimate was far below our require- 
ments, whUst the actual receipts fell far short of it. The 
actual supply in May proved to be less than one half of the 
War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished 
for our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to 
make any reliable forecast of the condition of the ammuni- 
tion supply at any particular date. This state of uncertainty 
rendered the formidation of plans for cooperating with the 
French most difficult, if not impossible. 

During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate 
some small reserve of ammunition, but, during this period, 
all oiu" efforts in this direction were of no avail, because the 
number of rounds per eighteen-pounder gun throughout 
this period fell to less than five ! 

I had serious misgivings that the morale of the Army was 
becoming affected by this first long and weary winter of 
inactivity in the trenches, and to render the defence effective 
it was necessary to undertake an offensive operation. 

Early in March a small reserve of ammunition had been 
accumulated, and the Battle of Neuve ChapeUe was fought 



SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION 359 

and won. Had proper steps been taken to increase the supply 
when my first strong appeals were sent in during September, 
1914, the oflPensive operation commenced so successfully at 
Neuve Chapelle might have been much further developed, 
and, indeed, possibly have led to great and important re- 
sults. But the battle had to be broken off after three days' 
fighting because we were brought to a standstill through 
want of ammunition. 

Immediately afterwards I again addressed the strongest 
representations I could frame to the War Office. I begged 
that His Majesty's Government might be informed that, 
if their object was to drive the enemy off French and Belgian 
territory during 1915, no progress towards this objective 
could be obtained unless and until the supply of artillery 
ammxmition should enable the Army to engage in sustained 
operations. The only official reply which I received to this 
letter was an injimction to use the utmost economy, but a 
private letter, dated March 16, was addressed by Sir James 
Wolfe Murray to Sir William Robertson, who was then my 
Chief of Staff. This letter was said to have been dictated by 
the Secretary of State, and its contents hinted very strongly 
that an impression prevailed at the War Office that we were 
wasting ammunition. 

The operations at Neuve Chapelle used up all our available 
resources, and it became necessary to restore them by revert- 
ing for a time to a strictly defensive attitude. 

It was, moreover, very clear that the Germans had early 
realized that the war was to be one calling for colossal sup- 
plies of munitions; supplies, indeed, upon such a stupendous 
scale as the world had never before dreamed of, and they 
also realized the vital necessity for heavy artillery. They 



360 AMMUNITION 

began with an inferior field gun, and they never stopped to 
remedy this defect, but directed all their energies, from the 
first, to developing their heavy artillery. Whilst their total 
proportion of guns to bayonets was fully maintained, the 
proportion of field guns to bayonets was reduced, and all 
heavy guns enormously increased. Each month the develop- 
ment of heavy artillery became more accentuated until, 
towards the late spring of 1915, the greater number of pro- 
jectiles fired by the Germans, whenever operations of any 
importance were taking place, were of 5.9 and upwards. 
This was in defence as well as in attack, and by this means 
the enemy endeavoured to shatter the morale of the at- 
tackers, as well as to inflict very heavy casualties. 

The necessity for a great preponderance of heavy artillery 
was also recognized by the French long before our War Office 
could be persuaded to move in that direction. From early in 
the war they aimed at obtaining one heavy gun of six-inch 
calibre and upwards for every field gun they held, without 
reducing the proportion to bayonets of the latter which ob- 
tains in the French Army. To meet these requirements the 
French were taking guns from their old warships and coast 
defence ships, and straining every nerve to get guns of heavy 
calibre into the field. 

In May, 1915, the proportion of field to heavy guns above 
six-inch calibre in the French Army was 2.3 to 1. At this 
time the British Army had but seventy-one guns altogether 
above five-inch calibre against 1416 below it, and no ade- 
quate steps whatever had yet been taken to bring the pro- 
portion more nearly to the requirements of modern warfare. 
The supply of trench guns and mortars, with their ammuni- 
tion, hand-grenades, and other most necessary munitions of 



MODERN SCIENCE AND WAR 361 

war, was almost negligible, nor was there any active attempt 
to understand and grapple vitally with the new problems 
calling for the application of modern science to the character 
of warfare that had developed. 

I have referred before to the disinclination of the War 
Office, prior to the war, to take up seriously the question of 
high explosives; the natural consequence was that the true 
nature of high-explosive shells, and the correct particulars 
which govern their construction, were not properly under- 
stood, as they had too little experience of them. 

The deadly nature of modern rifle and machine-gun fire 
had brought about trench warfare, which enabled the troops 
opposite to one another to approach to ranges which were 
customary in the days of the Peninsula and Waterloo. The 
time-honoured grenades, which were so marked a feature in 
those days, were thus resuscitated. 

Although the War Office received detailed reports from 
the Front as to the employment by the enemy of these new 
and unfamiliar weapons, no proper attention was ever paid 
to these reports. It was their duty to bring these old-time 
weapons up to date, and to compete with the new mechanical 
inventions constantly being devised by the great organiza- 
tion of a thoroughly prepared enemy. But reports from the 
Front as to these new and unfamiliar weapons were received 
with a carelessness which bordered on incredulity. The criti- 
cal days in the early part of November, and during the First 
Battle of Ypres, compelled me to devise a plan to meet the 
exigencies of this grave emergency. As the fighting settled 
into trench warfare, the inadequacy of our weapons to enable 
us to reply to an enemy thoroughly equipped with every 
contrivance for this sort of warfare became painfully appar- 



362 AMMUNITION 

ent; while even our hand-grenades, by reason of their faulty- 
construction, frequently did not explode. I was therefore 
compelled to conduct experiments in the field, and improvise 
new weapons as well as possible. For such work the Army 
had no organization. In this I received invaluable assistance 
from my friend George Moore. Mr. Moore is an American 
who has had wide experience of large construction develop- 
ments in the United States. Although a young man, he was 
deeply versed in the method of scientific research as applied 
to mechanical invention. Add to this that he was both the 
closest personal friend I had in the world and passionately 
interested in the success of the Allies, and it will be seen how 
naturally I turned to him for help and advice in this terrible 
crisis. Under Mr. Moore's advice and direction, experiments 
were carried out with the maximum of speed, energy, and 
resource, covering the field of the proper construction and 
use of high explosives, hand-grenades, trench mortars, and 
bombs; and a number of factories and small plants were 
set up for the production, for use in the field, of properly 
constructed hand-grenades, bombs, and trench mortars. 

As a result of this work, in the daily trench struggle that 
had then developed, we were rapidly enabled to acquire the 
accurate knowledge of the proper use of high explosives, 
and the appliances necessary to meet the enemy on his own 
ground under these novel conditions of warfare. Mr. Moore 
from time to time brought men in whom he had trust and 
confidence to help in the work. Among them I will only spe- 
cifically refer to Colonel Lewis, an American, whose machine 
guin, bearing his name, proved of such enormous help in this 
war, and to Lieutenant Lawrence Breese. This gallant young 
oflBcer of the Blues, to which magnificent regiment he be- 



SERIOUS NEED OF MUNITIONS 363 

longed, did wonderful work, and conducted experiments the 
result of which was of the highest value; and, after several 
months of tireless energy, gave his life in carrying out one 
of these experiments. This hastily improAdsed organization 
worked night and day in these trying times, with the results 
which enabled us, with success, to meet the enemy in trench 
warfare. 

During this time I received visits at my Headquarters 
from prominent members of both Houses of Parliament, to 
whom I told, in course of conversation, the great anxiety I 
felt on the subject of the shortage of heavy guns and ammu- 
nition. 

On March 22 I gave an interview to the Press, which ap- 
peared generally in the English papers, from which I quote: 
"It is a rough war, but the problem it sets is a compara- 
tively simple one — munitions, more munitions, always 
more munitions; this is the essential question, the governing 
condition of all progress, of every leap forward." On March 
27 I gave an interview to the "Times," in which I said as 
follows: "The protraction of the war depends entirely upon 
the supply of men and munitions. Should these be unsatis- 
factory, the war will be accordingly prolonged. I dwell em- 
phatically on the need for munitions." 
. To the public men who visited me, I appealed that they 
should make known this grave necessity to the public in their 
speeches. I quote a line from a speech of the Earl of Durham, 
who, at my request, said : "What we want and must have is 
more and more mimitions." 

At a conference at Chantilly with Lord Kitchener, I re- 
minded him of my constant representations on the subject 
of munitions, both officially and privately, and warned him 



364 AMMUNITION 

that the danger would be fatal if instant action were not 
taken to supply our needs. 

It must be remembered that all this time, when the British 
forces in France were in absolute jeopardy owing to these 
deficiencies, trainloads of all kinds of ammunition were pass- 
ing along our rear en route to Marseilles and the Dardanelles. 

This was the situation when on April 22 the Germans 
made their first attack with poison gas in the Second Bat- 
tle of Ypres and, in a gigantic effort, again attempted to 
break through; and the defence called for the most desperate 
kind of fighting, only surpassed in intensity by the struggle 
in the First Battle of Ypres. 

Just about this time, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, 
made his famous Newcastle speech, in which he stated that 
the Army had all the ammunition it required. When I read 
this speech, after all my public and private appeals, I lost any 
hope that I had entertained of receiving help from the Govern- 
ment as then constituted. 

On May 9, 1915, when we commenced the Battle of Festu- 
bert, an operation undertaken to relieve the intense pres- 
sure on the troops at Ypres, my mind was filled with keen 
anxiety. After all our demands, less than eight per cent of 
our shells were high explosive, and we had only sufficient 
supply for about forty minutes of artillery preparation for 
this attack. 

On the tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in 
close observation of the operations. Nothing since the 
Battle of the Aisne had ever impressed me so deeply with 
the terrible shortage of artillery and ammunition as did the 
events of that day. As I watched the Aubers Ridge, I clearly 
saw the great inequality of the artUlery duels, and, as attack 



SERIOUS NEED OF MUNITIONS 365 

after attack failed, I could see that the absence of sufficient 
artillery support was doubling and trebling our losses in men. 
I therefore determined on taking the most drastic measm-es 
to destroy the apathy of a Government which had brought 
the Empire to the brink of disaster. George Moore, to whose 
invaluable assistance I have referred, was standing by my 
side on the tower, and to him I poured out my doubts and 
fears and announced my determination. He warned me that 
the politicians would never forgive the action I proposed, and 
that it meant my certain recall from the command in France. 
But my decision was made, and I immediately started for my 
Headquarters, fully determined on my future course of ac- 
tion. If any additional proof were required of the hopeless- 
ness of any relief coming from the War Office, I found it 
waiting for me when I reached Headquarters that afternoon, 
in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State for 
War, directing that twenty per cent of our scanty reserve 
supply of ammunition was to be shipped to the Dardanelles. 
I immediately gave instructions that evidence should be 
furnished to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of 
the "Times," who happened to be then at Headquarters, that 
the vital need of high-explosive shells had been a fatal bar to 
our army success on that day. I directed that copies of all the 
correspondence which had taken place between myself and 
the Government on the question of the supply of ammuni- 
tion be made at once, and I sent my secretary, Brinsley Fitz- 
Gerald, with Captain Frederick Guest, one of my A.D.C.'s, 
to England with instructions that these proofs should be laid 
before Mr. Lloyd George, who had already shown me, by his 
special interest in this subject, that he grasped the deadly 
nature of our necessities. I instructed also that they should 



366 AMMUNITION 

be laid before Mr. Arthur J. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law, 
whose sympathetic imderstanding of my difficulties, when 
they visited me in France, had led me to expect that they 
would take the action that this grave exigency demanded. 
Together with the correspondence, I sent the following 
memorandum: — 

(Secret.) 

INFORRIATION REGARDING AMMUNITION 

1. Large quantities of high-explosive shells for field guns 
have become essential owing to the form of warfare in which 
the Army is engaged. The enemy is entrenched from the 
sea to the Swiss frontier. There is no flank in his position 
that can be turned. It is necessary, therefore, for all oflfen- 
sive operations to start by breaking the enemy's line, which 
pre-supposes the attack of formidable field entrenchments. 
Shrapnel, being the man-killing projectile which is used 
against troops in the open, is primarily used in defence. In 
offensive operations it is used for searching communication 
trenches, preventing the enemy's reenforcements intervening 
in the fight, repelling counter-attacks, and, as an alternative 
for high-explosive shell, for cutting wire entanglements. It is, 
however, ineffective against the occupants of the trenches, 
breastworks, or buildings. It is, therefore, necessary to have 
high-explosive shell to destroy parapets, obstacles, buildings, 
and many forms of fortified localities that the enemy con- 
structs, more particularly his machine-gun emplacements. 
Without an adequate supply the attack is impotent against 
the defenders of field fortifications, as the first step cannot 
be taken. Guns require fifty per cent of high-explosive shell. 
Howitzers use high-explosive shell almost exclusively. 



ESTIMATED MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS 367 

2. We have found by experience that the field guns actu- 
ally engaged in offensive operations, such as Neuve Chapelle, 
fire about one hundred and twenty rounds per gun per 
day. 

Heavy guns and howitzers, according to their calibre, fire 
less in proportion. The guns of the whole Army are of course 
never equally heavily engaged at the same time, but the 
number of guns available and the amount of ammunition 
are the limiting factors when a plan of attack is being con- 
sidered. There is, therefore, scarcely any limit to the supply 
of ammunition that could be usefully employed. The more 
ammunition, the bigger the scale on which the attack can be 
delivered, and the more persistently it can be pressed. 

Demands must, however, be reasonable, and our position 
would be very greatly improved if our supply reached the 

Wanted Three Months hence, say, August 1 
Table A 



Nature 


Guns now in 
country 


Rounds per gun per day 


Total rounds required daily' 


Shrapnel 


H.E. 


Shrapnel 


H.E. 


18-pdr 


700 
125 
200 
80 
28 
50 
130 
40 
12 


12 
12 
12 
8 
8 

'i 


12 
12 
12 
8 
8 
15 
16 
12 
12 


8,500 

1,500 

2,500 

650 

250 

500 


8,500 


13-pdr 


1,500 


15-pdr. BLC 

4.7-Ld. gun 

60-pdr 


2,500 
650 
250 


6-in. howitzer. . . . 
4.5-m. howitzer... 

6-in. howitzer 

9.2-in. howitzer... 


750 

2,000 

500 

150 










13,900 


16,800 


Giand total . . . 








30,700 daily 


Grand total . . . 








921,000 monthly 



1 Bound numbers are given. Expansion must be provided for at a similar rate. We need more guns and i 
correspondingly larger amount of ammunition. 



368 AMMUNITION 

figures in Table "A" within three months. Up to the pre- 
sent it has been below these figures. 

3. Table "B" shows the percentage of high explosive of 
certain natures received since application for increased 
quantities was made between September and December 
last. 

Percentage of High Explosive received since First 
Application for it in Increased Quantities 

Table B 



Nature of gun 



13-pdr 

18-pdr 

4.5-in. howitzer 

60-pdr 

7-in. howitzer . 



Dec. 

(Per cent) 



Nil 
3.8 

44.4 



Jan. 
(Per cent) 



Nil 



Feb. 
(Per cent) 



NU 
8.3 



60. 
51. 



March 
(Per cent) 



Nil 
8.2 

75. 

56. 

77. 



April 
(Per cent) 



Nil 
6.1 

59. 

S3. 



May 
(Per cent) 



Nil 



SO. 
50. 



Colonel FitzGerald and Captain Guest reported that on 
May 12 and 14 they had carried out my instructions and laid 
the facts before Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, and Mr. 
Bonar Law. On May 15, Colonel Repington's article ap- 
peared in the "Times." The world knows what then hap- 
pened. The Coalition Government was formed, with Mr. 
Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions; and, though delays 
afterwards occurred, the problem was at last faced with the 
intelligence and energy that its gravity demanded, and I feel 
that for his work on munitions we owe unmeasured gratitude 
to Mr. Lloyd George. The successful solution of the problem 
came when he applied to it that matchless energy which has 
enabled him to come through the great ordeal as England's 
most valued leader in her direst hour. 



THE MUNITIONS PROBLEM SOLVED 369 

For my unprecedented action I claim that no other course 
lay open to me. To organize the nation's industrial resources 
upon a stupendous scale was the only way if we were to con- 
tinue with success the great struggle which lay before us, and 
I feel that the result achieved fully warranted the steps I 
took. 



THE END 



APPENDIX 

TRANSLATION OF THE PREFACE 

Marshal French was Commander-in-Chief of the British Army 
at the beginning of the War. 

In 1914, as is well known, the Germans sought to profit by 
their numerical superiority and the crushing power of their ar- 
mament, to overwhelm the Allied armies in the West by an 
enveloping movement as rapid as possible. 

After having sought in vain a decision at the Marne, then at 
the Aisne and at the Somme, they continued the effort succes- 
sively at Arras, on the Yser, and at Ypres. 

In proportion as the imoccupied territory before them lessened 
on their advance to the sea, their blows fell with redoubled vio- 
lence, their reserves came into action, and numerous fresh army 
corps were brought into the line. The surrender of Antwerp also 
assured the enemy important available forces elsewhere. 

But already the Belgian Army, supported by French troops, had 
stopped the Germans on the Yser, from Nieuport to Dixmude. 
After having taken part in the actions on the Aisne the British 
Army had been moved north. Thus it was engaged progressively 
from La Bassee to Ypres, everywhere opposing the invasion. 

In brief, the Germans, after having vainly developed their 
efforts from the sea to the Lys, from the 15th of October, were 
compelled by the end of the month either to conquer at Ypres, 
or to see their manoeuvre definitely fail, their offensive in the West 
die, and the Coalition remain unshaken. 

Thus they were forced at Ypres to a desperate struggle to con- 
centrate their resources — ample heavy artillery well supplied 
with mimitions, reenforced by minenwerfers, and numerous fresh 
army corps. 

As for the Allies, they were compelled to receive the shock with 
limited effectives, a scarcity of munitions, and inadequate heavy 



372 APPENDIX 

artillery. Relief was impossible because of the paucity of troops, 
however long the battle might last. To cite a single instance, the 
first British corps was engaged from the 20th of October to the 
15th of November, in the midst of most violent attacks and in spite 
of formidable losses. 

But at the latter date the battle was won. The Allies had in- 
flicted a decisive check on the enemy ; they had saved the Channel 
communications, and by that had decided the fate and the future 
of the Coalition. 

If the close Union of the Allied Command and the bravery of the 
soldiers secured these glorious results, it was because Marshal 
French displayed the most perfect judgment, the most complete 
confidence, and the greatest energy, resolved to perish rather 
than to give way. 

Great Britain had found in him a great soldier. He had main- 
tained his army at the level of Wellington's. 

With feelings born of deep and ever-living memories I salute 
the valiant companion in arms of those hard days, and the glo- 
rious British flags of the Battle of Ypres. 

F. FOCH 
Marshal of France 



INDEX 



INDEX 



AbbevUle, 203, 204. 

Aircraft, and cavalry, for reconnais- 
sance purposes, 43, 44; range of, 
from Calais, 219. 

Aisne, the, reached by Allied troops, 
148; the valley of, 149, 150; Battle of, 
149, 152-77; withdrawal of troops 
from, 197; position of troops on, on 
Oct. 2, 1914, 199; British operations 
on, Oct. 5-Oct. 11, 203-16. 

Aizy, 154. 

Alfrey, Lieutenant, 122. 

Allenby, General E. H. H., instructions 
of French to (Aug. 21, 1914), 48; his 
reconnaissance, 61 ; his orders to con- 
centrate, 62; effective support given 
by, 66, 67; at Solesmes, 77; on Oct. 
28, 89; seizes bridges and advances 
near Fontaine Fauvel, 136; his cav- 
alry handled with vigour, 140; at 
Braine and Dhuizel, 148; instruc- 
tions to, Oct. 9, 204; magnificent 
work of, 208, 242, 266; instructions 
to, to make reconnaissance of the 
Lys, 209; memorandum concerning 
the London Scottish, 268. 

Allies, early hopes of offensive by, 33, 
35, 43, 47; disposition of their troops 
on Aug. 21, 1914, 47, 48; line of, 
on Aug. 29, 93; learn that the Ger- 
mans had sent force to eastern fron- 
tier, 93; position on Sept. 5, 111; the 
great accomplishment of, at the 
Marne, 141-43; their armies, con- 
trasted with the German Army, 142, 
143; plans in the West at close of 
First Battle of Ypres, 307-26; their 
grounds for confidence at the end of 
1914, 352-54; summary of their ac- 
complishment in 1914, 371, 372. 

Amiens, 32, 33. 

Ammunition, efforts of General French 
to secure increase of, 165, 166, 355- 



69; insufficient supply of, 245, 316, 
339, 350, 355-69; sent to the Dar- 
danelles, 319, 320, 350, 364, 365; of 
the Russians, 342-44, 348, 349; neg- 
lect of, by the British Government, 
355-69; General French's informa- 
tion regarding, 366-68. 

Ansell, Colonel, 77. 

Antwerp, menaced, 178, 179; plans for 
relief of, 182-86; siege and fall of, 
186, 196; criticism of operations 
about, 187. 

Armament, French urges increase of, 
165, 166, 339. 

Armentieres, 225, 226, 245, 289. 

"Armies," discussion of formation of, 
344. 

Army and Navy, joint action by, con- 
sidered, 166, 309-14, 349; why greater 
cooperation was not effected, 327, 328. 

Artillery, placed close behind the in- 
fantry fighting line, 12; field, position 
of, 132; Allies' first experience of 
"Jack Johnsons," 146; heavy, defi- 
ciency of, 165, 166, 360; heavy, range 
of, 219; heavy, arrival of, 293; in the 
French Army, 360. 

Artists' Rifles, the, 277, 301, 303. 

Asia Minor, the question of sending 
British troops to, 323. 

Asquith, Mr., interview with General 
French, 339; states that the British 
Army is supplied with ammunition, 
364. 

Aubers, 224. 

Aubers Ridge, 364. 

Augustovo, 234. 

Aulnoy, 125. 

Austria-Hungary, declares war on Ser- 
bia, 2. 

Austrians, driven across the San River, 
279. 

Avesnes, in war times, 68. 



376 



INDEX 



Bailleul, 211, 238, 245. 

Balfour, Arthur J., 366, 368. 

Basse ville, 129. 

Bavai, importance of, 66; scene at, 70. 

Bayonets, called for, by cavalry, 163, 
360. 

Beale-Browne, Major, 121. 

Belgian Government, message from, to 
General French, 45-47; decides to 
leave Antwerp, 178. 

Belgians, King of the, 43, 350-52; evac 
uate Brussels, 45; French's scheme of 
amalgamating Army of, with British 
Army, 350-52; training and effi- 

! ciency in, not so high as in the Brit- 
ish Army, 351; what the Army of, 
aecomplished in 1914, 371. 

Belgium, would never cooperate for her 
defence before the war, 8, 9; attempts 

j of French to secure defence of coast 
line of, 311-13; loss of, a misfortune, 
314, 318, 319. 

Ballot, 128. 

Berry-au-Bac, 160. 

Berthelot, General, 35. 

Berthen, 211. 

Bertie, Lord, General French's tribute 
to, 33; in the controversy between 
Lord Kitchener and General French, 
101. 

Bethune, 214. 

Beyers, General, 346. 

Binche, 54. 

Bleu, 211. 

Boers, War with, 345-47. 

Bois Grenier, 225. 

Bois I'Eveque, 53. 

Boitron, 129-31. 

Bombs, 362. 

Bonnet, First Corps Headquarters at, 
67. 

Boulogne in war times, 32. 

Bourg, 152, 153. 

Bradbury, Captain, 103. 

Braine, 148, 149. 

Breese, Lieutenant Lawrence, 362. 

Breteuil, 203. 

Bridges, Colonel, 187, 188, 350, 351. 

Bridoux, General, 160. 

Brie, Plateau de la, 119. 



British, the, failed to size up the situa- 
tion in Russia, 198. 

British Army, strength of, lay in un- 
derstanding between officers and 
men, 90, 337; disciplme of, 90, 91; 
memorandum concerning, issued by 
French on Sept. 10, 1914, 132, 133; 
its accomplishment at the Marne, 
143; General French's scheme of amal- 
gamating the Belgian Army with, 
350-52; training and efficiency in, 
higher than in Belgian Army, 351. 

Broome, Lord Kitchener's country 
place, 340. 

Brussels, evacuated, 45. 

Bucy-le-Long, 152, 154. 

Bulfin, General, 248, 255, 256. 

Bulgaria, 323, 349. 

Bussieres, 130. 

Buzancy, 147. 

Byng, General, at Battle of Ypres, 247, 
248. 

Bzura, the, 234. 

Cabinet, the British, perturbed by 
rumours, 336; French discusses situa- 
tion with, 341. 

Cambrai, 54. 

Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel D., 121, 
122. 

Carency, 352. 

Cassel, 246. 

Castelnau, General de, 147, 161, 165, 
201. 

Cavalry, and aircraft, for reconnais- 
sance purposes, 43, 44; French, work 
of, in Belgium, 45; keeps enemy in 
check, 86, 89; German, training of, 
126; calls for bayonets, 163; at the 
Aisne, 208, 209; on the Wytschaete- 
Messines Ridge, 208, 242; in Wyt- 
schaete village, 263; great work of, at 
Ypres, 266; trained to fight on foot, 
266, 267. 

Cavalry Divisions of British Army, 
composition of, 24, 25, 30. 

Cavan, General Lord, 256, 277. 

Cerizy, action at, 89. 

Chailly, 125. 

Chamigny, 137. 



INDEX 



377 



Changis, 131, 136. 

Channel ports, importance of, 157-59; 
would be endangered by fall of Axit- 
werp, 179; the threat to, 218, 219. 

Channel Tunnel, 159, 218. 

Charleroi, 59. 

Charly-sur-Marne, 136. 

Chateau of Hooge, 253. 

ChMeau-Thierry, in German hands, 
106. 

Chemin des Dames, 160, 164. 

Chermizy, 149. 

Chetwode, Brigadier-General, 89, 138. 

Chichester, Brigadier-General, 300. 

Chivalry in warfare, 345-47. 

Chivres spur, 149, 154. 

Christmas in the trenches, 344-46. 

Churchill, Winston, discusses with 
French joint action of Army and 
Navy, 166, 308, 309; injustice of at- 
tacks upon, 167; character, 308, 309; 
extracts of letters to French, 309-11, 
313; telegram from, Jan. 2, 1915, 317; 
not in accord with Kitchener's views, 
317. 

Clive, Major, 73, 279. 

Command of ground, chief value of, 
152. 

Commander, the responsibility of, 337. 

Communications, in Mons area, 55. 

Compiegne, 88, 148. 

Concentration, point of, for British 
forces, discussed, 4-7. 

Conde, importance of, 54. 

Conde Fort, 151. 

Conneau, General, 239, 240, 283. 

Coulommiers, 134. 

Council of War in Downing St., Aug. 5, 
1914, subjects discussed at, 3-5; of 
Jan. 9, 1915, 320, 321. 

Courtrai, 207, 262. 

Cracow, 198. 

Craonne, 160. 

Cunard, Lady, 2. 

Dalmatia, the question of sending Brit- 
ish troops to, 322. 

D'Amade, General, support given by, 
at Battle of Le Cateau, 80, 81; at- 
tacks at Peronne, 89. 



Dammartin, Headquarters at, 96. 

Dardanelles, the, 319, 320, 350, 304, 
365. 

Dawnay, Major Hugh, 86, 239, 278, 
279. 

Defence, greater relative power of, 144- 
47. 

Defensive and offensive war, new char- 
acteristics of, 11-13. 

Denmark, the question of sending Brit- 
ish troops to, 322. 

Derby, Lord, tribute to Lord Kitch- 
ener, 340. 

D'Esperay, General Franchet, super- 
sedes Lanrezac, 109. 

Despotism, unreliabOity of a, 198. 

Dhuisy, 136. 

Dhuizel, 148. 

Divided command, evils of, 237, 332. 

Dixmude, 283, 288. 

Domptin, 136. 

Done, 133. 

Doullens, 203. 

Douve, the, 249, 251, 281. 

Dover, in war times, 31. 

Drummond, General L. G., 62, 66, 67. 

Duff, Colonel Grant, 129. 

Durham, Earl of, 363. 

East Prussia, 198, 234. 

Egerton, 266. 

Eighth Royal Scots, the, 301, 303. 

Estaires, 208, 238. 

Expeditionary Force, the First, com- 
position of, 3, 4, 16-30; Staff, 5; the 
sailing of, 31-56. 

Farming in France, 36. 

Faujus, 122. 

Fere-en-Tardenois, 147, 202, 203. 

Fergusson, General Sir Charles, 66, 151. 

Festubert, 335, 336, 350, 364. 

Fifth French Army, position of, ex- 
tending from Dinant, 59; retreat of, 
69, 84, 89, 95, 96, 105, 106; throws 
enemy back, 107; on Sept. 6, 123. 

First Army Corps, composition of, 17- 
20; position of, Aug. 21, 1914, 48; on 
Aug. 23, 61; at Landrecies, 76; skil- 
ful withdrawal of, 83, 84; position of, 



378 



INDEX 



Sept. 8, 135; on Sept. 13 and 14, 153, 
154; on Sept. 17, 160; on Oct. 2, 199; 
arrival at Saint-Omer, 215; orders at 
Ypres, 230; line broken, Oct. 31, 256, 
257; line restored, 260; withdrawn, 
288-90; great services in the Battle of 
Ypres, 290, 291; losses in Battle of 
Ypres, 292. 

First Division at Vendresse, 153. 

FitzCIarence, Brigadier-General, 258- 
60, 284. 

FitzGerald, Brinsley, 365, 368. 

Foch, General, General French's esti- 
mate of, 201, 202; optimistic, 203, 
227, 239, 280; concerts with General 
French (Oct. 10), 207; favours inun- 
dation of the Yser, 246, 247; his view 
of the operations of Dec. 14-19, 332; 
interview with General French on 
Christmas Day, 344; Translation of 
Preface of, 371, 372. 

Fontaine Fauvel, 136. 

Foret de Crecy, 109. 

Foret de Mormal, 52. 

Foret de Nieppe, 207. 

Formidable, battleship, 317. 

Fosse Position, the, 58. 

Fourth Division, composition of, 25- 
27. 

France, territory of, violated by Ger- 
man troops, 2; and Great Britain, 
Staffs, understanding of, 8. 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, murder 
of, 1. 

Fraternization, German attempts at, 
345. 

French, Viscount, his conviction of the 
inevitableness of war 1, 7, 8; conver- 
sation with Prince Lichnowski, 2; in- 
timation given of his future com- 
mand, 2; conversation with Vicomte 
de la Panouse, 3; present at Council 
of War on Aug. 5, 1914, 3; views on 
concentration point, 6; had studied 
problems connected with possible 
war, 8; conversation with Emperor 
William, 9, 10; belief of, that Ger- 
many would violate Belgian neu- 
trality, 10; remarks on new tactics 
of modern warfare, 11-13; lands at 



Boulogne, 13, 31 ; his instructions be- 
fore leaving England, 13-15; arrival 
at Amiens and Paris, 32, 33; his im- 
pressions of President Poincare and 
General Joffre, 33-35 ; interview with 
General Joflfre, 35; his strictures upon 
General Lanrezac, 35-37; reaches 
Headquarters, 37; his eulogy of Sir 
James Grierson, 37, 38; and Sir Hor- 
ace Smith-Dorrien and Sir Herbert 
Plumer, 38; his statement of French 
dispositions west of the Meuse, 38- 
40; discussion with corps command- 
ers, 40-42; his general instructions to 
corps commanders, 42; his impres- 
sion of the British troops, 42, 43; 
on preparations preceding Battle of 
Mons, 43 ; on aircraft and cavalry for 
reconnaissance purposes, 43, 44; con- 
sults with Sir William Eobertson, 44; 
receives message from Belgian Gov- 
ernment, 45-47; his statement of dis- 
position of Allied troops on August 
21, 47, 48; interview with General 
Sordet, 68, 69; at Bavai, 70, 71; the 
question of Maubeuge, 72; directs 
retreat to Le Cateau-Cambrai line, 
72; receives telephone message from 
Major Clive, 73 ; issues orders for re- 
treat from Le Cateau-Cambrai line, 
74, 75; extract from despatch on ac- 
tion at Landrecies, 76; his despatch 
on the Battle of Le Cateau, 81; on 
the matter of despatches, 81, 82; 
conference with Generals Joffre and 
Lanrezac at Saint-Quentin, 83-85; 
orders move to line La Fere-Noyon, 
86; considers the Oise line, 87; con- 
siders with General Joffre Rheims- 
Amiens line, 88; learns of extent of 
English defeat, 88, 89; learns about 
Sixth French Army, 88, 91; talks 
with soldiers, 90, 91 ; gives directions 
to check enemy's advance, 93; his 
plans for defence of Marne, 94, 98, 
103; agrees to support the French, 
94; opposed by some subordinate 
commanders, 94; pressure exerted 
upon, to fight, 94, 95, 97, 113, 114; 
his view of his responsibilities, 96; 



INDEX 



379 



his conviction that disaster was 
averted by English troops, 96; re- 
quests independence of action, 96; 
difference with Lord Kitchener, 97- 
102; letter from Gallieni and answer 
thereto, 103-05; directs retreat to 
south of the Marne, 105, 106; his 
view of von Kluck, 107; receives 
Joffre's plan, 108, 109; his eulogy of 
Henry Wilson, 109, 110; orders an- 
other retirement, 110; plans for at- 
tack on Sept. 6, 111, 112, 116, 117; 
his view of the main cause of success 
in the Battle of the Marne, 112; his 
main object in writing the memoirs, 
112, 115, 116; on the danger of un- 
due interference of Government with 
the commander, 113, 181; his view 
of the enemy's situation and inten- 
tions on Sept. 6, 116, 118; Joffre's 
request to, for Sept. 7, 123-25; real- 
izes that the Germans were in re- 
treat, 124; his problem on the night 
of Sept. 7-8, 125-27; his course of ac- 
tion, 127; his memorandum issued on 
Sept. 10, 132, 133; did not call upon 
General Maunoury for assistance in 
crossing river, 138; talks to the 
troops, 138, 139; did not after the 
Marne and the Aisne understand 
full significance of new defensive 
weapons, 144-47; his conviction that 
trench line can be bent but not 
broken, 147; observations of, at the 
Aisne, 151, 152; not satisfied with 
his position (Sept. 15), 155, 156; in- 
terview with Maunoury, 156; his 
view of the importance of the chan- 
nel ports, 157-59, 218-20; efforts of, 
to secure increase of armament and 
ammunition, 165, 166, 355-69; dis- 
cusses with Winston Churchill joint 
action of Army and Navy, 166; re- 
pudiates attacks on Winston Church- 
ill, 167; communications with Joffre 
relative to disposition of British 
troops, 167-77; anxious about Ant- 
werp, 178, 179; troops of the north 
withdrawn from his command, 180; 
Rawlinson under his command, 182; 



full liberty of action granted to, from 
Oct. 10, 182; communications with 
Kitchener relative to relief of Ant- 
werp, 182-86; his criticism of coastal 
operations, 186, 187; communica- 
tions with Joffre, 189-96; optimistic 
of outlook, 197, 198; his opinion of 
Indian troops, 200, 201; his eulogy of 
Foch, 200, 201; explains his plans to 
Foch, 203; concerts plans with Foch 
(Oct. 10), 207; his eulogy of Pulte- 
ney, 209, 210; and Smith-Dorrien at 
Bethune, 214, 215; his Order of the 
Day (Oct. 16), 216, 217; on possibil- 
ity of despatching submarines in sec- 
tions, 218; on Oct. 15 thought the 
danger over, 220; his directions in 
accordance with agreement with 
Joffre, 222, 223; at Armentieres, 226; 
confronted by a problem,' 227-29; 
his instructions to Haig, 229, 230; 
astounded by numbers of Germans, 
232; issues Order of the Day (Oct. 
23), 233; looks to Russia for relief, 
233, 235; on divided command, 237, 
332; on the importance of Oct. 31 
and Nov. 1, 241, 265; tribute of, 
to the troops, 243; conference with 
Foch on inundation of Yser, 246, 
247; views situation with utmost 
gravity, 257; on the work of the Ox- 
fordshire Hussars and the London 
Scottish, 267-69; issues two Orders 
of the Day (Nov. 3), 271-75; on Vis- 
count Hampden and Lord Cavan, 
276, 277; on the Officers' Training 
School, 277; on the case of Hugh 
Dawney, 278, 279; interview with 
Foch (Nov. 8), 280; message from 
the Kmg and reply thereto, 280, 281 ; 
on visit of Lord Roberts, 286, 287; 
his tribute to the First Corps, 290, 
291 ; requests of, for Territorials, 297; 
his tribute to the Territorials, 300- 
06; desires cooperation with the 
Fleet, 308-14, 349; memorandum of 
Lord Kitchener to, Jan. 9, 1915, 314- 
17; his answer to Kitchener's objec- 
tions, 318-20; views of, about em- 
ploying British forces elsewhere than 



380 



INDEX 



in Prance, 321-26; returns to Eng- 
land, 336; his view of a commander's 
responsibility, 337; his impression of 
contrast between England and the 
Continent, 337, 338; arrival at Wal- 
mer Castle, 338; interview with Mr. 
Asquith, 339; his estimate of Kitch- 
ener as commander and as politician, 
340; at Broome with Kitchener 340; 
discusses situation with Cabinet, 
341; did not credit alarmist reports, 
343; discusses situation with Foch, 
344; discusses formation of "arm- 
ies," 344; views on fraternization 
and chivalry in warfare, 345-47; in- 
terview with General Joffre at Chan- 
tilly, Jan. 27, 347-49; his scheme of 
amalgamating the British and Bel- 
gian Armies, 350-52; his grounds for 
confidence at the end of the year, 
352-54; improvises new weapons, 
362; statement in regard to, in Mar- 
shal Foch's Preface, 371, 372. 

French, the, optimism of, 34; retreat of, 
near Franiere, 57-59; victory of, at 
Guise, 93. 

French Army, its accomplishment at 
the Marne, 143. 

Fretoy, 121. 

Galicia, 307. 

Gallieni, General, letter to General 
French, 103, 104. 

Gallipoli, the question of sending Brit- 
ish troops to, 323. 

George, King, message from, to Gen- 
eral French, and reply, 280, 281 ; re- 
ceives General French, 343. 

Germans, misapprehend the situation 
of affairs, 92, 106; aim to cut the Al- 
lied centre south of the Marne, 107, 
112; in a dangerous situation, 107; in 
retreat on Sept. 5, 116, 118, 124; re- 
treat of, in Battle of the Marne, 140, 
141; themselves threw away their 
chance of decisive victory, 141 ; rea- 
son for their change of plan, 141, 
142; their preparation for the great 
attack, 142; opportunities missed by, 
179, 219. 220; attempt of, to frater- 



nize, 345; summary of their accom- 
plishment in 1914, 371, 372. 

Germany, declares war against Aus- 
tria, 2; her system of mobilization, 7; 
north coast of, the question of send- 
ing British troops to, 232. 

Gheluvelt, 245, 246, 249, 265; taken by 
the Germans, 254, 255; retaken, 257, 
258. 

Gibbon, Sergeant-Major, 290. 

Givenchy, 335. 

Givenchy-les-La Bassee, 333, 335. 

Gough, General Hubert, 140; attacks at 
Saint-Quentin, 89; on Sept. 8, 131; his 
cavalry moves north from the Aisne, 
199; captures Mont des Cats, 208, 
209; captures Mont Noir, 209; on 
Oct. 30, 247, 248; on Oct. 31, 254, 
256, 266. 

Grand Morm River, 120, 121, 124, 125. 

Great Britain, declares war against 
Germany and Austria, 2, 3; and 
Prance, Staffs, understanding of, 8. 

Greece, the question of sending British 
troops through, 322. 

Grenades, 361, 362. 

Grenfell, Francis, 78. 

Grey, Sir Edward, favoured coopera- 
tion of Army and Navy, 311-14. 

Grierson, General Sir James, 7, 37, 38. 

Guest, Captam Frederick, 365, 368. 

Guise, Germans defeated at, 93. 

Haddon, Sh Charles, 165. 

Haig, Sir Douglas, views on concentra- 
tion point, 6; position of, on Aug. 
21, 1914, 48; retreats, 77; gauges the 
situation, 79; before the Allied offen- 
sive, 108; on the morning of Sept. 6, 
120; on Sept. 14, 153; example of his 
power of resource, 162; his instruc- 
tions at Ypres, 229, 230; on Oct. 31, 
254, 256, 257; skilful handling of 
forces by, 283-85. 

Haine River, the, description of the 
valley of, 49. 

Haldane, Lord, 8, 278, 297, 302, 305. 

Hamley, quoted from his Operations of 
War, 221. 

Hampden, Viscount, 276, 277. 



INDEX 



381 



Hankey, Major, 259. 

Hastiere, captured by the Germans, 
66. 

Hazebrouek, 207, 209. 

Henderson, Sir David, 33, 189. 

Hertfordshire Battalion, the, 276. 

Hertfordshires, the, 302, 303. 

High explosive shells, 356, 361, 366. 

Hindenburg, General von, 234. 

Holland, the question of sending Brit- 
ish troops to, 322. 

HoUebeke, 247, 248, 281, 285. 

HoUebeke-Wytscbaete Ridge, 329. 

Hondevilliers, 129. 

Honourable Artillery Company, the, 
301, 303. 

Hood, Admiral 328. 

Huguet, Colonel, at head of Mission 
sent to England by French Govern- 
ment, 6, 7; at SaLnt-Quentin, 83; 

' gives General French information 
about new French army, 91. 

Imperial Defence, Committee of, 1, 

157, 218. 
Imperial General Staff, General French 

as Chief of, 356. 
Impulse, the right, importance of, in 

battle, 221. 
Indian troops, 200, 271, 287, 289, 334, 

335, 347. 
Infantry, formation, in the Battle of 

the Marne, 132. 
Istria, the question of sending British 

troops to, 322. 
Italy, the question of sending British 

troops to, 322. 

Jerlain, 65. 

Joffre, General, General French's im- 
pressions of, 34; his characteris- 
tics, 35; conversation with General 
French, 35, 36; conference of, with 
French and Lanrezac at Saint-Quen- 
tin, 83; acknowledges help given by 
British, 87; anxious to take offensive, 
93, 94; urges the British Commander 
to stand and fight, 95, 97; his plan of 
offence, 108, 109, 111, 112, 116, 117; 
his orders of Sept. 4, 117, 118; his re- 



quest to General French for Sept. 7, 
124, 125; the greatness of his victory 
at the Marne, 143; after the Battle of 
the Marne, 144, 145; a military gen- 
ius, 161; note of French to, and re- 
ply, 167-73; communications with 
General French relative to disposi- 
tion of British troops, 167-77; his 
views of use of certain British troops 
at Antwerp, 181; communications 
with General French, 189-96; op- 
poses plan for cooperation of Army 
and Navy, 313; views as expressed 
Jan. 19, 1915, 324, 325; meetmg with 
General French at Chantilly, Dec. 
27, 347-49: his plan, 349. 
Jouy-sur-Morin, 125. 

Kazimirjev, Battle of, 234. 

Kemmel, 212. 

Kemmel Hill, 150, 263, 265. 

Kerr, Colonel Frederick, 256. 

Kitchener, Lord, 2; appointed Secre- 
tary of State, 5; views on concen- 
tration point, 6; controversy with 
General French, 97-102; ignorant 
of condition of the Army, 97, 114; 
communicates with Joffre directly, 

179, 180; interference of, in opera- 
tions in the field, a misfortune, 

180, 181; confusion of ideas due to 
proceedings of, 181, 182; grants full 
liberty of action to General French 
on Oct. 10, 182; communications 
with General French relative to re- 
lief of Antwerp, 182-86; telegram 
of, concerning Territorials, 296; ap- 
proves of cooperation of Navy, 311; 
memorandum of, Jan. 9, 1915, 314- 
17; answer to objections of, 318-20; 
greets French on latter's return to 
England, 336-38; French's estimate 
of, 340; and Broome, 340; communi- 
cations regarding reports about the 
Russians, 341, 342. 

Kluck, General von, General French's 
view of, 107; why he retreated at the 
Marne, 141, 142. 

Kozienice, 234. 

Kruiseij, 246. 



INDEX 



La Bassee, 225, 289. 

La Fere-Noyon line, 86. 

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, 131, 133, 136, 
137, 140. 

La Forge, 130. 

Lagny, 103, 121. 

La Haute Maison, 125. 

Lahore Division, the, 200, 237, 238, 347. 

Landrecies, attack on, 76. 

Langemarck, 283. 

Lanrezac, General, his ability as a gen- 
eral, 35-37; his orders to his troops 
near Mons, 47; offensive action con- 
trary to his plans, 58; his request of 
General French, 59, 60; French's 

' message to, 60; in conference with 
Generals Joffre and French at Saiat- 
Quentin, 83; superseded, 109. 

La Quinque Rue, 335. 

La Tretoire, 129, 130. 

Law, Bonar, 366, 368. 

Le Cas Rouge, 131. 

Le Cateau, 37; importance of, 55; Gen- 
eral French at, 70; Battle of, 80, 81, 
87, 88. 

Le Cateau-Cambrai line, 72-75. 

Le Gheer, 237. 

Le Gravier, 130. 

Le Mans, 95. 

Le Marchant, Colonel, 137. 

Lemberg, 234. 

Le Moulin du Pont, 130. 

Leveson, Major, 122. 

Lewis, Colonel, 362. 

Lichnowski, Prince, had prophetic 
feeling for the War, 2. 

LUle, 187, 207. 

Lisle, General de, 209, 251, 266. 

Lizy, 131. 

Lloyd George, Mr., 165, 166, 365, 368. 

Lodz, 234. 

Lomax, General, 153, 255, 256. 

London Rifle Brigade, 304. 

London Scottish, the, 267-69, 300. 

Loos, 350. 

Lowicz, 234. 

Lushington, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129. 

Luxemburg, entered by German 
troops, 2. 

Lys River. 147, 150. 



MacDonald, Lord, 298. 

Macdonogh, Brigadier-General, tribute 
of General French to, 92. 

Machine guns, in modern warfare, 12, 
361 ; shortage of, 328, 329, 332. 

Marne, the. General French suggests 
defence of, 94, 98, 103; French's view 
of success in Battle of, 112; the area 
operated in by British army in Bat- 
tle of, 119, 120; Battle of, 120-40; 
the battle concluded on Sept. 10, 
140; fulfilment of German designs 
crushed at, 141; tactical aspects of 
the Battle of, 143. 

Marwitz, General von der, 228. 

Maubeuge, description of the fortress, 
53; temptation of, to General French, 
72. 

Maud'huy, General de, 201, 206, 287, 
331. 

Maunoury, General, to command new 
French army, 91 ; discusses situation 
with General French on Sept. 5, 111; 
his attempt to turn the German 
right flank, 147; interview with Gen- 
eral French on Sept. 15, 156. 

Maurice of Battenberg, Prince, 245. 

Maxse, General, 128. 

Maxwell, General, 163. 

May, Colonel, 277. 

McMahon, Lieutenant-Colonel, 283. 

Melun, 107, 108. 

Mendleston Farm, 329. 

Menin, 225. 

Menm road, 283-85, 290. 

Menteren, 211. 

Merris, 209. 

Merville, 207, 208. 

Mery, 136. 

Messines, 248, 249, 251, 252, 262-64. 

Messines Ridge, 251. 

Millerand, M., War Minister, 97-99. 

Missy, 151-53. 

Mitry, General de, 231, 236. 

Mobilization, German and French sys- 
tems of, 7. 

Moncel, 121. 

Monro, Major-General, 256. 

Mons, Battle of, preparations preced- 
ing, 43; disposition of troops on Aug. 



INDEX 



383 



21, 47, 48; description of country in 
neighborhood of, 49-55; importance 
of, 53, 54; disposition of troops on 
Aug. 23, 61 ; beginning of retreat be- 
fore, 63-65. 

Mons-Conde Canal, 50. 

Montague de Paris, 148. 

Mont des Cats, 208. 

Montgivrault, 136. 

Mont Noir, 209. 

Montreuil, 136. 

Moore, George, 362, 365. 

Morionville, General de, visits General 
French, 45. 

Moroccan troops, 164. 

Mortars, 362. 

Mortcerf, Headquarters at, 108. 

Munitions, efforts of General French to 
secure increase of, 165, 166, 355-66; 
insufficient supply of, 245, 316, 339, 
350, 355-69; sent to the Dardanelles, 
319, 320, 350, 364, 365; of the Rus- 
sians, 342-44, 348, 349; neglect of, by 
the British Government, 355-69; 
General French's memorandum re- 
garding, 366-68. 

Murray, Sir Archibald, in consultation 
with English and French command- 
ers, 7; Chief of General Staff, 17; at 
Sars-la-Bruyere, 62; at Bavai, 70, 71; 
orders issued by, on Sept. 10, 134, 135. 

Murray, Sir James Wolfe, 359. 

Namur, fall of, 66. 

Nanteuil, 136. 

Napoleon, campaigns of, developed 
unexpectedly, 221. 

Naval Transport Service, the, effi- 
ciency of, 40. 

Navy and Army, joint action by. con- 
sidered, 166, 309-14, 349; why great- 
er cooperation between, was not ef- 
fected, 327, 328. 

Nery, action at, 103. 

Neuve ChapeUe, 245, 334, 350, 358, 
359. 

Neuve-Eglise, 263, 264. 

New Army, the, 307. 

Nicholas, Grand Duke, 198, 234, 235. 

Niemen, the, 234. 



Nineteenth Brigade of Infantry, General 
French receives sanction to form, 45. 

Ninth Highland Light Infantry, the, 
301, 303. 

Nmth Lancers, 78, 79, 121. 

Nogent, 138. 

Notre Dame de Consolation, 333. 

Notre Dame de Lorette, 331, 333. 

Nouvron, 156. 

Noyon, Headquarters at, 86. 

Oesttaverne, 250, 251, 255. 

Offensive and defensive war, new char- 
acteristics of, 11-13. 

Officers' Training School, 277. 

Order of the Day (Oct. 16), 216, 217; 
(Oct. 23), 233; (Nov. 3), 271-75. 

Ordnance Board, the, 356. 

Orly, 130. 

Ostel Spur, 153. 

Ostend, 186, 187. 

Ourcq River, the, importance of, in 
considering Battle of the Marne, 
141, 142. 

Oxfordshire Hussars, 267, 300. 

Oxley, Brigadier-General, 300. 

Panouse, Vicomte de la, conversation 
with General French, 3. 

Paris, arrival of General French at, 83; 
in war times, 34; the safety of, the 
paramount thought of the French 
generals, 105. 

Peronne, action at, 89. 

Petit Bois, 329. 

Petit Morin River, 127-29, 134. 

Pless, Princess Henry of, 2. 

Ploegsteert, 249. 

Ploegsteert Wood, 281, 334. 

Plumer, Sir Herbert, favoured by Gen- 
eral French as successor to com- 
mand of Sir James Grierson, 38. 

Poezelhoek, 246. 

Poincare, President, optimistic spirit 
of, 33; visits General French at Fere- 
en-Tardenois, 202, 203. 

Poland, 307. 

Pont du Hem, 214. 

Pont Rigneul, 214. 

Pope, the, 344. 



384 



INDEX 



Positions, war of, 11-13. 

Prussian Guard, 282, 283. 

Pulteney, General W. P., commences 

formation of Third Corps, 96 ; on Sept. 

8, 131, 132; General French's eulogy 

of, 209, 210; brilliant work of, at the 

Aisne, 211, 212. 

Queen's Westminsters, the, 301, 303. 

Railways, in Marne area, 120; in Aisne 
area, 150. 

Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 163, 180, 182, 
205, 225, 243. 

Rebais, 133. 

Reconnaissance, aircraft and cavalry 
for, 43, 44. 

Refugees, 70, 85. 

Rennenkampf, 234. 

Repington, Colonel, 365, 368. 

Reports, inaccurate, 341-43. 

Rethel, 36. 

Reutel, 246. 

Reynolds, Captain G. F., 122. 

Rheims, 36. 

Rheims Cathedral, destruction of, 162. 

Richebourg, 335. 

Rifle, in modern warfare, 12, 361. 

Roads, in Mons area, 55; in Marne 
area, 119, 120. 

Robb, General, 33. 

Robert, General, 32. 

Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, visits 
the British front, 286, 287; death, 
287; Order on, issued by General de 
Maud'huy, 287, 288. 

Roberts, Lady Aileen (Countess), 286. 

Robertson, Sir William, 44, 359. 

Roozebeek, 250. 

Rouges Bancs, 334. 

Roumania, 349. 

Rozoy, 120. 

Russia, mobilizes against Austria, 2; 
news from, at time of Battle of the 
Marne, 146; political situation in, 
198; governing classes in, disloyal, 
198, 199; her achievement, 233-35; 
her armies an expression of her na- 
tional will, 235 ; the question of send- 
ing British troops to, 322. 



Russians, successes of, in East Prussia 
and Poland, 197, 198; characteristics 
of troops, 198, 234, 235; combined 
sense of great objectives with pa- 
tience, 234; large hopes of, 276, 279, 
307, 353; question concerning their 
ammunition, 341-44, 348, 349; col- 
lapse of, 350, 353. 

Sablonnieres, 129, 136. 

Saint-Eloi, 250, 251. 

Saint-Laurent, 333. 

Saint-Nazaire-Nantes line, 95. 

Saint-Omer, 209, 211, 215, 301, 302. 

Saint-Quentin, conference at, 83; threat- 
ened, 85, 86; Gough attacks at, 89. 

Saint- Yves, 249. 

Sambre River, description of, 51, 52. 

San River, the, 279. 

Saulchery, 136. 

Scheldt River, description of, 50, 51. 

Scherpenberg, 330, 331. 

Science, modern, and war, 361. 

Scott-Kerr, Brigadier-General, 76. 

Second Army Corps, composition of, 
20-23; position of, on Aug. 21, 1914, 
48; on Aug. 23, 61; in the retreat 
from Mons, 73, 77, 80, 84; position 
of, Sept. 8, 135; on Sept. 13 and 14, 
153, 154; on Oct. 1, 175; on Oct. 2, 
199; operations of, at the Aisne, 213- 
15; leadership of, lacking in deter- 
mination and vigour, 227. 

Second Division, at Ostel Spur, 153. 

Second Monmouths, the, 301, 304. 

Serches, 152. 

Sermoise spur, 149. 

Servia, the question of sending British 
troops to, 322. 

Seventh Division, composition of, 29, 
30. 

Shaw, General, 266. 

Shea, of the Indian cavaby, 86. 

Singh, Maharajah Sir Pertab, 287. 

Sixth Division, composition of, 27, 28. 

Sixth French Army, the, 88, 91, 111, 
123, 132, 138, 161. 

Smith-Dorrien, Sir Horace, succeeds 
Sir James Grierson in command, 16, 
38; position of, on Aug. 21, 1914, 48; 



INDEX 



385 



his movements on Aug. 23, 63; de- 
termines to fight, 78; ordered to con- 
tinue retreat, 84; retreats, 85; his 
counsel of despair, 94, 95; on Sept. 8, 
131; at the Aisne, instructions to, 
206; operations with Second Corps 
at the Aisne, 213-15; subject to fits 
of despondency, 214, 215; in opera- 
tions Dec. 14-16, 331. 

Smuts, General Christian, 346. 

Snow, General, 163. 

Soissons, 147-49. 

Solesmes, 77. 

Sordet, General, 48; his appearance and 
character, 68, 69; interview with 
General French, 69; support given by, 
at Battle of Le Cateau, 80, 81; at- 
tacks at Peronne, 89. 

Spiers, Captain, 57, 58, 60, 333, 334. 

Staff, British, constitution of, 5 ; British 
and French, imderstanding between, 
before the war, 8; criticisms of, 71. 

Submarines, on possibility of despatch- 
ing by sections, 218. 

Sykes, Colonel, 189. -\ 

Syria, the question of sendmg British 
troops to, 323. 

Tactics of modern warfare, 11-13. 

Tamines, 59. 

Tannenberg, 234. 

Tenth French Corps, retreats near 
Franiere, 58, 59. 

Tenth Liverpools, the, 301, 303. 

Territorial County Associations, 297, 
298. 

Territorial troops, the first units of 
(Oxfordshire Hussars and London 
Scottish), to fight m the War, 266; 
other units of, arrive, 276; entrance 
of, into the fighting line, 296; history 
of, 297-99; called for service, 299; 
importance of their assistance, 300, 
303; arrival in France and training, 
300-04; efficiency of, 301, 306; con- 
cerning individual units, 303, 304; as 
complete divisions, 304-06. 

Third Corps, formation of, begun, 96; 
brilliant work of, at the Aisne, 211, 
212. 



Third French Army, defeat of, 71. 

Thompson, Colonel C. B., 156. 

Thorne, Captain, 259. 

Thourout, 208, 224. 

Tolstoy, Leo, 221. 

Transport service, the, 40, 44. 

Trelon, 60. 

Trench feet, cause of, 294; conditions 
favouring, 294; various conditions of, 
294; preventative of, 295; precau- 
tions against, 295; treatment of, 296; 
number of victims of, 296. 

Trench warfare, 146, 147, 361, 362. 

Turkey, the question of attacking, 323. 

Urbal, General d', 238, 239, 329. 
Urvillers, action at, 89. 

Vailly, 154. 

Valenciennes, importance of, 54. 

Varreddes, 126. 

Vaughan, Colonel, 65. 

Vauxcere, 148. 

Vendresse, enemy surprised at, 153. 

Venizel, 152, 153. 

Verbranden Molen, 284. 

Vervins, 37. 

Vesle, the, 149. 

Vidal, General, 284. 

Vieille Chapelle, 208. 

Villers-Cotteret, action at, 103. 

Vitry-le-Fran?ois, 34. 

Viviani, M., 97. 

Volunteers, the, 297, 304. 

Wales, Prince of, joins the Army, 293. 

Wallon-Cappel, 208. 

Walmer Castle, 336, 338-40. 

Warneton, 209. 

Warsaw, 233; Battle of, 234. 

Warta, the, 234. 

Watkins, General, 200. 

Watson, Colonel, 1. 

Weapons, improvised by General 

French, 362. 
Werwiek, 209. 
Weston, Hunter, 334. 
Willcocks, General Sir James, 200, 244, 

271, 335. 
William, Emperor, conversation with 



386 



INDEX 



General French, 9, 10; at Courtrai, 

262. 
Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, 

278. 
Wilson, General Henry, 7, 332; French's 

eulogy of, 109, 110. 
Wing, Poor, 152. 
Wulverghem, 263. 
Wytschaete, 250, 262-64. 
Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, use of 

cavalry on, 208, 242, 261-64, 281. 

Yeomanry, 301. 
Ypres, 246, 252, 253. 



Ypres, first Battle of, Indian troops 
at, 200; stakes of, 219; first phase, 
222-40; second phase, 241-60; third 
phase, 261-81; fourth phase, 282-90; 
loss of First Corps in, 292; bad 
weather during latter part of, 293. 

Ypres, second Battle of, 350, 364. 

Ypres salient, 243, 245, 282, 288-90. 

Yser, the, inundation of, 246, 247. 

Zeebrugge, 186, 187, 314, 317, 319, 

327. 
Zonnebeke, 237. 
Zonnebeke Station, 246. 



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